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THE RISE OF RAIL-POWER 

IN WAR AND CONQUEST 

1833^1914 



THE 
RISE OF RAIL'POWER 

IN WAR AND CONQUEST 
1833— 1914 



WITH A BIBLIOGRAPHY 



BY 

EDWIN A. PRATT 

Author of "A History of Inland Transport,' 
"Railways and their Rates," etc. 



PHILADELPHIA 

J. B. LIPPINCOTT COMPANY 

LONDON— p. S. KING & SON, LTD. 
1916 



rpr 



Library Congress Card-16-26037 



U % C<7 



'2~ ^ ?) 67 n 
Ml 



p 



CONTENTS. 



CHAP. 








page 


I 


A New Factor 






I 


II 


Railways in the Civil War . 






• 14 


III 


Railway Destruction in War 






. 26 


IV 


Control of Railways in War 






40 


V 


Protection of Railways in War 






• 54 


VI 


Troops and Supplies 






62 


VII 


Armoured Trains . 






67 


VIII 


Railway Ambulance Transport 






. 81 


IX 


Preparation in Peace for War 






98 


X 


Organisation in Germany 






103 


XI 


Railway Troops in Germany 






122 


XII 


France and the War of 1870-71 . 






13^5 


XIII 


Organisation in France 






149 


XIV 


Organisation in England 






175 


XV 


Military Railways 






205 


XVI 


Railways in the Boer War . 






232 


XVII 
CVIII 


The Russo-Japanese War 
Strategical Railways : Germany . 

V 






260 
277 



vi CONTENTS. 

CHAP. % PAGE 

XIX A German-African Empire .... 296 

XX Designs on Asiatic Turkey .... 331 

XXI Summary and Conclusions .... 345 

Appendix 

Indian Frontier Railways . . . 357 

The Defence of Australia . . . 368 

Bibliography ...... 376 

Index . . . . 398 



PREFATORY NOTE. 

The extent to which railways are being used in the 
present War of the Nations has taken quite by surprise a 
world whose military historians, in their accounts of what 
armies have done or have failed to do on the battle-field in 
the past, have too often disregarded such matters of detail 
as to how the armies got there and the possible effect of good 
or defective transport conditions, including the mainten- 
ance of supplies and communications, on the whole course 
of a campaign. 

In the gigantic struggle now proceeding, these matters 
of detail are found to be of transcendant importance. The 
part which railways are playing in the struggle has, indeed — 
in keeping with the magnitude of the struggle itself — assumed 
proportions unexampled in history. Whilst this is so it is, 
nevertheless, a remarkable fact that although much has 
been said as to the conditions of military unpreparedness 
in which the outbreak of hostilities in August, 19 14, found 
the AlHes, there has, so far as I am aware, been no suggestion 
of any inability on the part of the railways to meet, at 
once, from the very moment war was declared, all the 
requirements of militar}^ transport. In this respect, in- 
deed, the organisation, the preparedness, and the efficiency 
throughout alike of the British and of the French railways 
have been fully equal to those of the German railways 
themselves. 

As regards British conditions, especially, much interest 
attaches to some remarks made by Sir Charles Owens, for- 
merly General Manager and now a director of the London 
and South Western Railway Company, in the course of an 
address he delivered at the London School of Economics on 

vii 



viii PREFATORY NOTE. 

October 12, 1914. He told how, some five or six years 
ago, he had met at a social function the Secretary of State 
for War, who, after dinner, took him aside and asked, 
" Do you think in any emergency which might arise in 
this country the railways would be able to cope with it 
adequately ? " To this question Sir Charles replied, " I will 
take my reputation as a railway man that the War Office 
could not concentrate men and materials half so fast as 
the railways could deal with them ; but the management 
of the railways must be left in the hands of railway men." 
We have here an affirmation and a proviso. That the 
affirmation was warranted has been abundantly proved by 
what the British railways' have accomplished in the emer- 
gency that has arisen. The special significance of the 
proviso will be understood in the light of what I record in 
the present work concerning the control of railways in war. 

Taking the railways of all the countries, whether friends 
or foes, concerned in the present World- War, and assuming, 
for the sake of argument, that all, without exception, have 
accomplished marvels in the way of military transport, 
one must, nevertheless, bear in mind two important con- 
siderations : — 

(i) That, apart from the huge proportions of the scale 
upon which, in the aggregate, the railways are being required 
to serve military purposes, the present conflict, in spite of 
its magnitude, has thus far produced no absolutely new 
factor in the employment of railways for war except as 
regards the use of air-craft for their destruction. 

(2) That when hostilities were declared in August, 1914, 
the subject of the employment of railways for the purposes 
of war had already been under the consideration of railway 
and military experts in different countries for no fewer than 
eighty years, during which period, and as the result of 
vast study, much experience, and many blunders in or 
between wars in various parts of the world, there had been 
slowly evolved certain fixed principles and, also, subject 
to constant amendments, a recognised and comprehensive 
organisation which, accepted more or less completely by 
the leading nations, with modifications to suit their national 



PREFATORY NOTE. ix 

circumstances and conditions, was designed to meet all 
contingencies, to provide, as far as human foresight could 
suggest, for all possible difficulties, and be capable of appli- 
cation instantly the need for it might arise. 

The time has not yet come for telling all that the railways 
have thus far done during the war which has still to be 
fought out. That story, in the words of a railway man 
concerned therein, is at present " a sealed book." Mean- 
while, however, it is desirable that the position as defined in 
the second of the two considerations given above should be 
fully realised, in order that what the railwaj/s and, so far as 
they have been aided by them, the combatants, have accom- 
plished or are likely to accomplish may be better understood 
when the sealed book becomes an open one. 

If, as suggested at the outset, the world has already been 
taken by surprise even by what the railways are known to 
have done, it may be still more surprised to learn (as the 
present work will show) that the construction of railways 
for strategical purposes was advocated in Germany as early 
as 1833 ; that in 1842 a scheme was elaborated for covering 
Germany with a network of strategical railways which, 
while serving the entire country, would more especially 
allow of war being conducted on two fronts — France and 
Russia — at the same time ; and that in the same year (1842) 
attention was already being called in the French Chamber 
to the " aggressive lines " which Germany was building in 
the direction of France, while predictions were also being 
made that any new invasion of France by Germany would 
be between Metz and Strasburg. 

If, again, it is found that a good deal of space is devoted 
in the present work to the War of Secession, criticism may, 
perhaps, be disarmed by the explanation that the American 
Civil War was practically the beginning of things as regards 
the scientific use of railways for war, and that many of the 
problems connected therewith were either started in the 
United States or were actually worked out there, precedents 
being established and examples being set which the rest 
of the world had simply to follow, adapt or perfect. The 
possibility of carrying on warfare at a great distance from 



X PREFATORY NOTE. 

the base of supplies by means of even a single line of single- 
track railway ; the creation of an organised corps for the 
restoration, operation or destruction of railways ; the 
control of railways in war by the railway or the military 
interests independently or jointly ; the question as to 
when the railway could be used to advantage and when it 
would be better for the troops to march ; the use of armoured 
trains ; the evolution of the ambulance or the hospital 
train — all these, and many other matters besides, are to be 
traced back to the American Civil War of 1861-65, and are 
dealt with herein at what, it is hoped, will be found not 
undue length. 

As for the building up of the subsequent organisation in 
Europe — Germany, France and England being the coun- 
tries selected for special treatment in relation thereto — 
this, also, has had to be described with some regard for 
detail ; and, incidentally, it is shown (i) that the alleged 
perfection of Germany's arrangements when she went to 
war with France in 1870-71 is merely one of the fictions of 
history, so far as her military rail-transport was concerned ; 
(2) that France learned the bitter lesson taught her by the 
deplorable and undeniable imperfections of her own trans- 
port system — or no-system — on that occasion, and at once 
set about the creation of what was to become an organisa- 
tion of the most complete and comprehensive character ; 
and (3) that the " beginning of things " in England, in the 
way of employing railways for the purposes of war, was the 
direct outcome of the conditions of semi-panic created 
here in 1859 by what was regarded as the prospect of an 
early invasion of this country by France, coupled with the 
then recognised deficiencies of our means of national defence. 

Military railways, as employed in the Crimean War, the 
Abyssinian Campaign, the Franco-German War, the Russo- 
Turkish War and the Sudan are described ; a detailed 
account is given of the use of railways in the Boer War and 
the Russo-Japanese War ; and this is followed by a descrip- 
tion of the strategical railways constructed in Germany 
for the purpose of facilitating war on the possessions of 
her neighbours. 



PREFATORY NOTE. xi 

Chapters XIX and XX deal with the building of railways 
which, whether avowedly strategical or what I have de- 
scribed as "economic-political-strategical," are intended to 
effect the purposes of conquest, with or without the accom- 
paniment of war. The former of these two chapters, which 
shows how, with the help of railways, German^' proposed 
to transform the African continent into an African Empire 
of her own, should be found deserving of notice, and especially 
so in view of the statements quoted (p. 311) as having been 
made by German officers in what was then German 
South- West Africa, to the effect that the main objective of 
Germany in going to war would be the conquest of Africa, 
" the smashing up of France and Great Britain " being 
regarded only as " incidents " which, followed by seizure 
of the possessions of the smaller Powers, would make 
Germany the supreme Power in Africa, and lead to the 
whole A^frican continent becoming a German possession. 

From Chapter XX the reader will learn how Germany 
proposed to employ railways for the furthering of her aims 
against, not only Asiatic Turkey, but Egypt and India, as 
well. 

The subsidiary articles on " Indian Frontier Railways " 
and "The Defence of Australia " have no direct bearing 
on that evolution of rail-power in warfare with which it is 
the special purpose of the present volume to deal ; but in 
the belief that they are of interest and importance in 
themselves, from the point of view of the general question, 
they have been given in an Appendix. The difficulties and 
other conditions under which the Sind-Pishin State Railway, 
designed to serve strategical purposes, was built to the fron- 
tiers of Afghanistan are unexampled in the history either of 
railways or of v/ar. As regards Australia, the gravity of the 
position there was well indicated by Lord Kitchener when 
he wrote of the lines running inland that they were " of 
little use for defence, although possibly of considerable 
value to an enemy who would have temporary command 
of the sea." 

At the end of the volume there is a BibHography of 
books, pamphlets and review or other articles relating to 



xii PREFATORY NOTE. 

the use of railways for the purposes of war. In the first 
instance this compilation was based on a " List of Refer- 
ences " prepared by the American Bureau of Railway 
Economics ; but, while many items on that list have here 
been omitted, a considerable number of others have been 
inserted from other sources. The Bibliography is not offered 
as being in any way complete, but it may, nevertheless, 
be of advantage to students desirous of making further 
researches into the matters of histor}^ here specially 
treated. 

The assistance rendered in other ways by the American 
Bureau of Railway Economics in the preparation of the 
present work has been most helpful. In the writing of the 
chapters concerning German designs on Africa, Asia Minor, 
etc., the resources of the well-arranged and admirably- 
indexed library of the Royal Colonial Institute have been of 
great service. I have, also, to express cordial acknowledg- 
ments to the General Managers and other officers of various 
leading railway companies for information given respecting 
the organisation of railways in this country for military 
purposes. 

T J IT I, xA EDWIN A. PRATT. 

London, beoniary, igio. 



The Rise of Rail-Power in 
War and Conquest 

CHAPTER I 

A New Factor 

While the original purpose of railways was to promote 

the arts of peace, the wide scope of their possibiHties in the 

y direction, also, of furthering the arts of war began to be 

realised at a very early date after their success in the former 

capacity had been assured in Great Britain. 

Already the canal system had introduced an innovation 
which greatly impressed the British public. In December, 
1806, a considerable body of troops went by barge on the 
Paddington Canal from London to Liverpool, en route for 
Dublin, relays of fresh horses for the canal boats being 
provided at all the stages in order to facilitate the transport ; 
and in referring to this event The Times of December 19, 
1806, remarked : — " By this mode of conveyance the men 
will be only seven days in reaching Liverpool, and with 
comparatively little fatigue, as it would take them above 
fourteen days to march that distance." 

But when, on the opening of the Liverpool and Man- 
chester Railway, in 1830, a British regiment was conveyed 
thereon, in two hours, a journey of thirty-four miles, which 
they would have required two days to accomplish on foot, 
far-seeing men became still more impressed, and began to 
realise that there had, indeed, been introduced a new 
factor destined to exercise a powerful influence on the 
future conduct of war. 

The geographical position of the United Kingdom led, 
in those early days, to greater importance being attached 

1 B 



2 THE RISE OF RAIL-POWER. 

to the conveniences of railways as a means of transport 
than to their actual strategical and tactical advantages ; 
and the issue by the War Office, in 1846, of a " Regulation 
Relative to the Conveyance of Her Majesty's Forces, their 
Baggage and Stores, by Rail," may have appeared to meet 
the requirements of the immediate situation, so far as this 
country was concerned. 

On the Continent of Europe, however, the rivalry of 
nations divided from one another only by a more or less 
uncertain or varying frontier, and still powerfully influenced 
by the recollection of recent conflicts, resulted in much 
greater attention being paid to the possibilities of the new 
development. 

The first definite proposals for the use of railways for 
strategical purposes were advanced, as early as 1833, by 
Friedrich Wilhelm Harkort, a Westphalian worthy who 
came to be better known in his native land as " Der alte 
Harkort." A participant in the Napoleonic wars, he had 
subsequently shown great energy and enterprise in the 
development of steam engines, hydraulic presses, iron-mak- 
ing, and other important industries in Germany ; he had 
been the first writer in that country to give an account — 
as he did in 1825 — of the progress England was making 
in respect to railways and steamships ; and he had, in 1826, 
placed a working model of a railway in the garden of the 
Elberfeld Museum. These various efforts he followed up, 
in 1833, by bringing forward in the Westphalian Landtag 
a scheme for the building of a railway to connect the Weser 
and the Lippe. Later in the same year he published " Die 
Eisenbahn von Minden nach Koln," in which he laid special 
stress on the value to Germany of the proposed line from a 
military point of view. With the help of such a railway, 
he argued, it would be possible to concentrate large bodies 
of troops at a given point much more speedily than if they 
marched by road ; he made calculations as to what the 
actual saving in time, as well as in physical strain, would 
be in transporting Prussian troops from various specified 
centres to others ; and he proceeded : — 

Let us suppose that we had a railway and a telegraph line 



A NEW FACTOR. 3 

on the right bank of the Rhine, from Mainz to Wesel. Any 
crossing of the Rhine by the French would then scarcely be 
possible, since we should be able to bring a strong defensive 
force on the spot before the attempt could be developed. 

These things may appear very strange to-day ; yet in the 
womb of the future there slumbers the seed of great develop- 
ments in railways, the results of which it is, as yet, quite beyond 
our powers to foresee. 

Harkort's proposals gave rise to much vigorous contro- 
versy in Germany. The ofticial classes condemned as 
" nonsensical fancies " his ideas, not only as to the useful- 
ness of railways for the conveyance of troops, but, also, 
as to the utility of railways for any practical purposes 
whatever ; and contemporary newspapers and periodicals, 
in turn, made him the butt of their ridicule. 

The pros and cons of the use of railways for military 
purposes were, none the less, actively discussed in numerous 
pamphlets and treatises. Just as, in France, General 
Rumigny, adjutant to Louis- Philippe, had already fore- 
shadowed the possibility of a sudden invasion by a German 
army reaching the frontier by rail, so, also, in Germany, 
in the words of one writer at this period, " anxious spirits 
shudder at the thought that, some fine spring morning, 
a hundred thousand Frenchmen, thirsting for war, will 
suddenly invade our peaceful valleys at bird-hke speed, 
thanks to the new means of locomotion, and begin their 
old game [das alte Spiel) over again." On the other hand 
there were military sceptics — such as the author of a pam- 
phlet " Uber die Militarische Benutzung der Eisenbahnen " 
(Berlin, 1836) — who, basing their calculations on locomotive 
performances up to that date, asserted that, although the 
railway might be of service in the conveyance of supplies, 
guns and ammunition, it would be of no advantage in the 
transport of troops. These, they declared, would get to 
their destination sooner if they marched.^ 

1 In 1847 one of the leading military writers in Germany pub- 
lished a pamphlet in which he sought to prove that the best -organised 
railway could not carry 10,000 Infantry a distance equal to sixty 
English miles in twenty-four hours. As for the conveyance of 
Cavalry and Artillery by train, he declared that this would be a 
sheer impossibility. 



4 THE RISE OF RAIL-POWER. 

The most noticeable of the various pubHcations issued in 
Germany at this period was a book by Carl Eduard Ponitz 
(" Pz."), which appeared at Adorf, Saxony, in 1842, under 
the title of " Die Eisenbahnen als militarische Operations- 
linien betrachtet, und diirch Beispiele erlaiitert." The 
writer of this remarkable book (of which a second edition 
was issued in 1853) gave a comprehensive survey of the 
whole situation in regard to railways and war, so far as the 
subject could be dealt with in the light of railway develop- 
ments and of actual experiences of troop movements by 
rail down to that time ; and he argued strongly in favour 
of the advantages to be derived from the employment of 
railways for military purposes. He even suggested that, 
in the event of an inadequate supply of locomotives, or of 
operations having to be conducted in a mountainous country 
where locomotives could not be used for heavy traffic, the 
troops might still use their own horses to draw the coaches 
and wagons along the railway lines, so that the men would 
arrive fresh and fit for immediate fighting at the end of 
their journey. 

Describing railways as the most powerful vehicle for the 
advancement of " Kultur " since the invention of printing, 
Ponitz showed how Belgium and Saxony were the two 
countries which had taken the initiative in railway construc- 
tion on the Continent of Europe ; and his references to the 
former country are especially deserving of being recalled, 
in view of recent events. He pointed to the good example 
which had been set by the " far-sighted and energetic " 
King of the Belgians, and continued : — 

Although, in a land torn asunder by revolutionary factions.^ 
many wounds were still bleeding ; and although the newly- 
created kingdom was threatened by foes within and without 
and could organise means of resistance only with great diffi- 
culty, there was, nevertheless, taken in hand a scheme for the 
construction of a network of railways designed to extend over 
the entire country, while at the present moment the greater 
part of that scheme has, in fact, been carried out. In this way 
King Leopold has raised up for himself a memorial the full 
value and significance of which may, perhaps, be appreciated 
only by generations yet to come. 



A NEW FACTOR. 5 

While Belgium was thus shown to have been setting a 
good example, the only railways which Prussia then had 
in actual operation (apart from the Berlin-Stettin and the 
Berlin-Breslau lines, which had been begun, and others 
which had been projected) were the Berlin-Potsdam and 
the Berlin-Magdeburg-Leipzig lines ; though Saxony had 
the Leipsig-Dresden line, and Bavaria the Niiremberg- 
Fiirth and the Munich-Augsburg lines. Ponitz, however, 
excused the backwardness of Prussia on the ground that 
if her Government had refused, for a long time, to sanction 
various projected railways, or had imposed heavy obliga- 
tions in regard to them, such action was due, not to pre- 
judice, but to " a wise foresight " — m.eaning, presumably, 
that Prussia was waiting to profit by the experience that 
other countries were gaining at their own cost. 

Having dealt with all the arguments he could advance in 
favour of the general principle of employing railways for 
military purposes, Ponitz proceeded to elaborate a scheme 
for the construction of a network of strategical lines serving 
the whole of Germany, though intended, more especially, 
to protect her frontiers against attack by either France or 
Russia. Without, he said, being in the secrets of inter- 
national politics, he thought he might safely presume that 
Germany's only fear of attack was from one of these two 
directions ; and, although the relations of the Great Powers 
of Europe were then peaceful, a continuance of those 
conditions could not, of course, be guaranteed. So, he 
proceeded — 

We have to look to these two fronts ; and, if we want to 
avoid the risk of heavy losses at the outset, we needs must 
— also at the outset — be prepared to meet the enemy there 
with an overwhelming force. Every one knows that the strength 
of an army is multiplied by movements which are rapid in 
themselves and allow of the troops arriving at the end of their 
journey without fatigue. 

In a powerful appeal — based on motives alike of 
patriotism, of national defence and of economic advantage 
— that his fellow-countrymen should support the scheme 
he thus put forward, Ponitz once more pointed to 
Belgium, saying : — 



6 THE RISE OF RAIL-POWER. 

The youngest of all the European States has given us an 
example of what can be done by intelligence and good will. 
The network of Belgian railways will be of as much advantage 
in advancing the industries of that country as it will be in facili- 
tating the defence of the land against attack by France. It 
will increase alike Belgium's prosperity and Belgium's security. 
And we Germans, who place so high a value on our intelligence, 
and are scarcely 5^et inclined to recognise the political inde- 
pendence of the Belgian people, shall we remain so blind as 
not to see what is needed for our own safety ? 

Ponitz could not, of course, anticipate in 1842 that the 
time would come when his country, acting to the full on 
the advice he was then giving, would have her strategic 
railways, not only to the French and the Russian, but, also, 
to the Belgian frontier, and would use those in the last- 
mentioned direction to crush remorselessly the little nation 
concerning which he himself was using words of such gener- 
ous sympathy and approbation. 

The ideas and proposals put forward by Ponitz (of whose 
work a French translation, under the title of " Essai sur 
les Chemins de Fer, consideres commes lignes d'operations 
militaires," was published by L. A. Unger in Paris, in 1844) 
did much to stimulate the discussion of the general question, 
while the military authorities of Germany were moved to 
make investigations into it on their own account, there 
being issued in Berlin, about 1848 or 1850, a " Survey of the 
Traffic and Equipment of German and of neighbouring 
foreign Railways for military purposes, based on informa- 
tion collected by the Great General Staff." ^ 

In France, also, there were those w^ho, quite early in the 
days of the new means of transport, predicted the impor- 
tant service it was likely to render for the purposes of war 
no less than for those of peace. 

General Lamarque declared in the French Chamber of 
Deputies in 1832, or 1833, that the strategical use of rail- 
ways would lead to " a revolution in military science as 

^ " Uebersicht des Verkehrs und der Betriebsmittel aiif den 
inlandischen und den benachbarten auslandischen Eisenbahnen 
fiir militarischen Zwecke ; nach dem beim grossen Generalstabe 
vorhanden Materialen zusammen gestellt." 



A NEW FACTOR. 7 

great as that which had been brought about by the use of 
gunpowder." 

At the sitting of the Chamber on May 25, 1833, M. de 
Berigny, in urging the " incontestable " importance of 
railways, said : — 

From the point of view of national defence, what advan- 
tages do they not present ! An army, with all its material, 
could, in a few days, be transported from the north to the south, 
, from the east to the west, of France. If a country could thus 
speedily carry considerable masses of troops to any given point 
on its frontiers, would it not become invincible, and would it 
not, also, be in a position to effect great economies in its military 
expenditure ? 

In a further debate on June 8, 1837, M. Dufaure declared 
that railways had a greater mission to fulfil than that of 
offering facilities to industry or than that of conferring 
benefits on private interests. Was it a matter of no account, 
he asked, that they should be able in one night to send 
troops to all the frontiers of France, from Paris to the 
banks of the Rhine, from Lyons to the foot of the Alps, 
with an assurance of their arriving fresh and ready for 
combat ? 

Then, in 1842, M. Marschall, advocating the construction 
of a line from Paris to Strasburg, predicted that any new 
invasion of France by Germany would most probably be 
attempted between Metz and Strasburg. He further said : — 

It is there that the German Confederation is converging a 
formidable system of railways from Cologne, Mayence and 
Mannheim. . . . Twenty-four hours will suffice for our neigh- 
bours to concentrate on the Rhine the forces of Prussia, Austria 
and the Confederation, and on the morrow an army of 400,000 
men could invade our territory by that breach of forty leagues 
between Thionville and Lauterburg, which are the outposts of 
Strasburg and Metz. Three months later, the reserve system 
organised in Prussia and in some of the other German States 
would allow of a second Army being sent of equal force to the 
other. The title of " aggressive lines " given by our neigh- 
bours to these railways leave us with no room for doubt as to 
their intentions. Studies for an expedition against Paris by 
way of Lorraine and Champagne can hardly be regarded as 
indicative of a sentiment of fraternity. 



8 THE RISE OF RAIL-POWER. 

France, however, had no inchnation at that time to build 
railways designed to serve military purposes, whether 
from the point of view of aggression or even from that 
of national defence ; so that in a letter to his brother Lud- 
wig, written April 13, 1844, von Moltke, then a member 
of the General Staff of the Fourth Army Corps of the Prussian 
Army, declared that whilst Germany was building railways, 
the French Chamber was only discussing them. This was 
so far the case that when, later on, Germany had nearly 
3,300 miles of railway France was operating only a little 
over 1,000 miles. 

Apart from the experiences, on quite a small scale, which 
had been obtained on the Liverpool and Manchester Railway, 
the earliest example of what railways could do in the trans- 
port of large bodies of troops was afforded in 1846, when 
Prussia's Sixth Army Corps — consisting of over 12,000 men, 
together with horses, guns, road vehicles and ammunition — 
was moved by rail, upon two lines, to Cracow. In 1849 ^ 
Russian corps of 30,000 men, with all its equipment, was 
taken by rail from its cantonments in Poland to Coding, 
Moravia, whence it effected a junction with the Austrian 
army. There was, also, a certain movement of German 
troops by rail to Schleswig-Holstein in the troubles of 
1848-50 ; but of greater importance than these other 
instances was the transport of an Austrian army of 75,000 
men, 8,000 horses and 1,000 vehicles from Vienna and 
Hungary to the Silesian frontier in the early winter of 1850. 

It is true that, owing to the combined disadvantages of 
single-line railways, inadequate staff and rolling stock, un- 
favourable weather, lack of previous preparations and of 
transport regulations, and delays from various unforeseen 
causes, no fewer than twenty-six days were occupied in 
the transport, although the journey was one of only about 
150 miles. It was, also, admitted that the troops could have 
marched the distance in the same time. All the same, as 
told by Regierungsrat Wernekke,^ the movement of so large 
a body of troops by rail at all was regarded as especially 

1 " DieMitwirkungderEisenbahnan den KriegeninMitteleuropa." 
" Archiv fiir Eisenbahnwesen," Juli und August, 1912. 



A NEW FACTOR. 9 

instructive. It was the cause of greater attention being 
paid to the use of raihvays for mihtary purposes, while it 
further led (i) to the drawing up, in May, 1851, of a scheme 
for the construction throughout the Austrian monarchy of 
railways from the special point of view of strategical require- 
ments ; and (2) to a reorganisation of the methods hitherto 
adopted for the transport of troops by rail, the result being 
that the next considerable movement in Austria — ^in the 
year 1853 — ^was conducted with " unprecedented regu- 
larity and efficiency," and this, also, without any cessation 
of the ordinary traffic of the lines concerned. 

In 1 85 1 a further striking object lesson of the usefulness 
of railways was afforded by the moving of a division of 
14,500 men, with nearly 2,000 horses, 48 guns and 464 
vehicles, from Cracow to Hradish, a distance of 187 miles, in 
two days. Reckoning that a large column of troops, with 
all its impedimenta, would march twelve miles per day, 
and allowing for one day's rest in seven, the movement 
would, in this instance, have occupied fifteen days by road 
instead of two days by rail. 

It was in the Italiati campaign of iS^g that railways first 
played a conspicuous part in actual warfare, both stra- 
tegically and tactically. " In this campaign," said Major 
Millar, R.A., V.C, of the Topographical Staff, in two lectures 
delivered by him at the Royal United Service Institution in 
1S61 1— 

Railways assisted the ordinary means of locomotion hitherto 
employed by armies. By them thousands of men were carried 
daily through France to Toulon, Marseilles, or the foot of Mont 
Cenis ; by them troops were hastened up to the very fields of 
battle ; and by them injured men were brought swiftly back 
to the hospitals, stiU groaning in the first agony of their wounds. 
Moreover, the railway cuttings, embankments and bridges 
presented features of importance equal or superior to the ordi- 
nary accidents of the ground, and the possession of which was 
hotly contested. If you go to Magenta you will see, close to 
the railway platform on which you alight, an excavation full 
of rough mounds and simple black crosses, erected to mark 

1 " Journal of the Royal United Service Institution," vol. v, 
pp. 269-308. London, 1861. 



10 THE RISE OF RAIL-POWER. 

the resting-places of many hundred men who fell in the great 
fight. This first employment of railways in close connection 
with vast military operations would alone be enough to give 
a distinction to this campaign in military history. 

The French railways, especially, attained a remarkable 
degree of success. In eighty-six days — from April 19 to 
July 15 — they transported an aggregate of 604,000 men 
and over 129,000 horses, including nearly 228,000 men and 
37,000 horses sent to Culox, Marseilles, Toulon, Grenoble 
and Aix by hnes in the south-east. The greatest movements 
took place during the ten days from April 20 to April 30, 
when the Paris-Lyons Company, without interrupting the 
ordinary traffic, conveyed an average per day of 8,421 men 
and 512 horses. On April 25, a maximum of 12,138 men 
and 655 horses was attained. During the eighty-six days 
there were run on the lines of the same company a total of 
2,636 trains, including 253 military specials. It was 
estimated that the 75,966 men and 4,469 horses transported 
by rail from Paris to the Mediterranean or to the frontiers 
of the Kingdom of Sardinia between April 20 and April 30 
would have taken sixty days to make the journey by road. 
In effect, the rate of transit by rail was six times greater than 
the rate of progress by marching would have been, and 
this, again, was about double as fast as the best achievement 
recorded up to that time on the German railways. The 
Chasseurs de Vincennes are described as leaving the station 
at Turin full of vigour and activity, and with none of the 
fatigue or the reduction in numbers which would have 
occurred had they made the journey by road. 

As against, however, the advantage thus gained by the 
quicker transport of the French troops to the seat of war, 
due to the successful manner in which the railways were 
operated, there had to be set some serious defects in adminis- 
trative organisation. When the men got to the end of their 
rail journey there was a more or less prolonged waiting for 
the food and other necessaries which were to follow. There 
were grave deficiencies, also, in the dispatch of the subse- 
quent supphes. On June 25, the day after the defeat of 



A NEW FACTOR. ii 

the Austrians, the French troops had no provisions at all 
for twenty-four hours, except some biscuits whicli were so 
mouldy that no one could eat them. Their horses, also, 
were without fodder. In these circumstances it was im- 
possible to follow up the Austrians in their retreat beyond 
the Mincio. 

Thus the efficiency of the French railways was to a large 
extent negatived by the inefficiency of the military adminis- 
tration ; and in these respects France had a foretaste, in 
1859, of experiences to be repeated on a much graver scale 
in the Franco-German War of 1870-71. 

As regards the Austrians, they improved but little on 
their admittedly poor performance in 1850, in spite of the 
lessons they appeared to have learned as the result of their 
experiences on that occasion. Government and railways 
were alike unprepared. Little or no real attempt at organ- 
isation in time of peace had been made, and, in the result, 
trains were delayed or blocked, and stations got choked with 
masses of supplies which could not be forwarded. At 
Vienna there was such a deficiency of rolling stock — acceler- 
ated by great delays in the return of empties — that many 
of the troop trains for the South could not be made up until 
the last moment. Even then the average number of men 
they conveyed did not exceed about 360. At Laibach there 
was much congestion because troops had to wait there for 
instructions as to their actual destination. Other delays 
occurred because, owing to the heavy gradients of the Sem- 
mering Pass, each train had to be divided into three sections 
before it could proceed. Between, again, Innsbruck and 
Bozen the railway was stillincomplete, and the First Corps 
(about 40,000 men and 10,000 horses) had to march between 
these two points on their journey from Prague to Verona. 
Notwithstanding this fact, it was estimated that they 
covered in fourteen days a journey which would have taken 
sixty-four days if they had marched all the way. From 
Vienna to Lombardy the Third Army Corps (20,000 men, 
5,500 horses, with guns, ammunition and 300 wagons) was 
carried by rail in fourteen days, the rate of progress attained 
being four and a half times greater than by road marching, 



12 THE RISE OF RAIL-POWER. 

though still inferior by one and a half times to what the 
French troop-trains had accomplished. 

On both sides important reinforcements were brought up 
at critical periods during the progress of the war. Referring 
to the attacks by the allies on Casteggio and Montebello, 
Count Gyulai, the Austrian General, wrote : — " The enemy 
soon displayed a superior force, which was continually 
increased by arrivals from the railway " ; and the special 
correspondent of The Times, writing from Pa via on May 21, 
1859, said : — 

From the heights of Montebello the Austrians beheld a novelty 
in the art of war. Train after train arrived by railway from 
Voghera, each train disgorging its hundreds of armed men 
and immediately hastening back for more. In vain Count 
Stadion endeavoured to crush the force behind him before it 
could be increased enough to overpower him. 

Then, also, the good use made of the railways by the 
allies in carrying out their important flanking movement 
against the Austrians at Vercelli gave further evidence of 
the fact that rail-power was a new force which could be 
employed, not alone for the earlier concentration of troops 
at the seat of war, but, also, in support of strategic develop- 
ments on the battle-field itself. Commenting on this fact 
the Spectatc'ur Militaire said, in its issue for September, 
1869 :— 

Les chemins de fer ont joue un role immense dans cette con- 
centration. C'est la premiere fois que, dans I'histoire militaire, 
ils servent d'une maniere aussi merveiileuse et entrent dans 
les combinaisons strategiques. 

While these observations were fully warranted by the 
results accomplished in regard to concentration, reinforce- 
ments and tactical movements by rail, the campaign also 
brought out more clearly than ever before the need, if rail- 
ways were to fulfil their greatest possible measure of utility 
in time of war, of working out in advance all important details 
likely to arise in connection with the movement of troops, 
instead — ^as in the case of the Austrians, at least — ^of neglect- 
ing any serious attempt at organisation until the need 
arose for immediate action. 



A NEW FACTOR. 13 

From all these various points of view the Italian cam- 
paign of 1859 marked a further important stage in the 
early development of that new factor which the employment 
of railways for the purposes of warfare represented ; thoug?i 
far greater results in the same direction were to be brought 
about, shortly afterwards, by the American Civil War of 
1861-65. Not only does the real development of rail-power 
as a new arm in war date therefrom, but the War of Secession 
was to establish in a pre-eminent degree (i) the possibility, 
through the use of railways, of carrying on operations at a 
considerable distance from the base of supplies ; (2) the 
need of a special organisation to deal alike with restoration 
of railway lines destroyed by the enemy and with the 
interruption, in turn, of the enemy's own communications ; 
and (3) the difficulties that may arise as between the mili- 
tary element and the technical (railway) element in regard 
to the control and operation of railways during war. To 
each of these subjects it is proposed to devote a separate 
chapter. 



CHAPTER II 
Railways in the Civil War 

Such were the conditions under which the War of Seces- 
sion in the United States was fought that without the help 
of railways it could hardly have been fought at all. 

The area of the military operations, from first to last, was 
equal in extent almost to the whole of Europe. The line of 
separation between the rival forces of North and South was 
fully 2,000 miles. Large portions of this region were then 
unexplored. Everywhere, except in the towns, it was but 
thinly populated. Civilisation had not yet progressed so 
far that an advancing army could always depend on being 
able to " live on the country." There were occasions when 
local supplies of food and forage were so difficult of attain- 
ment that an army might be wholly dependent on a base 
hundreds of miles distant from the scene of its operations. 

Of roads and tracks throughout this vast area there were 
but few, and these were mostly either indifferent or bad, 
even if they did not become positively execrable in wet 
weather or after a considerable force of troops had passed 
along them. In the low-lying districts, especially, the 
alluvial undrained soil was speedily converted by the winter 
floods into swamps and lakes. Further difficulties in the 
movement of troops were offered by pathless forests as large 
as an English county ; and still others by the broad rivers 
or the mountain ranges it might be necessary to cross. 

Apart from the deficient and defective roads and tracks, 
the transport facilities available for the combatants were 
those afforded by coastal services, navigable rivers, canals 
and railways. Of these it was the railways that played the 
most important role. 

II 



RAILWAYS IN THE CIVIL WAR. 15 

The American railway lines of those days had, generally 
speaking, been constructed as cheaply as possible by the 
private enterprise which— though with liberal grants of 
land and other advantages — alone undertook their pro- 
vision, the main idea being to supply a railway of some sort 
to satisfy immediate wants and to improve it later on, 
when population and traffic increased and more funds were 
available. The lines themselves were mostly single track ; 
the ballasting was too often imperfect ; iron rails of in- 
adequate weight soon wore down and got out of shape ; 
sleepers (otherwise " ties "), which consisted of logs of wood 
brought straight from the forests, speedily became rotten, 
especially in low-lying districts ; while, in the early 'Sixties 
lumber, used either in the rough or smoothed on two sides, 
was still the customary material for the building of bridges 
and viaducts carrying the railways across narrow streams, 
broad rivers or wide-spread valleys. 

All the same, these railways, while awaiting their later 
betterment, extended for long distances, served as a con- 
necting link of inestimable advantage between the various 
centres of population and production, and offered in many 
instances the only practicable means by which troops and 
supplies could be moved. They fulfilled, in fact, purposes 
of such vital importance from a strategical point of view 
that many battles were fought primarily for the control of 
particular railways, for the safeguarding of lines of com- 
munication, or for the possession, more especially, of impor- 
tant junctions, some of which themselves became the base 
for more or less distant operations. 

The North, bent not simply on invasion but on reconquest 
of the States which had seceeded, necessarily took the 
offensive ; the South stood mostly on the defensive. Yet 
while the population in the North was far in excess of that 
in the South, the initial advantages from a transport point 
of view were in favour of the South, which found its principal 
ally in the railways. Generals in the North are, indeed, 
said to have been exceedingly chary, at first, in getting 
far away from the magazines they depended on for their 
suppKes ; though this uneasiness wore off in proportion 



i6 THE RISE OF RAIL-POWER. 

as organised effort showed how successfully the lines of rail 
communication could be defended. 

In these and other circumstances, and especially in view 
of the paramount importance the railway system was to 
assume in the conduct of the war, the Federal Government 
took possession of the Philadelphia, Wilmington and Balti- 
more Railway on March 31, 1861. This preliminary meas- 
ure was followed by the passing, in January, 1862, by the 
United States House of Representatives, of " An Act to 
authorise the President of the United States in certain cases 
to take possession of railroad and telegraph lines, and for 
other purposes." 

The President, " when in his judgment the public safety 
may require it," was " to take possession of any or all the 
telegraph lines in the United States ; ... to take pos- 
session of any or all the railroad lines in the United States, 
their rolling stock, their offices, shops, buildings and all 
their appendages and appurtenances ; to prescribe rules 
and regulations for the holding, using, and maintaining of the 
aforesaid telegraph and railroad lines, and to extend, repair 
and complete the same in the manner most conducive to 
the safety and interest of the Government ; to place under 
military control all the officers, agents and employes 
belonging to the telegraph and railroad lines thus taken 
possession of by the President, so that they shall be con- 
sidered as a post road and a part of the military establish- 
ment of the United States, subject to all the restrictions 
imposed by the Rules and Articles of War." Commissioners 
were to be appointed to assess and determine the damages 
suffered, or the compensation to which any railroad or 
telegraph company might be entitled by reason of such 
seizure of their property ; and it was further enacted 
" that the transportation of troops, munitions of war, 
equipments, military property and stores, throughout the 
United States, should be under the immediate control 
and supervision of the Secretary of War and such agents as 
he might appoint." 

Thus the Act in question established a precedent for a 
Government taking formal possession of, and exercising 



RAILWAYS IN THE CIVIL WAR. 17 

complete authority and control over, the whole of such 
railways as it might require to employ for the purposes of 
war ; although, in point of fact, only such lines, or portions 
of lines, were so taken over by the War Department as were 
actually required. In each instance, also, the line or por- 
tion of line in question was given back to the owning com- 
pany as soon as it was no longer required for military pur- 
poses ; while at the conclusion of the war all the lines taken 
possession of by the Government were formally restored 
to their original owners by an Executive Order dated 
August 8, 1865. 

Under the authority of the Act of January 31, 1862, the 
following order was sent to Mr. Daniel Craig McCallum, a 
native of Johnstone, Renfrewshire, Scotland, who had been 
taken to America by his parents when a youth, had joined 
the railway service, had held for many years the position 
of general superintendent of the Erie Railroad, and was 
one of the ablest and most experienced railway men then 
in the United States : — 

War Department. 

Washington City, D.C., 

February 11, 1862. 
Ordered, That D. C. McCallum be, and he is hereby, appointed 
Military Director and Superintendent of Railroads in the United 
States, with authority to enter upon, take possession of, liold 
and use all railroads, engines, cars, locomotives, equipments, 
appendages and appurtenances that may be required for the 
transport of troops, arms, ammunition and military supplies 
of the United States, and to do and perform all acts and things 
that may be necessary and proper to be done for the safe and 
speedy transport aforesaid. 

By order of the President, Commander-in-Chief of the Army 
and Navy of the United States. • 

Edwin M. Stanton, 

Secretary of War. 

McCallum commenced his duties with the staff rank of 
Colonel, afterwards attaining to that of Brev.-Brig.-General. 
The scope of the authority conferred on him, under the War 
Department order of February 11, 1862, was widened a 
year later, when he was further appointed general manager 

c 



i8 THE RISE OF RAIL-POWER. 

of all railways in possession of the Federal Government, or 
that might from time to time be taken possession of by 
military authority, in the departments of the Cumberland, 
the Ohio, the Tennessee, and of Arkansas, forming the 
" Military Division of the Mississippi." 

The total mileage of the lines taken over by the Federal 
Government during the course of the war was 2,105, namely, 
in Virginia, 611 miles ; in the military division of the Missis- 
sippi, 1,201 ; and in North CaroHna, 293. Much more was 
involved, however, for the Federal Government than a 
mere transfer to themselves of the ownership and operation 
of these lines for the duration of the war. 

One of the greatest disadvantages of the American rail- 
ways at the time of the Civil War lay in their differences 
of gauge. The various companies had built their lines 
with gauges chosen either to suit local conditions or accord- 
ing to the views of their own engineers, with little or no 
consideration for the running of through traffic on or from 
other lines. There were, in fact, at that time gauges of 
6 ft., 5 ft. 6 in., 5 ft., 4 ft. 10 in., 4 ft. 9 in., 4 ft. 8| in. (the 
standard English gauge), and various narrower gauges 
besides. These conditions prevailed until 1886, when the 
companies adopted a uniform gauge of 4 ft. 8-J- in. 

During the Civil War the lack of uniformity was in full 
force, and military transport by rail was greatly complicated 
in consequence. More than one-half of the lines taken over 
and operated had a gauge of 5 ft., and the remainder had 
a gauge of 4 ft. 8^- in., except in the case of one short line, 
which was 5 ft. 6 in. As locomotives and rolling stock 
adapted to one gauge were unsuited to any other, the 
obligations falling upon the Director and General Manager 
of the Federal Military Railways included that of taking 
up the lines of certain companies which had adopted the 
5 ft. gauge, and relaying them with the 4 ft. 8^ in. gauge, 
so that the same rolling stock could be used as on lines 
connecting with them. 

Incidentally, therefore, the Civil War in America taught 
the lesson that the actual value of rail-power as influencing 
warfare in one and the same country, or on one and the 



l/RRATUM : 



RAILWAYS IN THE CIVIL WAR. 19 

same continent, may vary materially according to whether 
there is miiformity or diversity of railway gauge. 

In certain instances the lines taken possession of were 
in so defective a condition that it was imperatively necessary 
to relay them, apart altogether from any question of gauge. 
When McCallum was appointed General Manager of Military 
Railways for the Division of the Mississippi, the main army 
was at Chattanooga, Tennessee, and its supplies were being 
received from Nashville, 151 miles distant, over the Nash- 
ville and Chattanooga Railroad. This was necessarily the 
main line of supply during the subsequent campaigns from 
Chattanooga towards Atlanta, and from Knoxville towards 
South-western Virginia ; yet McCallum says of it, in the 
Final Report he presented to the Secretary of War in 1866 : — 

The track was laid originally in a very imperfect manner, 
with a light U-rail on wooden stringers which were badly decayed 
and caused almost daily accidents by spreading apart and 
letting the engines and cars drop through them. 

ji, In still other instances, lines which, though begun, were 
not finished, had to be completed ; in others new lines 
had to be constructed throughout, or extensive sidings 
provided ; so that once more we see that it was not then 
simply a question of the Federal Government taking pos- 
session of and operating an existing complete and efficient 
system of railways. 

Whatever, again, the condition of the lines when taken 
over, the railways of both combatants were subjected to 
constant attack by the other side with a view to the inter- 
ruption of communications, the destruction of railway 
track, railway bridges, rolling stock and other railway 
property being enormous. 

Reviewing the general situation at this time, McCallum 
says in his report : — 

In the beginning of the war military railroads were an experi- 
ment ; and though some light as to their management had 
been gleaned by the operations of 1862 and 1863, yet so little 
progress had been made that the attempt to supply the army 
of General Sherman in the field, construct and reconstruct 
the railroad in its rear, and keep pace with its march, was re- 
garded by those who had the largest experience, and who had 



20 THE RISE OF RAIL-POWER. 

become most familiar with the subject, as the greatest experi- 
ment of all. The attempt to furnish an army of 100,000 men 
and 60,000 animals with supplies from a base 360 miles distant 
by one line of single-track railroad, located almost the entire 
distance through the country of an active and vindictive enemy, 
is without precedent in the history of warfare ; and to make 
it successful required an enormous outlay for labour and a vast 
consumption of material, together with all the forethought, 
energy, patience and watchfulness of which men are capable. 

To meet the various conditions which had thus arisen, 
McCallum was authorised by the Federal Government to 
create two distinct departments, destined to bring about 
a still further development in the apphcationof rail-power to 
war by estabhshing precedents which the leading countries of 
the world were afterwards to follow more or less completely, 
according to their own circumstances and requirements. 

The departments were known respectively as the " Trans- 
portation Department," embracing the operation and 
maintenance of all the Hues brought under use by the army 
of the North; and' the "Construction Corps," which was 
to repair the damage done by wrecking parties of the enemy, 
maintain lines of communication, and reconstruct, when 
necessary, railways captured from the enemy as the Federals 
advanced. 

Concerning the Construction Corps, and the great work 
accomplished by it in keeping the lines open, details will 
be given in the chapter which follows. 

In regard to the Transportation Department, it may be 
of interest to state that this was placed by McCallum in 
charge of a General Superintendent of Transportation on 
United States Railroads in the Military Division of the 
Mississippi. For each of the principal Hues there was 
appointed a Superintendent of Transportation who, acting 
under the control of the General Superintendent, was held 
responsible for the movement of all trains and locomotives ; 
and these superintendents, in turn, had under their direc- 
tion one or more Masters of Transportation, whose business 
it was to be constantly moving about over the sections of 
line placed under their charge, and see that the railway 
employes were attending properly to their duties. 



RAILWAYS IN THE CIVIL WAR. 21 

At each of the principal stations there was an Engine 
Dispatcher who was required to see that the locomotives 
were kept in good order and ready for immediate use 
whenever required, to exercise control over the drivers and 
firemen, and to assign the requisite " crew " to each engine 
sent out. 

Maintenance of road and structures for each line (as 
distinct from the reconstruction work left to the Construc- 
tion Department) was in charge of a Superintendent of 
Repairs, assisted by such supervisors, road-masters and 
foremen as he needed to control and direct his working 
staff ; and maintenance of rolling stock was delegated to 
(i) a Master Machinist, responsible for repairs to locomotives, 
and (2) a Master of Car Repairs. 

These various officers were independent of each other, 
and all of them reported direct to the General Superinten- 
dent. The maximum force employed at any one time in 
the Transportation Department of the Military Division 
of the Mississippi (as distinct from the military lines in 
Virginia and elsewhere) was about 12,000 men. 

A sufficient staff of competent railwaymen for the opera- 
tion of the Military Railways was difficult to get, partly 
because of the inadequate supply of such men in the United 
States at that period, and partly because those still at 
work on railways not taken over for military purposes were 
unwilling to give up what they found to be exceptionally 
good posts ; but of the men whose services he was able to 
secure McCallum speaks in terms of the highest commen- 
dation. 

Having got his Department and Construction Corps into 
working order, McCallum had next to turn his attention 
to ensuring an adequate supply of locomotives and cars, 
with the necessary shops, tools and materials for keeping 
them in working order. Here the Secretary of War again 
came to his help, issuing, on March 23, 1864, an Order 
addressed to locomotive manufacturers in which he stated 
that Colonel McCallum had been authorised by the War 
Department to procure locomotives without delay for the 
railways under his charge, and proceeded : — ■ 



22 THE RISE OF RAIL-POWER. 

Ill order to meet the wants of the Military Department of 
the Government, you will deliver to his order such engines as 
he may direct, whether building under orders for other parties 
or otherwise, the Government being accountable to you for 
the same. The urgent necessity of the Government for the 
immediate supply of our armies operating in Tennessee renders 
the engines indispensable for the equipment of the lines of com- 
munication, and it is hoped that this necessity wiU be recog- 
nised by you as a military necessity, paramount to all other 
considerations. — By order of the President. 

In January, 1864, McCallum had estimated that he would 
recjuire 200 locomotives and 3,000 cars for the lines to be 
operated from Nashville, and towards this number he then 
had only 47 locomotives and 437 cars available. There 
was thus a substantial shortage which had to be made 
good ; but the manufacturers, inspired by "a spirit of 
zealous patriotism," responded heartil}/ to the appeal made 
to them, putting their full force on to the completion of 
further supplies. These were furnished with a speed that 
surpassed all previous records. 

Then, to maintain the locomotives and cars in good 
condition — ^more especially in view of the constant attempts 
made by the enemy to destroy them — extensive machine 
and car shops were built at Nashville and Chattanooga. 
Those at Nashville — the terminal station for 500 miles of 
railway running south, east or west — had, at times, as 
many as 100 engines and 1,000 cars awaiting repair. 

Next to that insufficiency of engines and rolling stock 
which hampered the movements of both combatants came 
the difficulty in the way of obtaining further supplies of 
rails, whether for new lines or to take the place of those 
which had either worn out or been so bent and twisted by 
the enemy that they could not be used again without re- 
rolling. For the Confederates, cut off by the advance of 
General Grant to the south and west from their sources of 
supply, the want of iron for new rails was declared to be a 
worse evil than was the lack of gold for the Federals. 

One expedient resorted to by the Federal Government, 
on finding they could not procure from the manufacturers 
all the rails they wanted, was to pull up the railway lines 



RAILWAYS IN THE CIVIL WAR. 23 

that were not wanted for military purposes and use their 
rails for relaying those that were. Altogether the rails 
on over 156 miles of track in Virginia and the Military 
Division of the Mississippi were thus taken up and utilised 
elsewhere. Later on the Federal Construction Corps 
erected at Chattanooga some " very superior " rolhng mills, 
equipped with all the latest improvements in the way of 
machinery and mechanical appliances ; though these mills 
did not actually get to work until April i, 1865. Their 
production of new rails during the course of six months 
from that date was 3,818 tons, this supply being in addition 
to nearly 22,000 tons which the Federal Government 
obtained by purchase. 

These details may convey some idea of all that was in- 
volved in the utilisation of rail-power in the American Civil 
War under such development of railway construction as 
had then been brought about. Great, however, as was 
the outlay, the forethought, the energy, the patience and 
the watchfulness spoken of by McCallum, the results were 
no less valuable from the point of view of the Federals, 
who could hardly have hoped to achieve the aim they set 
before themselves — that of saving the Union — but for the 
material advantages they derived from the use of the rail- 
ways for the purposes of the campaign. 

Some of the achievements accomplished in the movement 
of troops from one part of the theatre of war to another 
would have been creditable even in the most favourable of 
circumstances ; but they were especially so in view alike 
of the physical conditions of many of the lines, the inade- 
quate supply of rolling stock, and the risks and difficulties 
to be met or overcome. 

One of these achievements, carried out in September, 
1863, is thus narrated in an article on " Recollections of 
Secretary Stanton," published in the Century Magazine 
for March, 1887 :— ^ 

The defeat of Rosecrans, at Chickamauga, was believed at 
Washington to imperil East Tennessee, and the Secretary [of 
War] was urged to send a strong reinforcement there from the 
Army of the Potomac. General Halleck (General-in-Chief of 



24 THE RISE OF RAIL-POWER. 

the Army of the United States) contended that it was impos- 
sible to get an effective reinforcement there in time ; and the 
President, after hearing both sides, accepted the judgment of 
Halleck. Mr. Stanton put off the decision till evening, when 
he and Halleck were to be ready with details to support their 
conclusions. The Secretary then sent for Colonel McCallum, 
who w as neither a lawyer nor a strategist, but a master of rail- 
way science. He showed McCallum how many officers, men, 
horses, and pieces of artillery, and how much baggage, it was 
proposed to move from the Rapidan to the Tennessee, and 
asked him to name the shortest time he would undertake to 
do it in if his life depended on it. McCallum made some rapid 
caiculations, jotted down some projects connected with the 
mo ve, and named a time within that which Halleck had admitted 
would be soon enough if it were only possible ; this time being 
conditioned on his being able to control everything that he 
could reach. The Secretary was delighted, told him that he 
would make him a Brigadier-General the day that the last 
train was safely unloaded ; put him on his mettle by telling 
him of Halleck 's assertion that the thing was beyond human 
power ; told him to go and work out final calculations and pro- 
jects and to begin prehminary measures, using his name and 
authority everywhere ; and finally instructed him what to do 
and say when he should send for him by and by to come over 
to the department. When the conference was resumed and 
McCallum ,vas introduced, his apparently spontaneous demon- 
stration of how easily and surely the impossible thing could 
be done convinced the two sceptics, and the movement was 
ordered, and made, and figures now in military science as a 
grand piece of strategy. 

The feat thus accompHshed was that of conve3dng by 
rail 23,000 men, together with artillery, road vehicles, 
etc., a distance of about 1,200 miles in seven days. It was 
estimated that if the troops had had to march this distance, 
with all their impedimenta, along such roads as were then 
available, the journey would have taken them three months. 
By doing it in one week they saved the situation in East 
Tennessee, and they gave an especially convincing proof 
of the success with which " a grand piece of strategy " 
could be carried out through the employment of rail trans- 
port. 

In December, 1864, General Schofield's corps of 15,000 
men, after lighting at Nashville in the midst of ice and snow. 



RAILWAYS IN THE CIVIL WAR. 25 

was, on the conclusion of the campaign in the west, trans- 
ferred from the valley of the Tennessee to the banks of the 
Potomac, moving by river and rail down the Tennessee, 
up the Ohio and across the snow-covered Alleghanies, a 
distance of 1,400 miles, accomplished in the short space of 
eleven days. In 1865 the moving of the Fourth Army Corps 
of the Federals from Carter's Station, East Tennessee, to 
Nashville, a distance of '^^'j'^ miles, involved the employment 
of 1,498 cars. 

What, in effect, the Civil War in America did in furthering 
the development of the rail-power principle in warfare was 
to show that, by the use of railways, (i) the fighting power 
of armies is increased ; (2) strategical advantages unattain- 
able but for the early arrival of reinforcements at threatened 
points may be assured ; and (3) expeditions may be under- 
taken at distances from the base of supplies which would 
be prohibitive but for the control of lines of railway com- 
munication ; though as against these advantages were to 
be put those considerations which also arose as to destruc- 
tion and restoration, and as to the control of railways in 
their operation for military purposes. 



CHAPTER 111 
Railway Destruction in War 

One of the earliest and most obvious criticisms advanced 
against the use of railways in war was based on the vulner- 
ability of the iron road. The destruction of a bridge, the 
tearing up of a few rails or the blocking of a tunnel would, 
it was argued, suffice to cause an interruption in the trans- 
port of troops or supplies which might be of serious conse- 
quence to the combatants prejudiced thereby, though of 
corresponding advantage to the other side. By means 
of such interruption the concentration of troops on the 
frontier might be delayed ; an army might be divided into 
two or more parts, and exposed to the risk of defeat in 
detail ; the arrival of reinforcements urgently wanted to 
meet a critical situation might be prevented until it was too 
late for them to afford the desired relief ; a force advancing 
into an enemy's country might have its rail connection 
severed and be left to starve or to surrender at discretion ; 
invaders would find that the force they were driving before 
them had taken the precaution to destroy their own railways 
as they retreated ; or, alternatively, fines of railway con- 
structed to the frontier, and depended upon to facilitate 
invasion of neighbouring territory, might — unless destroyed 
— be of material service to the enemy, should the latter 
become the invaders instead of the invaded. 

While these and other possibilities — foreshadowed more 
especially in the controversies which the whole subject 
aroused in Germany in the 'Forties — were frankly admitted, 
it was argued that, however vulnerable railways might be 
as a line of communication, it should be quite possible either 
to defend them successfully or to carry out on them such 

26 



RAILWAY DESTRUCTION IN WAR. 27 

speedy repairs or reconstruction as would, generally speak- 
ing, permit of an early resumption of traffic ; though 
experience was to show that these safeguards could only 
be assured through a well-planned and thoroughly efficient 
organisation prepared to meet, with the utmost dispatch 
and the highest degree of efficiency, all the requirements 
in the way of railway repairs or railway rebuilding that 
were likely to arise. 

The earliest instance of an attempt to delay the advance 
of an enemy by interrupting his rail communications was 
recorded in 1848, when the Venetians, threatened with 
bombardment by the Austrians, destroyed some of the 
arches in the railway viaduct connecting their island city 
with the mainland. Then in the Italian campaign of 18 5g 
the allies and the Austrians both resorted to the expedient 
of destroying railway bridges or tearing up the railway 
lines ; although the allies were able, in various instances, 
to repair so speedily the damage done by the Austrians 
that the lines were ready for use again by the time they were 
wanted. 

It was the American Civil War that was to elevate rail- 
way destruction and restoration into a science and to see 
the establishment, in the interests of such science, of an 
organisation which was to become a model for European 
countries and influence the whole subsequent course of 
modern warfare. 

The destruction of railways likely to be used by the 
North for its projected invasion of the Confederate States 
was, from the first, a leading feature in the strategy of the 
South. Expeditions were undertaken and raids were made 
with no other object than that of burning down bridges, 
tearing up and bending rails, making bonfires of sleepers, 
wrecking stations, rendering engines, trucks and carriages 
unserviceable, cutting off the water supply for locomotives, 
or in various other ways seeking to check the advance of 
the Northerners. Later on the Federals, in turn, became 
no less energetic in resorting to similar tactics in order either 
to prevent pursuit by the Confederates or to interrupt their 
communications. 



28 THE RISE OF RAIL-POWER. 

For the carrying out of these destructive tactics use was 
generally made either of cavalry, accompanied by civilians, 
or of bodies of civilians only ; but in some instances, when 
it was considered desirable to destroy lengths of track 
extending to twenty or thirty miles, or more, the Confeder- 
ates put the whole of their available forces on to the work. 

At the outset the methods of destruction were somewhat 
primitive ; but they were improved upon as the result of 
practice and experiment. 

Thus, in the first instance, timber bridges or viaducts 
were destroyed by collecting brushwood, placing this around 
the arches, pouring tar or petroleum upon the pile, and 
then setting fire to the whole. Afterwards the Federals 
made use of a " torpedo," eight inches long, and charged 
with gunpowder, which was inserted in a hole bored in the 
main timbers of the bridge and exploded with a fuse. It 
was claimed that with two or three men working at each 
span the largest timber bridge could be thrown down in a 
few minutes. 

h^ Then the method generally adopted at first for destroying 
a railway track was to tear up sleepers and rails, place the 
sleepers in a heap, put the rails cross-ways over them, set 
fire to the sleepers, and heat the rails until they either fell 
out of shape or could be twisted around a tree with the 
help of chains and horses. But this process was found to 
require too much time and labour, while the results were 
not always satisfactory, since rails only slightly bent could 
be restored to their original shape, and made ready for use 
again, in much less time than it had taken for the fire 
to heat and bend them. A Federal expert accordingly 
invented an ingenious contrivance, in the form of iron 
U-shaped " claws," which, being turned up and over at each 
extremity, were inserted underneath each end of a rail, 
on opposite sides, and operated, with the help of a long 
wooden lever and rope, by half a dozen men. In this way 
a rail could be torn from the sleepers and not only bent but 
given such a spiral or corkscrew twist, while still in the 
cold state, that it could not be used again until it had gone 
through the rolling mills. By the adoption of this method, 



RAILWAY DESTRUCTION IN WAR. 29 

440 men could destroy one mile of track in an hour, or 2,200 
men could, in the same time, destroy five miles. 

The most effective method for rendering a locomotive 
unfit for service was found to be the firing of a cannon ball 
through the boiler. Carriages and wagons which might 
otherwise be used by the enemy, and could not be con- 
veniently carried off, were easily destroyed by fire. In one 
period of six months the Federals disposed of 400 in this 
way. Stations, water-tanks, sleepers, fuel and telegraph 
poles were also destroyed or rendered useless by fire or 
otherwise. 

In the first year of the war — 1861 — the Confederates 
gave the Federals a foretaste of much that was to come by 
destroying forty-eight locomotives on the Baltimore and 
Ohio Railroad, and making a complete wreck of 100 miles 
of the North Missouri Railroad track and everything thereon. 

Much more serious than this, however, from a strategical 
point of view, was the wholesale destruction carried out by 
the Confederates, in April, 1862, on the Fredericksburg 
Railway, connecting Richmond and Washington, the imme- 
diate result of the mischief done being to prevent an impend- 
ing combination between the Federal armies of the Potomac 
and the Rappahannock, neither of which could act without 
the other, while neither could join the other unless it could 
make use of rail communication. There was much that 
required to be done, for the Confederates had carried out 
their work in a most thorough-going fashion. Several 
indispensable railway bridges had been destroyed ; three 
miles of track had been torn up, the rails being carried 
south and the sleepers burned ; and wharves and buildings 
had been burned or wrecked. The whole transportation 
service, in fact, had been reduced to a state of chaos. 

At the urgent request of the Secretary of War, the work 
of restoration was undertaken by Mr. Herman Haupt, a 
railway engineer who had already distinguished himself 
more especially as a builder of bridges, and was now to 
establish a further record as the pioneer of those Construc- 
tion Corps of which so much was to be heard later on in 
connection with railways and war. 



30 THE RISE OF RAIL-POWER. 

In carrying out the necessary repairs the only help which 
Haupt could obtain, at first, was that of soldiers detailed 
from the Federal ranks. Many of these men were entirely 
unaccustomed to physical labour ; others were sickly, 
inefficient, or unwilling to undertake what they did not 
regard as a soldier's duties, while the Army officers sent 
in a fresh lot daily until Haupt's remonstrances led to their 
allotting certain men to form a " Construction Corps." 
Other difficulties which presented themselves included an 
insufficient supply of tools, occasional scarcity of food, and 
several days of wet weather ; yet the work advanced so 
rapidly that the Akakeek bridge, a single span of 120 ft,, 
at an elevation of 30 ft., was rebuilt in about fifteen working 
hours ; the Potomac Creek bridge, 414 ft. long with an 
elevation of 82 ft. above the water, and requiring the use 
of as much roughly-hewn timber as would have extended 
a total length of six and a half miles, if put end to end, was 
completed in nine days ; ^ and the three miles of track 
were relaid in three days, included in the work done in that 
time being the preparation of more than 3,000 sleepers 
from lumber cut down for the purpose in woods a mile and 
a half distant from the track. General McDowell sub- 
sequently said, concerning the Potomac bridge : — 

When it is considered that in the campaigns of Napoleon 
trestle bridges of more than one story, even of moderate height, 
were regarded as impracticable, and that, too, for common mili- 
tary roads, it is not difficult to understand why distinguished 
Europeans should express surprise at so bold a specimen of 
American military engineering. It is a structure which ignores 
all rules and precedents of military science as laid down in the 
books. It is constructed chiefly of round sticks cut from the 
woods, and not even divested of bark ; the legs of the trestles 
are braced with round poles. It is in four stories — three of 
trestle and one of crib work. 

While constructed in so apparently primitive a fashion, 
the bridge was. General McDowell further said, carrying 

* In May, 1864, when this bridge had been again destroyed, it 
was rebuilt, ready for trains to pass over, in forty working hours. 



RAILWAY DESTRUCTION IN WAR. 31 

every day from ten to twenty heavy railway trains in both 
directions, and had withstood several severe freshets and 
storms without injury. 

Thus early, therefore, in the more active phases of the 
Civil War, evidence was being afforded that, although the 
railways on which so much depended might be readily 
destroyed, they could, also, be rapidly restored ; and 
subsequent experience was to offer proofs still more remark- 
able in support of this fact. 

On May 28, 1862, Haupt was appointed Chief of Con- 
struction and Transportation in the Department of the 
Rappahannock, with the rank of Colonel. He was raised 
to the rank of Brigadier-General in the following year, and 
did much excellent construction and other work for the 
Government, though mainly in Virginia, down to September, 
1863. In his " Reminiscences " he relates that the supplies 
of repair or reconstruction materials, as kept on hand 
by the Federals, included the interchangeable parts of 
bridge trusses, in spans of 60 ft., and so prepared that, taken 
on flat cars, by ox-teams or otherwise, to the place where 
they were wanted, and hoisted into position by machinery 
arranged for the purpose, they could, without previous 
fitting, be put together with such rapidity that one of his 
foremen claimed to be able to build a bridge " about as fast 
as a dog could trot." When the Massaponix bridge, six 
miles from Fredericksburg, was burned down one Monday 
morning, a new one was put up in its place in half a day — 
a feat which, he says, led some of the onlookers to exclaim, 
" The Yankees can build bridges quicker than the Rebs 
can burn them down." In May, 1862, five bridges over 
Goose Greek which the "Rebs" had destroyed were recon- 
structed in a day and a half. In the following month 
five other bridges, each with a span of from 60 ft. to 120 ft., 
were renewed in one day. At the Battle of Gettysburg 
Lee's troops destroyed nineteen bridges on the Northern 
Central Railroad and did much havoc on the branch Hues 
leading to Gettysburg ; but the Construction Corps was 
hard at work on the repairs whilst the battle was still being 
waged, and rail communication with both Washington and 



J-^ 



THE RISE OF RAIL-POWER. 



Baltimore had been re-established by noon of the day 
after Lee's retreat. 

In some instances railway bridges iinderM^ent repeated 
destruction and reconstruction. By June, 1863, the bridge 
over Bull Run, for instance, had been burned down and 
built up again no fewer than seven times. Many of the 
bridges, also, were swept away by floods, and this even for a 
second or a third time after they had been rebuilt. Pre- 
cautions thus had to be taken against the destructive forces 
of Nature no less than against those of man. 

Haupt's pioneer Construction Corps in Virginia was suc- 
ceeded by the one set up on much broader lines by McCallum 
when, in February, 1864, he became General Manager of 
railways in the Military Division of the Mississippi. This 
corps eventually reached a total of ro.ooo men. 

" The design of the corps," wrote McCallum, in his final 
report, " was to combine a body of skilled workmen in each 
department of railroad construction and repairs, under 
competent engineers, supplied with abundant materials, 
tools and mechanical appliances." The corps was formed 
into divisions the number of which varied from time to 
time, in different districts, according to requirements. 
In the military division of the Mississippi the corps com- 
prised six divisions, under the general charge of the chief 
engineer of the United States military railroads for that 
military division, and consisted at its maximum strength 
of nearly 5,000 men. In order to give the corps entire 
mobility, and to enable it to move independently and 
undertake work at widely different points, each of the six 
divisions was made a complete unit, under the command of 
a divisional engineer, and was, in turn, divided into sub- 
divisions or sections, with a supervisor in charge of each. 
The two largest and most important sub-divisions in an}^ 
one division were those of the track-layers and the bridge- 
builders. A sub-division was, again, composed of gangs, 
each with a foreman, while the gangs were divided into 
squads, each with a sub-foreman.^ Under this method of 

^ A division, completely organised, consisted of 777 officers and 
men, as follows : — Division engineer, assistant engineer, rodman, 



RAILWAY DESTRUCTION IN WAR. 33 

organisation it was possible to move either the entire division 
or any section thereof, with its tools, camp requirements 
and field transport, in any direction, wherever and whenever 
needed, and by any mode of conveyance — rail, road, with 
teams and wagons, or on foot. 

To facilitate the operations of the corps, supphes of 
materials were kept at points along or within a short dis- 
tance of the railway lines, where they would be compara- 
tively safe and speedily procurable in case of necessity. At 
places where there was special need for taking precautionary 
measures, detachments of the corps were stationed in 
readiness for immediate action, while on important lines of 
railway Federals and Confederates alike had, at each end 
thereof, construction trains loaded with every possible 
requisite, the locomotives attached to them keeping their 
steam up in order that the trains could be started off 
instantly on the receipt of a telegram announcing a further 
interruption of traffic. 

At Nashville and Chattanooga the Federals built extensive 
storehouses where they kept on hand supplies of materials 
for the prompt carrying out of railway repairs of every 
kind to any extent and in whatever direction. 

On the Nashville and Chattanooga Railway itself the 
Construction Corps, from February, 1864, to the close of 
the war, relaid 115 miles of track, put in nineteen miles of 
new sidings, eight miles apart and each capable of holding 
from five to eight long freight trains, and erected forty-five 
new water tanks. 

clerk, and 2 messengers (6). Sub-division I : Supervisor of bridges 
and carpenters' work, clerk and time-keeper, commissionary (taking 
charge of transport and issue of rations), quartermaster (in charge 
of tools, camp equipment, etc.), surgeon, hospital steward, 6 foremen 
(i for each 50 men), 30 sub-foremen (i for each 10 men), 300 
mechanics and labourers, blacksmith and helper, and 12 cooks (356). 
Sub-division II : Supervisor of track, and remainder of staff as in 
Sub-division I (356). Sub-division III : Supervisor of water stations, 
foreman, 12 mechanics and labourers, and cook (15). Sub-division 
IV : Supervisor of masonry, foreman, 10 masons and helpers, and 
cook (13). Sub-division V : Foreman of ox-brigade, 18 ox-drivers, 
and cook (20). Train crew : 2 conductors, 4 brakesmen, 2 Iocg- 
motive engineers, 2 firemen, and cook (11). 



34 THE RISE OF RAIL-POWER. 

The reconstruction of this particular Hne was more 
especially needed iri connection with General Sherman's 
campaign in Georgia and the Carolinas — a campaign which 
afforded the greatest and most direct evidence up to that 
time alike of the possibilities of rail-power in warfare, of 
the risks by which its use was attended, and of the success 
with which those risks could be overcome by means of 
efficient organisation. 

In that struggle for Atlanta which preceded his still more 
famous march to the sea, Sherman had with him a force of 
100,000 men, together with 23,000 animals. His base of 
supplies, when he approached Atlanta, was 360 miles dis- 
tant, and the continuance of his communications with that 
base, not onlj/ for the procuring of food, clothing, fodder, 
ammunition and every other requisite, but for the transport 
to the rear of sick and wounded, refugees, freedmen and 
prisoners, depended on what he afterwards described as 
" a poorly-constructed single-track railroad " passing for 
120 miles of its length through the country of an extremely 
active enemy. Yet Sherman is said to have made his 
advance in perfect confidence that, although subject to 
interruptions, the railway in his rear would be " all right " ; 
and this confidence was fully warranted by the results 
accomphshed. 

Early in September, 1864, the Confederate General, 
Wheeler, destroyed seven miles of road between Nashville 
and Murfreesboro', on the Nashville and Chattanooga 
Railway, and in the following December Hood destroyed 
eight miles of track and 530 ft. of bridges between the 
same stations ; yet the arrangements of the Federal Con- 
struction Corps allowed of the repairs being carried out wdth 
such promptness that in each instance the trains were 
running again in a few days. 

The Confederate attacks on the Western and Atlantic 
Railway, running from Chattanooga at Atlanta, a distance 
of 136 miles, were more continuous and more severe than 
on any other line of railway during the war ; but, thanks 
again to the speed with which the repair and reconstruction 
work was done, the delays occasioned were, as a rule, of 



RAILWAY DESTRUCTION IN WAR. 35 

only a few hours, or, at the most, a few days' duration. 
One especially remarkable feat accomplished on this line 
was the rebuilding, in four and a half days, of the Chatta- 
hochee bridge, near Atlanta — a structure 780 ft. long, and 
92 ft. high. Hood, the Confederate General, thought still 
further to check Sherman's communications by passing 
round the Federal army and falling upon the railway in its 
rear. He succeeded in tearing up two lengths of track, one 
of ten miles, and another of twenty-five miles, in extent, 
and destroying 250 ft. of bridges ; but once more the work 
of restoration was speedily carried out, McCallum saying in 
reference to it : — 

Fortunately the detachments of the Construction Corps 
which escaped were so distributed that even before Hood had 
left the road two strong working parties were at work, one at 
each end of the break at Big Shanty, and this gap of ten miles 
was closed, and the force ready to move to the great break 
of twenty-five miles in length, north of Resaca, as soon as the 
enemy had left it. The destruction by Hood's army of our 
depots of supplies compelled us to cut nearly all the cross-ties 
required to relay this track and to send a distance for rails. 
The cross-ties were cut near the line of the road and man^^ of 
them carried by hand to the track, as the teams to be furnished 
for hauling them did not get to the work until it was nearly com- 
plete. The rails used on the southern end of the break had to 
be taken up and brought from the railroads south of Atlanta, 
and those for the northern end were mostly brought from Nash- 
ville, nearly 200 miles distant. 

Notwithstanding all the disadvantages under which the 
labour was performed, this twenty-five miles of track was laid, 
and the tmins were running over it in seven and a half days 
from the time the work was commenced. 

Concluding, however, that it would be unv/ise to depend 
on the railway during his further march to the sea, Sherman 
collected at Atlanta, by means of the restored lines, the 
supplies he wanted for 600,000 men, sent to the rear all 
the men and material no longer required, and then, before 
starting for Savannah, destroyed sixty miles of track be- 
hind him in so effectual a manner that it would be impos- 
sible for the Confederates — especially in view of their own 
great lack, at this time, of rails, locomotives and rolling 



36 THE RISE OF RAIL-POWER. 

stock — ^to repair and utilise the lines again in any attempted 
pursuit. It was, in fact, as much to his advantage now to 
destroy the railways in his rear as it had previously been 
to repair and rebuild them. 

All through Georgia, for the 300 miles from Atlanta to 
Savannah (where he was able to establish communications 
with the Federal fleet), Sherman continued the same tactics 
of railway destruction ; and he resumed them when his 
army, now divided into three columns, turned northward to 
effect a junction with Grant at Richmond. 

On this northward march, also, there was no need for 
Sherman to make a direct attack on Charleston. By 
destroying about sixty miles of track in and around Branch- 
ville — a village on the South Carolina Railroad which formed 
a junction where the line from Charleston branched off in 
the directions of Columbia and Augusta respectively — -one 
of Sherman's columns severed Charleston from all its sources 
of supply in the interior, and left the garrison with no 
alternative but to surrender. Commenting on this event, 
Vigo-Rouissillon remarks, in his " Puissance Militaire des 
Etats-Unis d'Amerique " : — 

Ainsi il avait suffi de la destruction ou de la possession de 
quelques kilometres de chemin de fer pour amener la chute 
de ce boulevard de rinsurrection, qui avait si Ipngtemps resiste 
aux plus puissantes flottes du Nord. Exemple frappant du 
role reserve dans nos guerres modernes a ce precieux et fragile 
moyen de communication. 

In the aggregate, Sherman's troops destroyed hundreds 
of miles of railway track in their progress through what 
had previously been regarded as a veritable stronghold of 
the enemy's country ; though meanwhile the Construction 
Corps had repaired and reopened nearly 300 miles of rail- 
way in North Carolina and had built a wharf, covering an 
area of 54,000 square feet, at the ocean terminus of the 
Atlantic and North Carolina Railroad in order both to 
facilitate Sherman's progress northwards, by the time of 
his reaching the lines in question, and to enable him to 
obtain supplies from the fleet. The railways, in fact, con- 
tributed greatly to the brilliant success of Sherman's cam- 



RAILWAY DESTRUCTION IN WAR. 37 

paign, and hence, also, to the final triumph of the Federal 
cause. 

The total length of track laid or relaid by the Federal 
Construction Corps during the continuance of the war was 
641 miles, and the lineal feet of bridges built or rebuilt was 
equal to twenty-six miles. The net expenditure, in re- 
spect alike to construction and transportation, incurred by 
the department in charge of the railways during their 
control by the Government for military purposes was close 
on $jo,ooo,ooo. 

From this time the interruption of railway communication 
became a recognised phase of warfare all the world over ; 
and, not only have numerous treatises been written on the 
subject in various languages, but the creation of special 
forces to deal alike with the destruction and the restoration 
of railways has become an important and indispensable 
feature of military organisation. These matters will be 
dealt with more fully in subsequent chapters ; but it may 
be of interest if reference is made here to the experiences of 
Mexico, as further illustrating the universality of practices 
with which, in her case, at least, no effective measures had 
been taken to deal. 

" How Mexican Rebels Destroy Railways and Bridges " 
was told by Mr. G. E. Weekes in the Scientific American 
for September 13, 1913, and the subject was further dealt 
with by Major Charles Hine in a paper on " War Time 
Railroading in Mexico," read by him before the St. Louis 
Railway Club, on October 10, 1913. The term " rebels " 
applies, of course, in Mexico to the party that is against the 
particular President who is in office for the time being ; and 
in the revolutionary period lasting from 1910 to 1913 the 
" rebels " of the moment found plenty to do in the way of 
destro3dng railways not only, as in other countries, in order 
to retard the advance of their pursuers, but, also, to spite 
the national Government, who control about two-thirds of 
the stock in the railways of the Republic. 

Altogether, the mischief done by one party or the other 
during the period in question included the destruction of 
many hundreds of miles of track ; the burning or the dyna- 



38 THE RISE OF RAIL-POWER. 

miting of hundreds of bridges, according as these had been 
built of timber or of steel ; and the wrecking of many sta- 
tions and over 50 per cent, of the rolling stock on the national 
lines. 

Concerning the methods adopted in the carrying out of 
this work, Mr. Weekes, who had the opportunity of seeing 
track and bridge destruction in full progress, says : — 

Up to the past six months track destruction had been accom- 
panied either by the use of a wrecking crane, which lifted sec- 
tions of rails and ties (sleepers) bodily and piled them up ready 
for burning, or by the slower process of the claw-bar, wrench 
and pick. But a Constitutionalist expert devised a new system, 

A trench is dug between two ties, through which a heavy 
chain is passed around two opposite rails and made fast in the 
centre of the track. To this one end of a heavy steel cable is 
hooked, the other end being made fast to the coupling on the 
engine pilot. At the signal the engineman starts his locomotive 
slowly backward, and as they are huge 220-ton " consolida- 
tions," with 22-inch by 30-inch cylinders, one can easily imagine 
that something has to give. And it does ! The rails are torn 
loose from the spikes that hold them to the ties and are dragged 
closely together in tlie centre of the road bed. The ties are 
loosened from the ballast and dragged into piles, while in many 
cases the rails are badly bent and twisted by the force applied. 
A gang of men follows the engine, piling ties on top of the line 
and leaving others beneath them. These are then saturated 
with oil and a match applied. In a short time the ties are 
consumed and the rails left lying on the ground twisted and 
contorted into all sorts of shapes and of no further use until 
after they have been re-rolled. 

' As for the bridges, those of timber were saturated with 
oil and burned, while in the case of steel bridges rows of 
holes were bored horizontally in the lower part of the piers 
and charged with dynamite, which was then exploded by 
means of fuses connected with batteries of the type used in 
Mexican coal mines. 

Another favourite method adopted for interfering with 
transportation by rail was that of attacking a train, com- 
pelling it to stop, taking possession of the locomotive, and 
burning the cars. 

There is no suggestion b}' either of the authorities men- 
tioned above of any well-organised Construction Corps in 



RAILWAY DESTRUCTION IN WAR. 39 

Mexico repairing damage done on the railway almost as 
quickly as it could be effected by the destroyers. Mr. 
Weekes believed, rather, that it would take years to re- 
store the roads to the condition they were in before the 
rebellion against President Diaz, and he further declared 
that it would cost the national lines of Mexico many milhons 
of dollars to replace the destroyed rolling stock, bridges, 
stations, etc. 



CHAPTER IV 
Control of Railv/ays in War 

Curtailment of the efficiency of railways during war 
may be due to friend no less than to foe ; and there have 
been occasions when, of the two, it is the friend who has 
caused the greater degree of trouble, hindrance and inter- 
ruption. 

These conditions have arisen mainly from three causes — 
(i) questions of control ; (2) irregularities in the employ- 
ment of railway material ; and (3) absence or inadequacy 
of organisation for military rail-transport purposes. 

When the use of railways becomes an essential factor 
in the conduct of war, it may appear only natural that the 
niilitary authority charged with the duty of furthering or 
defending national interests should, through the Govern- 
ment concerned, have power to command the transport 
facilities of all railway lines the use of which may be 
necessary for the movement of troops or other military 
purposes. 

Yet, while the soundness of the principle here involved 
is beyond dispute, there is much to be said as to the circum- 
stances and conditions under which a militar}^ control of 
railways should be exercised. 

It is, in the first place, especially necessary to bear in 
mind that the railway, as a means of transport, must needs 
be regarded from a point of view wholly different from 
that which would apply to ordinary roads. On the latter 
any sort of vehicle can be used, and there are, generally, 
alternative roads along which traffic can pass, in case of 
need. Railroads are not only available exclusively for 
vehicles constructed to run upon them, but the degree of 
their usefulness is limited by such considerations as the num- 

40 



CONTROL OF RAILWAYS IN WAR. 41 

ber of separate routes to a given destination ; the important 
matters of detail as to whether the hnes are single track 
or double track and whether they are on the level or have 
heavy gradients ; the number of locomotives and the amount 
of rolling stock available; the extent of the station and 
siding accommodation ; the provision or non-provision 
of adequate facilities for loading and unloading ; and, in 
war time, the damage or destruction of a particular line 
or lines by the enemy. The amount of traffic it is possible 
to convey between certain points in a given time may 
thus be wholly controlled by the physical conditions of 
the railway concerned, and such conditions may be incap- 
able of modification by the railway staffs, in case of a sudden 
emergency, however great their desire to do everything 
that is in their power. 

In the next place, all these physical conditions may vary 
on different railway systems, and even on different sections 
of the same system. It does not, therefore, necessarily 
follow that military requirements which can be complied 
with on one line or in one district can be responded to as 
readily, if at all, under another and totally different set 
of conditions elsewhere ; though it is conceivable that a 
military commander or officer who fails to realise this fact 
may, if he is left to deal direct with the railway people, 
become very angry indeed at non-compliance with his 
demands, and resent protests that what he asks for cannot 
be done at one place although it may have been done at 
another. 

Then a railway must be regarded as a delicate piece of 
transportation machinery which can easily be thrown out 
of order, and is capable of being worked only by railwaymen 
as skilled in the knowledge of its mechanism, and as experi- 
enced in the details of its complicated operation, as military 
officers themselves are assumed to be in the technicalities 
of their own particular duties. The Chief Goods Manager 
of a leading line of railway who offered to take the place 
of a General at the seat of war would arouse much mirth 
in the Army at his own expense. It is, nevertheless, quite 
conceivable that the General would himself not be a com- 



42 THE RISE OF RAIL-POWER. 

plete success as a Chief Goods Manager. In the earUest 
days of railways it was assumed that the men best quahfied 
both to manage them and to control the large staffs to be 
employed would be retired Army officers. This policy 
was, in fact, adopted for a time, though it was abandoned, 
after a fair trial, in favour of appointing as responsible 
railway officers men who had undergone training in the 
railway service, and were practically acquainted alike with 
its fundamental principles and its technical details. 

In the operation of this delicate and complicated piece of 
machinery dislocation of traffic may result from a variety 
of causes, even when such operation is conducted by men 
of the greatest experience in railway working ; but the risk, 
alike of blocks and interruptions and of accidents involving 
loss of life or destruction of valuable property must needs 
be materially increased if military commanders, or officers, 
themselves having no practical knowledge of railway work- 
ing, and influenced only by an otherwise praiseworthy 
zeal for the interests of their own service, should have 
power either to force a responsible railwayman to do 
something which he, with his greater technical knowledge, 
knows to be impracticable, or to hamper and interfere with 
the working of the line at a time of exceptional strain on 
its resources. 

Under, again, a misapprehension of the exact bearing of 
the principle of military control of railways for military 
operations in time of war, there was developed in various 
campaigns a tendency on the part of commanders and sub- 
ordinate officers (i) to look upon railways and railwaymen 
as subject to their personal command, if not, even, to their 
own will, pleasure and convenience, so long as the war lasted; 
(2) to consider that every order they themselves gave should 
be at once carried out, regardless either of orders from other 
directions or of any question as to the possibility of com- 
plying therewith ; and (3) to indulge in merciless denuncia- 
tions, even if not in measures still more vigorous, when 
their orders have not been obeyed. 

Apart from other considerations, all these things have a 
direct bearing on the efficienc}' of the railway itself as an 



CONTROL OF RAILWAYS IN WAR. 43 

instrument in the carr3'ing on of warfare ; and it is, there- 
fore, a matter of essential importance to our present study 
to see how the difficulties in question had their rise, the 
development they have undergone, and the steps that have 
been taken to overcome or to guard against them. 

It was once more in the American Civil War that the 
control problem first arose in a really acute degree. 

The fundamental principle adopted for the operation 
of the railways taken possession of b}^ the Federal Govern- 
ment for military purposes was that they should be con- 
ducted under orders issued by the Secretary of War or by 
Army commanders in or out of the field. It was for the 
Quartermaster's department to load all material upon the 
cars, to direct where such material should be taken, and 
to arrange for unloading and delivery ; but because the 
Government had taken possession of the railways ; because 
the Quartermaster's department was to discharge the duties 
mentioned ; and because the railways were to be used 
during the war for the transport of troops and of Army 
supplies, therefore certain of the officers came to the con- 
clusion that the whole operation of the particular lines in 
which they were concerned should be left either to them- 
selves individually or to the Quartermaster'^ department. 

Among those holding this view was General Pope, who, 
on taking over the command of the Rappahannock Division, 
on June 26, 1862, disregarded the position held by Herman 
Haupt as " Chief of Construction and Transportation " in 
that Division, gave him no instructions, and left him to con- 
clude that the Army could get on very well without his 
assistance as a mere railwayman. Thereupon Haupt went 
home. Ten days afterwards he received from the Assistant- 
Secretary of War a telegram which said : — " Come back 
immediately. Cannot get on without you. Not a wheel 
moving." Haupt went back, and he found that, what 
with mismanagement of the lines and the attacks made on 
them by Confederates, not a wheel was, indeed, moving 
in the Division. His own position strengthened by his 
now being put in " exclusive charge of all the railways with- 
in the limits of the Army of Virginia," he was soon able 



44 THE RISE OF RAIL-POWER. 

to set the wheels running again ; and from that time General 
Pope exercised a wise discretion in leaving the details 
of railway transportation to men who understood them. 

Then there was a General Sturgis who, when Haupt 
called on him one day, received him with the intimation, 
" I have just sent a guard to your olftce to put you under 
arrest for disobedience of my orders in failing to transport 
my command." It was quite true. Haupt had failed 
to obey his orders. Sturgis wanted some special trains 
to convey 10,000 men, with horses and baggage, the short 
distance of eighteen miles. The railway was a single-track 
line ; it had only a limited equipment of engines and cars ; 
there was the prospect of further immediate requirements 
in other directions, and Haupt took the liberty of thinking 
that he had better keep his transportation for more pressing 
needs than a journey to a prospective battle-field only 
eighteen miles away — the more so as if the men were attacked 
whilst they were in the train the^^ would be comparatively 
helpless, whereas if they were attacked when on the road 
— doing what amounted to no more than a single day's 
march — they would be ready for immediate defence. These 
considerations suggest that, of the two, the railwayman 
was a better strategist than the General. 

Sturgis followed up his intimation to Haupt by taking 
military possession of the railway and issuing some orders 
which any one possessing the most elementary knowledge 
of railway operation would have known to be impracticable. 
Meanwhile Haupt appealed by telegraph to the Commander- 
in-Chief, who replied : — " No military officer has any 
authority to interfere with your control over railroad. 
Show this to General Sturgis, and, if he attempts to inter- 
fere, I will arrest him." Told what the Commander-in- 
Chief said in his message, Sturgis exclaimed, " He does, 
does he ? Well, then, take your damned railroad ! " 

Haupt found it possible to put at the disposal of Sturgis, 
early the following morning, the transportation asked for ; 
but at two o'clock in the afternoon the cars were still 
unoccupied. On the attention of Sturgis being called to 
this fact he replied that he had given his orders but they 



CONTROL OF RAILWAYS IN WAR. 45 

had been disobeyed. Thereupon the cars were withdrawn 
for service elsewhere — the more so since no other traffic 
could pass until they had been cleared out of the way. 
The net results of the General's interference was that 
traffic on the lines was deranged for twenty-four hours, 
and 10,000 men were prevented from taking part in an 
engagement, as they might have done had they gone by 
road. 

Of the varied and almost unending irregularities which 
occurred in the working of the lines as military railways 
during the progress of the same war a few other examples 
may be given. 

One prolific source of trouble was the detention or appro- 
priation of trains by officers who did not think it necessary 
to communicate first with the Superintendent of the Line. 
A certain General who did inform the Superintendent 
when he wanted a train was, nevertheless, in the habit of 
keeping it waiting for several hours before he made his 
appearance, traffic being meanwhile suspended, in conse- 
quence. 

Special consideration was even claimed for officers' wives, 
as well as for the officers themselves. On one occasion 
Haupt was much disturbed by the non-arrival of a train 
bringing supplies which were urgently wanted for a body 
of troops starting on a march, and he went along the line 
to see what had happened. Coming at last to the train, 
which had pulled up, he made inquiries of the engine-driver, 
who told him that he had received instructions to stop at a 
certain point so that an officer's wife, who was coming in 
the train to see her husband on the eve of an engagement, 
could go to a neighbouring town to look out for rooms 
for herself. At that moment the lady put in an appear- 
ance. She took her seat again and the train then proceeded ; 
but her side-trip in search of rooms meant a delay of three 
hours alike for this one train and for three others following 
behind. 

The impression seems to have prevailed, also, that officers 
were at liberty to make any use of the trains they pleased for 
the conveyance of their own belongings. To check the 



46 THE RISE OF RAIL-POWER. 

abuses thus developed, Haiipt was compelled to issue, on 
June 25, 1862, the following notice : — 

Assistant Quartermasters and Commissaries are positively 
forbidden to load on to cars on any of the MiHtary Railroads 
of the Department of the Rappahannock any freights which 
are not strictly and properly included in Quarter and Commis- 
sary stores. They shall not load or permit to be loaded any 
articles for the private use of officers, or other persons, what- 
ever their rank or position. 

Officers, again, there were who, regardless of all traffic 
considerations, would order a train to pull up at any point 
they thought fit along the main line in order that they could 
examine the passes and permits of the passengers, instead 
of doing this at a terminal or other station. In still another 
instance a paymaster adopted as his office a box car standing 
on a main line. He placed in it a table, some chairs, a 
money-chest and his papers — finding it either more com- 
fortable or more convenient than a house alongside — and 
proceeded with the transaction of all his Army business in 
the car. Invited to withdraw, on the ground that he was 
holding up the traffic, he refused to leave, and he persisted 
in his refusal until troops were called up to remove his 
things for him. 

Defective arrangements in regard to the forwarding of 
supphes were another cause of traffic disorganisation. The 
railwaymen made from time to time, the most strenuous 
efforts in getting to the extreme front large consignments of 
articles either in excess of requirements or not wanted 
there at all. After blocking the line for some days, the 
still-loaded cars might be sent back again, no fewer than 
142 of such cars being returned on the Orange and Alexan- 
dria Railroad in the course of a single day. If the excessive 
supplies so sent were unloaded at the front, they might have 
to be loaded into the cars again when the Army moved ; 
or, as was frequently the case in exposed positions, they 
might be seized or destroyed by the enemy. Under a 
well-organised system an adequate stock of supphes would, 
of course, have been kept in stores or on sidings at some 



CONTROL OF RAILWAYS IN WAR. 47 

point in the rear, only such quantities being forwarded to 
the advanced front as were really needed. 

At the railway stations there were frequent disputes 
between the responsible officers as to which should have 
the first use of such troop trains as were available, and 
Haupt found it necessary to ask the Commander-in-Chief 
to delegate some one who would decide in what order the 
troops should be forwarded. 

Much trouble arose because, in their anxiety to send off 
as many wounded as they could, medical officers detained 
their trains for such periods as dislocated the service, instead 
of despatching at schedule time the men they had ready, and 
then asking for an extra train for the remainder. 

In other respects, also, the arrangements for the transport 
of the sick and wounded were defective. Telegraphing on 
this subject to the Assistant Secretary of War on August 22, 
1862, Haupt said : — • 

I fear that I may be compelled to-night to do what may 
appear inhuman — turn out the sick in the street. Doctors 
will persist in sending sick, often without papers, to get them 
off their hands, and we cannot send forward the troops if we 
must run our trains to Washington v/ith sick to stand for hours 
unloaded. My first care is to send forward troops, next forage 
and subsistence. 

Still more serious were the irregularities due to delays 
in the unloading of trucks and the return of empties. The 
amount of rolling stock available was already inadequate 
to meet requirements ; but the effect of the shortage was 
rendered still worse by reason of these delays, due, in part, 
to the too frequent insufficiency of the force available for 
unloading a train of supplies with the expedition that should 
have been shown, and in part to the retention of the cars 
for weeks together as storehouses ; though the main cause, 
perhaps, was the inability of military men, inexperienced 
in railway working, to appreciate, as railwaymen would do, 
the need of getting the greatest possible use out of rolling 
stock in times of emergency, and not allowing it to stand 
idle longer than absolutely necessary. 

How such delays interfered with the efficiency of the 



48 THE RISE OF RAIL-POWER. 

railways was indicated in one of Haupt's oft-repeated 
protests, in which he wrote : — 

If all cars on their arrival at a depot are immediately loaded 
or unloaded and returned, and trains are run to schedule, a 
single-track road, in good order and properly equipped, may 
supply an army of 200,000 men when, if these conditions are 
not complied with, the same road will not supply 30,000. 

On July 9, 1863, he telegraphed to General M. C. Meigs : — 

I am on my way to Gettysburg again. Find things in great 
confusion. Road blocked ; cars not unloaded ; stores ordered 
to Gettysburg — where they stand for a long time, completely 
preventing all movement there — ordered back without unload- 
ing ; wounded lying for hours without ability to carry them 
off. All because the simple rule of promptly unloading and 
returning cars is violated. 

As for the effect of all these conditions on the military 
situation as a whole, this is well shown in the following 
" Notice," which, replying to complaints that railwaymen 
had not treated the military olftcers with proper respect, 
Haupt addressed " To agents and other employes of the 
United States Military Railroad Department " : — 

While conscious of no disposition to shield the employes 
or agents of the MiHtary Railroads from any censure or punish- 
ment that is really merited, justice to them requires me to 
state that, so far, examination has shown that complaints 
against them have been generally without proper foundation, 
and, when demands were not promptly complied with, the 
cause has been inability, arising from want of proper notice, 
and not indisposition. 

Officers at posts entrusted with the performance of certain 
local duties, and anxious, as they generally are, to discharge 
them efficiently, are not always able, or disposed, to look beyond 
their own particular spheres. -They expect demands on rail- 
way agents to be promptly comphed with, without considering 
that similar demands, at the same time, in addition to the 
regular train service and routine duties, may come from Quarter- 
masters, Commissaries, medical directors, surgeons, ordnance 
officers, the Commanding General, the War Department and 
from other sources. The Military Railroads have utterly 
failed to furnish transportation to even one-fifth of their capa- 
city when managed without a strict conformity to schedule 
and estabhshed rules. Punctuality and discipline are even 



CONTROL OF RAILWAYS TN WAR. 49 

more important to the operation of a railroad than to the move- 
ment of an army ; and they are vital in both. 

It is doubtful if even the Confederate raiders and wreckers 
had, by their destructive tactics, diminished the eiiftciency of 
the Union railways to the extent of the four-fifths here 
attributed to the irregularities and shortcomings of the 
Federals themselves. The clearest proof was thus afforded 
that, if the new arm in warfare which rail-power represented 
was to accomplish all it was capable of doing, it would have 
to be saved from friends quite as much as from foes. 

Haupt, as we have seen, suffered much from officers 
during the time he was connected with the Military Rail- 
roads in Virginia. He had the sympathetic support of the 
Commander-in-Chief, who telegraphed to him on one occa- 
sion (August 23, 1862), " No military officer will give any 
orders to your subordinates except through you, nor will 
any of them attempt to interfere with the running of trains "; 
and, also, of the Assistant Secretary of War, who sought to 
soothe him in a message which said : — •" Be patient as 
possible with the Generals. Some of them will trouble 
you more than they will the enemy." But the abuses 
which arose were so serious that, in the interest of the 
military position itself, they called for a drastic remedy ; 
and this was provided for by the issue of the following 
Order : — 

War Department, 
Adjutant-General's Office, 
Washington, 

November 10, 1862. 
Special Order. 
Commanding officers of troops along the United States Mili- 
tary Railroads will give all facilities to the officers of the road 
and the Quartermasters for loading and unloading cars so as 
to prevent any dela}^ On arrival at depots, whether in the 
day or night, the cars will be instantly unloaded, and working 
parties will always be in readiness for that duty, and sufficient 
to unload the whole train at once. 

Commanding officers will be charged with guarding the track, 
sidings, wood, water tanks, etc., within their several commands, 
and will be held responsible for the result. 
Any military officer who shall neglect his duty in this respect 



50 THE RISE OF RAIL-POWER. 

will be reported by the Quartermasters and officers of the rail 
road, and his name will be stricken from the rolls of the Army. 

Depots will be established at suitable points imder the direc- 
tion of the Commanding General of the Army of the Potomac, 
and properly guarded. 

No officer, whatever may be his rank, will interfere with the 
running of the cars, as directed by the superintendent of the 
road. Any one who so interferes will be dismissed from the 
service for disobedience of orders. 

By order of the Secretarj^ of War. 

J. C. Kelton. 

Commenting on this Order, General McCallum says in 
his report that it was issued " in consequence of several 
attempts having been made to operate railroads by Army 
or departmental commanders which had, without exception, 
proved signal failures, disorganising in tendency and 
destructive of all discipline " ; and he proceeds : — ■ 

Having had a somewhat extensive railroad experience, 
both before and since the rebellion, I consider this Order of the 
Secretary of War to have been the very foundation of success ; 
without it the whole railroad system, which had proved an 
important element in conducting military movements, would 
have been, not only a costly but ludicrous failure. The fact 
should be understood that the management of railroads is 
just as much a distinct profession as is that of the art of war, 
and should be so regarded. 

In Europe, Germany and Austria-Hungary were the 
first countries to attempt to solve problems that seemed 
to go to the very foundations of the practical usefulness 
of rail-transport in war. Various exhaustive studies thereon 
were written by railway or military authorities, and it may 
be of interest here to refer, more especially, to the views ex- 
pressed by an eminent German authority. Baron M. M. von 
Weber, in " Die Schulung der Eisenbahnen," published in 
1870.1 

Railway irregularities peculiar to war service were stated 
by this writer to be mainly of three kinds : — (i) Delays 
from unsatisfactory arrangements of the service and from 
the misemployment of rolling stock ; (ii) temporary 

1 See Bibliography. 



CONTROL OF RAILWAYS IN WAR. 51 

interruption of traffic owing to the crowding of transport 
masses at the stations or sidings ; (iii) unsuitableness of the 
stations and conveyances for the required mihtary services. 
The special reasons for the first of these causes he defined 
as {a) the absence of sufficient mutual comprehension 
between the military and the railway officials ; {b) the 
strict limitation of the efficiency of individual railway 
authorities to their own fines only ; (c) the ignorance of 
the entire staff of each line with regard to the details and 
service regulations of the neighbouring lines ; and {d) the 
impracticability of employing certain modes of carrying on 
business beyond the circuit to which they belong. It 
should, however, be borne in mind that these criticisms of 
authorities and their staffs relate to the conditions of the 
German railway system in 1870, at which time, as told by 
H. Budde, in " Die franzosischen Eisenbahnen im Kriege 
1870-71," there were in Germany fifteen separate Directions 
for State railways ; five Directions of private railways 
operated by the State ; and thirty-one Directions of private 
railways operated by companies — -a total of fifty-one con- 
troUing bodies which, on an average, operated only 210 
miles of line each. 

On the general question von Weber observed : — ■ 

The value in practice of mutual intelligence between military 
and railway officials has hitlierto been far too slightly regarded. 

Demands for services from military authorities, impractic- 
able from the very nature of railways in general or the nature 
of the existing lines in particular, have occasioned confusion 
and ill-will on the part of the railway authorities and conductors. 
On the other hand the latter have "frequently declared services 
to be impracticable which were really not so. 

All this has arisen because the two parties in the transaction 
have too little insight into the nature and mechanism of their 
respective caUings, and regard their powers more as contra- 
dictory than co-operative, so that they do not, and cannot, 
work together. 

If, on the contrary, the nature of the railway service, with its 
modifications due to differences in the nature of the ground, 
the locality, and the organisation of transport requirements, 
is apparent to the mihtary officer, even in a general way ; if 
he appreciates the fact tliat the same amount of transport must 
be difterently performed when he passes from a level line to a 



52 THE RISE OF RAIL-POWER. 

mountain line, from a double line to a single line, from one 
where the signal and telegraph system are in use to one in 
which these organs of safety and intelligence are destroyed ; 
if he can judge of the capability of stations, the length of track, 
and arrangements for the loading, ordering and passing of 
trains, etc., he will, with this knowledge, and his orders being 
framed in accordance with it, come much sooner and with 
greater facihty to an understanding with the railway executives 
than if his commands had to be rectified by contradiction and 
assertion, frequently carried on under the influence of excited 
passions, or attempted to be enforced by violence. 

The railway official, also, who has some acquaintance with 
military science, who understands from practical experience 
and inspection, not confined to his own line, the capabilities 
of lines and stations in a military point of view, will, at his first 
transaction with the military authorities, enter sooner into an 
understanding with them than if he were deficient in this know- 
ledge, and will find himself in a position to co-operate, and not 
be coerced. 

Here the suggestion seems to be that the individual 
Army officer and the individual railway executive, or railway 
official, should each become sufficiently acquainted with 
the technicalities of the other's business to be able to con- 
duct their relations with mutual understanding. It would, 
however, be too much to expect that this plan could be 
carried out as regards either the military element in general 
or the railway element in general. 

The real need of the situation was, rather, for some 
intermediary organisation which, including both elements, 
would provide the machinery for close co-operation between 
the Army on the one side and the railway on the other, guid- 
ing the Army as to the possibilities and limitations of the 
railway, and constituting the recognised and sole medium 
through which orders from the Army would be conveyed 
to the railway, no individual commander or officer having 
the right to give any direct order to the railway executives 
or staffs on his own responsibility, or to interfere in any way 
with the working of the railways, except in some such case 
of extreme emergency as an attack by the enemy on a 
railway station. 

All these problems were to form the subject of much 
more controversy, together with much further practical 



CONTROL OF RAILWAYS IN WAR. 53 

experience, in various other countries — and notably in 
France during the war of 1870-71 — before, as will be told 
in due course, they were solved by the adoption of elaborate 
systems of organisation designed to provide, as far as 
possible, for all contingencies. 



CHAPTER V 

Protection of Railways in War 

The liability of railway lines to interruption or destruc- 
tion — whether by bodies of cavalry sent across the frontier 
for that purpose, and aiming at damage on a large scale ; 
by smaller raiding parties operating in the rear of an advanc- 
ing army ; or by individuals acting on their own account 
in a hostile country — rendered necessary from an early 
date in the railway era the adoption of protective measures 
of a type and character varying according to circumstances ; 
while these, in turn, introduced some further new features 
into modern warfare. 

Under the orders given by General McDowell for the 
guarding of railways in the Department of the Rappahan- 
nock, in the American Civil Way, twelve sentinels were 
posted along each mile of track ; block-houses were con- 
structed at each bridge, at cross-roads, and at intervals 
along the track ; pickets were thrown forward at various 
points ; bushes and trees were cleared away from alongside 
the line, and the men at each post had flags and lanterns 
for signalling. General Sherman took similar measures to 
guard his rail communications between Nashville and 
Atlanta. 

Precautions such as these were directed mainly against 
the enemy in the field ; but an early example was to be 
afforded of how a civil population may either concern them- 
selves or be concerned against their will in the maintenance 
of rail communication for military purposes. This position 
is well shown in the followdng proclamation, issued July 30, 
1863, by Major-General G. G. Meade from the head-quarters 
of the Army of the Potomac at a time when attempts to 

54 



PROTECTION OF RAILWAYS IN WAR. 55 

throw troop trains off the railway lines were a matter of 
daily occurrence : — 

The numerous depredations committed by citizens or rebel 
soldiers in disguise, harboured and concealed by citizens, along 
the Orange and Alexandria Railroad, and within our lines, 
call for prompt and exemplary punishment. Under the in- 
structions of the Government, therefore, every citizen against 
whom there is sufficient evidence of his having engaged in 
these practices will be arrested and confined for punishment, 
or put beyond the lines. 

The people within ten miles of the railroad are notified that 
they will be held responsible, in their persons and property, 
for any injury done to the road, trains, depots or stations by 
citizens, guerillas or persons in disguise ; and in case of such 
injury they will be impressed as labourers to repair all damages. 

If these measures should not stop such depredations, it will 
become the unpleasant duty of the undersigned, in the execu- 
tion of his instructions, to direct that the entire inhabitants 
of the district of country along the railroad be put across the 
lines, and their property taken for Government uses. 

On the Manassas Gap Railway General Auger further 
sought to protect Federal army trains against guerilla attacks 
by placing in a conspicuous position in each of such trains 
some of the leading Confederates residing within Union 
lines, so that, should any accident happen to the train, they 
would run the risk of being among the victims. 

In the Austro-Prussian War of 1866 the principle of pun- 
ishing the civil population for attacks on the railway lines 
underwent a further development. Captain Webber says 
in reference to the line through Turnau, Prague and Par- 
dubitz to Briinn ^ : " The Prussians were fortunate in being 
able to preserve the line intact from injury by the inhabi- 
tants, partly by the number and strength of the guards 
posted along it, and partly from the terror of reprisals which 
they had inspired." Captain Webber suggests that, in the 
face of an active enemy, and in a country where the popula- 
tion was hostile, it would have been impossible to depend 
on the railway as a principal line of communication ; but 

' "Notes on the Campaign in Bohemia in 1866." By Capt. Web- 
ber, R.E. Papers of the Corps of Royal Engineers, N.S., vol. xvi. 
Woolwich, 1868. 



56 THE RISE OF RAIL-POWER. 

the significance of his expression, " the terror of reprisals," 
as denoting the pohcy adopted by Prussia so far back as 
1866, will not be lost on those who are only too well ac- 
quainted with more recent developments of the same policy 
by the same country. 

The number of men per mile required for guarding a line 
of rail communication is declared by Captain John Bigelow, 
in his "Principles of Strategy" (Philadelphia, 1894), to 
be exceedingly variable, depending as it does upon the 
tactical features of the country and the temper of the 
inhabitants. According, he says, to the estimate of the 
Germans for the conditions of European warfare, the num- 
ber will average about 1,000 men for every stretch of fifteen 
miles. At this rate an army sixty miles from its base requires 
about 4,000 men for the protection of each line of communi- 
cation. 

With the help of figures such as these one may, perhaps, 
understand the more readily how it is that a Commander- 
in-Chief, of merciless disposition, and wanting to retain the 
active services of every soldier he possibly can in the inter- 
ests of an early and successful advance will, by spreading 
a feeling of " terror " among the civil population, seek to 
reduce to as low a figure as circumstances will permit the 
number of men he must leave behind to guard his fines of 
rail communication. 

These considerations will be found to apply with the 
greater force when it is remembered that in the Franco- 
Prussian War of iSyo-yi the Prussians had to adopt an 
especially elaborate system for safeguarding their lines of 
communication with Germany during the time they occupied 
French territory. At each railway station they placed a 
guard formed of detachments of the Landwehr, while small 
detachments were stationed in towns and villages in the 
neighbourhood. In each signal-box a detachment of troops 
was stationed, and the whole line of railway was patrolled 
from posts estabfished along it at distances of every three 
or four miles. Altogether, the Germans are said to have 
employed, on over 2,000 miles of French railway lines 
controlled by them, as many as 100,000 troops for protective 



PROTECTION OF RAILWAYS IN WAR. 57 

purposes only ; and even then the franc-tireurs were able 
to cause many interruptions. 

Under a Prussian regulation dated May 2, 1867, it was 
laid down that after the restoration of an}/ lines taken 
possession of in an enemy's territory, notice should be given 
that in the event of an}/ further damage being done to the 
railway, the locality would be subject to a fine of at least 
500 thalers, the belongings of the inhabitants would be 
liable to seizure, and the local authorities might be arrested. 

As a further precautionary measure in the war of 1870-71, 
the Germans took a hint from the example of the Union 
Generals in the American Civil War by compelling a leading 
citizen of the district passed through to ride on the engine 
of each train run by them on French soil. In defence of 
this practice, the German General Staff say in their handbook 
on " The Usages of War " ^ : — 

Since the lives of peaceable inhabitants were, without any 
fault on their part, thereby exposed to grave danger, every 
writer outside Germany has stigmatised this measure as con- 
trary to the law of nations and as unjustified towards the 
inhabitants of the country. As against this unfavourable criti- 
cism it must be pointed out that this measure, which was also 
recognised on the German side as harsh and cruel, was only 
resorted to after declarations and instructions of the occupying 
authorities had proved ineffective, and that in the particular 
circumstances it was the only method which promised to be 
effective against the doubtless unauthorised, indeed the criminal, 
behaviour of a fanatical population. Herein lies its justifica- 
tion under the laws of war, but still more in the fact that it 
proved completely successful, and that wherever citizens were 
thus carried on the trains . . . the security of traffic was assured . 

Writing under date December 16, 1870, Busch offered the 
following justification for the course adopted :— 

They were taken, not to serve as a hindrance to French hero- 
ism, but as a precaution against treacherous crime. The rail- 
way does not carry merely soldiers, ammunition and other 
war material against which it may be allowable to use violent 
measures ; it also conveys a great number of wounded, doctors, 

1 ' ' The German War Book. Being the Usages of War on Land " ; 
issued by the Great General Staff of the German Army. London, 
1915- 



58 THE RISE OF RAIL-POWER. 

hospital attendants, and other perfectly harmless persons. Is 
a peasant or franc-tireur to be allowed to endanger hundreds 
of those lives by removing a rail or laying a stone upon the 
line ? Let the French see that the security of the railway 
trains is no longer threatened and the journeys made by those 
hostages will be merely outings, or our people may even be 
able to forgo such precautionary measures. 

In the South African Wa-y , Field-Marshal Earl Roberts 
issued at Pretoria, on June 19, 1900, a proclamation one 
section of which authorised the placing of leading men 
among the Boers on the locomotives of the trains run by 
the British on the occupied territory ; but this particular 
section was withdrawn eight days afterwards. 

The English view of the practice in question is thus de- 
fined in the official " Manual of Military Law " (Chap. XIV, 
" The Laws and Usages of War," par. 463) : — • 

Such measures expose the lives of inhabitants, not only to the 
illegitimate acts of train wrecking by private enemy individuals, 
but also to the lawful operations of raiding parties of the armed 
forces of the belligerent, and cannot, therefore, be considered a 
commendable practice. 

To guard against the attacks made on the railway lines 
in the Orange Free State and the Transvaal during the 
British occupation, entrenched posts were placed at every 
bridge exceeding a 30-feet span ; constant patroUing was 
maintained between these posts ; and the block-houses 
introduced (in 1901) by Lord Kitchener v^^ere erected along 
all the railway lines, at distances of about 2,000 yards. 
Each block-house, also, was garrisoned by about ten men, 
and each was surrounded by wire entanglements which, 
together with various kinds of alarm fences, were also placed 
between the block-houses themselves in order both to impede 
the approach of the enemy and to warn the garrison thereof. 

Block-houses are to-day regarded as one of the chief means 
of protecting railways against attacks. Their construction 
and equipment are dealt with by Major W. D. Connor, of 
the Corps of Engineers, U.S.A., in " Military Railways " 
(Professional Papers, No. 32, Corps of Engineers, U.S. Army, 
Washington, 1910). 



PROTECTION OF RAILWAYS IN WAR. 59 

Supplementary to the adoption of this block-house system, 
in time of war, is the practice followed in various Continental 
countries, in time of peace, of building 'permanent fortresses, 
in solid masonry, alongside railway bridges crossing import- 
ant rivers. In some instances the fortress is so constructed 
that the railway lines pass through the centre of it. Not 
only, as a rule, are these fortresses extremely solid and 
substantial, but they may be provided with bomb-proof 
covers and be stocked with a sufficient supply of provisions 
to be able to stand, if necessary, a fairly prolonged siege. 
One can assume, also, that the garrison would have under 
its control facilities arranged in advance for the destruction 
of the bridge, as a last resort, in case of need. 

The theory is that such fortresses and their garrisons 
should be of especial advantage, on the outbreak of war, in 
checking any sudden invasion and allowing time for the 
completion of defensive measures. Their construction in 
connection with all the principal railway bridges crossing 
the Rhine was especially favoured in Prussia after the war 
of 1870-1. 

Similar fortresses, or " interrupting forts," as the Germans 
call them, are also built for the protection of important 
tunnels, junctions, locomotive and carriage works, etc. 

Another method adopted for the safeguarding of railway 
lines in war is the use of armoured trains ; though in practice 
these are also employed for the purposes of independent 
attacks on the enemy, apart altogether from any question 
of ensuring the safety of rail communication.^ 

For the protection of locomotives and rolling stock, and to 
prevent not only their capture but their use by the enemy, 
the most efficacious method to adopt is, of course, that of 
removing them to some locality where the enemy is not 
likely to come. 

When, in 1866, Austria saw that she could not hold back 
the Prussian invader, she took off into Hungary no fewer 
than 1,000 locomotives and 16,000 wagons from the railways 
in Bohemia and Saxony. Similar tactics were adopted by 

^ The subject of armoured trains will be dealt with more fully 
in Chapters VII and XVI . 



6o THE RISE OF RAIL-POWER. 

the Boers as against ourselves in the war in South Africa, 
On the British troops crossing into the Orange Free State, 
from Cape Colony, they found that the retreating enemy had 
withdrawn all their rolling stock, as well as all their staffs 
from the railway stations, leaving behind only a more or less 
damaged line of railway. Subsequently, when the forces 
occupied Pretoria, they certainly did find there sixteen 
locomotives and 400 trucks ; but the station books 
showed that in the previous forty-eight hours no fewer 
than seventy trains, many of them drawn by two engines, 
had been sent east in the direction of Delagoa Bay. 

When it is not practicable to withdraw locomotives and 
rolling stock which it is desired the enemy shall not be able 
to use, the obvious alternative is that measures should be 
taken either to remove vital parts or to ensure their de- 
struction. Certain of the methods adopted during the Civil 
War in America were especially efhcacious in attaining the 
latter result. In some instances trains were started running 
and then — driver and fireman leaping off the engine — were 
left to go into a river, or to fall through a broken viaduct. 
In other instances two trains, after having had a good supply 
of explosives put in them, would be allowed to dash into one 
another at full speed. Many locomotives had their boilers 
burst, and wagons were set on fire after having b.en filled 
up with combustibles. 

Still another method which has been adopted with a view 
to preventing an enemy from using the railways he might 
succeed in capturing is that of constructing them with a 
different gauge. The standard gauge of the main-line rail- 
ways in France, Germany, Holland, Belgium, Denmark, 
Austria-Hungary, Italy, Switzerland, Roumania and Tur- 
key (like that, also, of railways in Great Britain, Canada 
and the United States), is 4ft. 8^in., allowing trains to 
pass readily from one country to the other with the same 
rolling stock ; but the gauge of the Russian railways is 
5ft., necessitating a transshipment from one train to another 
when the frontier is reached. Similar conditions are found 
in Spain and Portugal, where the standard gauge is 5ft. 6in.i 

^ See "Field Service Pocket Book, 1914," pp. 151-2. 



PROTECTION OF RAILWAYS IN WAR. 6i 

Russia adopted her broader gauge so that, m case of 
invasion, the invader should not be able to run his rolling- 
stock over her lines, as Germany, for instance, would be 
able to do in the case of the railways of Belgium and France. 
Thus far, therefore, Russia strengthened her position from 
the point of view of defence ; but she weakened it as regards 
attack, since if she should herself want, either to become the 
invader or to send troop trains over neighbouring territory 
to some point beyond, she would be at a disadvantage. In 
the Russo-Turkish War of iSyy-yS, when the Russian forces 
passed through Roumania on their way to Turkey, the 
difference in gauge between the Russian and the Roumanian 
railways caused great delay and inconvenience by reason of 
the necessary transfer of troops, stores, guns, ammunition, 
torpedo boats, etc., at the frontier. 

It should, also, be remembered that the reduction of a 
broad gauge to a narrow one is a much simpler matter, from 
an engineering point of view, than the widening of a narrower 
gauge into a broad one. In the former case the existing 
sleepers, bridges, tunnels, platforms, etc., would still serve 
their purpose. In the latter case fresh sleepers might have 
to be laid, bridges and tunnels widened or enlarged, and 
platforms and stations altered, use of the broader-gauge 
rolling stock thus involving an almost complete reconstruc- 
tion of the railway lines. To this extent, therefore, the 
balance of advantage would seem to be against the country 
having the broader gauge. The conclusion may, at least, 
be formed that such a country is far more bent on protecting 
her own territory than on invading that of her neighbours. 

The course adopted by Germany for overcoming the 
difficulty which, in the event of her seeking to invade 
Russia, the difference of railway gauge in that country would 
present, will be told in Chapter XVIII. 



CHAPTER VI 
Troops and Supplies 

In the earlier controversies as to the use of railways in 
war, attention was almost entirely concentrated on ques- 
tions relating to the movement of large masses of troops, 
the saving of time to be effected, and the strategic advan- 
tages to be gained. These considerations quickly passed 
from the theoretical to the practical, and when the results 
attained were put against such facts as, for instance, the one 
that in 1805 Napoleon's Grand Army of 200,000 men took 
forty-two days to march the 700 kilometres (435 miles) 
between Ulm on the Danube and the French camp at Bou- 
logne, there was no longer any possibility of doubt as to the 
services that railways might render from these particular 
points of view. 

Quicker trans-port was, however, only one consideration. 
There was the further important detail that the movement 
of troops by rail would bring them to their point of concen- 
tration, not only sooner, but in more complete numbers, than 
if they had to endure the fatigues of prolonged marches by 
road. 

According to German authorities, the falling-out of 
infantry and cavalry when marching along good roads under 
conditions of well-maintained discipline and adequate food 
supplies averages three per cent, in cool and dry weather, 
and six per cent, in hot or wet weather ; while in unfavour- 
able conditions as regards roads, weather and supplies, the 
diminution may be enormous. When, in the autumn of 
1799, Suvoroff made his famous march over the St. Gothard, 
he lost, in eleven days, no fewer than 10,000 men owing to 
the hardships of the journey. In his invasion of Russia, in 
1812, Napoleon's losses in men who succumbed to the 

Q'i 



TROOPS AND SUPPLIES 63 

fatigues and trials they experienced on the road were out 
of all proportion to the casualties due to actual fighting. 
It was, too, a saying of Bliicher's that " he feared night 
marches worse than the enemy." 

An English authority, Lieut. -Col. R. Home, C.B., R.E., 
wrote in a paper on " The Organisation of the Communica- 
tions, including Railways," published in Vol XIX. of the 
Journal of the Royal United Service Institution (1875) : — 

If an arm}' of moderate size, say 50,000 men, simply marches 
one hundred miles without firing one shot or seeing an enemy 
the number of sick to be got rid of is very great. 

Experience has shown that in a good climate, with abundant 
food, easy marches, and fair weather, the waste from ordinary 
causes in a ten days' march of such a force would be between 
2,000 and 2,500 men, while the number of galled, footsore or 
worn-out horses would also be very large. A few wet days or 
a sharp engagement would raise the number of both very con- 
siderably. An inefficient man or horse at the front is a positive 
disadvantage. 

Another equally important detail relates to the provision 
of supplies for the troops and animals thus transported by 
rail both more quickly and with less fatigue. 

In all ages the feeding of his troops in an enemy's country 
has been one of the gravest problems a military commander 
has had to solve ; and though, in some instances, vast 
armies have succeeded in drawing sufficient support from 
the land they have invaded, there have been others in which 
an army intending to " live upon the country " has failed 
to get the food it needed, and has had its numbers depleted 
to the extent of thousands as the result of sheer starvation 
This was the experience of Darius, King of Persia, who, in 
513 B.C., crossed the Bosporus, on a bridge of boats, with an 
army of 700,000, followed the retreating Scythians, and 
lost 80,000 of his men in wild steppes where no means existed 
for feeding them. When, also, Alexander the Great was 
withdrawing from India, in 325 b.c, two-thirds of his force 
died on the desert plains of Beluchistan from thirst or 
hunger. Lack of the supplies from which he found himself 
entirely cut off was, again, a main cause of the disaster that 
overtook Napoleon in his Russian campaign. Even fertile 



64 THE RISE OF RATE-POWER. 

or comparatively fertile lands, satisfying the needs of their 
inhabitants in time of peace, may fail to afford provisions 
for an invading" army, either because of the great number 
of the latter or because the retreating population have 
destroyed the food supplies they could not take with them 
into the interior whether for their own sustenance or with a 
view to starving the invaders. 

Should the invading army succeed in " living on the 
country," the effect of leaving the troops to their own re- 
sources, in the way of collecting food, may still be not only 
subversive of disciphne but of strategic disadvantage through 
their being scattered on marauding expeditions at a time 
when, possibly, it would be preferable to keep them con- 
centrated. 

General Friron, chief of the staff of Marshal Massena, wrote 
concerning Napoleon's campaign in Portugal : — 

The day the soldier became convinced that, for the future, 
he would have to depend on himself, discipline disappeared 
from the ranks of the army. The officer became powerless 
in the presence of want ; he was no longer disposed to reprimand 
the soldier who brought him the nourishment essential to his 
existence, and who shared with him, in brotherly goodwill, 
a prey which may have cost him incalculable dangers and 
fatigues. 

The extent to which a combination of physical fatigue 
and shortness of supplies in an inhospitable country ma}' 
interfere with the efficiency of an army is well shown by 
Thiers (" Histoire du Consulat et de 1' Empire ") in regard 
to the conditions at the very outset of Napoleon's Russian 
campaign. The French troops arriving on the Niemen — at 
which point they were merely on the frontiers of Russia — 
were already overcome by the long marches they had made. 
They had no bread, no salt, and no spirits ; their craving for 
food could no longer be satisfied by meat without salt and meal 
mixed with water. The horses, too, were out of condition 
for want of proper food. Behind the army a great number 
of soldiers dropped out of the ranks and had lost their way, 
while the few people they met in a scantily-populated dis- 
trict could speak nothing but Polish, which the wearied and 
famished men were unable to understand. Yet, under the 



TROOPS AND SUPPLIES. 65 

conditions of former days, it was by troops thus exhausted 
by marches of hundreds of miles, done on, possibly, a starva- 
tion diet, that battles involving the severest strain on human 
energy were fought. 

When " living on the country " is no longer practicable, 
the only alternative for an army is, of course, that of send- 
ing supplies after it for the feeding of the troops ; but when, 
or where, this has had to be done by means of ordinary road 
services, it has involved — together with the transport of 
artillery, ammunition and stores — (i) the employment of 
an enormous number of vehicles and animals, greatly com- 
plicating the movements of the army ; and (2) a limitation 
of the distance within which a campaign can be waged by 
an army depending entirely on its own resources. 

The latter of these conditions was the direct consequence 
of the former ; and the reason for this was shown by General 
W. T. Sherman in an article contributed by him to the 
Century Magazine for February, 1888 (pp. 595-6), in the 
course of which he says : — 

According to the Duke of Wellington, an army moves upon 
its belly, not upon its legs ; and no army dependent on wagons 
can operate more than a hundred miles from its base because 
the teams going and returning consume the contents of their 
wagons, leaving Httle or nothing for the maintenance of men 
and animals at the front who are fully employed in fighting. 

There was, again, the risk when food supplies followed 
the army by road either of perishables going bad en route, 
owing to the time taken in their transport by wagon, or of 
their suffering deterioration as the result of exposure to 
weather, the consequence in either case being a diminution 
in the amount of provisions available for feeding the army. 

All these various conditions have been changed by the 
railway, the use of which for the purposes of war has, in 
regard to the forwarding of supplies, introduced innovations 
which are quite as important as those relating to the move- 
ment of troops — if, indeed, the former advantages are not 
of even greater importance than the latter. 

Thanks to the railway, an army can now draw its supplies 
from the whole of the interior of the home country — pro- 



66 THE RISE OF RAIL-POWER. 

vided that the hnes of communication can be kept open ; 
and, with the help not only of regular rail services but of 
stores and magazines en route those supplies can be forwarded 
to rail-head in just such quantities as they may be wanted. 
Under these conditions the feeding of an army in the field 
should be assured regardless alike of the possible scanty 
resources of the country in which it is engaged and of its 
own distance from the base of supplies. 



CHAPTER VII 

Armoured Trains 

In the issue of the now defunct London periodical, Once 
a Week, for August 13, 1859, there was pubhshed an article 
on " Enghsh Railway Artillery : A Cheap Defence against 
Invasion," in which it was said, among other things : — 

We have hitherto regarded the rail merely as a vehicle of 
transport, to carry materials which are not to be set in work 
till off the rails. If we look at the rail as part of an instrument 
of warfare, we shall be startled at the enormous means we have 
at hand, instantly available, from mercantile purposes, to con- 
vert to engines of war. 

The writer was William Bridges Adams (1797-1872), an 
authority on railways who had grown up with them, had 
introduced into their operation many inventions and im- 
provements (including the fish-joint still used for connect- 
ing rails), and was the author of various books and papers 
on railways, transport, and other subjects. His new idea, 
as set forth in the article in question, was specially directed 
to the utilisation of railways for defending the shores of 
Great Britain against an invader ; and in developing this 
idea he was, also, as far as can be traced, the first to suggest 
the employment of armoured trains. 

The immediate reason alike for the writing of the article 
and for the making of the suggestion was that in 1859 Great 
Britain appeared to be faced by the prospect of invasion by 
France, — a prospect which, in view of the then admittedly 
defective condition of the national defences, led to the 
creation of the Volunteer Corps, to the appointment of a 
Royal Commission to inquire into the question of coast 
defence, and to suggestions being put forward by many 
different authorities as to what should be done. Among 

67 



68 THE RISE OF RAIL-POWER. 

those suggestions was one by the writer in question for 
supplementing any system of coast defence that might be 
adopted by the mounting of guns on railway trucks protected 
by armour, such trucks being moved from point to point 
along the coast railways to meet, as far as possible, the 
needs of the military situation. 

Heavy artillery, wrote Adams, though the most for- 
midable implement of modern warfare, had the disadvan- 
tage of requiring many horses to draw it. So the problem 
arose as to how the horses could be dispensed with. This 
could best be done, he thought, by putting artillery on 
" our true line of defence, — our rails," and having it drawn, 
or propelled, by a locomotive. " Mount," he said, " a gun 
of twenty tons weight on a railway truck, with a circular 
traversing platform, and capable of throwing a shot or shell 
weighing one hundred to one and a half a distance of five 
miles. A truck on eight wheels would carry this very 
easily, and there would be no recoil." Such a battery 
would be " practically a moving fortress," and, used on the 
coast railways, which he regarded as constituting lines of 
defence, would be " the cheapest of all possible fortresses — 
absolutely a continuous fortress along the whole coast." 
Communication with coast railways at all strategical points 
should, however, be facilitated by the placing of rails along 
the ordinary highways. After giving some technical details 
as to the construction alike of coast railways and road 
tramways, he proceeded : — 

With these roads communicating with the railroads, the 
whole railway system becomes applicable to military purposes. 

The railway system is so especially adapted for defence, and 
so little adapted to invaders, that it should become at once a 
matter of experiment how best to adapt Armstrong or other 
guns to its uses. The process of fitting the engines with shot- 
proof walls to protect the drivers against riflemen would be 
very easy. . . . Nothing but artillery could damage the engines 
or moving batteries, and artillery could not get near them if it 
were desirable to keep out of the way. 

One gun transportable would do the work of ten which are 
fixtures in forts, and there would be no men to take prisoners, 
for no forts would be captured. 



ARMOURED TRAINS. 69 

The more this system is thought of the more the conviction 
will grow that it is the simplest mode of rendering the country 
impenetrable to invaders at a comparatively trifling cost. 

It v^^ill be seen that the scheme here proposed included 
three separate propositions — (i) the use of railways, as 
" engines of war," for coast defence ; (2) the mounting of 
Armstrong or other guns on railway trucks from which they 
could be discharged for the purposes of such defence ; and 
(3) the providing of the engines with " shot-proof walls " 
for the protection of the drivers. A similar protection for 
the men operating the guns on the trucks was not then, 
apparently, considered necessary ; but we have here what 
was clearly the germ of the " armoured train." 

Among the other suggestions advanced on the same 
occasion were some for the employment of railways in 
general for strategical purposes, and more especially for 
the defence of London ; and here, again, the employment 
of armoured trains was advocated. 

" A Staff Officer," writing in The Times oi July 16, i860, 
declared that the most efficacious and the most economical 
line of defence which London could have would be a circular 
railway forming a complete cordon around the Metropolis 
at a distance of fifteen miles from the centre, and having for 
its interior lines of operation the numerous railways already 
existing within that radius. On this circular railway there 
should be " Armstrong and Whit worth ordnance mounted 
on large iron-plated trucks " fitted with traversing plat- 
forms in the way already recommended by W. Bridges 
Adams, the trucks themselves, however, and not only the 
locomotives, being protected by " shot-proof shields." The 
circular railway was to be constructed primarily for strate- 
gical purposes ; but during peace the line would be avail- 
able for ordinary traffic, and in this way it could be made 
to yield at least some return on the capital expenditure. 

The writer of this letter, Lieut. Arthur Walker, then an 
officer of the 79th Highlanders and the holder of a staff 
appointment at the School of Musketry, Fleetwood, fol- 
lowed up the subject by reading a paper on " Coast Rail- 
ways and Railway Artillery " at a meeting of the Royal 



70 THE RISE OF RAIL-POWER. 

United Service Institution on January 30, 1865. ^ On this 
occasion he specially advocated the use of " moveable 
batteries " for coast defence in conjunction with railways 
constructed more or less within a short parallel distance 
of the entire coast line. Field artillery, he recommended, 
should be mounted on a truck the sides of which would be 
" encased in a cuirass of sufficient thickness," while the 
engine and tender would also be " protected by an iron 
cuirass, and placed between two cupolas for further pro- 
tection." He considered that " to attempt to land in face 
of such an engine of war as this would be simply impossible." 
Moving batteries of this kind would be " the cheapest of all 
possible fortresses. . . . We have nothing to do but to 
improvise well-adapted gun-carriages for our rails." At the 
same meeting Mr. T. Wright, C.E., gave details of a pro- 
posed railway train battery for coast, frontier and inland 
defence which was designed to carry ten, twenty or forty 
guns or mortars. 

Another early advocate of the use of railways as an 
actual instrument of warfare was Colonel E. R. Wethered, 
who, in 1872, wrote to the War Office suggesting that 
heavy ordnance should be mounted on wheeled carriages 
so constructed that they could be moved along any of the 
railways, from point to point. In this way the three-fold 
advantage would be gained of (i) utilising the railway 
system for purposes of national defence ; (2) rendering 
possible a concentration of artillery with overwhelming 
force at any given spot, and, (3) by the use of these move- 
able carriages for the conveyance of the guns, exposing the 
men to less risk. 

Colonel Wethered further communicated to The Times 
of May 25, 1877, a letter on " Portable Batteries " in which 
he declared that if, before an enemy could effect a landing, 
we were to provide the means of concentrating, with unerr- 
ing certainty, on any given points of the coast, a crushing 
force of artillery, with guns of heavier calibre than even 
the warships of the invader could command, it would be 

^ See the "Journal of the Royal United Service Institution" 
Vol. IX., pp. 221-31, 1865. 



ARMOURED TRAINS. 71 

impossible for tlie vessels of an invading force to approach 
near enough to effect the landing of their men. He con- 
tinued : — 

My proposal is to take the full advantage which our railway 
system, in connection with our insular position, affords, and 
provide powerful moveable batteries which can be sent fully 
equipped in fighting order direct by railway to any required 
poftit ; and the recent experimental trials of the 81-ton gun 
have proved that the heaviest ordnance can be moved and 
fought on railv/ay metals with considerable advantage. . . . 
In connection with our present main lines of railway, which 
probably would require strengthening at certain points, I would 
construct branch lines or sidings leading to every strategical 
point of our coast and into every fort, as far as possible, with 
requisite platforms. . . . These branch Hnes during peace 
would, doubtless, be of some small commercial val'ie. . . . 
I would mount as many of our heaviest guns as practicable 
on railway gun carriages so that they could be moved by rail 
from one face of a front to another, and from one place to 
another. 

He also recommended that guns thus mounted, fully 
equipped, and ready for use, should be kept at three large 
central depots which might be utilised for the defence of 
London. At each of them he would station (i) Militia and 
Volunteer Artillery able not only to work the guns but to 
construct, repair or destroy railway lines, and (2) a loco- 
motive corps specially trained in the working of traffic 
under war conditions. 

By reading a paper at the Royal United Service Institu- 
tion on April 24, 1891, on " The Use of Railways for Coast 
and Harbour Defence," ^ Lieut. E. P. Girouard, R.E. 
(now Major-General Sir E. Percy C. Girouard, K.C.M.G.), 
made what was, at that time, an important contribution 
to a subject on which there was then still much to be learned. 
Sketching a detailed scheme comprising the employment 
of all the coastal railways for the purposes of national 
defence, he emphasised the value of Britain's " enormous 
railway power " as the strong point of her defensive position, 
whether regarded from the point of view of (i) railway 

^ " Journal of the Royal United Service Institution," Vol. XXXV., 
1891. 



72 THE RISE OF RAIL-POWER. 

mileage open as compared with the square mile of coastal 
area to be defended, or (2) the length of coast line compared 
with the railway mileage at or near that coast line, and, 
therefore, locally available for its defence. " Why," he 
asked, " should we not turn to account the enormous advan- 
tage which our great railway power gives us to concentrate 
every available gun at a threatened point in the right and 
the proper time, which the proper utilisation of our rail- 
ways can and will do, thereby practically doubling or 
e]uadrupling our available gun power ? " 

Whilst the subject had thus been under discussion in 
the United Kingdom, America, in her Civil War of 1861-65, 
had set the rest of the world an example by actually intro- 
ducing armoured-protected gun-carrying trucks into modern 
warfare. 

Writing from Washington, under date August 29, 1862, 
to Colonel Herman Haupt, then Chief of Construction and 
Transportation in the Department of Rappahannock, Mr. 
P. H. Watson, Assistant-Secretary of War, said : — " An 
armour-clad car, bullet proof, and mounting a cannon, has 
arrived here and will be sent down to Alexandria." A 
later message, on the same date added : — " After you see 
the bullet-proof car, let me know what you think of it. I 
think you ought at once to have a locomotive protected by 
armour. Can you have the work done expeditiously and 
well at Alexandria, or shall I get it done at Philadelphia or 
Wilmington ? " The car was duly received ; but Haupt 's 
comments in respect to it, as recorded in his " Reminis- 
cences," show that he was not greatly impressed by the 
innovation. " P. H. Watson, Assistant-Secretary of War, 
sent me," he says, " an armour-clad, bullet-proof car, 
mounting a cannon. The kindness was appreciated, but 
the present was an elephant. I could not use it, and, being 
in the wa}^ it was finall}^ side-tracked on an old siding in 
Alexandria." 

It would seem, however, that other armour-clad cars 
were brought into actual use during the course of the Civil 
War. 

In the Railway Age Gazette (Chicago) for January 22, 1915, 



ARMOURED TRAINS. 73 

Mr. Frederick Hobart, associated editor of the New York 
Engineer and Mining Journal, writes, from personal know- 
ledge, of two armoured cars which were in use in the Civil 
War. One of these, formed by heavy timbers built up on a 
flat car, was put together in the shops of the Atlantic and 
North Carolina Railroad Company at Newberne, N.C., in 
1862, about two months after the city had been captured 
by the Burnside expedition. The armour consisted of old 
rails spiked on the outside of the planking com.posing the 
sides and front of the car. Along the sides there were slits 
for musketry fire, and at the front end there was a port hole 
covered with a shutter behind which a gun from one of the 
field batteries was mounted. The second car was similarly 
constructed, but was armed with a naval howitzer. The 
cars were run ahead of the engine, and were used in recon- 
noitring along the railroad line west of Newberne. Mr. 
Hobart adds that he was quite familiar with the cars, having 
assisted in the design and construction of both. 

In the Centurv Magazine for September, 1887 (page 774), 
there is given an illustration (" from a photograph ") of an 
armour-clad car described as " the Union Railroad Battery " 
which was, apparently, used in connection with the springing 
of the mine in front of Petersburg on July 30, 1864. The 
car is shown to have consisted of a low truck with, at one 
end, a sloping armour plate coming down almost to the rails, 
and having a hole through which the gun placed behind it 
on the truck could be fired. The sides of the truck were 
protected from the top of the sloping armour downwards, 
but the back was open. The car was, of course, designed 
to be pushed in front of the locomotive. 

Mr. L. Lodian, also, contributed to the issue of the Ameri- 
can periodical. Railway and Locomotive Engineering, for 
May, 1915, a communication, under the title of " The Origin 
of Armoured Railroad Cars Unquestionably the Product of 
the American Civil War," in which, claiming that " our own 
Civil War " originated those cars, he said : — 

Attached is a picture of one in use on the old Philadelphia - 
Baltimore Railroad. The illustration appeared in Frank Leslie's 
illustrated periodical on May 18, 1864. No better proof could 



74 THE RISE OF RAIL-POWER. 

be furnished of the authenticity of the fact that such a car 
was in use at that time. . . . There appears to be no great 
variation even to-day in armoured car design from the initial 
effort of half a century ago. Pictures are appearing in numer- 
ous periodicals, at the period of writing, of those in use by the 
European belligerents, and in general appearance and outline 
they are about the same as the original, the chief variation in 
their use being that the war-going locomotive is also sheathed 
in armour, whereas that in use in the sixties was entirely 
unprotected, except in front, and then only by reason of the 
mailclad car being placed in front to do the fighting. 

As against this suggestion, there is the undoubted fact 
that in the American Civil War the plan was adopted of 
having the locomotives of ordinary troop or supply trains 
protected by armour-plating as a precaution against attack 
when there was no armoured car in front of them. Writing 
to the Director of Military Railroads on October 8, 1862, 
Haupt said : — 

I have been thinking over the subject of locomotives. It 
is one which, at the present time, and in view of the future 
requirements of the service, demands especial attention. Ex- 
perience has shown that on engines men are targets for the 
enemy ; the cabs where they are usually seated have been 
riddled by bullets, and they have only escaped by lying on the 
footboard. It will be necessary to inspire confidence in our 
men by placing iron cabins (bullet proof) upon all or nearly all 
our engines, and the necessity will increase as we penetrate 
further into the enemy's country. 

Again, it is desirable that the smaller and more delicate 
portions of the apparatus should be better protected than at 
present, and I would be pleased if you would give to the plans, 
of which I spoke to you recently, a careful consideration. It 
seems to me that they are peculiarly well adapted to military 
service. 

Haupt adds that " protected locomotives and bullet- 
proof cabs were soon after provided, as recommended " ; 
and elsewhere in his " Reminiscences " he says, on the 
same subject : — 

The bullet-proof cabs on locomotives were very useful — in 
fact, indispensable. I had a number of them made and put 
on engines, and they afforded protection to engineers and iire- 
men against the fire from guerillas from the bushes that lined 
the road. 



ARMOURED TRAINS. 75 

In the Franco-Prussian War of i8yo-yi guns mounted on 
four armour-plated trucks, fitted up in the workshops of 
the Orleans Companj^ under the supervision of M. Dupuy 
de Lorme, Engineer-in-Chief for Naval Construction, were 
taken into action on four occasions during the siege of 
Paris, namely, at Choisy-le-Roi, for the sortie preceding the 
one from Champigny ; near Brie-sur-Marne, to support the 
Champigny sortie ; at Le Bourget, for one of the attempts 
to recapture that position ; and at La Malmaison, to sup- 
port the Montretout sortie. The wagons were protected 
by a covering which consisted of five plates of wrought iron, 
each two-fifths of an inch thick, and giving, therefore, a 
total thickness of two inches. The two engines used were 
also protected by armour-plating. One or two of the 
wagons were struck by field-gun shells without, however, 
sustaining further damage than the denting of their plates. 
The engines escaped damage altogether. On going into 
action the armoured wagons were followed by another bullet- 
proof engine conveying a party of men with tools and mater- 
ials to repair any interruption of the lines that might inter- 
fere with the return of the trains ; but the only damage 
done was so slight that it was remedied in about a quarter 
of an hour.^ 

Further use was made of armoured trains in the Egyptian 
Campaign of 1882. One that was put together to assist 
in the defensive works at Alexandria is declared in the 
official history of the campaign ^ to have " proved most 
serviceable." Two of the trucks, fitted with iron plating 
and sand bags as a protecting cover, carried one Nordenfelt 
and two Gatling guns. A 9-pr. was also placed on one of 
the trucks, together with a crane by means of which it could 
be lowered out immediately. Other trucks, rendered bullet 
proof by sand bags and boiler-plating, and carrying a force 

^ For detailed description, with diagrams, of the trains here in 
question, sec ' ' Armour-plated Railway Wagons used during the 
late Sieges of Paris," by Lieut. Fraser, R.E. Papers of the Corps 
of Royal Engineers, N.S., Vol. XX, 1872. 

- "Military History of the Campaign of 1882 in Egypt." Pre- 
pared by the Intelligence Branch of the War Office. Revised 
edition. London, 1908. 



76 THE RISE OF RAIL-POWER. 

of 200 bluejackets, with small arms, completed the fighting 
force. On July 28, the train took part in a reconnaissance 
sent out to ascertain the extent of the damage which had 
been done to the railway lines near Arabi's outpost. Shots 
were fired at the train by the enemy, but without effect. 
The reconnaissance was a complete success inasmuch as it 
enabled such repairs to be done to the railway as gave the 
use of a second fine between Ramleh and Alexandria. 

So useful had the train been found that it was now further 
improved by adding to it a 40-pr. on a truck protected by 
an iron mantlet. The locomotive was put in the middle 
of the train and was itself protected by sand bags and rail- 
way iron. Thus strengthened, the train went into action 
in the reconnaissance in force carried out from Alexandria 
on August 5, and " the most interesting incident of the 
engagement," according to the official account, " was the 
good service done by the 40-pr. from the armoured train." 

Early in the morning of September 13 the train, consist- 
ing of five wagons, and having, on this occasion, one Krupp 
gun and one Catling in addition to the 40-pr., was sent to 
support the attack on Tel-el- Kebir. It was followed by 
another train having 350 yards of permanent-way mater 
ials, with all the necessary tools and appliances for the 
prompt carrying out of any repairs that might be necessary. 
Owing, however, to the hazy and uncertain light and to the 
ever-increasing clouds of smoke that hung over the battle- 
field, it was impossible to fire the 40-pr. 

In the futile attempt made in 1885 to construct a railway 
from Suakin to Berber, in support of the Nile Expedition 
of 1884-85, resort was had to an armoured train for the pur- 
pose of protecting the line from the constant attacks to 
which it was subjected by the enemy. The train carried a 
20-pr. B.L., which could be fired only either in prolonga- 
tion of the line or at a sHght angle from it. 

At the Camp of Exercise in DelJii in January, 1886, some 
important experiments were carried out with a view to 
testing the practicabihty of firing guns at right angles to an 
ordinary line of railway, the result being to establish the 
fact that a 40-pr. R.B.L. could be fired with perfect safety 



ARMOURED TRAINS. yy 

broadside from [a) small empty wagons mounted on four 
wheels ; (6) small empty wagons weighted up to four tons ; 
and (c) empty eight-wheel bogies. These experiments 
were especially successful when account is taken of the fact 
that no attempt was made to reduce in any way the energy 
of recoil. 

Other experiments, begun in 1885, were successfully con- 
ducted during a succession of years both by the French 
Government and by private firms in France in the transport 
and the firing of guns from railway trucks with a view to 
obtaining definite data on the subject, more especially in 
relation to firing at right angles to the line. 

In Italy a distinguished officer raised the question in the 
Italian Parliament, in 1891, as to whether Sicily should not 
be defended by means of a coast railway and armoured 
trains. 

Some experiments carried out at Newhaven, Sussex, in 
1894, were the more interesting because the results attained 
were due to the combined efforts of Artillery Volunteers 
and of the London, Brighton and South Coast Railway 
Company. 

Under the Volunteer mobilization scheme of 1891 there 
were some 300 members of the ist Sussex Artillery Volun- 
teers to whom no special duties had been allotted, and there 
happened to be, at Shoreham, a 40-pr. Armstrong B.L. 
gun which was then serving no particular purpose. In- 
spired by these two facts, the Secretary of the Committee 
for National Defence suggested, in November, 1891, that 
negotiations should be opened with the London, Brighton 
and South Coast Railway Company with a view to their 
mounting the 40-pr. on a specially prepared truck, designed 
to form part of an armoured train, experiments in firing 
the gun from the truck — in order to test the efficiency of 
this expedient for the purposes of coast defence — being 
afterwards carried out by the Artillery Volunteers whose 
services were available for the purpose. 

On being approached, the directors of the railway com- 
pany readily consented to the fitting up of the truck being 
carried out at their engineering and carriage works ; tliey 



yS THE RISE OF RAIL-POWER. 

contributed towards the expenses, and members of their 
staff entered with great cordiahty into the scheme, Mr. 
R. J. BilHngton, the locomotive superintendent, being the 
first to suggest the mounting of the gun on a turntable to be 
fixed on the truck, — a " bold departure," as it was regarded 
at the time, and one expected to produce excellent results. 
The railway staff were the more interested, also, in the 
proposed experiments because a large proportion of the 
members of the ist Sussex Artillery Volunteers consisted 
of men employed at the Brighton Company's works. 

In commenting upon these facts. Col. Charles Gervaise 
Boxall, the commanding officer, said in a paper on " The 
Armoured Train for Coast Defence," read by him at a 
meeting of officers and N.C.O's of the Brigade, held at 
Newhaven Fort, Sussex, on May 14, 1894 : — 

When one considers that a railway company is neither a 
philanthropic institution nor a patriotic society, the generous 
support given to this experiment by so powerful a body as the 
directors of the London, Brighton and South Coast Railway 
Company is in itself some considerable evidence of the import- 
ance they themselves ascribe to this effort in the direction of the 
maintenance of coast defence and protection from invasion. 

Preliminary experiments with the gun were conducted 
on May 5, 1894, and they conclusively showed, Col. Boxall 
said, " that the gun will require no traversing to correct 
variation caused by the recoil, while the muzzle of the gun 
can be directed to any part of its circumference by hand- 
spike traversing within half a minute." He was evidently 
proud of the results even of these preliminary trials. They 
were the first occasion on which a heavy gun had been 
fired broadside on the permanent way of an EngHsh railway, 
and the truck was the first armour-plated one on which a 
turntable, a recoil cylinder, and other inventions introduced 
had been employed. So, he further declared : — 

We do confidently submit that, having proved that such a 
gun as this can be mounted so as to be transportable to any 
part of our rai way system at a moment's notice, brought into 
action, and fired with accuracy either end on, broadside, or in 
any other direction, without danger of capsizing, and without 
injury to the permanent way, we have become pioneers of a 



ARMOURED TRAINS. 79 

new departure in artillery which must lead to results of the 
highest importance. 

This was written prior to the full trials, which took place 
at Newhaven on May 19, 1894, in the presence of a distin- 
guished company of military men and others. An account 
of the event will be found in The Times of May 21, 1894. 
The gun and its carriage are described as standing on a 
turntable platform pivoted on the centre of the truck, and 
revolving on a central " racer." The gun detachments 
were protected by a plating six feet high round three sides 
of the turntable, and the gun was fired through an aperture 
in the plating. Drawn by an ordinary locomotive, the 
truck on which the gun was mounted was accompanied by 
two carriages conveying the Volunteer Artillerymen who 
were to serve the gun. Several rounds were fired at a target 
some 2,500 yards distant, and " the armoured train passed 
through the searching and severe ordeal most successfully, 
the jar caused being so slight that a stone placed on the 
rails remained unmoved by the firing." The truck, it is 
further stated, had been provided with some cross girders 
which could be run out and supported on blocks in order 
to secure a broad base when the gun was fired at right angles 
to the line, and there was a further arrangement for connect- 
ing the truck to the rails by strong clips ; but the truck 
remained sufficiently steady without any need for making 
use of these appliances. 

Finally, as will be told more fully in Chapter XVI, the 
South African Campaign of i8gg-igo2 definitely established 
the usefulness of armoured trains as an " instrument of 
war," and led both to the creation of an efficient organisa- 
tion for their employment on the most scientific and most 
practical lines and to the establishment of certain principles 
in regard to such important matters of detail as uses and 
purposes, administration, staff, armament, tactics, etc. 
Published in the " Detailed History of the Railways in the 
South African War " which was issued by the Royal Engin- 
eers' Institute, Chatham, in 1905, these principles were 
adopted in the United States with modifications to suit 
American conditions, and, so modified, are reproduced in 



8o THE RISE OF RAIL-POWER. 

Major William D. Connor's handbook on " Military Rail- 
ways," forming No 32 of the Professional Papers of the 
Corps of Engineers, U.S. Army. An excellent treatment of 
the subject, from a technical point of view, will be found 
in a paper, by Capt. H. O. Nance, on " Armoured Trains," 
published, with photographs and drawings, in " Papers of 
the Corps of Royal Engineers," Fourth Series, Vol. I., 
Paper 4 (Chatham, 1906). 



CHAPTER VIII 
Railway Ambulance Transport 

According to statistics which have been compiled in 
relation to wars alike in ancient and in modern times, for 
every ten men among the armies in the field who have 
died from wounds received in battle there have been from 
thirty-five to forty who died from sickness or disease. 
Writing in the Journal des Sciences Militaires, Dr. Morache, 
a surgeon in the French Army, has said that while the total 
number of deaths among combatants taking part in the 
Crimean War was 95,000, no fewer than 70,000 were due 
to typhus, scurvy, cholera or other diseases. In the Italian 
campaign of 1859 the French lost 5,498 men, of whom 2,500 
died from sickness. On the conclusion of the Russo- 
Turkish War the Russians had 51,000 of their troops sick, 
the ravages of typhus having been especially severe. 

These conditions have been materially aggravated by 
the gathering together of great numbers of sick and wounded 
into overcrowded hospitals situate on or near to the theatre 
of war and destined inevitably to become hot-beds of disease 
and pestilence far more dangerous to human life, under 
these conditions, than even the most deadly weapons which 
the art of war had invented for use on the battle-field itself. 

Nor was it the armies alone that suffered. Returning 
troops spread the seeds of disease among the civil population, 
causing epidemics that lingered, in some instances, for 
several years and carried off many thousands of non-com- 
batants, in addition to the great number of victims among 
the combatants themselves. In a volume of 866 pages, 
published by Dr. E. Gurlt, under the title of " Zur Geschichte 
der I Internationellen und Freiwilligen Krankenpflege im 
Kriege " (Leipzig, 1873), will be found many terrible details 

81 G 



82 THE RISE OF RAIL-POWER. 

concerning the ravages in France, Germany and Austria of 
the typhus which Napoleon's troops brought back with 
them on the occasion of their disastrous retreat from Russia. 
The most practicable means of mitigating, if not of 
avoiding, these various evils is to be found in the prompt 
removal of the sick and wounded from the theatre of war, 
and their distribution in smaller units, not simply among a 
group of neighbouring towns, but over an area extending to 
considerable distances inland. The adoption of this remedy 
only became possible, however, with a provision of adequate 
rail facilities, and even then many years were to elapse 
before an efificient system of railway ambulance transport 
was finally evolved. 

The objects which the use of the railway in these directions 
was to attain were alike humanitarian and strategical. 

To the sick and wounded among the troops, prompt 
removal and wide-spread distribution among hospitals in 
the interior meant (i) that they avoided the risks to which 
they would have been subjected in the aforesaid overcrowded 
and pestilential hospitals near the fighting line, where 
slight injuries might readily develop dangerous symptoms, 
and contagious disease complete the conditions leading to a 
fatal issue ; (2) that, apart from these considerations, it 
would be possible to give them a greater degree of individual 
attention if they were distributed among a large number of 
hospitals away from the scene of the fighting ; (3) that 
more conservative methods of surgery became practicable 
when operations of a kind not to be attempted either on 
the battle-field or in temporary hospitals (from which the 
inmates might have to be suddenly removed, owing to some 
change in the strategical position) could be delayed until 
the sufferer's arrival at some hospital in the interior, where 
better appliances and better facilities would be available, 
and where, after the operation, the patient would be able 
to remain undisturbed until he was cured ; (4) that these 
improved conditions might more especially permit of 
the avoidance of amputations otherwise imperatively 
necessary ; and (5) that, on the whole, the wounded soldier 
was afforded a better chance of effecting a speedy recovery 



RAILWAY AMBULANCE TRANSPORT. 83 

and of saving both life and limb than would be possible if 
railways were not available. 

To the army in the field the innovation meant that with 
the speedy removal of the sick and wounded it would be 
relieved of the great source of embarrassment caused by 
the presence and dependence upon it of so many inefficients ;^ 
depot and intermediate hospitals could be reduced to the 
smallest proportions, and would thus occasion less incon- 
venience if, owing to a retreat or a change in the strategical 
position, they were brought within the sphere of military 
operations ; with the delegation of so many of the sick and 
wounded to the care of civil practitioners in the interior, 
fewer of the divisional, brigade and regimental medical 
officers would require to be detached from the marching 
column ; a smaller supplementary medical staff would 
suffice ; a considerable reduction could be effected in the 
stocks of ambulance supplies kept on hand at the front ; 
while important strategical advantages would be gained 
through (i) the greater freedom of movement which the 
army would secure ; (2) the decreased risk of the number 
of efficients being reduced through the outbreak of epi- 
demics ; and (3) the prospect of a large proportion of the 
sick and wounded being enabled to rejoin the fighting 
force on their making a speedy recovery from their illness 
or their wounds. 

The earliest occasion on which the railway was made use 
of for the conveyance of sick and wounded from a scene 
of actual hostilities to the rear was on the occasion of the 
Crimean War, when the little military line between Balaklava 
and the camp before Sebastopol, of which an account will 
be given in Chapter XV, was so employed. The facilities 
afforded were, however, of the most primitive character. 
Only the wagons used for the transport of supplies to the 
front — wagons, that is to say, little better than those 
known as " contractors' trucks " — ^were available, and there 
were no means of adapting them to the conveyance of 
sufferers who could not be moved otherwise than in a recum- 

1 A saying attributed to Napoleon is that he preferred a dead 
eoldier to a wounded one. 



84 THE RISE OF RAIL-POWER. 

bent position. Sitting-iip cases could, therefore, alone be 
carried ; but what was to develop into a revolution in the 
conditions of warfare was thus introduced, all the same. 

In the Italian war of iS^g both the French and the Aus- 
trians made use of the railways for the withdrawal of their 
sick and wounded, and, in his " Souvenir de Solferino," 
Jean Henri Dumant, the " Father " of the Red Cross Move- 
ment, speaks of the transportation of wounded from Brescia 
to Milan by train to the extent of about i,ooo a night. 
No arrangements for their comfort on the journey had been 
made in advance, and the changes in the military situation 
were so rapid, when hostilities broke out, that no special 
facilities could be provided then. All that was done was to 
lay down straw on the floor of the goods or cattle trucks 
used for the conveyance of some of the more serious cases. 
The remainder travelled in ordinary third-class carriages, 
and their sufferings on the journey, before they reached 
the long and narrow sheds put up along the railway lines 
at Milan or elsewhere to serve as temporary hospitals, must 
often have been very great. They may, nevertheless, have 
escaped the fate of those who died, not from their wounds, 
but from the fevers quickly generated in the overcrowded 
hospitals at the front, where there was, besides, a general 
deficiency of ambulance requirements of all kinds. The 
good resulting from the removal by train is, indeed, said 
to have been " immense." 

These experiences in the campaign of 1859 led to a recom- 
mendation being made in the following year by a German 
medical authority. Dr. E. Gurlt,^ that railway vehicles 
should be specially prepared for the conveyance of the 
sick and wounded in time of war. The plan which he 
himself suggested for adoption was the placing of the 
sufferers in hammocks suspended from hooks driven into 
the roof of the goods van or carriage employed, mattresses 
being first put on the hammocks, when necessary. By this 



^ " Ueber den Transport Schwervenvundeter und Kranker im 
Kriege, nebst Vorschlagen iiber die Benutzung der Eisenbahnen 
dabei. " 33 pp. Berlin, 1860. 



RAILWAY AMBULANCE TRANSPORT. 85 

means, he suggested, the sufferers would travel much more 
comfortably than when seated in the ordinary passenger 
carriages, or when lying on straw in the goods wagons or 
cattle trucks. 

Dr. Gurlt's pamphlet served the good purpose of drawing 
much attention to the subject, and his proposals were duly 
subjected to the test of experiment. They failed, however, 
on two grounds, — -(i) because the roofs of the goods vans, 
designed for shelter only, were not sufficiently strong to 
bear the weight of a number of men carried in the way 
suggested ; and (2) because the motion of the train caused 
the hammocks to come into frequent contact with the sides 
of the wagon, to the serious discomfort of the occupants. 

In November of the same year (i860) the Prussian War 
Minister, von Roon, appointed a Commission to enquire 
into the whole subject of the care of the sick and wounded 
in time of war, and the question of transport by rail was 
among the various matters considered. As a result of 
these investigations, the Minister issued, on July i, 1861, 
an order to the effect that in future the less seriously wounded 
should travel in ordinary first, second or third-class carriages, 
according to the degree of comfort they required, care being 
taken to let them have corner seats ; while for those who 
were seriously ill, or badly wounded, there were to be pro- 
vided sacks of straw having three canvas loops on each side 
for the insertion of poles by means of which the sacks and the 
sufferers lying upon them could be readily lifted in or out 
of the goods wagons set apart for their conveyance. In 
these wagons they were to be placed on the floor in such a 
way that each wagon would accommodate either seven or 
eight. In the event of a deficiency of sacks, loose straw 
was to be used instead. The door on one side of the truck 
was to be left open for ventilation. A doctor and attend- 
ants were to accompany each train, and they were to have 
a supply of bandages, medicines and appliances. Of the 
last-mentioned a list of five articles was appended as obliga- 
tory. The medical officer was to visit the wagons during 
the stoppages, and the attendants on duty in the wagons 
were to carry flags so that, when necessary, they could signal 



86 THE RISE OF RAIL-POWER. 

both for the train to pull up and for the doctor to come to 
the sufferers. 

This was as far as Prussia had got by 1861, when the 
arrangements stated were regarded as quite sufficient to 
meet the requirements of the situation. Real progress was 
to come, rather, from the other side of the Atlantic. 

In the early days of the War of Secession (1861-65) the 
arrangements for the conveyance by rail of the sick and 
wounded from the battle-fields of the Eastern States to the 
hospitals in the large cities were still distinctly primitive. 
Those who could sit up in the ordinary cars were conveyed 
in them. Those who could not sit up, or would be injured 
by so doing, were carried to the railway, by hand, on the 
mattresses or stretchers they had occupied in the hospitals 
to which they had first been taken. At the station the 
mattresses were placed on thick layers of straw or hay 
strewn over the floors of the freight cars in which supplies 
had been brought to the front. Large window spaces were 
cut in the sides or ends of the cars to provide for ventilation. 
On some occasions, when hay or straw was not available, 
pine boughs or leaves were used instead. As only the floor 
space was occupied no more than about ten patients could 
be carried comfortably in each car, though as many as 
twenty were occasionally crowded in. The wide doors of 
the box cars readily permitted of the beds being hfted in 
or out. Medical officers, with supplies, accompanied each 
train. On arrival at New York, Washington, Philadelphia, 
Harrisburg, or other destination, the sufferers were taken 
out and carried, still on the same mattresses or stretchers, 
to the hospitals there. 

Large numbers of sick or wounded were conveyed by rail 
under one or other of these conditions, and the work was 
done with great expedition. Between the morning of 
June 12 and the evening of June 14, 1863, over g,ooo wounded, 
victims of the Federal disaster at Chancellorsville, were 
taken by the single-track Aquia Creek railroad from Aquia 
Creek to Washington. Many even of the severely wounded 
declared they had suffered no inconvenience from the 
journey. After the battle of Gettysburg, July 1-3, i86j, 



RAILWAY AMBULANCE TRANSPORT. 87 

more than 15,000 wounded had been sent by rail from the 
field hospitals to Baltimore, New York, Harrisburg or 
Philadelphia by July 22. An even more rapid distribution 
was effected after the battles of the Wilderness and Spott- 
sylvania when, with a few exceptions, the transfer to the 
hospitals in the cities mentioned was effected in the course 
of a few days. Following* on the battle of Olustree (Febru- 
ary 20, 1864), the serious cases were removed on the Mobile 
Railway by freight cars bedded with pine boughs, palmetto 
leaves and a small quantity of straw, each patient having 
a blanket, in addition. 

As an improvement on these methods of transport, the 
plan was adopted of fixing rows of upright wooden posts, 
connecting floor and ceiling, on each side of a car as supports 
for two or three tiers of rough wooden bunks, a central 
gangway through the car being left. In this way the avail- 
able space in the car was much better utilised than with 
the straw-on-floor system. Next, in place of the bunks, 
came an arrangement by which the stretchers whereon the 
patients lay could be securely lashed to the uprights ; while 
this was followed, in turn, by the insertion of wooden pegs 
into the uprights and the placing on them of large and 
strong india-rubber rings into which the handles of the 
stretchers could readily be slipped, and so suspended. The 
first car so arranged came into use in March, 1863. 

Meanwhile the Philadelphia Railroad Company had, at 
the end of 1862, fitted up an ambulance car on the principle 
of a sleeping car, but so planned that the stretchers on which 
the sufferers lay could be made to slide in or out of the 
wooden supports. This particular car was capable of 
accommodating fifty-one patients, in addition to a seat at 
each end for an attendant. Other innovations introduced 
on the car were (i) a stove at which soups could be 
warmed or tea made ; (2) a water tank, and (3) a locker. 

What the introducers of these improvements mainly 
prided themselves upon was the fact that the patient could 
remain, throughout the entire journey from field hospital 
to destination, on the stretcher he had been placed on at 
the start. The adoption of this principle necessitated. 



88 THE RISE OF RAIL-POWER. 

however, uniformity in the dimensions of the stretchers in 
order that these could always be accommodated on the 
ambulance-car fittings. 

The next important development was reached when the 
ambulance car, run in connection with ordinary trains, 
and used for exceptionally severe cases, was succeeded by the 
ambulance train. Here came further innovations, the nine 
or ten " ward-cars," of which such a train mainly consisted 
in the Eastern States, being supplemented by others fitted 
up as dispensary and store-room, kitchen, and quarters 
for surgeon, attendants, and staff of train, besides carry- 
ing all necessary appliances and provisions for the 
journey. 

What was now specially aimed at was to make the train 
as close an approach to an actual hospital on wheels as 
circumstances would permit. " At present," wrote the 
Medical Director of the Department of Washington, " the 
sick and wounded are transferred in cars ill-adapted for 
the purpose and with difficulty spared from the other 
pressing demands ; and lives are lost on the route not infre- 
quently which, in all probability, might be saved by a 
more comfortable and easy method of transportation." 
The train he caused to be constructed consisted of ten 
ward-cars, one car for the surgeon and attendants, one as a 
dispensary and store-room, and one as a kitchen, etc. The 
ward-cars, arranged on an improved principle, each accom- 
modated thirty recumbent and twenty or thirty seated 
patients. The train was to run regularly on the Orange 
and Alexandria Railroad between the theatre of war and 
the base hospitals at Alexandria and Washington. It was 
either to supplement or to supersede the freight cars with 
their bedding of straw, hay or leaves. If only from the 
point of view of the inadequate supply of rolling stock, a 
car fitted up to accommodate fifty or sixty patients offered 
an obvious advantage, in the speedy removal and distribution 
of sick and wounded, over a car, without fittings, in which 
the floor space alone could be utihsed. 

Several complete trains of the type stated were soon 
running on the Orange and Alexandria Railroad, within 



RAILWAY AMBULANCE TRANSPORT. 89 

the Union lines, and the hospital train thus became an 
established institution in modern warfare. 

It was, however, in connection with the chief army in the 
West, the Army of the Cumberland, operating under General 
George H. Thomas, that the useful purposes which could 
be served by hospital trains became most conspicuous. 

The need for them in the West was even greater than in 
the East, because the distances to be covered were greater 
and lay, also, to a considerable extent, in enemy country. 

In the fall of 1863 and the winter of 1864, as narrated in 
the " Medical and Surgical History of the War of the Rebel- 
lion," the chief army of the West was concentrated prin- 
cipally along the line of railroads leading from Nashville, 
Tennessee, to the South-west, via Chattanooga, Tenn., and 
onwards towards Atlanta, Georgia. At the outset the sick 
and wounded who could travel in ordinary passenger cars 
to points in the North were so taken. Severe cases had 
to remain in the nearest available hospital depot. In 
addition to the discomfort suffered by the former in having 
to travel in cars not suited to invalids, they were liable to 
frequent and prolonged delays on the single-track lines by 
reason of the constant passing of supply trains proceeding 
to the front ; and not unfrequently the detentions were at 
points where nothing could be obtained for feeding the 
sufferers or making them comfortable, while even if rations 
could be drawn the train afforded no means of cooking 
them. So it was resolved to have a train which would be 
the equivalent of an ambulating, self-contained hospital, 
capable of carrying both recumbent and sitting-up patients 
and supplying all their wants on the journey. 

On August II, 1863, instructions were sent from the 
Assistant-Surgeon-General's Office to the Medical Officer 
of the Army of the Cumberland directing him " to take 
immediate measures to fit up a special train for hospital 
purposes, with every possible comfort," to run between 
Nashville, Ten., and Louisville, Ken. General Thomas, 
in turn, accorded the fullest authority to the Medical 
Officer to select for the purpose the best locomotives and 
the best cars to be found among the railway rolling stock, 



90 THE RISE OF RATL-POWER. 

and to have new cars fitted up whenever necessary. He 
further directed that the most experienced drivers, con- 
ductors and other necessary railway employes should be 
selected for the conduct of the hospital-train service. 

Three of these trains were ready by the spring of 1864, 
and they ran regularly — each taking a section of the journey 
— between Atlanta and Louisville, a distance of 472 miles. 
They consisted, apparently, in part of specially-built and 
in part of adapted rolling stock, the large open American 
passenger cars, with their greater freedom from internal 
fittings than ordinary European railway carriages, lending 
themselves specially to the purpose. In the converted 
passenger cars the carrying of the stretchers through the 
end doors was avoided by removing two windows and the 
panelling underneath them from the side of the car, and 
making an opening 6 ft. in width which could be closed by 
a sliding door. Each train provided five ward-cars (con- 
verted passenger cars) for lying-down patients ; a surgeon's 
car (a passenger car from which the seats had been removed, 
with partitions and fittings for the accommodation of the 
doctor and his helpers) ; a dispensary car (in which an ample 
supply of medicines, instruments and appliances was car- 
ried) ; an ordinary passenger car for sitting-up patients 
or convalescents ; a kitchen car (divided into kitchen, 
dining-room and store-room) ; and a conductor's car. The 
kitchen car was supplied with a small cooking range, boilers, 
and other requisites for the feeding of from 175 to 200 
patients. The cars were warmed and lighted in winter, 
and special attention was paid to ventilation, so that Dr. F. 
L. Town, of the United States Army, was able to report 
of them : — " In visiting these hospital trains, the air is 
found sweet and pure, the wards are neat and inviting ; and 
it may unhesitatingly be said that men on hospital trains 
are often as comfortable and better fed and attended than 
in many permanent hospitals." The trains had distin- 
guishing signals which were recognised by the Confederates, 
and none of them were ever fired on or molested in any way. 

One, at least, of the trains was despatched daily from the 
vicinity of the field hospitals. The services rendered by 



RAILWAY AMBULANCE TRANSPORT. 91 

them during the last eighteen months of the war were of 
the greatest vahie. It has been said, indeed, that the com- 
bined effect of all the provision made for the care of the 
sick and wounded and their speedy recovery — including 
therein, as one of the most important items, their prompt 
removal and distribution by rail— was to ensure for the 
Federals the retention of a force equal in itself to an army 
of 100,000 men. No single fact could show more con- 
clusively the strategical as well as the humanitarian value 
of railway ambulance transport. 

These details as to what was accomplished in the American 
Civil War are the more deserving of record because they 
show that the evolution of the " hospital on wheels," from the 
initial conditions of a bedding of straw on the floor of a 
railway goods wagon, w^as really carried out, step by step, 
in all its essential details, in the United States. The hos- 
pital train was thus not an English invention, as is widely 
assumed to be the case ; though much was to be done here 
to improve its construction, equipment and organisation. 

Whilst America had been gaining all this very practical 
experience, the Danish War of 1864 had given Prussia the 
opportunity of testing the system approved by her in 1861 
for the conveyance of the less severely wounded in ordinary 
passenger carriages and of the seriously wounded on sacks 
of straw laid on the floor of goods wagons. The results 
were found so unsatisfactory that on the conclusion of 
hostilities a fresh series of investigations and experiments 
was begun, and matters were still at this stage when war 
broke out between Prussia and Austria. 

The conditions in regard to the care of the sick and wounded 
in the campaign of 1866 were deplorably defective. Not 
only, according to Dr. T. W. Evans ^ — an American medical 
man, settled in Paris, who visited the battle-field and assisted 
in the work of relief — was there no advance on what had 
been done in the United States, but the American example 
was in no way followed, the combatants having made no 
attempt whatever to profit from her experience. 

^ " Les Institutions Sanitaires pendant le Conflit Austro-Prus- 
sien-Italien." Par Thomas W. Evans. Paris, 1867. 



92 THE RISE OF RAIL-POWER. 

After the battle of Sadowa, thousands of wounded were 
left on the battle-field, and many remained there three 
days and three nights before they could be removed in the 
carts and wagons which were alone available for the pur- 
pose. Within five days every village in a radius of four 
leagues was crowded with wounded. Those taken to 
Dresden and Prague in ordinary passenger carriages or 
goods vans were detained for days on the journey owing to 
the congestion of traffic on the lines. Some of them, also, 
were in the trains for two days before their wounds were 
dressed. Then the use of straw, depended on by the 
Austrians, was found to be unsatisfactory. It failed to 
afford the sufferers a sufficient protection against the jolting 
of the wagons, especially when they worked through it to 
the bare boards ; and even then there was not always 
sufficient straw available to meet requirements. Altogether, 
it is declared, the wounded suffered " unheard-of tortures." 

Shortly after the conclusion of the war there was appointed 
in Prussia a further Commission of medical and military 
authorities to renew the investigation into the care and 
transport of sick and wounded. The Commission sat from 
March i8 to May 5, 1867. In the result it still favoured 
the use of sacks of straw, with canvas loops, as the simplest 
and most comfortable method to adopt for the rail transport 
of recumbent sufferers, though it recommended that the 
sacks should be made with side pieces, giving them the 
form of paillasses, as this would afford a greater degree of 
support to those lying on them. The American system of sus- 
pending stretchers in tiers by means of india-rubber rings 
depending from pegs let into wooden uprights was disap- 
proved of, partly because of the continuous swinging of the 
stretchers so carried, and partly because of the assumed 
discomfort to one set of patients of having others just above 
them. The report also recommended the adoption of the 
following principles : — (i) Through communication between 
all the carriages employed in one and the same train for the 
conveyance of sick and wounded ; (2) provision, for the 
severely wounded, either of beds with springs or of litters 
suspended from the roof or the sides of the carriages ; and 



RAILWAY AMBULANCE TRANSPORT. 93 

(3) extra carriages for the accommodation of doctor, nurses, 
surgical appliances, medical stores, cooking utensils, etc. 

These principles were subjected to various tests, and it 
was found that in Germany the existing carriages which 
could best be adapted to the desired purpose were those 
belonging to the fourth-class, inasmuch as they had no internal 
divisions or fittings, travellers by them being expected 
either to stand during the journey or to sit on their luggage. 
The only structural alteration necessary was the placing of 
the doors at the end of the carriages instead of at the sides, 
so that, on opening these end doors, and letting down a 
small bridge to be provided for the purpose, access could 
readily be obtained from one carriage to another. Instruc- 
tions were accordingly given that all fourth-class carriages 
on the Prussian railways should thenceforward have end 
doors— an arrangement which had, in fact, already been 
adopted in South Germany. Steps were also taken in 
Prussia to adapt goods vans and horse boxes for the con- 
veyance of sick and wounded in the event of the number of 
fourth-class carriages not being sufficient to meet require- 
ments. 

The widespread interest which was being attracted 
throughout Europe to the subject of the care of the sick 
and wounded in war led to a series of experimental trials 
being carried out at the Paris International Exhibition of 
i86j, when, with the help of a short line of railway laid 
down in the exhibition grounds and of a goods wagon 
supplied by the Western of France Railway Company, a 
number of different systems were tested. On this occasion, 
also, a model of an American car fitted up with india-rubber 
rings for the handles of stretchers was shown. 

At this time, and for many years afterwards, the ideal 
arrangement was considered, on the Continent of Europe, 
to be one under which railway vehicles sent to the front 
with troops, supplies or munitions could be readily adapted 
for bringing back the sick and wounded on the return 
journey ; and aHke in Germany, Russia, France, Austria 
and Italy the respective merits of a great variety of internal 
fittings designed to adapt existing roUing stock, whether 



94 THE RISE OF RAIL-POWER. 

passenger coaches, luggage vans, Post Office vans or goods 
wagons, to the serving of these dual purposes formed the 
subject of much experiment and controversy. Rope cables 
across the roof of a goods wagon, with dependent loops of 
rope for the reception of the stretcher handles (as in the 
Zavodovski method) ; stretchers laid on springs on the 
floor, suspended from the roof either by strong springs or 
by rope, resting on brackets attached to the sides, or partly 
resting and partly suspended ; and collapsible frames of 
various kinds, each had their respective advocates.^ The 
use and equipment of ambulance or hospital trains con- 
stituted, also, a regular subject of discussion at all the 
international congresses of Red Cross Societies which have 
been held since 1869. 

The experimental trials at the Paris Exhibition of 1867 
were followed by the appointment in Prussia of still another 
Commission of inquiry, and, acting on the recommendations 
of this body, the Prussian Government adopted the "Grund" 
system, under which the stretchers v/hereon the recumbent 
sufferers lay in the goods wagons or fourth-class carriages 
were placed on poles resting in slots over the convexity of 
laminated springs having one end screwed into the floor 
while the other, and free, end was provided with a roller 
designed to respond to the varying conditions of weight by 
sliding to and fro. This was the system mainly used in the 
" sanitary trains " of the Germans in the Franco-Prussian 
War of i8yo-yi. It was criticised on the ground (i) that 
the sick and wounded were still subject to the same jolts 
and concussions as ordinary seated passengers ; (2) that 
the number who could be carried per carriage or wagon was 
very small, since it was still the case that only the floor 
space was utilised ; and (3) that it was inconvenient for 
the doctor and the attendants to have to kneel down in 

1 For "A short consideration and comparison of the regulations 
for the transport of sick and wounded by rail, as laid down in four 
of the leading ( ontinental armies (the German, French, Austrian 
and Italian)," see a paper on "Continental Regulations for the 
Transport of Sick and Wounded by Rail," by Surg.-Capt. C. H. 
MelviUe, A. M.S., Royal United Service Instiiution Journal, vol. 4^ 
(1898), pp. 560-594. 



RAILWAY AMBULANCE TRANSPORT. 95 

order to attend to the patients. ^ Apart from these disad- 
vantages, the ambulance service of the Germans was well 
organised during the war. Of ambulance trains, fitted 
up more or less as complete travelling hospitals, twenty-one 
were run, and the total number of sufferers removed by rail 
is said to have been over 89,000. 

Owing to traffic congestions, the transport to Berlin 
of wounded from the army engaged in the investment of 
Paris occupied no less a period than six daj^s ; but these 
journeys were made in the special ambulance trains which, 
provided in the later stages of the war, ensured full provision 
for the feeding, nursing and general comfort of the sufferers. 
The fact that such journeys could be undertaken at all showed 
the great advance which had been made since the battle of 
Sadowa, when most of the wounded could be conveyed no 
further than to cottages and farm-houses in neighbouring 
villages. 

In the South-African War of i8gg-igo2 the system 
favoured was that of having hospital trains either expressly 
built for the purpose or aclapted from ordinary rolling stock 
and devoted exclusively, for the duration of the war, to 
the conveyance of the sick and wounded. The " Princess 
Christian " hospital train, specially constructed for the 
British Central Red Cross Committee by the Birmingham 
Railway Carriage and Wagon Company Ltd., according to 
the plans of Sir John Furley and Mr. W. J. Fieldhouse, and 
sent out to South Africa early in 1900, consisted of seven 
carriages, each about 36 ft. in length, and 8 ft. in width, 

1 In an article on " Military Hospital Trains ; their Origin and 
Progress," in The Railway Gazette of December 4, 1914, it is said : 
"The comparatively small loss of the Germans by death from 
wounds in 1S70 was due solely to the fact that they entered upon 
the war with what were then considered wonderfully elaborate 
arrangements for removing the wounded. . . . The trains were 
composed partly of first-class carriages, for the less badly wounded, 
and partly of covered goods wagons. ... In these covered vans 
were placed beds formed of boards laid on springs. Each van 
would hold four or live men, and a sister rode in the van." One 
would not, however, consider to-day that there was anything 
wonderfully elaborate in an arrangement under which no more than 
four or five sufferers were accommodated in each goods van. 



96 THE RISE OF RAIL-POWER. 

for running on the Cape standard gauge of 3ft. 6in. The 
carriages were arranged as follows : — I., divided into three 
compartments for [a) linen and other stores, (&) two nurses 
and (c) two invalid officers ; II., also divided into three 
compartments, for {a) two medical officers ; (6) dining- 
room and (c) dispensary ; III., IV., V., and VI., ward-cars 
for invalids, carried on beds arranged in three tiers ; VII., 
kitchen, pantry, and a compartment for the guard. The 
train carried everything that was necessary for patients 
and staff even though they might be cut off from other 
sources of supply for a period of two or three weeks. 

Seven other hospital trains, all adapted from existing 
rolling stock in Cape Colony or Natal, were made available 
for the transport of sick and wounded in the same war. One 
of these, No. 4, was arranged and equipped at the cost of 
the British Central Red Cross Committee, under the direction 
of Sir John Furley, then acting as the Society's Chief Com- 
missioner in South Africa. The arrangement of the other 
converted trains was carried out by the Army Medical 
Service in South Africa, with the co-operation of the Govern- 
ment Railway officials in Cape Town and Natal. A number 
of specially-fitted carriages, placed at convenient distances 
on the railways occupied by the British, were made use of 
to pick up small parties of sick from the various posts along 
the lines, such carriages being attached to passing trains 
for the conveyance of the sufferers to the nearest hospital. 
Many of them had a regular service up and down a particular 
stretch of railwa^^ Some were provided with iron frames 
for the support of service stretchers, and others were fitted 
up similarly to the ward-carriages of the converted hospital 
trains. Convalescents and " sitting-up " patients for 
whom no special accommodation was necessary travelled 
in such ordinary trains as might be available. 

In effect, there are four classes of trains by which, under 
the conditions of to-day, the sick and wounded may be 
despatched from the seat of war : — (i) Permanent hospital 
trains, specially constructed for the purpose ; (2) temporary 
hospital trains, made up either entirely of converted ordinary 
vehicles or partly of converted and partly of specially- 



RAILWAY AMBULANCE TRANSPORT. 97 

constructed rolling stock, their use for this purpose con- 
tinuing for the duration of the war ; (3) ambulance trains 
improvised at rail-head out of rolling stock bringing troops, 
supplies and stores to the front, the internal fittings for 
" lying-down " cases being of such a kind that they can be 
readily fixed or dismantled ; and (4) ordinary passenger 
carriages for slightly wounded or convalescents. 

The advantages conferred on armies from a strategical 
point of view, under all these improved conditions, are no 
less beyond dispute than the benefits conferred on the 
individual soldiers, and if railways had done no more in 
regard to the conduct of warfare than ensure these dual 
results, they would still have rendered a service of incal- 
culable value. While, also, their provision of an efficient 
ambulance transport system, with its speedy removal of 
non-effectives, has served the purposes of war, it has, in 
addition, by its regard for the sick and wounded themselves, 
further served to relieve warfare of some, at least, of its 
horrors. 



H 



CHAPTER IX 

Preparation in Peace for War 

The greater the experience gained of the application of 
rail-power in practice, and the closer the study devoted to 
its possibilities, in theory, the more obvious it became 
that the fuUest degree of advantage to be derived therefrom 
could only be assured as the result of preparation and organ- 
isation in peace ; and this conclusion appeared specially 
to apply to countries whose geographical and political 
conditions led them to regard it as expedient that they 
should always be ready to meet some great national emer- 
gency. The Federal Government of the United States 
certainly did succeed, in the early sixties, in creating an 
excellent mihtary rail-transport organisation after hostil- 
ities had broken out ; but the conditions of warfare to-day 
make it essentially necessary that arrangements for the use 
of railways for military purposes should, as far as possible, 
be planned, perfected or provided for long in advance of 
any possible outbreak of hostilities. 

Among other considerations which strengthen this view 
are the following : — 

I. The increasing dependence of armies on rail transport 
owing to (a) the vastly greater number of troops employed 
now than in former days ; [b] the supreme importance of 
time as a factor in enabling a Commander-in-Chief to effect, 
possibly, an earlier concentration than the enemy, and 
so obtain the power of initiative ; and (c) the magnitude 
of the supplies, munitions and other necessaries wanted 
to meet the daily wants of the prodigious forces in the field, 
and only to be assured by the employment of rail transport 
from a more or less distant base. 

98 



PREPARATION IN PEACE FOR WAR. 99 

II. The complications, confusion and possible chaos 
which may result if, without prior preparation, railway 
lines designed to serve ordinary transport purposes are 
suddenly required to meet military demands taxing their 
resources to the utmost extreme. 

III. The further troubles that will assuredly arise if, in 
the absence of efhcient control by properly-constituted and 
responsible intermediaries, railwaymen unfamiliar with mili- 
tary technicalities are left to deal with the possibly con- 
flicting and impracticable orders of individual militarj^ 
officers themselves unfamiliar with the technicalities and 
limitations of railway working. 

IV. The imperative necessity of having an organised and 
well-regulated system of forwarding military supplies, 
etc., in order both to avoid congestion of stations and lines 
and to ensure the punctual arrival of those supplies in the 
right quantities, at the right spot, and at the right time. 

V. The need, in view of the vital importance of the part 
that railways may play in war, of having organised forces 
of railway troops and railway workers available, together 
with stores of materials and apphances, to carry out, speedily 
and thoroughly, all the work that may be necessary for the 
repair, construction or destruction of railway lines. 

In making the necessary preparations, in time of peace, 
to ensure the successful realisation of these and other 
purposes, there is a vast amount of work that requires to 
be done. 

In readiness for the excessive strain that will be thrown 
on the railways as soon as they pass from a peace footing 
to a war footing, on the order being given for mobilisation, 
the military authorities and the railway authorities must 
needs have at their command the fullest information as to 
the physical conditions, the resources and the transport 
capabilities of every line of railway in the country which, 
directly or indirectly, may be able to render useful service. 
Details as to double or single track ; gradients ; number 
of locomotives, carriages, wagons, horse-boxes and other 
vehicles available ; and facilities afforded by stations in 
important centres as regards number and length of plat- 



100 THE RISE OF RAIL-POWER. 

forms and sidings, water suppl^^, loading, unloading or 
storage accommodation, etc., are all carefully compiled and 
kept up to date. As regards rolling stock, lines not likely 
to be called upon to carry any military transports at all 
may still be able to contribute to the supply of carriages 
and wagons wanted to meet the heavy demands on other 
railways. By including all lines of railway in the collected 
data, it will be known exactly where additional rolHng stock 
may be obtained if wanted. The carrying capacity of the 
different types of carriages, trucks, etc., is also noted. If 
necessary, arrangements will be made for the reduction of 
gradients, the improvement of curves, the construction of 
connecting links between different main lines, the lengthen- 
ing of station platforms, or the provision of increased loading 
or unloading facilities. 

On the basis of the information collected elaborate cal- 
culations are made in regard to such matters as (i) the 
number of vehicles required for a given number of men, 
with horses, guns, munitions, stores, road vehicles, etc., so 
that rolling stock can be used to the best advantage and 
according as to whether the troops carried belong to the 
Infantry, Cavalry or the Artillery ; (2) the number of ve- 
hicles that can be made up into a train going by any one 
route ; (3) the length of time likely to be taken for the en- 
training and detraining respectively of a given unit ; (4) 
the time intervals at which a succession of troop trains can 
follow one another on the same line ; (5) the speed of troop 
trains ; and (6) the further intervals to be allowed in the 
arrival at one and the same station, or centre, of a number 
of trains starting from different points, so as to avoid the 
risk of congestion and of consequent delays. 

Military time-tables, corresponding to those in everyday 
use, have next to be prepared, showing exactly what trains 
must run from given stations, at fixed hours, by clearly 
defined routes, to specified destinations as soon as the occa- 
sion arises. The great aim kept in view in the compilation 
of these time-tables is, not alone preparation in advance, 
but the most complete utilisation possible of the available 
transport facilities of the country as a whole. 



PREPARATION IN PEACE FOR WAR. loi 

A selection must also be made in advance of the stations 
at which troops on long journeys can obtain food, as well 
as of the stations to be used as depots for stores and supplies, 
all the necessary arrangements being provided for. 

After the initial great strain on the railway resources 
involved in mobilisation and concentration, there will 
still be an enormous amount of transport to be done during 
the campaign. In the one direction there will be a constant 
despatch of reinforcements, provisions, clothing, munitions 
and supplies or stores to the front ; in the other direction 
there will be a steady flow of sick and wounded, of prisoners 
of war, and of materiel not wanted at the front, followed 
by the final return home of the troops at the end of the 
campaign. 

At each important point along the lines of communication 
where special services in connection with the rail transport, 
in either direction, are to be rendered, there must be organis- 
ation of such kind as will ensure that whatever is necessary 
shall be done promptly and efficiently under the control 
of persons of recognised authority and responsibility, and 
without any of the friction that would, inevitably, lead to 
delays, traffic blocks and other complications. 

Nor can the same system of organisation apply to the 
whole line of communication, from the base to the limit 
of the rail service at the front. A point will be reached 
therein where the control, if not the actual operation, of 
the railway lines must needs be transferred from the civil 
to the military authorities, rendering necessary a scheme of 
supervision and working different from that which can 
be followed on the sections not within the actual theatre of 
war. 

Then, if the army should be compelled to retreat before 
the enemy, there should be available a sufficiency of forces 
skilled in the art of rapidly and effectively destroying 
lines, bridges, viaducts, tunnels, or other railway property, 
with a view to retarding the enemy's movements until, it 
may be, reinforcements can be brought up in sufficient 
number to check his further progress. If, alternatively, the 
army should advance into the enemy's country, there must 



102 THE RISE OF RAIL-POWER. 

again be a provision of Railway Troops fully qualified by 
previous training and experience both to repair quickly 
the demolitions or the damage which the enemy will have 
carried out on his own lines and to construct hastily such 
new lines — light railways or otherwise — as the circumstances 
of the moment require. These things done, and still further 
advance being made into the invaded territory, the need 
will also arise for a staff capable of operating, under war 
conditions, the lines of which possession has been taken, in 
order that communications with the advanced front and 
the forwarding of reinforcements and supplies can still be 
maintained. 

All these and many other things, besides, must needs 
be thought out and prepared for in time of peace, long in 
advance of any probable or even any possible war. They 
are, in fact, made the subject of exhaustive and continuous 
study alike by military officers specially entrusted with 
the task and by railway managers commanding all the 
technical knowledge requisite for making arrangements cal- 
culated to ensure the prompt and efficient satisfaction of all 
such demands for military rail-transport as may, with what- 
ever urgency, and under whatever conditions, some day 
be put forward. 

Still more practical do the preparations in peace for war 
become when they include the construction of a network 
of strategical railways expressly designed to facilitate the 
mobilisation of troops, their speedy concentration on the 
frontier, or their movement from one point of attack to 
another at the theatre of war. 



CHAPTER X 
Organisation in Germany 

In no country in the world was the desirabiht}^ of pre- 
paring in time of peace for military rail-transport in time 
of war recognised earlier than in Germany. In none has 
the practice of such preparation in peace been followed up 
with greater study and persistence. 

As shown in Chapter I, the military use of railways led 
to the proposal and discussion in Germany of definite 
schemes for such use as early as 1833 ; and it is not too 
much to say that, from that date down to the outbreak of 
the World-War in 1914, the whole subject had received 
there an ever-increasing degree of attention from the mili- 
tary authorities, and, also, from a large body of writers as 
a question of the day in its relation more especially to 
German expansion. 

One great mistake, however, made alike by historians, 
by writers in the Press, and by popular tradition, has been 
the attributing to Germany of a far higher degree of credit 
in regard to the alleged perfection of her preparations for 
the Franco-Prussian War of i8yo-yi than she was really 
entitled to claim. Nor, indeed, has the fact been sufficiently 
recognised that the organisation eventually elaborated 
by Germany for the efficient conduct of her rail-transport 
in war had been evolved from studies, investigations, trials, 
experiments and tests (in actual warfare or otherwise) 
extending over a period of half a century or more, during 
which time, also, there was issued a bewildering mass of 
laws, rules and regulations, each more or less modifying those 
that had gone before and adding still further to the elabor- 
ate, if not the extremely complicated, machinery labori- 

103 



104 THE RISE OF RAIL-POWER. 

ously built up as the result of the universally recognised 
genius of the German people for organisation. 

The final great test of all this machinery was to be applied 
in 1914. Here, however, it must suffice, for present pur- 
poses, to show how the machinery itself was created and 
the form it finally assumed. 

Down to 1861 Prussia had done no more, in the way of 
organising military transport by rail, than issue a series 
of Ordinances dealing with the movement of large bodies 
of troops, such Ordinances being akin to those which all 
the leading countries of Europe had either compiled or 
were engaged in compiling. Directly influenced by the 
developments of the Civil War in America, Prussia took 
the further step, in 1864, of forming a Railway Section of 
her General Staff. This new body was actively employed 
in the furtherance of Prussia's interests in the Danish War 
of the same year, when confirmatory evidence was given of 
the advantages to be derived from the use of rail transport 
for military movements, journeys that would have taken 
the troops sixteen days by road being done within six days 
by rail. 

The organisation thus applied on a comparatively small 
scale in 1864 was further developed by Prussia in the cam- 
paign of 1866. 

On that occasion mobilisation and concentration of the 
Prussian troops were both carried out mainly by rail, 
under the direction of an Executive Commission consisting 
of an officer of the General Staff and a representative of the 
Ministry of Commerce. This Executive Commission sat in 
Berlin, and was assisted by Line Commissions operating 
on the different railways utihsed for military purposes. 
Movements of troops by rail were certainly effected in 
one-third of the time they would have taken by road, 
while the Prussians, gaining a great advantage, by the 
rapidity of such movements, over Austria, routed her com- 
bined forces within seven days of crossing the frontier, and 
dictated terms of peace to her within a month. 

Some serious faults were nevertheless developed, even 
in the course of this very short campaign, in Prussia's rail- 



ORGANISATION IN GERMANY. 105 

transport arrangements, such being especially the case in 
regard to the forwarding of supplies. These were rushed 
to the front in excess of immediate requirements, the only 
concern of contractors or of officers at the base being to get 
them away, while the railway companies — bound to accept 
goods for transport and delivery as ordered — dispatched 
them without regard for any possible deficiency in the un- 
loading and storage arrangements at the other end. The 
supplies, forwarded in bulk, followed as close up behind the 
troops as they could be taken ; but the provision made for 
unloading was inadequate, the railway staffs disclaimed 
responsibility for the work, and, before long, stations and 
sidings at the front were hopelessly blocked, although else- 
where the shortage of wagons was so great that everything 
was at a standstill. Even when wagons had been unloaded, 
they were too often left on the lines, in long trains of empties, 
instead of being sent where they were most needed. Each 
railway company disposed of its own rolling stock inde- 
pendently of the other companies, adopting the view that 
it had no concern with what was happening elsewhere. In 
some instances special trains were dispatched for the con- 
veyance of a few hundred men or a few hundredweights of 
stores. Orders which should have gone direct from one 
responsible person to another went through a variety of 
channels with the result that serious delays and no less 
serious blunders occurred. One East Prussian Battalion, 
for instance, was sent off by train in a direction exactly 
opposite to that which it should have taken. 

All these and other troubles experienced were directly 
due to the absence of a central controlling body formed on 
such a basis that it could (i) govern the rail-transport 
arrangements as a whole ; (2) supervise the forwarding of 
supplies ; (3) provide for a proper distribution, and better 
utilisation, of rolhng stock ; (^) secure the prompt unloading 
and return of wagons, and (5) form a direct link between the 
military authorities and the railway managements and 
staffs. 

Immediately on the close of the war a mixed committee 
of Staff' offtcers and railway authorities was appointed, 



io6 THE RISE OF RAIL-POWER. 

under the supervision of von Moltke, to inquire what steps 
should be taken to organise the Prussian mihtary transport 
services on such a basis as would avoid a repetition of the 
faults already experienced, and give a greater guarantee of 
efficiency on the occasion of the next war in which Prussia 
might be engaged. The desirability of making such pre- 
parations in time of peace doubtless appeared the greater 
in proportion as it became more and more evident that 
the trial of strength between Prussia and Austria would 
inevitably be followed by one between Prussia and France. 

The scheme elaborated b}/ the committee in question 
took the form of a Route Service Rcgulaiion which was ap- 
proved by the King on May 2, 1867, and was, also, adopted 
by most of the other German States, but was kept secret 
until the time came for applying it in practice, as was done 
in the war of 1870-71. 

The basis of the scheme was the creation of a system of 
Route Inspection ("Etappen Inspektion ") constituting a 
department of the General Staff, and designed — 

I. To watch over the replenishing of the operating army 
with men, horses, provisions, ammunition, and other 
military stores. 

II. To see to the removal into the interior of the country 
of the sick and wounded, prisoners and trophies of war. 

III. With the assistance of the troops appointed for the 
purpose and the Railway Field Corps, to maintain the line 
of communication, viz., railway, roads, bridges, telegraphs, 
and postal arrangements ; to undertake the government 
of the hostile conquered provinces, and other duties. 

The preparation of the necessary plans for the attainment 
of these objects was entrusted to a Central Commission 
composed, partly of officers connected with the General 
Staff and the Ministry of War, and partly of prominent 
functionaries on the staffs of the Ministry of Commerce, 
Industry and Public Works (then in supreme control over 
the railways), and of the Minister of the Interior. Two of 
its members — a Staff Oflicer and a railway expert from the 
Ministry of Commerce — formed an Exeeiitivc Commission 
and exercised a general supervision over the arrangements 



ORGANISATION IN GERMANY. 107 

for military transports ; though on the removal of the Great 
Head-quarters from Berlin, the Executive Commission was 
to be succeeded by an Auxiliary Executive Commission, 
which would supervise the railways in the interior to be 
made use of for supplying the needs of the army. 

In time of war the Central Commission was to be supple- 
mented by Line Commissions formed by military officers 
and railway officers in combination, and operating each in 
a leading centre of railway traffic. Their function it would 
be — with the assistance of District Line Commissions — not 
only to communicate to the line or lines of railway in their 
district such orders as might be necessar}^ for the transport 
of troops, guns, ammunition, horses, and supplies, but, also, 
to draw up or make the final arrangements in connection 
with the time-tables for the running of military trains ; 
to fix the direction in which the trains would go ; to decide 
at what stations the troops should stop for their meals or 
for their coffee ; and, in fact, to arrange everything con- 
nected with the said transport down to — as it appeared at 
the time — the smallest details. 

In the forwarding of supplies, each Aniiy Corps was to 
have its own line of communication, separate and distinct 
from that of the other Army Corps, the object aimed at 
being that of avoiding the confusion and disorder which 
might result from the fact of several Army Corps using the 
same railway. 

Each of such lines of communication would start from 
some large railway station forming a Point of Concentration 
(" Etappenanfangsort ") for the collection and the dispatch 
therefrom of supplies for the Army Corps it would serve, 
or for the receipt and further distribution in the interior 
of persons or commodities coming back from the seat of war. 

Along the line of railway, at distances of about 100 or 
125 miles, stations were to be selected which would serve as 
halting-places for the feeding of troops, for the watering of 
horses, for the reception of sick and wounded unable to con- 
tinue their journey, for the repair of rolHng stock, or for 
other such purposes. The furthest point to be reached by 
rail from day to day would constitute Railhead (" Etappen- 



io8 THE RISE OF RAIL-POWER. 

hauptort "), whence communication with the fighting line 
would be carried on by road, being further facilitated by 
Halting Places {" Etappenorter ") en route. 

The whole of this elaborate organisation — and here we 
come to the weakest point in the system — was to be under 
the supreme direction and control of an Inspector-General 
of Conininnications — a sort of Universal Provider of every 
requirement the Army could possibly need, and responsible 
for the fulfilment of a long and exceedingly varied list of 
obligations among which the conduct of military rail-trans- 
port became simply one of many items. The special merit 
of his position was assumed to be that of a superior authority 
who, having the rank of Commandant of a Division, and 
being in constant touch both with the Commander-in- 
Chief of the Army and with the War Minister, would be 
able to establish harmony in the operations of the different 
services and corps. The principle itself was sound ; but, 
in practice, such a multiplicity of duties fell upon him, or, 
through him, on his department, that the break-down which 
actually occurred in the campaign of 1870-71 should have 
been foreseen in advance. 

On the declaration of war the Inspector-General was to 
organise the stations for the feeding of the troops and horses 
proceeding to the front, and was then himself to go to some 
station one or two marches from the fighting-line, and fix, 
each day, the Rail-head Station for the time being, moving 
his own head-quarters as occasion might require. From 
these head-quarters he was to exercise control and direction 
over a staff among whose duties — apart from those relating 
to railways or rail-transport — were the following : — A 
centralisation of all the services through a Chief of the Staff 
giving a common impulse to them according to the in- 
structions of the Inspector-General ; the forv/arding of all 
troops to the front, special precautions having to be taken 
that none were left behind ; distribution of the troops on 
arrival at their destination ; the forwarding of all supplies ; 
decision of all personal questions that might arise in con- 
nection with the troops ; the keeping of journals and 
registers, the drawing up of reports, and the carr3dng on of 



ORGANISATION IN GERMANY. 109 

correspondence with the War Minister and the Chiefs of 
the army ; everything concerned with horses for the 
troops, transport and distribution of prisoners of w^ar, 
and maintenance of good order among the troops ; assur- 
ance of an ample supply of ammunition for the artillery ; 
construction or provision of barracks, huts, or temporary 
hospitals ; maintenance of roads and telegraphs ; control 
of telegraphs and postal services at the seat of war ; super- 
vision of road communications ; responsibility for the safe 
and regular delivery to the troops of all supplies and neces- 
saries ordered to meet their requirements, and establish- 
ment of hospitals, infirmaries and convalescent homes, with 
the arrangements for the removal thereto of the sick and 
wounded. 

In regard to railway matters, the Inspector-General was 
assisted by a Director of Field Railways who, in turn, had 
many duties to perform. Acting in the name and with 
the authority of the Inspector-General, he gave directions 
to the Line Commissions concerning the succession in which 
supplies were to be forwarded, and, in conjunction with the 
military and railway authorities, drew up the time-tables 
for military transports, submitting them, however, for 
the approval of his chief before they were put into operation. 
The actual transport of troops and material — on the basis 
of principles the details of which would have been worked 
out in advance — was also to be conducted under the super- 
vision of the Director of Railways. In the event of any of 
the lines being destroyed by the enemy, he was to under- 
take their reconstruction, obtaining through the Inspector- 
General such helpers — whether soldiers or civilians — as he 
might require to supplement his own working staff in the 
accomplishment of the necessary work. On the lines being 
restored, the Director was further to take control of their 
operation by means of troops and, also, of railway em- 
ployes to be furnished by the Minister of Commerce on the 
requisition of the Inspector-General of Communications. 

Such was the elaborate machinery which, constructed 
alike in peace and in secret by the Great General Staff, 
under the direct supervision of von Moltke himself, was to 



no THE RISE OF RAIL-POWER. 

be tested in the inevitable war with France for which it had 
been designed. 

According to popular belief, Germany's preparations 
for that war were so complete that she had only, as it were, 
to press a button, or pull a lever, in order to ensure the 
immediate and perfect working of all the plans she had made 
in advance. Whether or not this was really so in regard 
to her transport arrangements, at least, is a point to which 
attention may now be directed. 

At the beginning of the war a Route Inspection, organised 
on the basis already detailed, and having its own Inspector- 
General of Communications in charge of, and responsible 
for, the efficient working of the entire network of duties 
and obligations, was called into being for each of the three 
German armies. Subsequently a fourth, under the Crown 
Prince of Saxony, was added. 

So far as the mobilisation of the German troops and their 
concentration on the frontier were concerned the plans worked, 
on the whole, remarkably well ; though even in this respect 
complete success was not attained. There were, in 1870, 
nine lines of concentration available, namely, six for the 
Northern and three for the Southern Army ; and between 
July 24 and August 3, there were dispatched by these differ- 
ent routes 1,200 trains, conveying 350,000 men, 87,000 
horses, and 8,400 guns or road vehicles. Yet the delays 
which occurred to some of these trains were alone sufficient 
to show that the machinery which had been elaborated 
was not working with perfect smoothness. On, for example, 
the route known as line " C," the troops sent to Giessen 
were — as told by Balck, in his " Taktik "- — eleven hours 
late in their arrival. They then had their first warm food 
after a journey which had lasted twenty-one hours. For 
the transport to Homburg-in-der-Pfalz and Neunkirchen 
forty hours had been allowed. The first train did the 
journey in the time, but the next one took ninety hours. 

It was, however, in the forwarding of supplies and in the 
provisioning of the troops that the greatest difficulties were 
experienced ; and here there certainly appeared to be little 
real advance on the shortcomings of the campaign of 1866, 



ORGANISATION IN GERMANY. iii 

notwithstanding all the preparations which had been 
made in the meantime. 

Comprehensive as it undoubtedly was, the scheme pre- 
pared in time of peace included no adequate organisation 
for regulating the transport of supplies to the front and for 
ensuring alike their dispatch and their arrival in just such 
quantities, and under just such conditions, as would pro- 
vide for the needs of the troops from day to day. Maga- 
zines had certainly been set up, but not in sufficient number 
or always in the right place. The system, too, of operating 
them was defective. Just as in 1866, so in 1870, army 
officers, contractors and railway companies, all inspired 
by zeal for the welfare of the troops, rushed off train-load 
after train-load of supplies to stations provided with an 
inadequate supply alike of sidings where the wagons could 
be accommodated and of labour for the work of unloading. 
Stores were handed to the railway staffs under the same 
conditions as in peace time, the idea being, apparently, 
that if they were only dispatched as soon as possible they 
would be sure to get to the troops in want of them. 

As for the conditions at the other end, it not unfrequently 
happened that even though the supply-trains might go to 
stations where the facilities for unloading them were ample, 
the Commissariat or other officers in charge would follow 
the example already being set in France by regarding loaded 
railway trucks as convenient movable magazines which 
should not be unloaded until their contents were really 
wanted. This was done regardless of the fact alike that 
the trucks thus kept standing on the lines impeded the 
traffic and that they were urgently wanted to meet the 
shortage of trucks elsewhere. But for the stringent action 
taken to check it, the evil due to this use of railway trucks 
for storage purposes would have assumed even graver pro- 
portions than was actually the case. Defective, also, as the 
German arrangements in this respect undoubtedly were, 
they still did not attain to the same degree of inefficiency 
as was the case in France. 

All the same, the general result of these various con- 
ditions was that serious difficulties were experienced on the 



112 THE RISE OF RAIL-POWER. 

German no less than on the French railways. No sooner 
had the concentration of the Prussian troops been com- 
pleted than provisions and stores were sent after them in 
such volume that a hopeless block, extending to Cologne in 
one direction and Frankfort in the other, was speedily pro- 
duced on the lines along the left bank of the Rhine, while 
the feeding of the troops was brought to a temporary stand- 
still. The combined efforts of the Prussian Executive 
Commission, of the Minister of Commerce and of the Line 
Commissions failed for a time to overcome the conditions 
of chaos and confusion thus brought about, and on August 
II, 1870, instructions had to be given that thenceforward 
supplies were to be forwarded only on the express order 
of the Intendant-General or of an Inspector-General of 
Communications. Yet on September 5 there were stand- 
ing, on five different lines, a total of no fewer than 2,322 
loaded wagons, containing 16,830 tons of provisions for the 
Second Army, or sufficient to keep it supplied for a period of 
twenty-six days. Such blocks on the German lines — 
though not always on so great a scale — were of frequent 
occurrence throughout the war. 

Trouble arose, also, in getting provisions from the rail- 
way to the troops by reason either of the inadequate number 
of road vehicles or because of the use of these for the con- 
veyance of ammunition or for other purposes, instead. 
Thus the Inspector-General of the First Army started with 
2,000 road vehicles ; but on October 17 the total number 
still at his disposal was only twenty. The position became 
still worse as the retreating French destroyed the lines 
behind them, increasing the difficulties of the invaders in 
maintaining their communications with the Fatherland. 

While the food supplies for the German troops were thus 
blocking the railway lines — or, alternatively, were going 
bad on account either of the heated conditions of the 
closed wagons or of exposure to the weather after unload- 
ing — many of the German troops were suffering severe 
privations from lack of adequate nourishment ; and they 
would have suffered still more but for the provision-trains 
or stores of supplies seized from the French at Metz, For- 



ORGANISATION IN GERMANY. 113 

bach, Verdun, Dole, Le Hans, and elsewhere. If, indeed, 
the French had only refrained from rushing their own 
supplies to the extreme front in excessive quantities, or 
if they had destroyed those they could not remove in time, 
the invaders would, on various occasions, have found them- 
selves in a condition bordering on starvation. Even as it 
was, they were often reduced to the necessity of dependence 
on their " iron " rations. 

Difficulty was especially experienced in feeding the army 
of occupation during the investment of Paris. The supplies 
received by train from Germany were equal to scarcely one 
half of the actual requirements ; a resort to " requisitions " 
on the French territory occupied yielded inadequate re- 
sults ; and the making of a regular daily money-allowance 
to officers and men, so that they could purchase their owm 
supplies in the open market or otherwise, was, at first, far 
from satisfactory. It was, in fact, only owing to the most 
strenuous effort on the part of the responsible officers, both 
during the investment of Paris and in earlier phases of the 
w^ar, that the German troops were often saved from actual 
want.^ 

The main reasons for the defects and shortcommgs thus 
developed in a scheme on which so much care and prepara- 
tion had been bestowed were (i) that, while based on 
fundamentally sound principles, the scheme in its actual 
appKcation threw too great a strain on the department of 
the Inspector-General of Communications, which, as we 
have seen, was expected to look after, not only rail trans- 
port, but route marching, telegraphs, postal arrangements, 
and a great variety of other things besides ; (2) that, owing 

^ In " Der Kriegs-Train des deutschen Heeres," by E. Schaffer, 
(Berlin, 1883), the author, dealhig with the subject of transport 
in the war of 1870-71, and its effect on the feeding of the German 
Army, says of the situation in August-September, 1870 : " Immer- 
hin wurden den Truppen damals nicht unerhebliche Entbehrungen 
auferlegt " ; while concerning the position of the army of occupa- 
tion in France he writes : " Immerhin erforderte es umfassender 
Massregeln seitens der Intendantur, die Truppen vor wirklichem 
Mangel zu schiitzen, namentlich da die Requisitionen wenig ergiebig 
ausfielen, und anfanglich auch der freihandige Ankauf keinen 
rechten Erfolg hatte." 



114 THE RISE OF RATE-POWER. 

to the larger number of Army Corps, it was no longer 
possible, as had been done in 1866, to place a separate line 
of railway at the disposal of each, so as to allow the said 
department to superintend the traffic on the basis of its 
own organisation ; and (3) the absence of a central ad- 
ministration specially designed {a) to act as an intermediary 
and to ensure co-operation and mutual working between 
the various Line Commissions and, also, between the 
individuals and administrations, both military and civil, 
engaged in the conduct of rail-transport ; and [b) to control 
the trafhc as a whole, avoiding difficulties, blocks and delays, 
assuring a prompt and efficient distribution of supplies, and 
guaranteeing the utilisation of rolling stock to the best 
advantage. 

With a view to overcoming, as far as possible, the trouble 
due to the wide extent and the great variety of duties falhng 
on the department of the Inspector-General of Communi- 
cations, it was arranged, during the latter part of the war, 
to relieve that department of all responsibility for the 
railway services and to transfer the control and direction 
of these to the Executive Commission established at the 
Royal Head-quarters. In this way it was hoped to utilise 
the rail-transport facilities to greater advantage, to de- 
crease the risk of collisions and delays, and, through a cen- 
tral organisation, to distribute the transport demands more 
equally among the various railways concerned. By means 
of these provisional modifications in the original scheme 
a better system of operation was obtained during the re- 
mainder of the war. But the complete reorganisation that 
was really necessary was then impracticable, and much 
friction in the working of the railway services was still 
experienced, partly because this needful reorganisation could 
not be carried out, and partly because of the conflicting 
orders coming from different authorities, each of whom, 
under the conditions then existing, was perfectly within 
his right in giving them.^ 

The difficulties due to the attempts to rush supplies in 
excessive quantities direct to the fighting-line, or as near 
1 " Revue militaire de I'Etranger," 27 Novembre, 1872. 



ORGANISATION IN GERMANY. 115 

thereto as possible, were also met, to a certain extent, during 
the course of the war, by the setting up of additional rail- 
way magazines or depots where the forwarding of necessaries 
could be better controlled ; but it was not until the end of 
1870 that any approach to regularity in supplying the wants 
of the German forces was finally secured. 

No sooner had the war come to an end than the work of 
remedying the defects which had been developed was 
taken in hand by the Minister of War and the Great General 
Staff. Following the creation, on October i, 1871, of a 
Railway Battalion on a permanent basis came, on July 
20, 1872, a new Regulation cancelling the one of May 2, 
1867, which had been in operation during the war, and 
substituting a new basis of organisation in its place. 

While retaining the principle of a Central Commission in 
Berlin, the scheme of 1872 relieved the route authorities 
of all responsibility for rail transport as well as for railway 
restoration and operation at the theatre of war, transferring 
to a new military department all the duties falling under 
these heads, with the further advantage that such depart- 
ment would be able to control the railways in time of war 
independently of the civil authorities, and without the dis- 
advantages hitherto resulting from the need to deal, in 
regard to railway questions, with nine separate Ministries of 
Commerce and about fifty different railway companies. 
At the same time the principle of co-ordination was to be 
maintained by the appointment of an Inspector-General of 
Railways and Lines of Commimication who, in each of these 
departments, would control a far more efficient organisation 
than had previously existed, and, also, as director-in-chief, 
would constitute a central authority and an intermediary 
between the services concerned and the head of the Great 
General Staff, under whose direction he would himself act. 

Another important feature of the new Regulation was 
that a distinction was now drawn between (i) railways on 
or near to the theatre of war which could not be worked by 
their ordinary staffs, and must needs pass under military 
operation, with a paramount military control ; and (2) 
" home " or other railways, in the rear of the fighting, which 



ii6 THE RISE OF RAIL-POWER. 

might carry ordinary traffic — except so far as the lines were 
wanted for miUtary purposes — and might still be worked 
by their own staffs, but in the operation of which there 
should be a military element in time of war in order to 
facilitate the transport of troops and military necessaries. 

Various other Regulations, and notably a series in 1878 
and 1888, followed that of 1872, and eventually the whole 
scheme of organisation, with its additions and modifications, 
seeking to provide for every possible contingency, became 
extremely complicated. Of the multifarious instructions, 
provisions and orders which had been compiled, some applied 
to peace only, some to war only, and some to both peace and 
war ; some to " home " railways and some to railways at 
the seat of war ; some to military men and some to railway 
men, and so on. As an elaborate piece of machinery the 
organisation was more comprehensive and more complete 
than ever ; but the fear arose that there had again been a 
failure to take the human element sufficiently into account. 
Of those in the military and the railway service who should 
have applied themselves in time of peace to a study of the 
elaborate and extremely involved provisions which would 
apply in time of war, comparatively few, it was found, were 
disposed to devote themselves to so uninviting a task. 

So there was issued, on January 18, 1899, still another 
new Regulation which repealed some of the earlier ones 
and aimed at amplifying, condensing, rearranging and 
facilitating reference to the provisions remaining in force, 
in order that the whole scheme should be made clearer, 
simpler and easier to grasp. These results were fully at- 
tained, and, though still subject to the final test of a great 
war, such as that which broke out in 1914, the German 
Regulation of 1899 might certainly be considered a master- 
piece of organisation as prepared in time of peace. One 
especially useful purpose it served was that of defining clearly 
the duties, responsibilities, and spheres of action of all 
the authorities, civil or military, concerned in the control 
and operation of railways for military purposes. 

The various Regulations here in question have been 
supplemented from time to time by Field Service Regula- 



ORGANISATION IN GERMANY. 117 

tions, the first series of which, issued under date May 23, 
1887, was designed to take the place of the Ordinances of 
1861 relating to the movement by rail of great bodies of 
troops. These Field Service Regulations of 1887 constituted 
an epoch in the military history of Germany. They were 
regarded at the time as offering a resume of the most ad- 
vanced ideas of Moltke, if not, also, as the crowning glory 
of military organisation in the reign of William I ; and 
they certainly exercised a powerful influence on German 
military literature. They were, further, the starting-point 
of a prolonged series of similar Regulations, all amend- 
ing, modifying, adding to, or abbreviating their predeces- 
sors. These changes led to the issue, on January i, 1900, 
of a new edition, based on the exhaustive studies of a 
Commission of fourteen members ; and still later revisions 
resulted in the publication of a further series on March 
22, 1908.^ 

Here, then, we get still further evidence of the keenness 
with which Germany has followed up, in times of peace, her 
preparations for war, while the Field Service Regulations, 
no less than the other Regulations already detailed, show 
the important place that military rail-transport holds in the 
view of those responsible in Germany for the making of these 
arrangements. " Railways," it is declared in the Regula- 
tions of 1908, " exercise a decisive influence on the whole 
conduct of a war. They are of the greatest importance for 
mobilising and concentrating the army, and for maintain- 
ing it in a state of efficiency, and they enable portions of it 
to be transported from one place to another during the 
operations." What the Field Service Regulations do is to 
present in concentrated and compact form the working 
details, in respect to field service requirements, of those 
other and fuller Regulations which cover the whole ground 
of military transport in general. 

Taking these various sources of information, the nature 
of the organisation that Germany has thus effected as the 

^ " Field Service Regulations (Felddienst Ordnung, 1908) of 
the German Army." Translated by the General Staff, War Office. 
London, 1908. 



ii8 THE RISE OF RAIL-POWER. 

result of so many years of study and experience may be 
summarised as follows : — 

In time of peace the authorities entrusted with the task 
of ensuring, by their preparations in advance, the success 
of the whole system of military rail-transport include (i) 
the Minister of War ; the Prussian Chief of the General 
Staff of the Army ; the members of the Railway Section 
of the Great General Staff, the Line Commissions and the 
Station Commissions ; authorities concerned in the for- 
warding, transport and receiving of supplies, and repre- 
sentatives of the Commissariat department ; and (2) the 
Imperial Chancellor, the Imperial Railway Bureau, the 
Imperial Administration of Posts and Telegraphs, and the 
various railway administrations. 

The Prussian Minister of War is the chief representative 
of the interests of the Army in all questions relating to the 
military use of the railways. 

The Prussian Chief of the General Staff of the Army has 
under his orders, in time of peace, the military authorities 
concerned in rail-transport, and gives them the necessary 
instructions. He keeps in close relations with the Imperial 
Railway Bureau, and serves as intermediary between that 
Bureau and the Prussian Minister of War. It is he who 
gives the directions according to which the use of the 
railways in war-time is regulated, and he prescribes all the 
preparations that are to be made in advance for the facilitat- 
ing of such use. On mobilisation, he discharges all the 
duties appertaining to the office of the Inspector-General 
of Railways and Lines of Communication until that ofhcer 
has himself taken them in hand. From that time he issues 
instructions according to circumstances. 

The Railway Section of the Great General Staff is required, 
among other duties, to collect, and have always available, 
the fullest and most complete information as to the powers 
and facilities of the railways for the transport of troops, etc. 
To this end it keeps in constant communication with the 
railway administrations, and, also, with the Imperial Railway 
Bureau (whicli centralises all questions affecting railway 
administration), completing, if necessary, through investi- 



ORGANISATION IN GERMANY. 119 

gations made by its own officers, the information furnished 
annually by the Bureau. The Railway Section further 
takes charge of a wide range of details and preparations 
concerning military rail-transport in war-time . 

On the outbreak of hostilities there is appointed for each 
theatre of war an Inspector-General of Railways and Lines 
of Communication who, receiving his orders from the Chief 
of the General Staff, co-ordinates the two groups of ser- 
vices, and ensures harmony in their joint working. For 
the operation of the railways, as appHed to military pur- 
poses, there is a Director of Field Railways who, acting under 
the Inspector-General, controls the whole railway service. 
Through the Line Commissions or Commandants subordinate 
to him he conveys to the railway authorities the necessary 
demands or instructions in respect to military transport, 
and, in concert with his superior officers, he fixes the boun- 
dary between the lines to be operated on a peace footing and 
those that are to be subject to military working. In the 
discharge of these and other duties he is assisted by a staff 
composed partly of military men and partly of railwaymen. 
Each officer concerned in the transport arrangements has a 
recognised deputy who can act for him in case of need. 

Of Line Commissions, placed in charge, for military pur- 
poses, over the lines of railway in certain districts, and 
becoming Line Commandants on the outbreak of war, there 
were twenty under the revised Regulation of 1899, the 
number being increased in 1904 to twenty-one. The head- 
quarters of these Commissions are at such centres of traffic as 
Berlin, Hanover, Erfurt, Dresden, Cologne, Altona, Breslau, 
etc. They serve as intermediaries between the higher 
military authorities and the railway administrations with 
which they are associated. Each Line Commission con- 
sists, normally, of a staff officer of the active army and a 
prominent railway functionary, the former having a non- 
commissioned officer, and the latter a railway official, as 
secretary, with such further assistance as may be needed. 

Subordinate, in turn, to the Line Commissions are the 
Station Commissions, which, receiving instructions from 
the former, see to the carrying out of the necessary transport 



120 THE RISE OF RAIL-POWER. 

requirements either at their particular station or on the 
section of line of which they are placed in charge. 

While full provision is thus made for the representation 
of the military element in the conduct of rail-transport in 
time of war, with a view to ensuring its efficiency, precautions 
are no less taken to avoid repetitions of earlier troubles 
due to questions of responsibility and control, and, more 
especially, to the interference of military officers in the tech- 
nical operation of the railway lines. On this subject the 
Field Service Regulations of 1900 stated (paragraph 496) : — 

Railways can only fully accomplish their important and diffi- 
cult task during war if no serious hindrances to their manage- 
ment are created by the conduct of the troops. 

In the later Regulations of 1908 it was said (paragraph 

527) :— 

The important role which railways have to fulfil renders it 
incumbent on every commander to do all in his power to pre- 
vent any interference with the traffic due to delay, etc., on the 
part of the troops. The railway staff and conducting officers 
are bound by the transport arrangements made by the railway 
authorities. 

The conducting officer is responsible for the administration 
of the detachment of troops or consignment of stores under 
his charge. It is his duty, as regards himself and his charge, 
to obey the instructions of the railway officials. 

Any interference with the service of the railways is forbidden. 

At important stations Railway Staff Officers are appointed 
who act as intermediaries between the conducting officers and 
the railway officials. 

Concerning Lines of Comnmnication the Field Service 
Regulations of 1908 say : — 

A railway station, to serve as a Home Base (" Etappenan- 
fangsort ") will be assigned to every Army Corps. From these 
home bases supplies are sent forward to Collecting Depots 
(" Sammelstationen "), which will be established at not too 
great a distance from the theatre of war. 

In the theatre of war a base will be assigned to each Army, 
the situation of which will change according to the progress 
of the operations. The Army Corps are connected with the 
Field Base by lines of communication roads (" Etappenstras- 
sen ") , and on these roads posts are formed about 13^ miles 
apart. 



ORGANISATION IN GERMANY. 121 

As for the mass of working details also included in the 
various Regulations, these may well appear to provide in 
advance for every possible requirement in regard to military 
transport by rail, from the movement of entire armies 
down to the supply of drinking water at stations and the 
taking of carrier pigeons in the troop trains. 



CHAPTER XI 
Railway Troops in Germany 

The innovation introduced into modern warfare by the 
Federal Government of the United States, in the organisa- 
tion on a comprehensive scale of a Construction Corps for 
the combined purposes of repairing, destroying and operat- 
ng the railways on which so much might depend in the 
conduct of war, attracted great attention in Europe, and 
more especially so in Germany, which was the first country 
on this side of the Atlantic to follow the American prece- 
dent, since adopted more or less completely by all nations 
possessed alike of railways and a standing army. 

Down to the time of the War of Secession the need for 
such a corps had not been realised in Europe ; but the 
advantages which might be gained therefrom had been 
shown in so unmistakable a form that when, in 1866, there 
was the certainty of an early conflict between Prussia and 
Austria, one of the first steps taken by the former country 
was to provide, under a decree of May 6, 1866, for a Field 
Railway Section, (" Feldeisenbahnabteilung,") to be formed, 
and designed to operate, on a basis closely approximating 
to that which had applied to the corresponding American 
corps. The special purposes to be served were defined as 
those of rapidly repairing lines of railway destroyed by the 
enemy and of destroying railways it might be thought 
expedient to prevent the enemy from using. The section 
was to be under the orders of the General Staff either of the 
Army or of an Army Corps. It was, however, not to come 
into being until its services were really required, and it was 
then to act for the duration of the war only. 

On the outbreak of hostilities three divisions of the corps 

122 



RAILWAY TROOPS IN GERMANY. 123 

were mobilised, under Cabinet Orders of May 25 and June i, 
one division being allotted to each of the three Prussian 
armies operating in different parts of the theatre of war. 
The composition of the corps was partly military and partly 
civil. The military element was supplied by officers of the 
Engineers (one of whom acted as chief), non-commissioned 
officers, and a detachment of Pioneers, the last-mentioned 
being either carpenters or smiths. The civil element com- 
prised railway engineers, thoroughly acquainted with the 
construction and repair of permanent way, bridges, etc. ; 
assistant railway engineers, performing the duties of clerks 
of the works ; head platelayers, foremen, locomotive drivers, 
machinists (for the repair of engines, rolling-stock, water 
pumps and water tanks), and others. The members of the 
civil section were chosen from the staff of the Prussian State 
railways by the Minister of Commerce, their services being 
placed by him at the disposal of the War Minister. Each 
of the three divisions constituted a complete unit. 

On the side of the Austrians there was at that time no 
similar force available. Three years before there had 
been published in Vienna a book, by Oberst. von Panz, 
entitled " Das Eisenbahnwesen, vom militarischen Stand- 
puncte," in which the author expressed the view that details 
on the following points, among others, concerning railways 
should be collected in time of peace and classified for refer- 
ence in case of need : — Permanent way : system and con- 
struction ; gauge and number of lines ; whether lines single 
or double. Stations : size and construction ; which of 
them best fitted to serve as depots. Bridges : underground 
works, etc. ; which of these could be the most easily de- 
stroyed, or soonest repaired if destroyed, and if prepared 
beforehand for destruction. Embankments : size ; how 
made ; slope ; if provided with culverts and size of these. 
Cuttings : length and depth ; slopes ; nature of ground ; 
whether much or little water, and whether danger of land- 
slips. Tunnels : dimensions and construction ; if lined or 
cut in rock ; nature of cuttings at end and whether they 
can be blocked. Large bridges and viaducts : system of 
construction ; span of arches ; whether or not the piers are 



124 THE RISE OF RAIL-POWER. 

mined. ^ Where men, tools, stores and materials can be 
obtained, and to what extent. 

These recommendations attracted much attention at the 
time. They were quoted by H. L. Westphalen in his book 
on " Die Kriegfiihrung unter Benutzung der Eisenbahnen " 
(Leipzig, 1868), of which a French translation was published 
under the title of " De I'Emploi des Chemins de Fer en 
Temps de Guerre " (Paris, 1869) ; yet when, just before the 
outbreak of war with Prussia, the Commander-in-Chief 
of the Austrian Northern Army recommended that a Con- 
struction Corps should be formed, the Minister of War replied 
that " the repair of railways was work which should be done 
by the railway companies concerned." 

All the same, the retarding of the Prussian advance by 
interrupting the rail communications became an important 
phase of Austrian tactics and was followed up with great 
activity. Bridges and viaducts were destroyed, rails torn 
up, sleepers burned, points and turn-tables carried away, 
tunnels obstructed and water cranes and pumps rendered 
useless. At one place (between Libenau and Sichrau), 
where the railway passed through a deep cutting, the explo- 
sion of mines along the top of each bank detached great 
masses of rock which, falling on the lines, filled up the 
cutting to a height of six or eight feet for a distance of about 
250 ft., and could not be removed until, by means of blast- 
ing, they had been broken up into pieces sufficiently small 
to be carried away in ballast trucks. 

The arrangements made by the Prussians were, however, 
so complete as to permit, in most instances, of a speedy 
restoration. Even in the instance just mentioned, fifty 
Pioneers, aided by twenty labourers, had the line clear for 
traffic again before midnight of the day the destruction was 
caused. 

Each division of the Construction Corps had at its dis- 
posal two locomotives and thirty closed wagons or open 

1 Captain A. de Formanoir states in his book, "Des Chemins 
de Fer en Temps de Guerre " (Conferences mihtaires beiges. Brux- 
elles, 1870), that in France and Austria all the railway bridges 
have mine-chambers so that thej^ can be readily destroyed when 
the occasion arises. 



RAILWAY TROOPS IN GERMANY. 125 

trucks, provision thus being made for the transport of, 
among other things, six hght covered carts (for use on the 
roads in the country to be invaded, horses being requisi- 
tioned therein as necessary) ; tools ; suppHes of blasting 
powder or gun-cotton ; and rails, sleepers, bolts, etc., for 
250 yards of railway, reserve materials for a further quarter 
of a mile of track being left at intermediate depots, supple- 
mented by an unlimited supply at the base of operations. 
The construction trains also carried timber, ropes, nails, 
scaffolding, clamps, etc., for the prompt repair of small 
bridges. Materials for larger bridges or viaducts were stored 
at convenient centres. 

How the reconnaissance of a line which might have been 
subjected to the enemy's destructive tactics was carried 
out is thus told by Captain C. E. Webber, R.E., in his 
" Notes on the Campaign in Bohemia in 1866 " : — 

The reconnaissance starts with, and, until interrupted, keeps 
up with, the advance guard, the movement being covered by 
cavalry scouts on each side of the line. 

The greater portion of the train in charge of the department, 
with one engine in front and another behind, advances slowly, 
preceded at a distance of about 500 paces by a trolley carrying 
one of the officers, four men to work it, and a bugler. On 
arriving at any obstruction the trolley signals to the train by 
bugle and extra caution is used in advancing towards it. If 
in presence of the enemy, the scouts give warning to the officer 
in the trolley, who returns to the train and the whole retires. 
The second engine can be detached from the rear to send mes- 
sages or bring up fresh supplies. 

But for the successes already gained in the same direction 
by the Federals in the United States, the speed with which 
repairs were carried out by the Prussian Construction Corps 
— then so recently organised — would have been regarded 
as remarkable. In various instances communication was 
restored within from one and a half to three days after the 
destruction even of important bridges. 

As it happened, however, whilst the Austrians had shown 
an excess of zeal in some directions by destroying bridges 
when the tearing up of the rails would have answered the 
same purpose, the hesitation of the responsible Austrian 



126 THE RISE OF RAIL-POWER. 

officer to fire the mines which had aheady been laid to the 
bridge over the Elbe at Lobkowitz was of great advantage 
to the Prnssians, leaving them the use of the line from 
Turnau to Prague, Pardubitz and Briinn between July i8 
and July 27, on which latter date the bridge was at last 
destroyed by order of the governor of Theresienstadt. This 
particular bridge was one of exceptional strategical import- 
ance, and, according to Captain Webber, the construction 
even of a temporar}^ substitute — had the Austrians blown 
up the bridge before the Prussians could cross it — would 
have taken no less than six weeks. The omission, also, of 
the Austrians to remove or to destro}^ the railway rolling 
stock they left behind at Prague, on their retirement from 
that city, conferred a further benefit on the Prussians, 
These examples would seem to show that promptness in 
carrying out destruction at a critical moment may be no less 
important on the one side than efficient organisation on the 
other for accomplishing the work of restoration in the 
shortest possible time. 

While the Construction Corps had thus fully justified its 
existence, the sudden creation of such a corps for the pur- 
poses of a particular war, and for the period of the war only, 
was considered inadequate for a country where a large stand- 
ing Army had to be maintained in readiness for action at 
any moment, in case of need. Hence it was thought desir- 
able that Prussia should have a Field Railway Section 
established on a permanent and well-organised footing. 
There was the further reason for adopting this course because 
the Pioneers, composed almost exclusively of reservists, 
had received no special training in railway work, wliile the 
railway men themselves, accustomed to building lines in a 
solid way for public use, were at a disadvantage when called 
on to carry out, with great rapidit}^ and in a rough and 
ready manner, w'ork that was wanted only to serve the 
temporary purposes of the Army with which they were 
associated. 

It was found, also, that the corps, comprising so large a 
civil element, had escaped the supervision and control of the 
Executive Commission at Berlin which had for its function 



RAILWAY TROOPS IN GERMANY. 127 

the regulation of all matters concerning military rail-trans- 
port. Nor did the Construction and Destruction Corps 
constitute, as well, an Operation Corps, providing for the 
working of railways at the theatre of war, and especially of 
railways taken from the enemy. The Prussians had, indeed, 
been able to command the services of Austrian railwaymen 
in working the railways seized in that country ; but there 
was no certainty that the adoption of a like expedient would 
be possible in any future war. 

By this time the whole subject of the destruction and 
restoration of railway lines as an important element in 
modern warfare was attracting attention among military 
authorities and writers in Germany. A translation of Mc- 
Callum's report was published, and the issue was begun of 
what was to develop into a long series of technical papers, 
pamphlets or books — such as, for example, Wilhelm Bas- 
son's " Die Eisenbahnen im Kriege, nach den Erfahrungen 
des letzten Feldzuges " (Ratibor, 1867) — dealing with the 
art of rapidly destroying and restoring railways in time of 
war and the most effective measures to be adopted in the 
attainment of either end. 

These various considerations and developments were, no 
doubt, the reason for the issuing, on August 10, 1869, of a 
Prussian Royal Decree which created a permanent cadre of 
Railway Troops to be constituted of Pioneers who were to 
undergo regular instruction in ever37thing relating to the 
construction, destruction and operation of railways. A new 
Battalion of Pioneers was to be raised for the purpose, and 
the whole scheme was to be carried into effect in the course 
of 1871. 

When, in 1870, the war with France broke out, the pre- 
parations for the creation of this permanent corps were still 
proceeding ; but the Prussians were, nevertheless, able to 
enter on the campaign with four sections of Railway Troops, 
subsequently increased to six, including one Bavarian 
section. Each section comprised Engineers, Pioneers, rail- 
waymen and auxiliary helpers, all of whom wore a uniform 
having the letter " E " (" Eisenbahntruppen ") on the 
shoulder, and carried rifles, Prussia, in fact, once more 



128 THE RISE OF RAIL-POWER. 

started, as in 1866, with such advantage over her enemy as 
might result from her control of a Railway Construction 
Corps. At the outset France had no similar body, and 
though, during the progress of the war, she hurriedly set 
about the creation of a Construction Corps of her own, that 
corps did not do very much beyond collecting at Metz and 
Strasburg a great store of railwa}^ materials which was 
afterwards to fall into the hands of the Prussians, and assist 
them in their own operations. 

Notwithstanding the advantage thus gained, the practi- 
cal benefits secured by the Germans, although important 
in their effect on the final issue, were far from being as great 
as the Army leaders may have anticipated or desired. The 
destruction work carried out by the French on their own 
railways, on their retirement, was much more serious than 
anything experienced in the Prussian campaign in Austria. 
Thus the works for the re-establishment of the Paris- — Stras- 
burg line (of primary importance to the Germans for the 
siege of Paris) extended from September 17 to November 22, 
The French had blocked the tunnel of Nanteuil by the explo- 
sion therein of six mines which brought down the walls and 
filled the western end of the tunnel with about 4,000 square 
yards of sand. Attempts to clear away the obstruction were 
a failure, owing to the occurrence of fresh slips due to the 
wet weather, and eventually the Construction Corps built 
a loop line which avoided the tunnel, and so restored commu- 
nication. The defence of some of the principal lines b}^ 
fortresses also contributed to the difftculties of the invaders ; 
though, on the other hand, these difficulties would have been 
greater still if the French had always adopted the best and 
most scientific methods of interrupting rail communications, 
as, presumably, they would have done if they had had the 
advantage of a well-organised corps prepared in advance 
for the work that required to be done. 

At Fontenoy-sur-Moselle, between Nancy and Toul, there 
was, for example, a bridge of seven arches, effective destruc- 
tion of which would have made a very serious check in the 
communications along the principal line between Germany 
and Paris ; but, instead of blowing up the bridge in the 



RAILWAY TROOPS IN GERMANY. 129 

middle, the men entrusted with the work (in January, 1871) 
brought down two arches at the side of the bridge, causing 
a break which the Germans were able to fill in with stones 
and earth, restoring communication in about seventeen days. 
Then, although several of the tunnels in the Vosges moun- 
tains were mined, the mines had not been charged, and before 
instructions to blow up the tunnels had been received by 
those awaiting them, the Germans were on the spot and took 
possession. 

On the other hand the absence on the side of the French 
of an organised corps for destruction as well as construction 
did not prevent the carrying out of some very bold and highly 
successful work by parties of fmnc tireurs, who showed alike 
their appreciation of the importance of rail communications 
and their skill in impeding them. 

One especially striking feat in this direction was accom- 
plished by a company known as the " Franc Tireurs of the 
Meuse." 

Learning that a Prussian troop train was to pass through 
Lanois (on the line between Reims and Mons) on October 26, 
1870, they resolved to effect its destruction. How they 
operated is told by Lieutenant Fraser, R.E.,^ who arrived 
on the spot shortly afterwards, and heard the story from some 
of the men engaged on the work. 

Any obstruction placed on the line would have been seen. 
Hence a different course had to be adopted. Selecting a 
spot where the hne ran along a 12-ft. high embankment, 
to which a well-wooded slope came down on one side, the 
jranc tireurs took up a pair of rails, removed the sleepers, 
cut a deep trench across the line, laid some pieces of iron 
at the bottom of the trench, placed on the iron a box con- 
taining thirty kilos (2 qrs. 10 lbs.) of powder, and fixed into 
the lid of the box a French field shell in such a way that, 
when the rail was replaced over the box, the head of the fuse 
would be just below the lower flange of the rail. In restoring 
the line again in order that there should Ve nothing to 

^ " Account of a Torpedo used for the Destruction of a Railway 
Train on the 26th of October, 1870." By Lieut. Fraser, R.E. 
Papers of the Corps of Royal Engineers, N.S., Vol. XX. Woolwich, 
1872. 

K 



130 THE RISE OF RAIL-POWER. 

attract attention, the fyanc tireni's omitted one sleeper so 
that the weight of the locomotive should in passing press 
the rail down on to the head of the fuse. The party — some 
seventy-five strong — then withdrew to the shelter of the 
woods to await developments. 

In due time the train of forty coaches approached at the 
ordinary speed, the driver not suspecting any danger. 
When the engine reached the spot where the " torpedo " 
had been placed, an explosion occurred which tore up a mass 
of earth, rails and sleepers, threw the engine and several 
carriages down the embankment, and wrecked the train. 
Those of the Prussian troops who got clear from the wreckage 
were shot down by the franc tireurs under the protection of 
their cover. The number of the enemy thus disposed of 
was said to be about 400. 

Altogether the French, in their efforts to impede the rail 
movements of the invader, destroyed many miles of line, 
together with no fewer than seventy-eight large bridges and 
tunnels, apart from minor interruptions. The repairs and 
reconstruction thus rendered necessary threw a great amount 
of labour on the Prussian Railway Troops, and much trouble 
arose from time to time on account, not only of the inade- 
quate supply of materials even for temporary constructions, 
but, also, by reason of the shortcomings of the workers 
themselves. The sections of Railway Troops had been so 
recently formed that the men were still without adequate 
training. In 1870—71, as in 1866, military members and 
civilian members of the Construction Corps were alike 
unfamiliar with the special class of work called for in the 
repair or the rebuilding of railways under the emergency 
conditions of actual warfare. This instruction had, in fact, 
to be completed at the theatre of war at a time when the 
Corps should have been prepared to show the greatest 
efficiency. 

Difficulties arose, also, on the side of the Germans in 
operating the 2,500 miles of French railway lines of which 
they took possession. 

There was, in the first place, a deficiency both of locomo- 
tive;^ and of rolling stock. So far as circumstances would 



RAILWAY TROOPS IN GERMANY. 131 

permit, the French, as they retreated, either took their 
railway rolHng stock with them or destroyed it, in order that 
it should not be used by the enemy. Attempts were made 
to meet the difficulty by obtaining constant reinforcements 
of engines and wagons from Germany ; but even then the 
organisation for controlling the use of rolling stock, among 
other transport details, was still so defective that com- 
manders who wanted to ensure the movement of their own 
troops by rail did not hesitate to take possession of engines 
and carriages set aside for the regular services of the line. 
There were, in fact, occasions when, for this reason, the 
regular services had to be stopped altogether. 

In the next place troubles with the personnel were no less 
acute than those with the materiel. In proportion as the 
Germans advanced towards Paris the bulk of the French 
population retired, while threats and offers of liberal pay 
alike failed to secure from those who remained assistance 
either in repairing or in operating the lines of which the 
invaders had taken possession. In these circumstances not 
only engines, carriages and wagons, but no fewer than 3,500 
railwaymen — in addition to the German Railway Troops 
already in France — had to be brought from Germany. Yet 
even the resort to this expedient started a fresh lot of 
troubles. The railwaymen so imported had been in the 
service of different German railway companies whose equip- 
ment and methods of operation varied considerably ; so that 
when the men were required to work together — and that, 
also, on the lines of a foreign country, with the accompani- 
ment of much laxity in discipline as well as of much mutual 
misunderstanding — a vast amount of friction arose. 

All these experiences emphasised and strengthened the 
conclusion arrived at even before the campaign of 1870-71 — 
that the real efficiency of Railway Troops can only be ob- 
tained by organising them in time of peace in readiness for 
times of war. Such conclusion being now beyond all possi- 
ble dispute, action was taken by Prussia with characteristic 
promptness. 

In accordance vdth a Royal Order of May 19, 1871, there 
was added to the Prussian Army, on October i of the same 



132 THE RISE OF KAIL-POWER. 

year, a Railway Battalion {" Eisenbahnbataillon "), the 
special purposes of which were (i) to afford to those constitut- 
ing it the means of obtaining, in time of peace, such technical 
training as would enable them to construct any railway 
works necessary in time of war, to repair promptly any dam- 
age done to railways, and to undertake the entire railway 
traffic along lines of communication ; (2) to procure, or 
prepare, in time of peace, all plant, materials, tools, etc., 
likely to be required in time of war ; and (3) to constitute 
the nucleus of all necessary railway formations in war. 
The Battalion was formed of non-commissioned oiUcers and 
men of the now disbanded sections of Railway Troops who 
were still liable to military service, supplemented by three- 
year volunteers and recruits from all parts of the territory 
subject to the Prussian Minister of War, only those being 
accepted, however, whose previous occupations fitted them 
for one or other of the various grades of railway work. The 
officers were obtained mainly, though not exclusively, from 
the Engineers. Members of that corps, together with others 
who were mechanical engineers by profession, were accepted 
as one-year volunteers. 

On a peace footing the Battalion was composed of a 
Staff and four Companies, each of 100 or 125 men, with a 
depot, and provided with its own means of transport. One 
of the Companies consisted exclusively of platelayers and 
watchmen. On mobilisation each Company was to be 
enlarged into two Construction Companies and one Traffic 
Company, giving a total, on a war footing, of eight Construc- 
tion and four Traffic Companies. The Corps also had a 
reserve division consisting of a Staff, two Companies and a 
section of railway employes. All officers having railway 
experience who had served in the war of 1870—71 were 
included in the reserve. 

The training of the Battalion was under the direction of 
the Inspector-General of the Engineers Corps. It com- 
prised (i) theoretical and scientific instruction of the officers 
in all branches of railway construction, repair and destruction, 
coupled with the study of every branch of railway science 
likely to be of advantage in mihtary transport, while special 



RAILWAY TROOPS IN GERMANY. 133 

importance was attached to a close and constant intercourse 
with the staffs of the various railways, and (2) practical 
experience of railway construction and operation. This 
experience was afforded (a) on the Battalion's practice 
grounds, where instruction was more especially given in the 
art of rapidly destrojdng railway track ; (b) through the 
employment of the men — subject to the continued main- 
tenance among them of the principle of a military organisa- 
tion — on many of the private as well as on the State railways 
in Germany, such employment including the repair of 
bridges, the laying of track, the enlargement of stations, 
etc., and (c) by the construction, operation and management 
of a short line of railway which, on completion, was devoted 
to the public service. The period of training was for either 
one or three years and the Battalion was kept up to a normal 
standard of about 500 men by a succession of recruits. 
These recruits were generally men of a good type, admission 
to the Battahon being regarded with the greater favour 
inasmuch as the experience gained was found to be of 
advantage to the men in obtaining railway employment on 
their return to civil life. 

In the giving of this practical instruction the purpose 
specially kept in view was that of anticipating as far as 
possible actual war conditions, and providing for them 
accordingly. Thus in the laying of rails for any new line 
built by the Railway Troops great importance was attached 
to the speed with which the work could be done, the records 
of the time taken being very closely watched. 

To one group of officers was allocated the duty of studying 
all developments in railway science and operation at home 
or abroad and conveying information thereon to those under 
instruction. A further important feature of the scheme 
included the pubHcation of a series of text-books on railway 
subjects regarded from a military standpoint. A beginning 
was also made with the collection of large supplies of rails, 
bridge materials, etc., for use as required. 

In December, 1872, Bavaria created a similar Battalion, 
comprising a single Company attached to the ist Bavarian 
Corps. The constitution and the operations of this Battahon 



134 THE RISE OF RAIL-POWER. 

followed closely the precedents established by Prussia. 

Such was the importance attached by the highest military 
authorities in Germany to the formation of these Railway 
Troops that the Chief of the Great General Staff was their 
Inspector-General from the time of the first Prussian 
Battalion being created down to the year 1899. 

In December 30, 1875, came the conversion of the Railway 
Battalion into a Railway Regiment. It was felt that the 
cadres of the former did not respond sufficiently to the needs 
of the military rail-transport situation, and they were 
accordingly enlarged into a Regiment of two Battalions, 
with a regimental Staff of forty-eight, and 502 men in each 
Battalion. In 1887 the Prussian Regiment was increased 
from two Battalions to four, and the Bavarian Battalion 
expanded to the extent of two companies in place of one. 
In 1890 the Prussian Regiment further became a Brigade 
of two Regiments, each of two Battalions, the number of 
units thus remaining the same as before ; though in 1893 
the Prussian Brigade was augmented by two more Battalions, 
increasing its force to three Regiments, each of two Battalions 
with four Companies in each Battalion, or a total of twenty- 
four Companies, of which one was a Wiirtemberg Company 
and two were Saxon Companies, while the Bavarian Battalion 
acquired three Companies in the place of two. 

In 1899 Prussia took a further new departure by grouping 
together, as Comnmnication Troops {" Verkerstriippen "), 
all the technical units concerned in the railway, the tele- 
graphic and the air-craft services. This new arm was put 
under the control of an officer holding the rank of a General 
of Division and receiving his orders direct from the Emperor. 
A change was also effected in regard to the Berlin-Juterbog 
railway — a single-track line, 70 km. (44 miles) in length, 
which, originally constructed mainly by the Railway Troops, 
was operated by them as a means of acquiring experience 
in railway working. Prior to the passing of the law of 
March 25, 1899, troops for the working staff were supplied 
by the Brigade, and the frequent changes were a cause of 
some inconvenience. Under the new law a section consti- 
tuted of three Prussian Companies and a Saxon detachment. 



RAILWAY TROOPS IN GERMANY. 135 

with a Lieutenant-Colonel as director, was specially created 
for the operation of the line. 

Altogether the Railway Troops comprised a total of thirty- 
one Companies, having 180 officers and 4,500 non-commis- 
sioned officers and men ; but these figures were irrespective 
of carefully-compiled lists (subjected to frequent revision) 
of all reservists possessing railway experience and still liable 
for military service. Brigade, Battalions and Companies 
thus formed only the cadres of a small army of men con- 
sidered qualified to undertake railway work of one kind or 
another in time of war. 

Even in Germany itself the need for having so large a 
body of Railway Troops was called into question some years 
ago, on the ground, partly, that it was desirable to keep to 
the lowest practicable minimum the number of non-comba- 
tants closely associated with the Army ; and, partly, because 
of the view — favoured bj^ Von der Goltz, in his " Krieg- 
flihrung " — that much of the construction work which the 
Railwa}/ Troops would carry out might be left to contractors, 
without hampering the Army with further bodies of new 
troops for special purposes. 

To these suggestions it was repHed, in effect, (i) that in 
any future war the movement of large bodies of troops would 
be directly associated with the provision and the mainten- 
ance of adequate railway facilities ; (2) that Railway Troops, 
constituted in time of peace, would alone be capable of 
ensuring the rapid renovation of damaged lines, or the con- 
struction of new ones, in time of war ; (3) that works of this 
kind, done under great pressure, and serving temporary 
purposes only, would differ essentially from railway works 
undertaken in peace by ordinary contractors ; and (4) that 
Germany required a large body of Railway Troops on account 
of her geographical position, inasmuch as she might have to 
face an enemy on either, or both, of two fronts — France and 
Russia ; while if, in the event of a war with Russia, she 
should want to send her forces into that country by rail, 
she would require to have a large body of Railway Troops 
available either for the conversion of the Russian 5 ft . gauge 
into the 4 ft. 8^ in. gauge of the German lines (in order that 



136 THE RISE OF RAIL-POWER. 

the engines and rolling stock of the latter could be utilised 
on Russian territory), or for the construction of special 
military railways as substitutes for the Russian lines. 

Whatever the merits of these respective arguments, the 
fact remains that the Railway Troops of Germany, created 
under the circumstances and conditions here detailed, have 
been maintained in steadily increasing numbers, and, also, 
in constantly expanding effiiciency thanks to what is, in 
effect, their School of Railway Instruction and to the great 
amount of practical work they have been called upon to do, 
whether in the building of strategical lines or in other de- 
partments of railway construction, destruction or working 
in which they could gain experience likely to be of advantage 
in time of war. 

There was, also, according to M. Paul Lanoir, as related 
by him in his book on " The German Spy System," a still 
further purpose that these Army railwaymen might be called 
on to serve. He tells how in 1880, the chief of the system, 
the notorious Stieber, conceived the idea of securing the 
appointment in every portion of the national railway 
system of France (and more especially at important junctions 
or strategical centres) of German spies who, competent to 
act as railway workers, would, in the event of any future war 
between Germany and France, and on receiving the neces- 
sary instructions, destroy or block the railway lines at those 
points in such a manner — as planned, of course, in advance — 
that great delay would occur in the mobilisation of the French 
troops owing to the traffic being paralysed for the time 
being ; the Germans, in the meantime, rushing their own 
forces to the frontier. " The extremely important role 
which would devolve on our railwaymen," adds M. Lanoir, 
" at the moment of the declaration of war, in fulfilling their 
functions as indispensable auxiliaries to the combatant 
army, was already thoroughly appreciated at this period." 
Submitted to Prince Bismarck, Stieber's scheme was 
approved by him, and, so far as the obtaining of appoint- 
ments on the French railways by Stieber's agents was 
concerned, the plan had been quietly carried into effect by 
the end of 188^, ; but a casual incident then led to the 



RAILWAY TROOPS IN GERMANY. 137 

discovery of the conspiracy by M. Lanoir himself. Within 
a week, as the result of his communications with General 
Campenau, Minister of War, the railway companies received 
a confidential circular requiring that they should call upon 
every foreigner employed by them in any capacity what- 
ever to become naturalised without delay. Those who would 
not adopt this course were to be immediately dismissed. 
The number of foreigners then in the employ of the railway 
companies was 1,641, and, although 1,459 of them agreed to 
become naturalised, there were 182 Germans who refused so 
to do. These 182 were at once discharged — the assumption 
being that they were the spies, qualified to act as railway 
workers, by whom the dislocation of traffic was to have been 
ensured whenever they might receive word to that effect. 



CHAPTER XII 

France and the War of 1870-71 

When France went to war with Germany in 1870-71, 
her miUtary rail-transport was still governed by regulations 
which, adopted as far back as 1851 and 1855, related only 
to such matters of detail as the financial arrangements 
between the Army and the railway companies, the length 
of troop trains, etc., without making any provision for 
an organisation controlling the transport of large bodies of 
men in time of war. It certainly had been under these 
regulations that the French troops were conveyed to Italy 
when the}/ took part in the campaign of 1859 ; ^^^ ^^e 
defects then developed, coupled with the further lessons 
taught by the Austro-Prussian War of 1866, had shown 
the need for bringing these early French regulations into 
harmony with the conditions and requirements of modern 
warfare. 

Impressed by these considerations, and realising the 
disadvantages and clangers of the position into which his 
country had drifted, the French Minister of War, Marshal 
Niel, appointed in March, 1869, a " Commission Centrale 
des Chemins de Fer," composed of representatives of the 
Army, the Ministry of Public Works, and the principal 
railway companies, for the purpose not only of revising the 
existing regulations on military transports but of preparing 
a new one to take their place. The Commission held 
twenty-nine sittings and it drew up a provisional scheme 
on lines closely following those already adopted in Germany 
and Austria and based, especially, on the same principle 
of a co-ordination of the military with the railwa}/ technical 
element. This provisional scheme was subjected to various 
tests and trials with a view to perfecting it before it was 

l'3S 



FRANCE AND THE WAR OF 1870-71. 139 

placed on a permanent basis. But Marshal Niel died ; no 
new regulation was adopted ; the projected scheme was 
more or less forgotten ; time was against the early comple- 
tion of the proposed experiments, while political and mili- 
tary developments succeeded one another with such rapidity 
that, on the outbreak of war in 1870, it was no longer 
possible to carry out the proposed plans. So the studies 
of the Commission came to naught, and France embarked 
on her tremendous conflict with no organisation for military 
transport apart from the out-of-date and wholly defective 
regulations under which her troops had already suffered in 
the Italian war of 1859. 

There was an impression that the talent of the French 
soldier would enable him to " se debrouiller " — to " pull," 
if not (in the English sense) to " muddle," through. But 
the conditions were hopeless, and the results speedily brought 
about were little short of chaos. 

So far as the actual conveyance of troops was concerned, 
the railway companies themselves did marvels. " The 
numerical superiority of Germany," as Von der Goltz says 
in his " Nation in Arms," " was known in Paris, and it was 
thought to neutralise this superiority by boldness and 
rapidity. The idea was a good one. . . but ... it was 
needful that the Germans should be outdone in the rapidity 
with which the armies were massed." That the railway 
managements and staffs did their best to secure this result 
is beyond any possibility of doubt. 

On July 15, 1870, the Minister of Public Works directed 
the Est, Nord and Paris-Lyon Companies to place all their 
means of transport at the disposal of the War IMinister, 
suspending as far as necessary their ordinary passenger 
and goods services ; and the Ouest and Orleans Companies 
were asked to put their rolling stock at the disposal of the 
three other companies. The Est, to which the heaviest 
part in the work involved was to fall, had already taken 
various measures in anticipation of an outbreak of war ; 
and such was the energy shown by the companies, as a 
whole, that the first troop train was started from Paris at 
5.45 p.m. on July 16, within, that is to say, twenty- four 



140 THE RISE OF RAIL-POWER. 

hours of the receipt of the notice from the Minister of Public 
Works. Between July i6 and July 26 there were despatched 
594 troop trains, conveying 186,620 men, 32,410 horses. 
3,162 guns and road vehicles, and 995 wagon-loads of 
ammunition and supplies. In the nineteen days of the 
whole concentration period (July i6-August 4) the com- 
panies carried 300,000 men, 64,700 horses, 6,600 guns and 
road vehicles, and 4,400 wagon-loads of ammunition and 
supplies. 

All this activity on the part of the railway companies was, 
however, neutralised more or less by the absence of any 
adequate organisation for regulating and otherwise dealing 
with the traffic, so far as concerned the military authori- 
ties themselves. 

The first regiment to leave Paris, on July 16, arrived at 
the station at 2 p.m. for the train due to start at 5.45 p.m. 
The men had been accompanied through the streets by 
an immense crowd shouting " A Berlin ! " and, with so 
much time to spare, they either blocked up the station or 
were taken off by their friends to the neighbouring taverns, 
where the consumption of liquor was such that, by the time 
the train started, most of the men were excessively drunk. 
In addition to this, many had been relieved of their ammuni- 
tion — taken from them, perhaps, as " souvenirs " of an 
historic occasion, though destined to reappear and to be put 
to bad use in the days of the Commune, later on. 

If, however, at the beginning, the troops got to the 
station three hours before there was any need, other occa- 
sions were to arise when they kept trains waiting three or 
four hours before they themselves were ready to start. 

Then, in Germany the concentration of the troops at 
some safe point in the interior, and their transport thence 
by rail to the frontier in complete units, took place as separate 
and distinct operations. In France the two movements 
were conducted simultaneously ; and this, in itself, was a 
prolific source of confusion and disorganisation on the 
railways. The troops came to the stations on a peace 
footing and in various strengths. One regiment might 
have only one-third the strength of another despatched 



FRANCE AND THE WAR OF 1870-71. 141 

earlier the same day or on the previous day, although the 
railway company would have provided the same number of 
vehicles for both. There was thus a choice of evils as 
between removing two-thirds of the carriages (a procedure 
which time or the station arrangements did not always 
permit) ; sending the train away only partially loaded ; or 
filling up the available space either with men belonging to 
other corps or with such supplies as might be available at 
the moment. Some trains did leave nearly empty, but it 
was the last mentioned of the three courses that was gener- 
ally adopted. Men of different arms — Infantry, Cavalry 
and Artillery ; mobilised troops, reservists, and individuals, 
separated, it might be, from their own officers and not 
willing to show themselves amenable to the discipline of other 
officers — were thus transported at the same time as, possibly, 
a miscellaneous collection of horses, material and com- 
missariat supplies. Other trains, again, went away so 
overcrowded that they could not accommodate all the men 
who should have gone by them, many being left behind in 
consequence. 

Confusion and delays at the railway stations during the 
entraining of the troops were rendered the more complete 
because the railway staffs failed to get an adequate degree 
of support from the military authorities. According to 
one of the articles in those regulations of 1855 which were 
still in force, " officers were responsible for the prescribed 
movements in connection with the entraining, and should 
personally co-operate in ensuring observance of the regula- 
tions referring thereto " ; but, according to Baron Ernouf, 
(" Histoire des Chemins de Fer Fran^ais pendant la Guerre 
Franco- Prussienne,") there were officers who refused abso- 
lutely to concern themselves with the entraining of their 
men at the Est station in Paris, declaring that this was a 
matter to be looked after by the railway officials with 
the help of subordinate officers, if they wanted it. 

Under such conditions as these, officers in charge of 
troops got hopelessly separated from their men, who them- 
selves might have been sent off with no knowledge of their 
proper destination. One General telegraphed to Paris on 



142 THE RISE OF RAIL-POWER. 

July 21 : — " Have arrived at Belfort. Not found my 
Brigade. Not found General of Division. What should I 
do ? Don't know where my Regiments are." As for the 
men, it was not many days before the stations en route 
to the front were occupied by a floating mass of " lost " 
soldiers, who pretended to be looking for their corps but too 
often found it much pleasanter to remain in the station 
buffets, and there enjoy the hospitality of local patriots. 
Such proportions did this evil assume that in August, 1870, 
the railway station at Reims had to be protected against a 
mob of from 4,000 to 5,000 " lost " ones, who wanted to 
plunder the wagons containing supplies for the front. 

Confusion, again, was made still worse confounded by the 
multiplicity of orders — too often contradictory or impossible 
to carry out — which bombarded the railway officials, and 
must have driven them at times almost to distraction. 
Orders came direct from anybody and everybody possessed 
of the slightest degree of military authority. They came 
from the Ministry of War, the General Staff, and the Admin- 
istrative Staff ; from the Quartermaster-General's Depart- 
ment and the Commissariat ; from officers and non-com- 
missioned officers of Infantry, Artillery and Engineers ; 
while each individual invariably gave his orders based on the 
range of his own particular sphere, or the convenience of his 
own particular troops, without any regard for the situation 
as a whole, for what might be wanted in other spheres, or 
for whether or not it was physically possible for the railway 
staffs to do at all what was asked of them, even if they were 
not being overwhelmed with those other orders, besides. 
Commanding officers of different corps especially distin- 
guished themselves by presenting to the railway manage- 
ments claims for priority in the despatch of Infantry, 
Artillery or supplies, as the case might be, threatening them 
with grave consequences if, in each instance, they did not 
yield such priority at once, though leaving them to meet 
an obviously impracticable position as best they could. 
Then it might happen that when all the necessary arrange- 
ments — involving much interference with other traffic — 
had been made, another order would come countermanding 



FRANCE AND THE WAR OF 1870-71. 143 

the first one, or postponing the execution of it until a later 
occasion. 

As though, again, the orders from all these independent 
military authorities were not sufficient, the railways were 
further worried by local authorities who wanted special 
trains for some such service as the conveyance of detach- 
ments of garde mobile a distance of ten or twelve miles 
to an instruction camp so that the men would not have to 
march by road. There were even demands from certain 
of the local authorities that they should be allowed to use 
railway wagons as barracks for troops. 

M. Jacqmin, general manager of the Chemin de Fer de 
I'Est, relates in his book, " Les Chemins de Fer Pendant la 
Guerre de 1870-71," that at the moment when the Compagnie 
de I'Est was providing for the transport of Bourbacki's 
forces, and preparing for the revictualling of Paris, the 
prefet of the Rhone demanded the use of railway wagons 
in which to house the garde nationale mobilised on the plain 
of Venissieux, on the left bank of the Rhone, there having 
been a delay in the delivery of the material for barracks. 
The company refused the request, and they had with the 
departmental authorities a lively controversy which was 
only settled by the decision of the Bordeaux Government 
that those authorities were in the wrong. 

Typical of the general conditions, as they prevailed not 
only in Paris but elsewhere in France, were the circum- 
stances under which the Nineteenth Army Corps, of 32,000 
men, 3,000 horses and 300 guns, was sent from Cherbourg to 
Alengon. The troops were late in arriving at the station ; 
the officers neglected to look after the men ; the men 
refused to travel in goods trucks ; orders and counter- 
orders succeeded one another in rapid succession ; two or 
three hours were required for the despatch of each train, 
and delays occurred which must have disorganised the 
traffic all along the line. 

Great as the confusion undoubtedly was at the points of 
despatch, it was far surpassed by that which prevailed at 
stations to which trains were sent regardless of any con- 
sideration as to whether or not they could be unloaded there 



144 THE RISE OF RAIL-POWER. 

with such despatch as to avoid congestion. No transfer 
stations — constituting the points beyond which only the 
suppHes wanted for immediate or early use at the extreme 
front should be taken, the remainder being forwarded as 
wanted — had been arranged, and the consignors, military 
or civil, had assumed that all supplies should be sent in 
bulk to places as near to the troops as possible There 
were, consequently, many stations close to the frontier 
where the rails leading to them . were occupied for miles 
together by loaded wagons, the number of which was being 
constantly added to by fresh arrivals. Many of these 
wagons were, in fact, used as magazines or store-houses on 
wheels. The same was, also, being done to a certain extent 
on the German lines, though with this difference — that 
whereas in Germany there were at the railway stations 
route commandants whose duty it was to enforce the 
prompt unloading of wagons, in France there was no corre- 
sponding authority. It suited the officers or the military 
department concerned to keep the supplies in the wagons 
until they were wanted ; and this arrangement may have 
appeared an especially desirable one from their point of 
view because if the army moved forward- — or backward — 
the supplies could be more readily moved with it if they 
were still in the wagons. 

For these various reasons, there were officers who gave 
the most stringent orders that the wagons were not to be 
unloaded until their contents were actually required. It 
was evidently a matter of no concern to them that the 
wagons they were detaining might be wanted elsewhere, 
and that, for lack of them, other troops might be experienc- 
ing a shortage in their own supplies. 

When the wagons were not deliberately kept loaded, it 
might still be impossible for the unloading to be done 
because of there being no military in attendance to do the 
work. As for the picking out, from among the large number 
in waiting, of some one wagon the contents of which were 
specially wanted, the trouble involved in this operation 
must often have been far greater than if the wagon had 
been unloaded and the supplies stored in the first instance. 



FRANCE AND THE WAR OF 1870-71. 145 

Even the stations themselves got congested, under Hke 
conditions. The Commissariat wanted to convert them 
into depots, and the Artillery sought to change them into 
arsenals. There were stations at which no platform was 
any longer available and troops arriving by any further 
train had to descend some distance awa}^, several days 
elapsing before their train could be moved from the place 
where it had pulled up. At stations not thus blocked 
trains might be hours late in arriving, or they might bring 
a squadron of cavalry when arrangements had been made 
for receiving a battalion of infantry. 

In one instance a General refused to allow his men to 
detrain on arrival at their destination at night, saying 
they would be more comfortable in the carriages than in 
the snow. This was, indeed, the case ; but so long as the 
train remained where it was standing no other traffic could 
pass. SomiCtimes it was necessary for troop trains to wait 
on the lines for hours because no camp had been assigned 
to the men, and there was at least one occasion when a 
Colonel had to ask the station-master where it was his 
troops were to go. 

Most of the traffic had been directed to Metz and Strasburg, 
and the state of chaos speedily developed at the former 
station has become historic. 

The station at Metz was a large one ; it had eight good 
depots and four miles of sidings, and it was equal to the 
unloading of 930 wagons in twenty-four hours under well- 
organised conditions. But when the first infantry trains 
arrived the men were kept at the station four or five hours 
owing to the absence of orders as to their further destina- 
tion. The men detrained, and the wagons containing road 
vehicles, officers' luggage, etc., were left unloaded and 
sent into the sidings. Other trains followed in rapid suc- 
cession, bringing troops and supplies, and the block began 
to assume serious proportions. 

The railway officials appealed to the local Commissariat 
force to unload the wagons so that they could be got out 
of the way. They were told that this could not be done 
because no orders had been received. The Commissariat 



146 THE RISE OF RAIL-POWER. 

force for the division also declined to unload the wagons, 
saying it was uncertain whether the troops for whom the 
supplies were intended would remain at Metz or go further 
on. 

Any unloading at all for several days was next rendered 
impossible by the higher military authorities. They asked 
the railway officers to prepare for the transport of an army 
corps of 30,000 men. This was done, and forty trains 
were located at various points along the line. An order 
was then given that the trains should be brought to Metz, 
to allow of the troops leaving at once. Within four hours 
every train was ready, and its locomotive was standing 
with the steam up ; but no troops appeared. The order 
was countermanded. Then it was repeated, and then it 
was countermanded over again. 

All this time fresh train-loads of supplies and ammunition 
had been arriving at Metz, adding to the collection of un- 
loaded wagons which, having lilled up all the sidings began 
to overflow and block up, lirst the lines leading to the loco- 
motive sheds and next the main lines themselves. Every- 
thing was in inextricable confusion. Nobody knew where 
any particular commodity was to be found or, if they did, 
how to get the truck containing it from the consohdated 
mass of some thousands of vehicles. " In Metz," tele- 
graphed the Commissary-General to Paris, " there is neither 
coffee, nor sugar ; no rice, no brandy, no salt, only a little 
bacon and biscuit. Send me at least a million rations to 
Thionville." Yet it was quite possible that the articles 
specified were already in some or other of the trucks on 
hand, had the Commissary-General only known where they 
were and how to get them. 

The railway people did what they could. They unloaded 
some of the consignments and removed them a consider- 
able distance by road — only to have them sent back again to 
Metz station for re-loading and conveyance elsewhere. 
Hay unloaded at the station was sent into Metz to some 
magazines which, in turn, and at the same time, were 
sending hay to the railway for another destination. Finally, 
as a last resource, and in order both to reduce the block 



FRANCE AND THE WAR OF 1870-71. 147 

and to get further use out of the wagons, the railway officials 
began to unload them and put their contents on the ground 
alongside. A big capture alike of wagons and of supplies 
was made by the enemy on his occupation of Metz. 

Analogous conditions prevailed in many other places. At 
Dole (Dep. Jura) an accumulated stock of loaded wagons 
not only filled up all the sidings but blocked up a large 
portion of the main line. When the evacuation was de- 
cided on a great waste of time occurred in selecting the 
wagons to be moved. Orders given one hour were counter- 
manded the next ; trains which had been made up were 
moved forward and backward, instead of being got out of 
the way at once ; and, eventually, a considerable quantity 
of rolling stock, which might and should have been removed, 
had to be left behind. 

On the Paris-Lyon railway a collection of 7,500 loaded 
trucks had accumulated at a time when a great truck 
shortage began to be felt, and the whole of these, together 
with the provisions and the materials they contained, 
fell into the hands of the Germans, whose total haul of 
wagons, including those captured at Metz and other places, 
numbered no fewer than 16,000. The wagons thus taken 
were first used by them for their own military transport 
during the remainder of the war ; were then utilised for 
ordinary traffic on lines in Germany, and were eventually 
returned to France. Not only, therefore, had the French 
failed to get from these 16,000 railway wagons the benefit 
they should have derived from their use but, in blocking 
their lines with them under such conditions that it was 
impossible to save them from capture, they conferred a 
material advantage on the enemy, providing him with 
supplies, and increasing his own means both of transport 
and of attack on themselves. 

The proportions of the German haul of wagons would, 
probably, have been larger still had not some of the French 
railway companies, on seeing the advance the enemy was 
making, assumed the responsibility of stopping traffic on 
certain of their lines and sending off their rolling stock to a 
place of safety. In taking this action they adopted a 



148 THE RISE OF RAIL-POWER. 

course based alike on precedent and prudence, and one 
fully warranted by the principle of keeping railway rolling 
stock designed for purposes of defence from being utilised 
by the enemy for his own purposes of attack. 



CHAPTER XIII 
Organisation in France 

While, on the conclusion of the Franco-Prussian war, 
Germany began, as we have seen in Chapter X., to improve 
her own system of military rail-transport, with a view to 
remedying the faults developed therein, France applied 
herself with equal, if not with even greater, determination 
and perseverance to the task of creating for herself a system 
which, in her case, had been entirely lacking. 

Recognising alike her own shortcomings, the imperative 
need to prepare for future contingencies, and the still more 
important part that railways would inevitably play in the 
next great war in which she might be engaged, France 
resolved to create, in time of peace, and as an indispensable 
factor in her scheme of national defence, a system of military 
transport comprehensive in its scope, complete in its work- 
ing details, and leaving nothing to chance. Everything 
was to be foreseen, provided for, and, as far as circumstances 
would permit, tested in advance. 

The Prussian organisation of 1870-71 was, admittedly, 
and as recommended by Jacqmin, taken as a starting point 
for what was to be done. From that time, also, every new 
regulation adopted by Prussia in regard to military trans- 
port, and every important alteration made in the Prussian 
system, was promptly recorded and commended or criticised 
in the ably-conducted French military papers ; though in 
the actual creation of her own system there was no mere 
following by France of Prussian examples. What was con- 
sidered worth adopting certainly was adopted ; but the 
organisation eventually built up, as the result of many 
years of pertinacious efforts, was, in reality, based on French 

149 



150 THE RISE OF RAIL-POWER. 

conditions, French requirements, and the most progressive 
ideas of French mihtary science. The French were, also, 
to show that, when they appHed themselves to the task, 
they had a genius for organisation in no way inferior to that 
of the Germans themselves. 

In his review of the events of 1870-71, Jacqmin declared 
that, while the education of France in the use of railways in 
time of war had still to be completed, the basis for such 
education had already been laid down by Marshal Niel's 
" Commission Centrale " of 1869. The two essential con- 
ditions were (i) unification of control in the use of railways 
for military purposes, whether for the transport of men or 
of supplies ; and (2) association of the military element and 
the technical element, — an association which should be 
permanent in its nature and apply to every phase of the 
railway service, so that before any order was given there 
should be a guarantee that it was one possible of achieve- 
ment, and this, also, without prejudice to other transport 
orders already given or likely to become necessary. 

It was these essential conditions that formed the basis 
of the organisation which France created. 

As early as November, 1872, there was called into exist- 
ence a Commission Militaire Sitperieure des Chemins de 
Fer consisting of twelve members, who represented the 
Ministry of Public Works, the Army, the Navy, and the 
great railway companies. Attached to the Ministry of War, 
and charged with the task of studying all questions relating 
to the use of railways by the Army, the Commission had 
for its first duty a revision of the proposals made by Mar- 
shal Niel's Commission of 1869. Following on this came 
a succession of laws, decrees and instructions dealing with 
various aspects of the situation in regard to military trans- 
port and the military organization of the railways, the 
number issued between 1872 and 1883 being no fewer than 
seventeen. These, however, represented more or less tenta- 
tive or sectional efforts made in combination with the 
railway companies, who gave to the Chambers and to the 
administrative authorities their most earnest support and 
the full benefit of all their technical knowledge and experi' 



ORGANISATION IN FRANCE. 151 

ence in regard to the many problems which had to be solved. 

In 1884 there were issued two decrees (July 7 and October 
29) which codified, modified or further developed the various 
legislative or administrative measures already taken, and 
laid down both the fundamental principles and the leading 
details of a comprehensive scheme which, after additional 
modifications or amendments, based on later experiences, 
was to develop into the system of organised military rail- 
transport as it exists in France to-day. 

These later modifications v/ere more especially effected 
by three decrees which, based on the law of December 28, 
1888, dealt with (i) the composition and powers of the 
Commission Militaire Superieure des Chemins de Fer ; (2) 
the creation of Field Railway Sections and Railway Troops ; 
and (3) the organisation of the military service of railways. 

Since its original formation in 1872, the Superior Military' 
Commission had already undergone reconstruction in 1886, 
and still further changes, in addition to those made by the 
decree of February 5, 1889, were to follow. In its final 
form the Commission still retains the principle of represen- 
tation thereon alike of the military and the technical (rail- 
way) element. Presided over by the Chief of the General 
Staff — who, with the help of a special department of that 
Staff, exercises the supreme direction of the military trans- 
port services, subject to the authority of the War Minister 
— the Commission is composed of six Generals or other 
military officers of high rank, three representatives of the 
Ministry of Public Works, and the members of the Line 
Commission appointed for each of the great railway systems 
and, also, for the Chemin de Fer d'Etat. 

All the members of the Commission are nominated by the 
Minister of War. The function they discharge is a purely 
consultative one. Their business it is to give to the Minis- 
ter their views on all such questions as he may submit to 
them for consideration in regard to the use of the railways 
by the Army, and more especially in regard to — 

1. Preparations for military transports. 

2. Examination of all projects for new lines or junctions 
and alterations of existing lines, as well as all projects which 



152 THE RISE OF RAIL-POWER. 

concern railway facilities (stations, platforms, water supply, 
locomotive sheds, etc.) 

3. The fixing of the conditions to be fulfilled by railway 
rolling stock in view of military requirements, and the 
alterations which may be necessary to adapt it thereto. 

4. Special instructions to be given to troops of all arms 
as to their travelling by rail. 

5. Agreements to be made between railway companies 
and the War Department in respect to transport of troops, 
provisions, etc. 

6. Organisation, instruction and employment of special 
corps of railwaymen (for repairs, etc.). 

7. Measures to be taken for ensuring the supervision and 
protection of railways and their approaches. 

8. The means of destroying and of rapidly repairing lines 
of railway. 

Heads of the different services at the Ministry of War 
can attend meetings of the Commission, in a consultative 
capacity, in respect to matters coming within their juris- 
diction, and the Commission can, in turn, apply to the 
Minister for the attendance of any person it may desire to 
hear. 

As far as possible, all plans and arrangements concerning 
the transport of troops and supplies in time of war, from the 
moment of mobilisation onward, are thus prepared, 
examined or provided for in advance. In article 8 of the 
Regulation of December 8, 1913, on Military Transports 
by Railway (" Reglement sur les transports strategiques 
par chemin de fer ") it is, in fact, stated that — 

All the arrangements relating to the organisation and carry- 
ing out of transport for mobilisation, concentration, revictual- 
ling and evacuation are studied and prepared in time of peace. 
The Minister gives, to this effect, all the necessary instructions 
to the General Staff, to the commanders of Army Corps, and 
to the different services. A like course is adopted, in time 
of peace, with regard to the study of the conditions under which 
the railways will be operated on the lines of communication. 

The creation, under the law of March 13, 1875, of Field 
Railway Sections and Railway Troops was the outcome 
of the obvious need of having an organised force able to 



ORGANISATION IN FRANCE. 153 

take up the duties of constructing, repairing, destroying 
or operating railways at the theatre of war, such force 
being estabhshed in time of peace and assured all the ex- 
perience needed to qualify them for the discharge of those 
various duties. France, in fact, was now, in this respect, 
to follow the example of Germany, just as Germany had 
already been inspired by the example of the United States. 

Under a decree of February 5, 1889, Field Railway Sec- 
tions {" Sections de chemins de fer de campagne ") were 
defined as permanent military corps charged, in time of 
war, and concurrently with the Railway Troops, with the 
construction, renovation and operation of those railways 
of which the working could not be assured by the national 
companies. Their personnel was to be recruited from 
among the engineers, officials and men employed by the 
railway companies and by the State Railways Administra- 
tion, such recruiting being carried out either voluntarily 
or by reason of liability to render military service ; and 
they were to form a distinct corps, having its own govern- 
ing body with, as its head, a commandant exercising the 
functions of a Chef de Corps. In time of peace there were 
to be nine sections, each designated by a distinctive number 
according to the particular railway system or systems from 
which it was formed ; though authority was given to the 
Minister of War to call further sections into being in case 
of war. The number in peace was increased, in 1906, by 
the formation of a tenth section from among the staffs of 
railways in the " secondary " group, including local lines 
and tramways, in order to assure, or to assist in, the opera- 
tion of these railways or tramways for military transport 
in time of war. 

In time of peace the sections were to be subject to in- 
spections, musters, reviews and assemblies, as ordered by 
the Minister of War. A further provision in the decree of 
1889 says : — " All the arrangements relative to the mobilisa- 
tion of each section shall be studied and planned in time of 
peace. Each section should always be ready, in the most 
complete manner, to render its services to the Minister of 
War." 



154 THE RISE OF RAIL-POWER. 

Subsequent decrees or instructions constituted each of 
the sections a complete unit on the following basis : (i) 
A central body; (2) three distinct divisions, namely, (a) 
" movement," ih) " voie/' and (c) " traction " ; (3) a central 
depot common to the three divisions and the central body ; 
and (4) complementary territorial subdivisions in the same 
three classes, and attached to the central depot of the sec- 
tion. The territorial subdivisions are designed to provide 
a reserve force of men who can complete or strengthen the 
existing sections, or, alternatively, be constituted into 
additional sections, if so desired by the Minister of War. 
The total strength of each section (including 141 allotted 
to the central depot) was fixed as 1,466. 

The administration of a section rests with an Adminis- 
trative Council formed by the president and the heads of 
the several departments, and meeting at least once in every 
three months in time of peace, and once a week in time of 
war. Authority is exercised over the sections by the Field 
Railway Commissions to which they are attached. ^ 

Men in the active divisions of the sections who are liable 
to military service are excused from taking part in the 
ordinary military exercises, but may be assembled for 
inspections, etc., or to undergo courses of instruction in 
railway work. Men in the territorial subdivisions can be 
summoned by the Minister of War for "a period of exer- 
cises " in railway work in time of peace ; and the fact may 
be recalled that advantage of this power was taken during 
the French railway troubles of 1910, when the strikers were 
required to assume the role of soldiers doing railway work 
under military authority and control. 

The Railway Troops {" Troupes de chemin de fer ") now 
constitute a Railway Regiment ("5' regiment du genie ") 
organised under the decree of July 11, 1899, ^.nd comprising 
on a peace footing, three Battalions, each of four Companies. 

Recruits for the Railway Regiment come from one or 
other of the following classes : (i) Young soldiers who were 

1 For details concerning the functions and duties of the various 
divisions, subdivisions, etc., see " Mouvenients et Transports. 
Sections de chemins de fer de campagne. Vokune arrete a la date 
du ler 'septembre, 1914." Paris : Henri Charles-Lavauzelle. 



ORGANISATION IN FRANCE. 155 

in the railway service before they joined the Army ; (2) an 
annual contingent of railway employes selected by the 
Minister of War from lists supplied for this purpose by the 
administrations of the five great railway companies and of 
the State railways, the number so selected not to exceed 
240, distributed as follows : Compagnie du Nord, 42 ; Est, 
18 ; P. L. M., 54 ; Orleans, 42 ; Midi, 15 ; Etat, 69 ; and 
(3) soldiers belonging to Infantry Regiments who, after 
one year of training therein, are sent to the Railway Regi- 
ment, those chosen for this purpose being, by preference, 
men whose previous occupation in life has adapted them for 
railway work. 

The railway administrations are also required to provide 
from among their officials a certain number of officers and 
non-commissioned officers to form a reserve for the Regi- 
ment. 

A most complete and systematic course of instruction is 
arranged.^ It is divided into (i) military instruction and 
(2) technical instruction, the purpose of the latter being 
defined as that of qualifying the Railway Troops to under- 
take at the theatre of war, subject to the authority of the 
Director-General of Railways and Communicatioiis, works 
of repair or destruction of railway lines, or, in case of need, 
the provisional working of the railways. In time of peace 
it is the duty of the Superior Military Commission for Rail- 
ways to advise on all questions concerning the organisation, 
instruction and employment of the special troops for rail- 
way work. To enable it to discharge this function the 
Commission receives, through the Chief of the General 
Staff, all programmes, proposals or reports that may be 
issued in regard to the technical instruction of the troops, 
giving its views thereon, and making such recommendations 
as it may consider desirable. 

Such technical instruction comprises [a) that which is 
given to the whole of the troops ; (b) instruction in particu- 
lar branches of railway work given to a limited number of 
individuals ; (c) instruction to groups of men operating in 

^ " Bulletin Officiel du Ministere de la Guerre. Genie. Troupes 
de chemms de fer. Volume arrete a la date du ler decembre, 191 2." 



156 THE RISE OF RAIL-POWER. 

companies or otherwise, and {d) instruction obtained on the 
ordinary railways. It is further divided into (i) theoretical 
and (ii) practical. 

Among the measures adopted for ensuring the success of 
the general scheme, mention might be made of the issuing 
of special series of textbooks ; the regular working by the 
Regiment of about forty miles of railway — including an 
important junction — between Chartres and Orleans, on the 
State Railway system ; and arrangements made with the 
railway administrations under which (i) a certain number 
of Companies belonging to the Regiment are attached to 
the ordinary railway systems every year, for periods of two 
or three months ; and (2) power is given to the railway 
administrations to engage the services of the Railway 
Troops in carrying out repairs or construction works on 
their lines, a mutual advantage thus being obtained. 

Finally there is a Railway School (" Ecole de chemins de 
fer ") which has charge of all the materials, tools, etc., used 
in the technical instruction of the troops ; draws up, under 
the orders of the Colonel, programmes of practical work 
and instruction ; and provides (i) a library which is sup- 
plied with books and periodicals deahng with military, 
railway, scientific and historical subjects, together with maps, 
plans, decrees, regulations, etc., relating to the military 
operation of railways ; (2) a collection of tools, instruments 
and models ; (3) photographic and lithographic depart- 
ments ; (4) stores of railway construction material for 
instruction purposes ; (5) other stores of like material for 
use in case of war ; (6) workshops for practical instruction 
in railway repairs, etc. ; and (7) practice grounds reserved 
exclusively for the Railway Troops. 

The fact of these two bodies of Field Railway Sections 
and Railway Troops being organised on so practical and 
comprehensive a basis secured to France the control of 
forces certain to be of the greatest service to her in the next 
war in which she might be engaged. It would, also, even 
suffice by itself to prove the earnestness, the vigour and 
the thoroughness with which, after 1870-71, France entered 
upon the improvement of her system of military rail-trans- 



ORGANISATION IN FRANCE. 157 

port for national defence. There was, however, much 
more to be done, besides, before that system could be con- 
sidered complete ; and here, again, a vast amount of study, 
foresight and energy was shown. 

Following, indeed, the laws, decrees, regulations, orders, 
and instructions issued down to 1889 came so many others- 
dealing, in some instances, with even the minutest detail 
concerning some particular phase of the organisation in 
course of being perfected — that a collected series of those 
still in force in 1902 formed a volume of over 700 pages. ^ 
Since the issue of this somewhat formidable collection, 
still further changes have been introduced, the general 
conditions being finally modified by decrees passed on 
December 8, 1913. 

Without attempting to indicate all the successive stages 
in this prolonged series of legislative and administrative 
efforts, it may suffice to offer a general sketch of the French 
organisation of military rail-transport on the basis of the 
laws, regulations and practices in operation on the outbreak 
of war in 1914. 

Connected with each of the great railway systems there 
is a permanent Line Commission {" Commission de reseau ") 
which consists of (i) a technical member who, in practice, 
is the general manager of the line ; and (2) a military 
member, who is a member of the General Staff of the Army. 
The former is chosen by the railway administration, subject 
to the approval of the War Minister, and the latter by the 
War Minister himself. Each Line Commission controls 
the services of a combined technical and military staff, and 
each Commissioner has a deputy who can take his place 
and exercise his powers in case of need. While the Military 
Commissioner is specially responsible for measures adopted 
from a military point of view, the Railway Commissioner 
is specially responsible for putting at the command of the 
Army, as far as may be necessary or practicable, all the 

^ " Transports militaires par chemin de fer. (Guerre et Marine.) 
Edition mise a jour des textes en vigueur jusqu'en octobre, 1902." 
For later publications, dealing, in separate issues, with particular 
departments of the military rail-transport organisation, see Bib- 
liography, 



158 THE RISE OF RAIL-POWER. 

resources of the particular railway system he represents. 

The authority of a Line Commission on any one of the 
great railway systems extends to the smaller, or secondary, 
lines situate within the same territory ; but the smaller 
companies may themselves claim to be represented on the 
Commission by a duly credited agent. 

Among the duties to be discharged by a Line Commission 
in time of peace are the following : — 
^^i. Investigation of all matters to which military transport 
on the line or the system can give rise. 

2. Study of all the available resources of the system, in 
material and men, from the point of view of military 
requirements. 

3. Preparation of plans, estimates, and other data in 
connection with the movement of troops, etc. 

4. Verification of reports concerning extent of lines, 
rolling stock, and station or traffic facilities. 

5. Special instruction of the railway staff. 

6. Inspection of lines, bridges, etc. 

7. The carrying out of experiments of all kinds with a 
view to ameliorating or accelerating the facilities offered by 
the system in respect to military transports. 

Should several Line Commissions be interested in some 
particular question concerning military movements by rail, 
the Chief of the General Staff can summon them to a joint 
conference as often as may be necessary. The fact, also, 
that the members of the Line Commissions are members 
of the Superior Commission assures co-ordination in the 
studies carried on as regards the railways in general, and 
provides a ready means by which the central body can 
obtain the information it desires concerning any one system 
or group of systems. 

As their district executives, the Line Commissions have 
such number of Sub- Line Commissions as may be found 
necessary. Each of these is, in turn, composed of a mihtary 
member, nominated by the Minister, and a technical mem- 
ber, chosen by the Line Commission. Then, also, to dis- 
charge the function of local executive, there is at every 
important centre of traffic a Station Commission (" Commis_ 



ORGANISATION IN FRANCE. 159 

sion de gare ") which consists of a military officer and the 
stationmastcr. It receives from the Line or Sub-Line 
Commission all orders or instructions concerning military 
transport to, from, or passing through, such station, and 
is the recognised intermediary for carrying them into effect 
and seeing that efficiency is ensured and good order main- 
tained. 

A staff, formed of mihtary men and railwaymen acting 
in combination, is allotted to each Line, Sub-Line or Station 
Commission. Concerning the representation of these two 
elements, military and civil, on the one body, article 10 
of the decree of December 8, 1913, on Military Transports 
says : — 

The special function of each of the agents, military or tech- 
nical, on the Commissions or Sub-Commissions must, in the 
operation of the service, be maintained in the most absolute 
manner. At the same time these agents should not lose from 
their view the fact that their association is designed to effect 
harmony between the exigencies alike of military requirements 
and of rail transport, subordinating those of the one to those 
of the other, according to circumstances. 

From the time that mobihsation begins — or even earHer, 
on the order of the War Minister — the members of the 
Superior Commission take up their posts en perinancncc 
at the War Office, and those of the Line, Sub-Line and 
Station Commissions locate themselves at the stations which 
will have been allotted to them in time of peace. Thence- 
forward each Station Commission is in constant communi- 
cation by telegraph with the Line or Sub-Line Commission 
under which it acts, supplementing such communication 
by daily written reports. Among the duties to be dis- 
charged by the Station Commissions are those of super- 
intending the entrainment or detrainment of troops and 
the loading or unloading of material ; seeing that the 
trains required for transport purposes are provided ; pre- 
venting congestion of the lines or of the station approaches ; 
and ensuring the security of the station and of the lines 
within a certain radius thereof. 

On the outbreak of war the railway companies must 



i6o THE RISE OF RAIL-POWER. 

place at the service of the State either the whole or such of 
their lines, rolling stock, and other means of transport as 
may be needed for the conveyance of troops, stores, etc., 
to any points served by them. Thenceforward the lines 
so required for " strategic transports " — including therein 
mobilisation, concentration, reinforcements, supplies and 
evacuations from the theatre of war — can be used for 
ordinary passengers and goods only to such extent as the 
Minister may approve. 

Following on the order for mobilisation the Minister, 
after consultation with the Commander-in-Chief, divides 
the railways of the country into two zones — the " Zone of 
the Interior," and the " Zone of the Armies." Of these 
the former passes under the supreme control of the War 
Minister, and the latter under that of the Commander-in- 
Chief. The location of the Stations of Transition, dividing 
the one zone from the other, can be varied from time to 
time by the Minister, in consultation with the Commander- 
in-Chief, according to the developments of the military 
situation. 

The Zone of the Interior is that part of the railway system 
which, though not situated at the theatre of war, is subject 
to military control by reason of the services required of it 
in the forwarding of troops, supplies, guns, ammunition 
and other necessaries. Operation by the ordinary staffs 
of the railway systems is continued, but the transports 
ordered by the War Minister are regulated by the Chief of 
the General Staff. The execution of the orders given is 
entrusted from the day of mobilisation to the Line Com- 
missions, each of which, acting under the authority of the 
War Minister, takes charge over the whole of the services 
on the lines comprised in its particular territory. 

The Zone of the Armies is, in turn, divided into two sec- 
tions (i) the " Zone de I'avant," in which military opera- 
tion of the railways is necessary on account of their nearness 
to the fighting-line ; and (2) the " Zone de TArriere," in 
which the railways can still be operated by the ordinary 
railway staffs, under the direction of Line and Station 
Commissions, as in the adjoining Zone of the Interior. 



ORGANISATION IN FRANCE. i6i 

Orders given by the Commander-in-Chief in respect to 
transport in the Zone of the Armies are carried out under 
the supreme control of an officer now known as the Dircc- 
tcur do I'Ayyiere. The history of this important functionary 
affords an excellent example of the way in which the whole 
scheme of operations has been evolved. 

The " Reglement general " of July i, 1874, — one of the 
earliest attempts to meet the difficulties which had arisen 
in 1870-71 in respect to military rail-transport — was 
found to be defective inasmuch as it did not apply, also, to 
those road and rear services (" Services del'Arriere ") which 
are necessarily associated with the rail services and them- 
selves constitute so important a phase of military trans- 
port as a whole. In 1878 an attempt was made to meet 
this defect by the inauguration of a system of " Services 
des Etapes " ; but here, again, the existence of separate 
organisations for rail service and road service, without any 
connecting and controlling link, was found to be unsatisfac- 
tory. In 1883 a Commission, presided over by General Fay, 
was appointed to consider what would be the best course 
to adopt, and, in the result, there was issued, on July 7, 1884, 
a Decree creating a " Directeur General des Chemins de 
Fer et des Etapes," whose duties were more clearly defined 
under a Decree of February 21, 1900. In 1908 the title 
of this officer was changed to that of " Directeur de I'Ar- 
riere," and, after further revisions, the scope of his authority 
and responsibility was eventually fixed by the Regulation 
of December 8, 1913. 

Taking up his position at the head-quarters of the Com- 
mander-in-Chief, and keeping in close touch, also, with 
the Minister of War through the Chief of the General Staff, 
the Directeur de I'Arriere has for his special function that 
of securing complete co-ordination alike between rail ser- 
vices and road services and between the services in the 
Zone of the Interior and those in the Zone of the Armies. 
Both from the Minister and from the Commander-in-Chief 
he receives information as to operations projected or in 
progress, and as to the needs of the armies in personnel 
and materiel. His business it is to see that these needs, 

M 



i62 THE RISE OF RAIL-POWER. 

according to their order of urgency — as further communi- 
cated to him — are suppHed under conditions which shall 
provide for all contingencies and guard against all possible 
confusion or delays. He fixes, among other things, the 
lines of communication ; he keeps in close touch with the 
road services, and — having, within the limit of his instruc- 
tions, complete control over the railways in the Zone of 
the Armies — he decides on the conditions to be adopted 
in respect to all transport alike from the interior to the 
armies and from the armies to the interior. As between, 
also, the Minister of War and the Commander-in-Chief, he 
maintains a constant exchange of information concerning 
time-tables for military trains and other such matters. 

In the discharge of these duties the Directeur de TArriere 
is aided by a staff which comprises both the technical and 
the military elements ; but he is not himself responsible 
for the actual working of either the rail or the road services. 

Railway services in the Zone of the Armies are — subject 
to the supreme authority of the Directeur de I'Arri^re — 
under the control of a Director of Railways who is assisted 
by (i) a combined military and technical staff ; (2) a Line 
Commission for that section of the zone where the railways 
can still be worked by their ordinary staffs ; and (3) one or 
more Field Line Commissions (" Commissions de chemins 
de fer de campagne "), together with Railway Troops, for 
the section where military operation is necessary. 

In the interests of that co-ordination to which so much 
importance is rightly attached, the Director of Railways 
refers to the Directeur de I'Arriere all demands for transport 
that concern the railways of both the Zone of the Interior 
and the Zone of the Armies or involve conveyance by road 
as weU as by rail. He also passes on to the Commissions 
in charge of either section of the railways included in the 
Zone of the Armies the orders he himself receives from the 
Directeur de I'Arriere in respect to such transport require- 
ments as may concern them. Time-tables drawn up, and 
other arrangements made, by these Commissions are subject 
to his approval. He further decides as to the distribution, 
witliin the Zone of the Armies, of the rolling stock and the 



ORGANISATION IN FRANCE. 163 

railway personnel placed at his disposal by the Commander- 
in-Chief. 

The Field Line Commissions are the executive agents of the 
Director of Railways in the discharge of the various duties 
assigned to him. The number of these Commissions is 
decided by the Directeur de I'Arriere, and the date of their 
entering on their functions is fixed by the Director of Rail- 
ways. Each Commission consists of a staff officer and a 
railway engineer. Of these the former is military president 
of the Commission and has the controlling voice. When he 
considers it necessary that he should accept, in addition to 
his own responsibility, that of the technical commissioner, 
the latter must defer to his views and to the orders he gives. 
The president has an assistant — also a staff officer — who 
can replace him when necessary, while the Commission has 
a staf^ of secretaries and orderlies as approved by the 
Minister of War. The personnel of the Commissions in- 
cludes Railway Troops (" Sapeurs de chemins de fer " and 
" Sections de chemins de fer de campagne ") ; a telegraphy 
staff ; Station Commissions ; and gendarmerie " to under- 
take police duties in the stations and on the trains. 

In addition to making traffic arrangements and under- 
faking the operation of those lines at the theatre of war 
that may pass under full military control, the Field Line 
Commissions are required to carry out such construction, 
repair, maintenance or destruction work on the railways as 
should be found necessary. 

On the Lines of Communication passing through the two 
zones and ensuring direct communication between the 
interior and such accessible points on the railway as may, 
from time to time, be nearest to the armies in the field, the 
leading stations en route are required to serve a variety of 
military purposes ; though in each and every such instance 
the system of organisation is such that the duties to be dis- 
charged or the responsibilities to be fulfilled are undertaken 
by, or are under the control of, a Commission formed on 
the now established basis of representation thereon of both 
the military and the technical elements. 

For the conveyance of troops, there are, in the first 



i64 THE RISE OF RAIL-POWER. 

place, Mobilisation stations and Junction Stations, whence 
the men within a certain district are sent to the Embarka- 
tion Stations, at which complete units for the front are made 
up. These are followed by Stations for Meals (" Stations 
haltes-repas "), for men and horses ; though in this case 
the " stations " may really be goods or locomotive sheds, 
able to accommodate a large number of men. At the end 
of the railway line, so far as it is available for troops, come 
the Detraining Stations. 

In regard to supplies and stores, the first link in the chain 
of organisation is constituted by the Base Supply Stations 
(" gares de rassemblement "). Here the supplies going 
from a certain district outside the theatre of operations to 
any one Army Corps must be delivered ; and here they are 
checked, made up into full train loads, or otherwise dealt 
with in such a way as to simplify and facilitate their further 
transport. 

In certain cases full train-loads arriving at these assem- 
bling stations pass through to destination, after being 
checked ; but the general practice is for the consignments 
forwarded from base supply stations to go to the Supply 
Depots (" Stations-magasins "), serving the purposes of 
store-houses from which supplies, whether received from 
the base or collected locally, can be despatched in just such 
quantities, and at just such intervals, as circumstances may 
require. These depots are organised on a different basis 
according to the particular service or purpose for which 
they are designed, — Cavalry, Engineers, Artillery, Medical, 
Telegraph Corps ; provisions, live stock, clothing, camp 
equipment, etc. Their number, character, and location 
are decided by the Minister of War in time of peace. On 
the outbreak of war those in the Zone of the Armies pass 
under the control of the Commander-in-Chief together with 
the railway lines within that zone. The situation of the 
depots may be changed, or additional depots may be opened, 
by the Directeur de I'Arriere, with the consent of the 
Commander-in-Chief. 

Each station depot is under the charge of the military 
member of the Station Commission. His special function 



ORGANISATION IN FRANCE. 165 

it is to supply therefrom the wants of the Army in accord- 
ance with the demands he receives. These demands he 
distributes among the different departments of the depot, 
giving instructions as to the time by which the railway 
wagons must be loaded. He also takes, with the station- 
master, all the necessary measures for ensuring the making 
up, the loading, and the departure of the trains ; but he 
must not interfere with the internal administration of the 
station or with the technical direction and execution of the 
railway services. 

Provision is also made for the immediate unloading of 
trains bringing supplies to the station depots for storage 
there, the military commissioner being expressly instructed 
to guard against any block on the lines in or near to the 
station. Wagons need not be unloaded if they are to be 
sent on after only a brief detention, or if they contain 
ammunition forming part of the current needs of the 
Army. 

From the supply depots the supplies and stores pass on 
to the Regulating Station (" gare regulatrice "). This is 
located at such point on each line of communication as, 
while allowing of a final regulation of supplies going to the 
front, does not — owing to its nearness to the fighting line — 
permit of any guarantee of a fixed train service beyond that 
point. The locality of the regulating station is changed 
from day to day, or from time to time, according to develop- 
ments in the military situation. 

The regulating station is in charge of a Regulating Com- 
mission ("Commission regulatrice"), constituted on the 
same basis as a Sub-Line Commission. Receiving orders 
or instructions as to the nature and quantities of the sup- 
plies and stores required by the troops at the front, and 
drawing these from the supply depots, the Commission 
must always have on hand a sufficiency to meet require- 
ments. It is, also, left to the Commission to arrange for 
the further despatch of the supplies from the regulating 
station by means of such trains as, in the circumstances of 
the moment, may be found practicable. 

As a matter of daily routine, and without further instruc- 



i66 THE RISE OF RAIL-POWER. 

tions, the supply depots send one train of provisions each 
day to the regulating station, and the latter sends on one 
train daily to the front, always, however, keeping a further 
day's supply on hand, at or near the regulating station, to 
meet further possible requirements. Additional trains, 
whether from the supply depots or from the regulating 
station (where rolling stock is kept available) are made up 
as needed. 

Supplementing these arrangements, the Regulating Com- 
mission may, at the request of the Director of Road Ser- 
vices, further keep permanently within its zone of action a 
certain number of wagons of provisions in readiness to meet 
contingencies, the wagons so utilised as Stores on wheels 
being known as " en-cas mobiles." Should the Direct eur 
de I'Arriere so desire, railway wagons with ammunition can, 
in the same way, be kept loaded at any station within the 
Zone of the Armies, or, by arrangement with the Minister 
of War, in the Zone of the Interior. It is, however, stipu- 
lated that the number of these wagons should be reduced 
to a minimum, in order to avoid congestion either of the 
stations or of the railway lines. 

Beyond the regulating station comes Railhead, which 
constitutes the furthest hmit of possible rail-transport for 
the time being, and the final point of connection between 
rail and road services, the latter being left with the respon- 
sibility of continuing the line of communication thence to 
the armies on the field of battle. 

It is the duty of the Regulating Commission, as soon as 
it enters on the discharge of its functions and as often after- 
wards as may be necessary, to advise both the General in 
command of the Army served by the line of communication 
and the Director of Road Services as to the station which 
can be used as railhead and the facilities offered there for 
the accommodation, unloading, and loading of wagons. 
On the basis of the information so given the General-in- 
Command decides each day, or as the occasion requires, on 
the particular station which shall be regarded as railhead 
for the purposes of transport. He advises the Regulating 
Commission and the Director of Road Services accordingly, 



ORGANISATION IN FRANCE. 167 

and he further notifies to them his wishes in regard to the 
forwarding of siippKes to the point thus fixed. 

These elaborate arrangements for ensuring a maintenance 
of efficiency along the whole line of communication from the 
interior to the front equally apply to transport of all kinds 
from the theatre of war to the interior. In principle, 
evacuations from the army of sick and wounded, prisoners, 
surplus stores, and so on, are effected from railhead by 
means of the daily supply-trains returning thence to the 
regulating station, where the Regulating Commission takes 
them in charge, and passes them on by the trains going back 
to the Depot Stations, or beyond. Should special trains 
be necessary for the removal of a large number of wounded, 
or otherwise, the Director of Road Services communicates 
with the Regulating Commission, which either makes up 
the desired specials from the rolling stock it has on hand or, 
if it cannot do this, itself applies, in turn, to the Director 
of Railways. 

For dealing with the sick and wounded, every possible 
provision is made under the authority of the Minister of 
War and the Director-General, the arrangements in ad- 
vance, as detailed in the decrees relating to this branch of 
the subject, being on the most comprehensive scale. Among 
other measures provided for is the setting up of Evacuation 
Hospitals {" hopitaux d' evacuation ") in the immediate 
neighbourhood of the Regulating Stations, if not, also, at 
railhead. Elsewhere along the line certain stations become 
hifmnary Stations, (" infirmaries de gare ") where, in 
urgent cases, and under conditions laid down by the War 
Minister, the sick and wounded en route to the interior can 
receive prompt medical attention in case of need. From 
the Distribution Stations {" gares de repartition "),the sick 
and wounded are sent to the hospitals in the interior to 
which they may be assigned. 

It will be seen that this comprehensive scheme of 
organisation aims at preventing the recurrence of any of 
those defects or deficiencies which characterised the mili- 
tary rail-transport movements of France in the war of 
1S70-71. 



i68 THE RISE OF RAIL-POWER. 

The presence, at every important link in the chain of rail 
communication, of a Commission designed to secure regu- 
larity and efficiency in the traffic arrangements should 
avoid confusion, congestion and delay. 

The association, on each of these Commissions, of the 
military and technical elements, with a strict definition of 
their respective powers, duties and responsibilities, should 
ensure the best use of the available transport facilities under 
conditions in themselves practicable, and without the risk 
either of friction between the representatives of the two 
interests or, alternatively, of any interference with the rail- 
way services owing to contradictory or impossible orders 
being given by individual officers acting on their own 
responsibility. 

The setting up of the supply depots and regulating stations 
along the line of communication should prevent (i) the 
rushing through of supplies in excessive quantities to the 
extreme front ; (ii) the congestion of railway lines and 
stations ; (iii) the undue accumulation of provisions at one 
point, with a corresponding deficiency elsewhere, and (iv) 
the possibility of large stocks being eventually seized by 
the enemy and made use of by him to his own advantage. 

The measures adopted both to prevent any excessive 
employment of railway wagons as storehouses on wheels 
and to secure their prompt unloading should afford a greater 
guarantee of the best utihsation of rolling stock under 
conditions of, possibly, extreme urgency. 

Finally, the unification of control, the co-ordination of 
the many different services involved, and the harmony of 
working established between all the various sections on the 
line of communication linking up the interior of the country 
with the troops in the fighting line should assure, not only 
the nearest possible approach to complete efficiency in the 
transport conditions, but the conferring of great advan- 
tages on the armies concerned, with a proportionate increase 
of their strength in the field. 

The effect of all these things on the military position of 
France must needs be great. Had France controlled a 
rail-transport organisation such as this — instead of none 



ORGANISATION IN FRANCE. 169 

at all — in 1870-71 ; and had Germany controlled a system 
no better than what we have seen to be the admittedly 
imperfect one she put into operation on that occasion, the 
results of the Franco-German war and the subsequent 
course of events in Europe might alike have been wholly 
different. 

Tests of what were being planned or projected in France 
as precautionary measures, for application in war, could 
not, of course, be carried out exhaustively in peace ; but 
many parts of the machinery designed came into daily 
use as a matter of ordinary routine. Full advantage was 
taken, also, of whatever opportunities did present them- 
selves — in the form of exercises in partial mobilisation, 
reviews, and other occasions involving the movement by 
rail of large bodies of troops — to effect such trials as were 
possible of regulations and instructions already based on 
exhaustive studies by the military and railway authorities. 
In i8q2 the results attained were so satisfactory that a 
German authority. Lieutenant Becker, writing in his book 
on " Der nachste Krieg und die deutschen Bahnverwal- 
tungen," (Hanover, 1893,) concerning the trials in France, 
in that year, of the new conditions introduced by the law of 
December 28, 1888, was not only greatly impressed thereby 
but even appeared disposed to think that the French were 
becoming superior to the Germans in that very organisation 
which the la.tter had regarded as their own particular pro- 
vince. The following passages from his book may be worth 
recalling : — 

Towards the middle of September, 1892, from a military 
railway station improvised for the occasion, there were sent 
off in less than eight hours forty-two trains conveying a com- 
plete Army Corps of 25,000 men. 

In their famous mobilisation test of 1887 the French des- 
patched from the Toulouse station 150 military trains without 
interrupting the ordinary traffic, and without any accident. 

Such figures speak a significant language. They show what 
enormous masses of troops the railway can carry in the course 
of a few hours to a given point. . . . 

If I have referred to the results obtained by our neighbours 
on their railway systems, it is not because I have the least fear 
as to the final issue of the next war. Quite the contrary ; but 



1^0 THE RISE OF RAIL-POWER. 

the fact does not prevent me from asking why the German 
Army cannot base on the raihvays of that country the same 
hopes which neighbouring countries are able to entertain in 
regard to theirs. 

The favourable impression thus given, even to a German 
critic, by the progress France was making in her creation, 
not so much de novo as ah ovo, of a system of organised 
military rail-transport, were confirmed by many subsequent 
trials, experiments and experiences, all, in turn, leading to 
further improvements in matters of detail ; but it was, in- 
deed, the " nachste Krieg " concerning which Lieutenant 
Becker wrote that was to be the real test of the organisa- 
tion w^hich, during more than forty years of peace, France 
followed up with a zeal, a pertinacit}^ and a thoroughness 
fully equal to those of Germany herself. 

In any case it would seem that France, though having to 
make up for the headw-ay gained by Germany, finally created 
a system of military rail-transport wdiich would be able 
to stand the fullest comparison with even the now greatly- 
improved system of her traditional foe ; while the organisa- 
tion she thus elaborated, not for the purposes of aggression 
but as an arm of her national defence, illustrates in a strik- 
ing degree the ever-increasing importance of the problem 
of rail-power, and the comprehensive nature of the measures 
for its effective exercise which a great Continental nation 
regards as indispensable under the conditions of modern 
warfare. 

Defensive Railways 

The measLues adopted included, also, the improvement 
of the French railway system, since this was no less in need 
of amendment and additions in order to adapt it to the 
needs of the military situation. 

Whilst, as we have seen in Chapter I, the important part 
that railways w^ere likely to play in w^ar was recognised in 
France as early as 1833, ^.nd whilst, in 1842, attention was 
called in that country to the " aggressive lines " w^hich 
Germany was then already building in the direction of the 
French frontiers, the French railway system itself was, 



ORGANISATION IN FRANCE. 171 

prior to the war of 1870-71, developed on principles which 
practically ignored strategical considerations, were based 
mainly on economic, political and local interests, and not 
only refrained from becoming " aggressive " in turn, but 
even failed to provide adequately, as they should have done, 
for the legitimate purposes of national defence. 

Apart from the absence of any designs on the part of 
France against her neighbours' territory, during this period 
of her history, one of the main reasons for the conditions 
just mentioned is to be found in the predominant position 
of Paris as the capital and centre-point of French life and 
French movement. Germany at this time consisted of a 
collection of States each of which had its own chief city and 
built its railways to serve its own particular interests, 
without much regard for the interests of its sister States, 
even if it escaped the risk of cherishing more or less jealousy 
towards them. In France there was but one State and 
one capital, and Paris was regarded as the common centre 
from which the main lines were to radiate in all directions. 
Communication was thus established as between the capital 
and the principal inland towns or important points on the 
frontiers or on the coasts of France ; but the inadequate 
number of lateral or transverse lines linking up and con- 
necting these main lines placed great difficulty in the way 
of communication between the provincial centres them- 
selves otherwise than via Paris, 

Some of these disadvantages were to have been overcome 
under a law passed in 1868 which approved the construction 
of seventeen new lines having a total length of 1,840 km. 
(1,143 miles). When, however, war broke out in 1870, 
comparativel}^ little had been done towards the achieve- 
ment of this programme, and France entered upon the 
conflict with a railway system which had been even less 
developed towards her eastern frontiers than towards the 
north, the west and the south, while for the purposes of 
concentrating her troops in the first-mentioned direction 
she had available only three lines, and of these three one 
alone was provided with double-track throughout. Such 
were the inadequacies of the system at this time that the 



172 THE RISE OF RAIL-POWER. 

important line between Verdun and Metz had not yet been 
completed. 

No sooner had the war come to an end than the French 
Government started on the improvement of the railway 
system in order to adapt it to the possible if not prospective 
military requirements of the future, so that they should never 
again be taken at a disadvantage ; and in carrying on this 
work — in addition to the reorganisation of their military- 
transport system in general — they showed an unexampled 
energy and thoroughness. Within five years of the restora- 
tion of peace the French railway system had already under- 
gone an extension which, according to Captain A. Pernot, 
as told in his " Apergu historique sur le service des trans- 
ports militaires," would have been possible in but few 
countries in so short a period ; while of the situation at 
the time he wrote (1894) the same authority declared : — 
" One can say that everything is ready in a vast organisa- 
tion which only awaits the word of command in order to 
prove the strength of its capacity." 

Without attempting to give exhaustive details of all 
that was done, it may suffice to indicate generally the 
principles adopted. 

One of the most important of these related to an improve- 
ment of the conditions in and around Paris. 

Here the purposes speciall}^ aimed at were (i) to estab- 
lish further connecting links between the various trunk 
lines radiating from the capital, and (2) to obviate the 
necessity for traffic from, for example, the south or the 
west having to pass through Paris en route to the east or 
the north. 

These aims it was sought to effect by means of a series 
of circular railways, or " rings " of railways, joining up 
the existing lines, and allowing of the transfer of militar}^ 
transport from one to the other without coming into Paris 
at all. An " inner " circular railway (" Chemin de Fer de 
Petite Ceinture ") had already been constructed within 
the fortifications prior to 1870, and this was followed in 
1879 t>y an " outer " line, (" Chemin de Fer de Grande 
Ceinture "), which provided a wider circle at an average 



ORGANISATION IN FRANCE. 173 

distance of about 20 km. (12^ miles) and established direct 
rail connection, not only between a large number of the 
more remote suburbs, together with the different trunk 
lines at a greater distance from the cit}^ but, also, between 
the various forts constructed for the defence of Paris. 

These circular railways were, in turn, succeeded by a 
series of connecting links which ensured the provision of a 
complete ring of rail communication at a still greater dis- 
tance around Paris, the towns comprised therein including 
Rouen, Amiens, La Fere, Laon, Reims, Chalons-sur-Marne, 
Troyes, Sfens, Montargis, Orleans, Dreux, and so on back 
to Rouen. Within, again, this outermost ring there was 
provided a further series of lines which, by linking up 
Orleans, Malesherbes, Montereau, Nogent, Epernay, Sois- 
sons, Beauvais and Dreux, established additional connec- 
tions between all the lines from Paris to the north and the 
east of France, and gave increased facilities for the distri- 
bution in those directions of troops arriving at Orleans 
from the south-west, this being once more done without 
any need for their entering Paris or even approaching it at 
a closer distance than about forty miles. 

Orleans itself was recognised as a point of great strategical 
importance in regard to the movement of troops, and it was, 
accordingly, provided with a number of new lines radiating 
therefrom, and establishing better connections with other 
lines. Tours and other centres of military significance, 
from the same point of view, were strengthened in a like 
manner. At important junctions, and notably so in the 
case of Troyes (Champagne), loop lines were built in order 
that troop trains could be transferred direct from one line 
to another without stopping, and with no need for shunting 
or for changing the position of the engine. 

In the direction of the eastern frontier the line from Ver- 
dun to Metz was completed, and by 1899 the three routes 
which could alone be made use of in 1870-71 had been in- 
creased to ten. Most of them were provided with double- 
track throughout, and all of them were independent of one 
another, though having inter-communication by means 
of cross lines. 



174 THE RISE OF RAIL-POWER. 

Other new railways established connection with or be- 
tween the forts on both the eastern and the northern fron- 
tiers. Others, again, provided direct communication 
between different harbours or between each of them and 
strategical points in the interior, thus contributing to the 
possibilities of their defence in case of attack from the sea. 
Still others were designed for the defence of the French Alps. 

Apart from the provision of all these new lines, much 
was done in the doubling or even the quadrupling of existing 
track wherever the question of military transport came 
into consideration at all. Then at railv/ay stations near 
to arsenals, and at important strategical centres, speciall}' 
long platforms were provided to allow of the rapid entrain- 
ing of men or material in case of need. 

While, also, so much was being done for the improvement 
of the French railway system from an avowedly strategical 
point of view, there were many additional lines constructed 
or improvements made which, although designed to further 
the interests of trade and travel, also added to the sum 
total of available facilities for military transport. 

The advantages specially aimed at were (i) the ensuring 
of a more rapid mobilisation of troops through the better- 
ment of cross-country connections ; (2) the avoidance of 
congestion of traffic in Paris ; (3) the securing of a more 
rapid concentration on the frontiers, especially when each 
Army Corps could be assured the independent use of a 
double-track line of rails for its own use ; and (4) the more 
effective defence of all vital points. 

National defence, rather than the building of strategical 
lines designed to serve " aggressive " purposes, was the 
fundamental principle on which the policy thus followed 
since 1870-71 was based ; and if, as Captain Pernot wrote 
in 1894, everything was even then ready for all emer- 
gencies, the continuous additions and improvements made 
since that time, bringing the railway system of the country 
more and more into harmony with the " perfectionnement " 
aimed at by France in the organisation of her military 
transport, must have made the conditions of preparedness 
still more complete by 1914. 



CHAPTER XIV 

Organisation in England 

The difference between the geographical conditions of 
the British Isles and those of the principal countries on the 
Continent of Europe led to the systematic organisation of 
rail transport for military purposes being taken in hand 
at a later date in the United Kingdom than was, more 
especially, the case in Germany. Here there was no ques- 
tion of building lines of invasion or lines to facilitate the 
massing of troops on a neighbour's frontiers. The ques- 
tions that alone seemed to arise in England were — (i) the 
relations between the State and the companies in regard 
to the use of the railways for the transport of troops and 
military necessaries under conditions either of peace or of 
war ; (2) the employment of railways both for resisting 
invasion and for the conveyance of expeditionary forces 
to the port of embarkation ; (3) the adoption of such means 
as would ensure the efficient working of the railways under 
war conditions ; and (4) the creation of an Army engineer- 
ing force providing for the construction, repair, operation 
or destruction of railways either at home, in case of in- 
vasion, or to facilitate operations in overseas expeditions 
through the building and working of military railways. 

With these various considerations it may be convenient 
to deal in the order as here given. 

The State and the Railways 

In the Railway Regulation Act, 1842, (5 and 6 Vict., c. 
55,) entitled " An Act for the better Regulation of Railways 
and for the Conveyance of Troops," it was provided, by 
section 20 : — ■ 

175 



176 THE RISE OF RAIL-POWER. 

Whenever it shall be necessary to move any of the officers 
or soldiers of her Majesty's forces of the hne . . . by any railway, 
the directors shall permit them, with baggage, stores, arms, ammu- 
nition and other necessaries and things, to be conveyed, at the 
usual hours of starting, at such prices or upon such conditions 
as may be contracted for between the Secretary at War and such 
railway companies on the production of a route or order signed 
by the proper authorities. 

This was the first provision made in the United Kingdom 
in respect to the conveyance of troops by rail. It was 
succeeded in 1844 by another Act (7 and 8 Vict., c. 85,) 
by which (sec. 12) railway companies were required to pro- 
vide conveyances for the transport of troops at fares not 
exceeding a scale given in the Act, and maximum fares 
were also prescribed in regard to public baggage, stores, 
ammunition, (with certain exceptions, applying to gun- 
powder and explosives,) and other military necessaries. 
In 1867 these provisions were extended to the Army 
Reserve. Further revision of the fares and charges took 
place under the Cheap Trains Act, 1883, (46 and 47 Vict., 
c. 34,) entitled " An Act to amend the Law Relating to 
Railway Passenger Duty and to amend and consolidate 
the law relating to the conveyance of the Queen's forces by 
railway." 

State control of the railways in case of war was provided 
for under the Regulation of the Forces Act, 1871, (34 and 
35 Vict., c. 86,) " An Act for the Regulation of the Regular 
and Auxiliary Forces of the Crown, and for other purposes 
relating thereto." Section 16 laid down that — 

When her Majesty, by Order in Council, declares that an 
emergency has arisen in which it is expedient for the public 
service that her Majesty's Government should have control over 
the railroads of the United Kingdom, or any of them, the Secre- 
tary of State may, by warrant under his hand, empower any 
person or persons named in such warrant to take possession in 
the name or on behalf of her Majesty of any railroad in the United 
Kingdom, and of the plant belonging thereto, or of any part 
thereof, and may take possession of any plant without taking pos- 
session of the railroad itself, and to use the same for her Majesty's 
service at such times and in such manner as the Secretary of 
State may direct ; and the directors, officers and servants of any 
such railroad shall obey the directions of the"Secretary of State 



ORGANISATION IN ENGLAND. 177 

as to the user of such raih'oad or plant as aforesaid for her 
Majesty's service. 

Any warrant granted by the said Secretary of State in pur- 
suance of this section shall remain in force for one week only, but 
may be renewed from week to week so long as, in the opinion 
of the said Secretary of State, the emergency continues. 

Provision was also made for the payment of " full com- 
pensation " to the interests concerned. 

The powers of control thus acquired by the Government 
followed, in effect, closely upon the precedent already 
established in the United States, (see p. 16,) even although 
they were not defined with the same elaborate detail. On 
the other hand greater emphasis is laid in the English Act 
on the provision that the Government " may take posses- 
sion of any plant without taking possession of the railroad 
itself." This gives them the right to take over the loco- 
motives and rolling stock of any raihvay in any part of the 
United Kingdom, even though the lines in question may 
not themselves be wanted for the purposes of military trans- 
port. 

Under the provisions of the National Defence Act, 1888, 
(51 and 52 Vict., c. 31,) traffic for naval and military pur- 
poses is to have precedence over other traffic on the rail- 
ways of the United Kingdom wdienever an Order for the 
embodiment of the Militia is in force. 

It was by virtue of the above section of the Act of 1871 
that the Government took control over the railways of 
Great Britain on the outbreak of war in 1914. 

As regards the earlier Acts of 1842 and 1844, these were 
mainly domestic measures relating to the conveyance of 
troops in time of peace rather than war. The beginnings 
of organisation of military rail-transport for the purposes 
of war followed, rather, on a realisation both of the possi- 
bilities of invasion and of the weakness of the position in 
which England at one time stood from the point of view 
of national defence. 

Invasion Prospects and Home Defence 
In 1847 the Duke of Wellington, (then Commander-in- 



178 THE RISE OF RAIL-POWER. 

Chief,) addressed to Sir John Biirgoyne a letter in which 
he said he had endeavoured to awaken the attention of 
different Administrations to tlie defenceless state of the 
country. We had, he declared, no defence, or hope of 
chance of defence, except in our Fleet, and he was especially 
sensible both of the certainty of failure if we did not, at an 
early moment, attend to the measures necessary to be 
taken for our defence and of " the disgrace, the indelible 
disgrace," of such failure. Then, in words that greatly 
impressed the country, he added : — 

I am bordering upon seventy-seven years of age, passed in 
honour ; I hope that the Almighty may protect me from being 
the witness of the tragedy which I cannot persuade my contem- 
poraries to take measures to avert. 

As the result alike of this pathetic warning ; of a " Letter 
on the Defence of England by Volunteer Corps and Militia " 
issued in pamphlet form by Sir Charles Napier in 1852 ; 
and of the Indian Mutiny in 1857, which event called atten- 
tion to the defenceless condition of the Empire as a whole, 
continuous efforts were made to secure the creation of 
Volunteer Corps for the purposes of defence. For a period 
of twelve years these efforts met with persistent discourage- 
ment, the Government refusing official recognition to cer- 
tain corps of riflemen tentatively formed ; but in 1859 the 
prospect of an early invasion of this country by France 
aroused public feeling to such an extent that on May 12 
the then Secretary of State for War, General Peel, addressed 
a circular to the Lord-Lieutenants of counties in Great 
Britain announcing that Volunteer Corps might be formed 
under an Act passed in 1804, when a like course had been 
adopted as a precautionary measure against the threatened 
invasion of England by Napoleon. 

The formation of Volunteer Corps was thereupon taken 
up with the greatest zeal, and by the end of i860 the number 
of Volunteers enrolled throughout Great Britain was no 
fewer than 120,000. Other results of the national awaken- 
ing in 1859 were the public discussion of the questions of 
coast defence and armoured trains, (of which mention has 
been made in Chapter VII,) and the appropriation, in i860. 



ORGANISATION IN ENGLAND. 179 

of a loan of seven and a half millions for the improvement 
of our coast defences and notably the fortifications of Ports- 
mouth and Plymouth. 

Engineer and Railway Staff Corps 

Already in December, 1859, the necessity for some definite 
engineering instruction for Volunteers was being pointed 
out, and in January, i860, the first corps of Volunteer 
Engineers was created, under the title of the ist Middlesex 
Volunteer Engineers. Similar corps were formed in various 
parts of the country, and by 1867 the number of Volunteer 
Engineers enrolled was 6,580. 

At the beginning of i860 a further proposal was made 
for the formation of a body which, composed of eminent civil 
engineers, the general managers of leading lines of railway, 
and the principal railway contractors or other employers 
of labour, would undertake a variety of duties considered 
no less essential in the interests of national defence. 

There was, in the first place, the question of the transport 
by rail alike of Volunteers and of the regular forces, either 
on the occasion of reviews or for the protection of our coasts 
against an invader. While it was evident that the railways 
could be efficiently worked only by their own officers, it 
was no less obvious that plans for the movement of large 
bodies of men, and especially of troops, with horses, guns, 
ammunition and stores, should be well considered and 
prepared long beforehand, and not left for the occasion 
or the emergency when the need for them would arise. 

In the next place it was suggested that the engineering 
talent of the country should be made available for the 
purpose of supplementing the services of the Royal Engi- 
neers in carrying out various defensive works, such as the 
destruction of railway lines, bridges and roads, the throwing 
up of earthworks, or the flooding of the lowland districts, 
with a view to resisting the advance of a possible invader. 

Finally the great contractors were to be brought into the 
combination so that they could provide the labour neces- 
sary for the execution of these defensive works under the 



i8o THE RISE OF RAIL-POWER. 

direction of the civil engineers, who themselves would act 
under the direction of the military commanders. 

Each of the three groups was to discharge the function 
for which it was specially adapted, while the co-ordination 
of the three, for the purpose of strengthening the country's 
powers of resisting invasion, was expected to add greatly 
to the value of the proposed organisation. 

The author of this scheme was Mr. Charles Manby, F.R.S., 
(i 804-1 884,) a distinguished civil engineer who for nearly 
half a century was secretary of the Institution of Civil 
Engineers and was closely associated with the leading 
civil engineers, contractors and railway interests of the 
country. He submitted his ideas to several members 
of the Council of his Institution, and though, at first, the 
scheme was not well received, he was subsequently so far 
encouraged that in August, i860, he laid his plan before 
Mr. Sidney Herbert, then Minister at War in Lord Pal- 
merston's second administration. Mr. Herbert expressed 
cordial approval of the project, giving the assurance, on 
behalf of the War Office, that an organisation on the basis 
suggested could not fail to be of pubHc benefit ; but Mr. 
Manby still met with difficulties alike from several members 
of the Council, who either offered direct opposition to the 
scheme or else gave unwilhng consent to join, and, also, 
from the railway companies, who thought that arrange- 
ments for rail-transport might very well be left to them- 
selves, and that there was no necessity for the suggested 
system so far as they, at least, were concerned. 

In these circumstances Mr. Manby made, at first, very 
little progress ; but he was unremitting in his efforts to 
demonstrate ahke to civil engineers and to the railway 
com_panies the practical benefits from the point of view of 
public interests that would result from the organisation 
he advocated, and in 1864 he felt sufficiently encouraged 
to lay his views once more before the War Office. Earl 
de Grey, then in charge of that Department, thereupon 
instructed the Inspector-General of Volunteers, Colonel 
McMurdo, (afterwards General Sir W. M. McMurdo, C.B.,) 
to inquire into and report to him on the subject. 



ORGANISATION IN ENGLAND. i8i 

In the result there was created, in January, 1865, a body 
known as the Engineer and Railway Volunteer Staff Corps, 
constituted, according to its rules, " for the purpose of 
directing the application of skilled labour and of railway 
transport to the purposes of national defence, and for 
preparing, in time of peace, a system on which such duties 
should be conducted." The Corps was to consist of officers 
only, and its members were to be civil engineers and con- 
tractors, officers of railway and dock companies, and, under 
special circumstances. Board of Trade Inspectors of Rail- 
ways. Civil engineers of standing and experience who 
had directed the construction of the chief railways and 
other important works, general managers of railways and 
commercial docks, and Board of Trade Inspectors of 
Railways, were alone eligible for the rank of Lieutenant- 
Colonel. Other civil engineers and contractors connected 
chiefly with railway works, and, also, railway officers other 
than general managers, take the rank of Major. Col. 
McMurdo was appointed Honorary Colonel of the Corps 
on February 9, 1865.^ As ultimately constituted, the corps 
consisted of an Honorary Colonel (now Maj.-Gen. D. A. 
Scott, C.V.O., C.B., D.S.C.), thirty Lieutenant-Colonels 

^ Colonel McMurdo had special qualifications for the post. Be- 
coming a Lieutenant-Colonel in the Army in October, 1853, he was 
Assistant- Adjutant-General at Dubhn from May, 1854, to January, 
1855. On February 2, 1855, he was entrusted with the duties of 
Director-General of the new Land-Transport Corps, and was sent 
out to the Crimea, with the local rank of Colonel, to reorganize the 
transport service, then in a deplorably defective condition. He is 
said to have accomplished this task with great energy and success. 
Before the close of the campaign his corps numbered 17,000 men, 
with 28,000 horses, mules, etc. He also took over the working of the 
pioneer military railway in the Crimea. In 1857 the Land-Transport 
Corps was converted into the Military Train, with Colonel McMurdo 
as Colonel-Commandant. Early in i860, when the Volunteer 
movement was assuming a permanent character. Colonel McMurdo 
was appointed Inspector of Volunteers, and in June of the same year 
he became Inspector-General, a post he retained until January, 1865. 
He was chosen as Colonel of the Inns of Court Volunteers on January 
23, 1865, and his further appointment to the post of Colonel of the 
newly-formed Engineer and Railway Volunteer Staff Corps followed, 
as stated above, in February, 1865. He was created K.C.B. in 
1881 and G.C.B. in 1893. He died in 1894. 



l82 THE RISE OF RAIL-POWER. 

including a Commandant, (now Lieut.-Col. Sir William 
Forbes, general manager of the London, Brighton and 
South Coast Railway) and twenty Majors/ 

Functions and Purposes 

That the Corps thus created was the direct outcome, 
first, of the Volunteer movement, and, through that move- 
ment, of the state of semi-panic into which the country 
had drifted in 1859, as the result both of the anticipations 
of invasion and the admitted weakness, at that time, of 
our national defences, has thus been clearly established. 
Writing in 1869, Major-General McMurdo, who had been 
raised to that rank in 1868, said in a pamphlet he issued 
under the title of " Rifle Volunteers for Field Service " 
that the Corps was " prepared to work, not for Volunteers 
alone, but for the entire defensive forces of the country." 

In this same publication Major-General McMurdo gave 
an account of the functions and purposes the Corps had been 
designed to serve. Alluding first to the Volunteer move- 
ment, he showed how the railway carriage must both carry 
and shelter the Volunteer when moving from one part of 
the country to another ; and he proceeded : — 

I will ask you to look attentively for a moment at a Bradshaw's 
railway map, and you will see that throughout the network of 
rails that overspreads the land none of the meshes, so to speak, 
in any vital parts of the country, exceed fifteen miles across, from 
rail to rail ; but as the eye approaches the Metropolis, or any of 
the commercial centres, these meshes are diminished to about 
one-half the area of the others. 

He then dealt with the operations which the movement 
of troops along these lines of railway would involve, and 
continued : — 

The railway schemes for the accomplishment of such delicate 
operations would emanate from the Council of the Engineer and 
Railway Staff Corps. . . . 

^ The names of present members of the Corps will be found in 
" Hart's Army List." Under the Territorial and Reserve Forces Act 
of 1907 the Corps became part of the Territorial Force, and the 
designation " Volunteer " was dropped from its title, which since 
that date has been " The Engineer and Railway Staff Corps" 



ORGANISATION IN ENGLAND. 183 

During peace the railway branch of this body is employed in 
working out hypothetical plans of campaign, in the development 
of which they manipulate in theory the entire rolling-stock and 
railway resources of the country, elaborated by special time- 
tables and technical reports. 

The share taken by the civil engineers is not confined to 
providing merely for the class of railway works contingent on 
war, whether of construction, demolition, or of reconstruction, but 
in supplying the military engineers with information, advice and 
labour. No one, for example, can be more familiar with the 
features and character of a district than the engineer who has 
constructed a line of railwav through it. No one is so well able to 
point out the results of letting in that which he had been so often 
employed in keeping out, viz., the inundations of the sea. None 
better acquainted with the existing distribution of labour 
power throughout the country, and of the means by which it could 
be concentrated upon given points, for the construction of works 
of defence. AU these elements, in short, by which the gigantic 
resources of our country may be safely wielded for her defence, 
are now being silently considered and woven into strategical 
schemes of operations by these eminent and patriotic men, the 
value of whose voluntary services will not be fully comprehended 
or appreciated till the day comes when the discomfiture of the 
invader shall be accomplished through their instrumentality. 

The same distinguished authority wrote concerning the 
Engineer and Railway Volunteer Staff Corps in an article 
on " Volunteers " which he contributed to the " Encyclo- 
paedia Britannica " (ninth edition) : — 

The ready labour power of this useful Corps is estimated 
at from 12,000 to 20,000 navvies, with tools, barrows and com- 
missariat complete. It has already performed important 
service in tabulating, and printing at great private cost, complete 
time-tables and special reports for six general concentrations 
against possible invasion. A special return was also prepared 
by the Corps (the first of its kind) of the entire rolling stock of all 
the railways in Great Britain. This important work — which is 
corrected and republished annually — -shows where the requisite 
number of carriages of every description can be obtained for the 
composition of troop trains. 

In the official catalogue of books in the War Office Library 
there is an item which reads : — " Time Tables for Special 
Troop Trains, etc. Compiled by the Railway Companies. 
311 pp. 8vo. London, 1866." This, presumably, refers 



i$4 THE RISE OF RAIL-POWER. 

to the first of the complete time tables mentioned in the 
" Encyclopaedia Britannica " article as having been com- 
piled by the Corps. It is evident, from the date given, 
that the Corps must have got quickly to work after its 
formation in 1865. 

At one time there was an expectation that the Engineer 
and Railway Volunteer Staff Corps would develop into a 
body exercising still wider and more responsible duties 
than those already mentioned. On this point we have the 
testimony of the late Sir George Findlay, formerly general 
manager of the London and North- Western Railway Com- 
pany, and himself a Lieutenant-Colonel in the Corps. 

Col. J. S. Rothwell had written some articles^ in which, 
while admitting their practically unlimited resources, he 
questioned the ability of the British railways, at a few hours 
notice, to transport to any part of our coasts which might 
be the scene of a hostile invasion a sufficient body of troops 
to dispute the advance of an army upon London, and he 
further suggested that the whole question was one which 
had not yet received the mature consideration it deserved. 
Col. Rothwell said, in the course of what he wrote : — 

Though the actual working of our railways must be left in the 
hands of the proper railway officials, it does not follow that the 
planning of the arrangements for the military traffic should also 
be entrusted to them exclusively. This, however, appears to be 
contemplated, as, under existing circumstances, such arrange- 
ments would rest with the members of a body called the " Vol- 
unteer Engineer and Railway Staff Corps." . . . Though the 
efficiency of these gentlemen in their own sphere is undeniable, 
it appears open to question whether they are likely to have suffi- 
cient leisure personally to work out the details of a large con- 
centration of troops by rail, and whether the special requirements 
of military transport will be fully appreciated by them, or by the 
subordinates whom they presumably will employ. 

Much, he argued, required to be done before the coun- 
try could be considered ready to meet a possible invader ; 
and he concluded ;— 

^ "The Conveyance of Troops by Railway." By Col. J. S. Roth- 
well, R.A., Professor of Military Administration, Staft College. 
United Service Magazine, Dec, 1S91, and Jan., 1S92. 



ORGANISATION IN ENGLAND. 185 

If the invasion of England is to be regarded as an event which 
is within the bounds of possibihty, it is surely not unreasonable 
to ask that those precautionary measures which require time for 
their elaboration shall be thoroughly worked out before there is 
any risk of our wanting to employ them. The organisation for 
the conveyance of our troops by railway is such a measure. 

To these criticisms Sir George Findlay replied in an 
article " On the Use of Railw^ays in the United Kingdom 
for the Conveyance of Troops," published in the United 
Service Mazagine for April, 1892. The complete netv^^ork 
of railways covering these islands, admirably equipped and 
efficiently worked as they were, would, he declared, be 
found equal to any part they might be called upon to play 
in a scheme of national defence. As regarded the attention 
already paid to the question he said : — 

The War Office, so far from having in any way neglected the 
subject, have devoted considerable attention to it, and a complete 
scheme for the working of our railways for transport purposes 
in time of war has been elaborated, and would at once be put in 
operation, if ever the emergency arose. 

Passing on to describe the composition and duties of the 
Engineer and Railway Volunteer Staff Corps, he spoke of 
its members as meeting in council at their headquarters to 
discuss from time to time details of railway organisation 
and other matters delegated to their consideration, after- 
wards reporting their conclusions to the War Office ; and 
he went on to say that for the operation of the railways, 
under State control, on any occasion of national energy 
or danger — 

A draft scheme has been prepared, has been worked out in 
detail, and would, in all probability, be adopted and put in 
operation if, unhappily, the necessity should ever arise. 

This scheme in its main features provides that, at such time 
as we are contemplating, the principal railway officials in Great 
Britain and Ireland would at once become, for the time being, 
the officers of the State, and in addition to the general managers 
of the leading railways, who are officers of the Engineer and 
Railway Volunteer Staff Corps, military rank of some kind 
would be conferred upon the engineers, locomotive superinten- 
dents, chief passenger superintendents and goods managers of the 



i86 THE RISE OF RAIL-POWER. 

principal railway companies, as well as on the managers of the 
principal Irish railways. 

The railways of the country would be divided into sections, 
and for each section there would be a committee composed of the 
general managers of the railways included in the section, together 
with the principal engineers, locomotive superintendents and 
other chief officers. The railways would be worked and con- 
trolled for military purposes by these committees of sections, each 
committee having as its president a Lieutenant-Colonel of the 
Engineer and Railway Volunteer Staff Corps, who would be 
directly responsible for providing transport for troops and stores 
over the section of which his committee had charge, while if the 
operation to be carried out required the co-operation of one or 
more sections of the railways, the committees of those sections 
would act in unison. In such a case the Quartermaster-General's 
requisition for the service to be performed would be made upon 
the president of the section embracing the point of departure, 
that officer and his committee taking the initiative and arranging 
with the other committees for the performance of the service. 

For each section, or group, of railways, a military officer of rank 
would be appointed, with full power to arrange for food, forage 
and water for the troops and horses en route, and having at his 
disposal a sufficient number of soldiers or labourers to assist in 
loading and unloading baggage, stores, etc., at the points of 
entrainment and detrainment within his section. He would also 
be able to command the services of the Royal or Volunteer 
Engineers to assist in the erection of temporary platforms or 
landings, or the laying down of temporary rails, and would be 
instructed to co-operate with, and assist in every way, the 
committee of section having charge of his district, but not in any 
way to attempt to interfere with the working of the line or the 
movement of the trains or traffic. 

The number of sections into which the railways were to 
be divided for the purposes of this scheme was nine. After 
defining the various areas, Sir George continued : — 

It is contemplated that during any such period of crisis as 
we are now discussing, the Council of the Engineer and Railway 
Volunteer Staff Corps would be sitting en permanejice at its head- 
quarters, and, with a full knowledge of the nature and extent of 
the operations to be carried out, would have power to regulate 
the supply and distribution of rolling stock throughout the area 
affected, all the vehicles in the country being, for the time being, 
treated as a common stock. 

This is a mere outhne of the scheme, with the further details of 
which it is not necessary to trouble the reader, though probably 



ORGANISATION IN ENGLAND. 187 

enough has been said to show that the subject, far from having 
been neglected, as Colonel Rothwell appears to assume, has been 
carefully studied and thought out. 

Had the scheme in question been matured and adopted 
on the lines here stated, a still greater degree of importance 
would have been attached to the position and proceedings 
of a Corps then — and still — almost unknown to the world 
at large, since its chief function was to carry out investiga- 
tions at the request of the authorities, and prepare reports, 
statements and statistics which have invariably got no 
further than the War Office and the Horse Guards, where, 
alone, the value of the services rendered has been fully 
understood and appreciated. The scheme was, however, 
allowed to drop, the policy eventually adopted being based, 
preferably, (i) on the railways of Great Britain being oper- 
ated in war time as one group instead of in a series of groups 
or sections ; and (2) on such operation being entrusted to 
a body specially created for the purpose ; though prior 
to the adoption of the latter course there was to be a fresh 
development in another direction. 

The War Railway Council 

While the Engineer and Railway Volunteer Staff Corps 
remained, down to 1896, the only organised body which 
(apart from the individual railway companies) Govern- 
ment departments could consult as to the technical work- 
ing and traffic facilities of the railways, from the point of 
view of military transport, it was thought desirable, in the 
year mentioned, to supplement that Corps by a smaller 
body known at first as the " Army Railway Council " 
and afterwards as the " War Railway Council." 

Designed to act in a purely advisory capacity, without 
assuming any administrative or executive functions, this 
Council was eventually constituted as follows : — The Deputy 
Quartermaster-General (president) ; six railway managers, 
who represented the British railway companies and might 
or might not already be members of the Engineer and 
Railway Staff Corps ; one Board of Trade Inspector of 
Railways ; two members (not being railway managers) 



i88 THE RISE OF RAIL-POWER. 

of the Engineer and Railway Staff Corps ; the Deputy- 
Assistant Quartermaster-General ; one mobilisation officer ; 
two Naval officers ; and one officer of the Royal Engi- 
neers, with a representative of the Quartermaster-General's 
Department as secretary. 

The Council approximated closely to the " Commission 
Militaire Superieure des Chemins de Fer " in France, of 
wliich an account has been given in Chapter IX. It also 
undertook many of the duties which in the case of the 
German Army would be performed by a special section of 
the General Staff ; though some of these duties it took over 
from the Engineer and Railway Staff Corps, reducing the 
functions and the importance of that body proportionately. 

In time of peace the Council was (i) generally to advise 
the Secretary of State for War on matters relating to military 
rail-transport ; (2) to draw up, in conjunction with the 
different railway companies concerned, and on the basis 
of data to be supplied to them by the War Office, a detailed 
scheme for the movement of troops on mobilisation ; (3) 
to arrange in advance as to the composition of the trains 
which would be required for any such movement ; (4) to 
determine the nature of the data to be asked for from the 
railway companies,^ and to prepare the necessary regula- 
tions and instructions in regard to the said troop move- 
ments ; (5) to draw up rules for the organisation of a body 
of Railway Staff Officers who, located at railway stations 
to be selected by the Council, would act there as inter- 
mediaries between the railway officials and the troops ; 
and (6) to confer with the different railway companies as 
to the provision of such extra sidings, loading platforms, 
ramps, barriers, etc., as might be necessary to facilitate 
military transport, and to decide on the best means by 
which the provision thereof could be arranged. Informa- 
tion on these subjects was to be carefully compiled, elabor- 

^ Detailed information as to the capacity of British rolUng stock ; 
composition of trains required for units at war strength ; truck 
space taken up by Army vehicles ; standard forms of reports on 
existing railways, and other matters, is published in the official 
publication known as "Railway Manual (War)." 



ORGANISATION IN ENGLAND. 189 

ated, and, with explanatory maps, placed on record for use 
as required. 

In the event of mobilisation, or of some national emer- 
gency, the Council was, also, to advise the Secretary of 
State for V\^ar in regard to matters relating to the move- 
ment of troops by rail ; to act as a medium of communi- 
cation between the War Office and the railway companies, 
and to make all the necessary arrangements in connection 
with such movements. 

Other questions likely to arise, and requiring considera- 
tion in time of peace, included the guarding of the railways 
against possible attack ; the prompt repair of any damage 
that might be done to them ; the equipment of armoured 
trains, and the provision of ambulance trains on lines where 
they might be required. 

All these and various other matters were dealt with at the 
periodical meetings held by the Council, which, within 
the range of its limitations as an advisory body, rendered 
good service to the War Office ; though that Department 
was still left to deal with the individual railway companies 
in regard to all arrangements and matters of detail directly 
concerning them. 

Railway Transport Officers 

In the foregoing statement as to the functions to be 
discharged by the War Railway Council it is mentioned 
that these were to include the drawing up of rules for the 
organisation of a body of Railway Staff Officers who were 
to act as intermediaries between the troops and the rail- 
v/ay station staffs in the conduct of military rail-transport. 

We touch here upon those questions of control and organi- 
sation of military traffic which had been a fruitful source 
of trouble in earlier wars, and more especially so on the 
French railways in the war of 1870-71. There was, indeed, 
much wisdom in the attempt now being made, as a pre- 
cautionary measure, to provide well in advance against 
the risk of similar experiences in regard to movements 
of British troops by rail, while the course adopted led to 
the creation of a system which was to ensure excellent 
results later on. 



igo THE RISE OF RAIL-POWER. 

In the first instance the officers appointed under the 
system here in question were known as " Railway Control 
Officers," (R.C.O.'s,) their chief as the " Director of Rail- 
ways," (D.R.,) and the organisation itself as the " Rail- 
way Control Establishment " ; but the titles of Railway 
Transport Officers (R.T.O.'s), Director of Railway Trans- 
port (D.R.T.) and Transport Estabhshments were after- 
wards substituted. 

The functions of the Director of Railway Transport 
are thus defined in Field Service Regulations, Part II, 
section 23 (1913) : — 

Provision of railway transport and administration of railway 
transport personnel. Control, construction, working and main- 
tenance of all railways. Provision of telegraph operators for 
railway circuits. Control and working of telephones and tele- 
graphs allotted to the railway service. For the erection and 
maintenance of all telegraph circuits on railways which are worked 
by the troops, a representative of the Director of Army Signals 
will be attached to his headquarters and the necessary signal 
troops allotted to him as may be ordered by the I. G.C. (Inspector- 
General of Communications). 

As regards the Railway Transport Establishments, the 
Regulations say (section 62) : — 

In railway matters, the authority of each member of a railway 
transport establishment will be paramount on that portion of a 
railway system where he is posted for duty. 

Railway technical officials will always receive the demands 
of the troops for railway transport through the railway transport 
establishment. 

Except when fighting is imminent or in progress, a member of 
the railway transport establishment will receive orders from the 
Director of Railway Transport only, or his representative. 

An officer, or officers, of the railway transport establishment, 
recognized by a badge worn on the left arm marked R.T.O., will 
be posted for duty at each place where troops are constantly 
entraining, detraining, or halting en route. Their chief duties 
will be : — ■ 

1. To facilitate the transport of troops, animals and material. 

2. To act as a channel of communication between the military 

authorities and the technical railway personnel. 

3. To advise the local military authorities as to the capacity 

and possibilities of the railway. 



ORGANISATION IN ENGLAND. igi 

4. To bring to the notice of tlie Director of Railway Transport 
any means by which the carrying power of the railway 
may, for mihtary purposes, be increased. 

All details as to the entraining and detraining of troops and the 
loading and unloading of stores will be arranged in conjunction 
with the technical officials by the railway transport establishment, 
who will meet all troops arriving to entrain, inform com- 
manders of the times and places of entrainment, and allot trucks 
and carriages to units in bulk. They will see that the necessary 
rolling stock is provided by the railway officials, that only the 
prescribed amount of baggage is loaded, and that no unau- 
thorised person travels by rail. They will meet all troop trains, 
and see that troops and stores are detrained with the utmost 
despatch. 

It will be observed from these regulations that, whatever 
his own rank may be, the R. T. O., subject to the instruc- 
tions he has received from his superior Transport Officer, 
exercises at the railway station to which he is delegated an 
authority that not even a General may question or seek 
to set aside by giving orders direct to the station staff. The 
R.T.O. alone is the " channel of communication " between 
the military and the railway elements. He it is who, acting 
in conjunction with the railway people, must see that all 
the details in connection v/ith entraining and detraining 
are properly arranged and efficiently carried out, while the 
operations of the station staff are, in turn, greatly facilitated 
alike by his co-operation and by the fact that there 
is now only one military authority to be dealt with at a 
station instead, possibly, of several acting more or less 
independently of one another. 

Volunteer Reviews 

While all these developments had been proceeding, the 
railway companies had, since the formation of the Engineer 
and Railway Volunteer Staff Corps, given repeated evidence 
of their capacity to move large bodies of Volunteers with 
complete efficiency. They specially distinguished them- 
selves in this respect on the occasion of the great Volunteer 
reviews held from time to time. In a book entitled " Eng- 
land's Naval '• and ^ Military Weakness," (London, 1882,) 
Major James -Walter, of the 4th Lancashire Artillery Volun- 



192 THE RISE OF RAIL-POWER. 

teers, was highly eulogistic of what was done by the railways 
on the occasion of the reviews in Edinburgh and Windsor 
in 1881. In regard to the Windsor review he wrote :— 

The broad result has been, so far as the railway part of the 
business goes, to prove that it is perfectly feasible to concentrate 
fifty thousand men from all parts of the kingdom in twenty- 
four hours. . . . The two lines most concerned in the Windsor 
review — -the Great Western and the South Western — carried out 
this great experiment with . . . the regularity and dispatch of 
the Scotch mail. 

Major Walter seems to have had the idea, rightly or 
wrongly, that the success of this performance was mainly 
due to the Engineer and Railway Volunteer Staff Corps. 
He says concerning that body : — 

Not the least valued result of the Windsor and Edinburgh 
reviews of 1881 is the having introduced with becoming promin- 
ence to public knowledge the necessary and indispensable services 
of the " Engineer and Railway Volunteer Staff Corps." Until 
these reviews bore testimony to the national importance of this 
Corps, few knew anything of its duties, or even existence, beyond 
a list of officers recorded in the Army List. . . . Since the 
embodiment of the Volunteers the Engineer and Railway Trans- 
port Corps has done much service, invariably thorough and with- 
out a hitch. . . . These several officers of the Railway Staff 
Corps set about their transport work of the 1881 reviews in a 
manner worthy of their vocation. They proved to the country 
that their Corps was a reality and necessity. 

In 1893 the authors of the " Army Book for the British 
Empire " wrote (p. 531) :• — 

There is every reason to believe that, in case of the military 
forces in the United Kingdom being mobilised for the purposes 
of home defence, and being concentrated in any part or parts of 
tlie country for the purpose of guarding against or confronting 
an invasion, the railway arrangements would work satisfactorily. 
The remarkable success which has attended the concentration of 
large bodies of Volunteers gathered from all quarters of the 
Kingdom for military functions and reviews, on more than one 
occasion, has shown the extraordinary capabilities of the British 
railway system for military transport on a great scale. Rolling 
stock is abundant. The more important lines in England have 
a double line of rails ; some have four or more rails. Gradients, 
moreover, as a rule are easy, an important point, since troop 
trains are very heavy. 



ORGANISATION IN ENGLAND. 193 



The South African War 

While no one was likely to dispute these conclusions, it 
had to be remembered that the transport by rail even of 
exceptionally large bodies of Volunteers, carrying their 
rifles only, was a very different matter from the conveyance, 
under conditions of great pressure, of large forces of troops 
accompanied by horses, guns, ammunition, road wagons, 
stores and other necessaries for prospective actual warfare. 
So the accepted capacity of the British railways had still 
to stand the test of actual war conditions, with or without 
the accompaniment of invasion ; and this test was applied, 
to a certain extent, by the South African War. 

The bulk of the military traffic on that occasion passed 
over the lines of the London and South Western Railway 
Company, troops from all parts of the country being con- 
veyed by different routes and different lines of railway to 
Southampton, whence they and their stores, etc., were 
shipped to the Cape. Such was the magnitude of this 
traffic that between the outbreak of the war, in 1899, and 
the end of 1900 there were carried on the London and South 
Western, and despatched from Southampton, 6,160 officers ; 
229,097 men ; 29,500 horses ; and 1,085 wheeled vehicles. 
The conveyance of this traffic involved the running of 1,154 
special trains, in addition to a large number of others carry- 
ing baggage, stores, etc. At times the pressure was very 
great. On October 20, 1899, five transports sailed from 
Southampton with 167 officers and 4,756 men, besides guns 
horses and wagons. Yet the whole of the operations were 
conducted with perfect smoothness, there being no overtax- 
ing either of the railway facilities or of the dock accommo- 
dation.^ 

Much of this smoothness of working was due to the fact 
that the War Office had, in accordance with the principle 
adopted on the appointment of the War Railway Council, 
stationed at Southampton a Railway Transport Officer who 
was to act as a connecting link, or intermediary, between 

^ The Railway Magazine, May, 1901. 



194 THE RISE OF RAIL-POWER. 

the railway, the docks, the mihtary and the Admiralty 
authorities, co-ordinating their requirements, superintend- 
ing the arrivals by train, arranging for and directing the 
embarkation of the troops and their equipment in the trans- 
ports allotted to them, and preventing any of that confusion 
which otherwise might well have arisen. Similar ofTficers 
had also been stationed by the War Office at leading railway 
stations throughout the country to ensure co-operation be- 
tween the military and the railway staffs and, while avoiding 
the possibility of friction or complications, facilitate the 
handhng of the military traffic. 

In the account to be given in Chapter XVI. of " Railways 
in the Boer War," it will be shown that a like course was 
pursued in South Africa for the duration of the campaign. 

Army Manoeuvres of igi2 

Further evidence as to what the British railways were 
capable of accomplishing was afforded by the Army Manoeu- 
vres in East Angiia in 1912. This event also constituted a 
much more severe test than the Volunteer reviews of former 
days, since it meant not only the assembling, in the manoeu- 
vre area, of four divisions of the Army and some thousands 
of Territorials, but the transport, at short notice, and within 
a limited period, of many horses, guns, transport wagons, 
etc., together with considerable quantities of stores. Cer- 
tain sections of the traffic were dealt with by the Great 
Northern and the London and North- Western Companies ; 
but the bulk of it was handled by the Great Eastern and was 
carried in nearly 200 troop trains, consisting in all of about 
4,000 vehicles. Of these trains 50 per cent, started before 
or exactly to time, while the others were only a few minutes 
late in leaving the station. Such was the regularity and 
general efficiency with which the work of transportation 
was carried out that in the course of an address to the 
Generals, at Cambridge, his Majesty the King referred to 
the rapid concentration of troops by rail, without dislocating 
the ordinary civilian traffic, as one of the special features of 
the manceuvres. The dispersal of the forces on the conclu- 



ORGANISATION IN ENGLAND. 195 

sion of the manoeuvres was effected in a little over two days, 
and constituted another smart piece of work.^ 

A Railways Executive Committee 

In view of all such testimony and of all such actual 
achievements, there was no reason to doubt that the railway 
companies, with their great resources in material and per- 
sonnel, and with the excellence of their own organisation, 
would themselves be able to respond promptly and effect- 
ively to such demands as might be made upon them in a 
time of national emergency. 

There still remained, however, the singular fact that 
although, so far back as 1871, the Government had acquired 
power of control over the railways, in the event of an emer- 
gency arising, a period of forty years had elapsed without 
any action being taken to create, even as a precautionary 
measure, the administrative machinery by which that con- 
trol would be exercised by the State. Such machinery had 
been perfected in Germany, France, and other countries, 
but in England it had still to be provided. Not only had 
section 16 of the Act of 1871 remained practically a dead 
letter, but even the fact that it existed did not seem to be 
known to so prominent a railway manager as Sir George 
Findlay when he wrote " Working and Management of an 
English Railway " and the article he contributed to the 
United Service Magazine of April, 1892, his assumption that 
the State would control the railways in time of war being 
based, not on the Act of 1871 — which he failed to mention 

^ For details as to the nature of the organisation by which these 
results were effected, see an article on " The Great Eastern Railway 
and the Army Manoeuvres in East Anglia — 1912," by H. J. Pry- 
therch, in the Great Eastern Railway Magazine for November, 191 2. 
In the Great Western Railway Magazine for November, 1909, there 
are given, under the heading, "The Transport of an Army," some 
details concerning the military transport on the Great Western sys- 
tem during the Army manoeuvres of that year. The traffic conveyed 
was, approximately, 514 officers, 14,552 men, 208 officers' horses, 
2,474 troop horses, 25 guns, 34 limbers, and 581 wagons and carts. 
" The military authorities and the Army contractors," it is said, 
" expressed their pleasure at the manner in which the work wasper- 
formed by the Company's staff," 



196 THE RISE OF RAIL-POWER. 

— but on the Act of 1888, which simply gives a right of 
priority to mihtary traffic, under certain conditions. 

Notwithstanding, too, the draft scheme spoken of by Sir 
George Findlay, under which the operation of the railways 
was to be entrusted, in case of emergency, to the Engineer 
and Railway Staff Corps, that body and, also, the War 
Railway Council, continued to occupy a purely advisory 
position. 

So it was clearly desirable to supplement the recognized 
efficiency of the railways themselves by the creation of a 
central executive body which, whenever the State assumed 
control of the railways, under the Act of 1871, would (i) 
secure the necessary co-operation between Government 
departments and the railway managements ; (2) ensure 
the working of the various railway systems on a national 
basis ; and (3) co-ordinate such various needs as naval and 
military movements to or from all parts of the Kingdom ; 
coal supply for the Fleet ; transport of munitions ; the 
requirements of the civil population, etc. 

The necessity for this machinery — which could not possi- 
bly be created at a moment's notice — became still more 
apparent in the autumn of igii, and steps were taken to 
provide what was so obviously a missing link in the existing 
organisation. 

Thus it was that in igi2 the War Railway Council was 
succeeded by a Railways Executive Committee which, con- 
stituted of the general managers of leading railway com- 
panies, was to prepare plans " with a view to facilitate the 
working " of the provisions of the Act of 1871, and would, 
also, in the event of the Government assuming control over 
the railways of Great Britain, under the provisions of that 
Act, constitute the executive body for working them on 
behalf of the State, becoming the recognised intermediary (i) 
for receiving the instructions of Government departments 
in respect to military and naval requirements ; and (2) for 
taking the necessary measures in order to give effect to 
them through the individual companies, each of which, sub- 
ject to the instructions it received from the Committee, 
would retain the management of its own line. 



ORGANISATION IN ENGLAND. 197 

In accordance with the principle thus adopted, it was 
through the Railways Executive Committee that the Govern- 
ment, subject to certain financial arrangements which need 
not be dealt with here, established their control over the 
railways of Great Britain on the outbreak of war in 1914, 
the announcement to this effect issued from the War Office, 
under date August 4, stating : — 

An Order in Council has been made under Section 16 of the 
Regulation of the Forces Act, 1871, declaring that it is expedient 
that the Government should have control over the railroads in 
Great Britain. This control will be exercised through an Execu- 
tive Committee composed of general managers of railways which 
has been formed for some time, and has prepared plans with a 
view to facilitating the working of this Act. 

In a notification issued by the Executive Committee, of 
which the official chairman was the President of the Board 
of Trade and the acting chairman was Mr. (now Sir Herbert 
A.) Walker, general manager of the London and South 
Western Railway, it was further stated : — 

The control of the railways has been taken over by the Govern- 
ment for the purpose of ensuring that the railways, locomotives 
rolling stock and staff shall be used as one complete unit in the 
best interests of the State for the movement of troops, stores and 
food supplies. . . . The staff on each railway will remain under 
the same control as heretofore, and will receive their instructions 
through the same channels as in the past. 

As eventually constituted, the Committee consisted of 
the following general managers :■ — Mr. D. A. Matheson, 
Caledonian Railway ; Sir Sam Fay, Great Central Railway ; 
Mr. C. H. Dent, Great Northern Railway ; Mr. F. Potter, 
Great Western Railway ; Mr. Guy Calthrop, London and 
North Western Railway ; Mr. J. A. F. Aspinall, Lancashire 
and Yorkshire Railway ; Sir Herbert A. Walker, London 
and South Western Railway ; Sir William Forbes, London, 
Brighton and South Coast Railway ; Sir Guy Granet, Mid- 
land Railway ; Sir A. K. Butterworth, North Eastern Rail- 
way, and Mr. F. H. Dent, South Eastern and Chatham 
Railway, with Mr. Gilbert S. Szlumper as secretary. 



igS THE RISE OF RAIL-POWER. 

i860 AND I914 

Such, then, was the linal outcome of a movement which, 
started in i860, by individual effort, as the result of an 
expected invasion of England by France, was, in 1914, and 
after undergoing gradual though continuous development, 
to play an important part on behalf of the nation in helping 
France herself, now England's cherished Ally, to resist the 
invader of her own fair territory. 

With what smoothness the transport of our troops was 
conducted cannot yet be told in detail ; but the facts here 
narrated will show that the success attained was mainly 
due to three all-important factors, — (i) the efficiency of the 
railway organisation ; (2) the willingness of the Govern- 
ment, on assuming control of the railways under the Act of 
1871, to leave their management in the hands of railway 
men ; and (3) the ready adoption, alike by the railway 
interests and by State departments, of the fundamental 
principle enforced by a succession of wars from the Ameri- 
can Civil War of 1861-65 downwards, — that in the conduct 
of military rail transport there should be, in each of its 
various stages, intermediaries between the military and the 
railway technical elements, co-ordinating their mutual 
requirements, constituting the recognised and only channel 
for orders and instructions, and ensuring, as far as prudence, 
foresight and human skill can devise, the perfect working 
of so delicate and complicated an instrument as the railway 
machine. 

Railway Troops 

While Germany, inspired by the American example, had 
begun the creation of special bodies of Railway Troops in 
1866, it was not until 1882 that a like course was adopted 
in England. Prior to the last-mentioned year it was, pos- 
sibly, thought that the labour branch of the Engineer and 
Railway Volunteer Staff Corps would suffice to meet require- 
ments in regard to the destruction or the re-estabhshment of 
railways at home in the event of invasion ; but the arrange- 
ments of the Corps did not provide for the supply of men 



ORGANISATION IN ENGLAND. 199 

to take up railway construction and operation on the occa- 
sion of military expeditions to other countries. 

It was this particular need that led, in the summer of 
1882, to the conversion of the 8th Company of Royal Engin- 
eers into the 8th (Railway) Company, R.E., the occasion 
therefor being the dispatch of an expeditionary force under 
Sir Garnet (afterwards Lord) Wolseley to Egypt, where the 
necessity for railway work of various kinds was likely to 
arise. This pioneer corps of British Railway Troops was 
formed of seven officers, one warrant officer, two buglers, 
and ninety-seven N. CO. 'sand sappers. So constituted, it 
was thought better adapted for railway work under condi- 
tions of active service than a body of civilian railwaymen 
would be. There certainly was the disadvantage that those 
constituting the 8th were not then proficient in railway 
matters ; but, before they left, both officers and men were 
given the run of the London, Chatham and Dover Railway 
lines, and were there enabled to pick up what they could of 
railway working in the locomotive and traffic departments, 
while on the London and South Western and the South East- 
ern Railways they were initiated, as far as could be done 
in the time, into the art of platelaying. The Corps took out 
to Egypt four small tank locomotives ; two first-class, two 
second-class and six third-class carriages ; forty cattle 
trucks ; four brake vans ; two travelling cranes ; two 
breakdown vans, and five miles of permanent way, com- 
plete, wdth accessories, tools, etc. Excellent work was done 
in carrying on regular train services, repairing damaged 
track, etc., running an armoured train, constructing supple- 
mentary short lines, and conveying troops, sick and wounded, 
and stores, the practical utility of such an addition to the 
engineering forces of the Army being thus fully assured. 

In January, 1885, the loth Company, Royal Engineers, 
was converted into the lotli (Railway) Company, and sent 
to Egypt to assist in the construction of the then contem- 
plated Suakin-Berber line, to which further reference will 
be made in Chapter XV. Both companies also rendered 
good service in the South African War. 

According to the " Manual of Military Railways," issued 



200 THE RISE OF RAIL-POWER. 

with Army Orders dated March ist, 1889, the duties likely 
to be required from the Royal Engineers with regard to rail- 
ways are as follows : — (i) Laying, working, and maintain- 
ing a military line of railway between two places ; (2) restor- 
ing an existing hne which has been damaged or destroyed by 
an enemy ; (3) destrojdng an existing line as much as pos- 
sible with a given number of men and in a specified time, 
and (4) working and maintaining an existing line. The 
" Manual " itself gave much technical information as to the 
construction, maintenance, destruction and working of rail- 
ways. It was re-issued by the War Office in 1898 as Part 
VI of " Instruction in Military Engineering," and was 
stated to embody a portion of the course of instruction in 
railways at the school of Military Engineering, Chatham. 
In the " Manual of Military Engineering," issued by the 
General Staff of the War Office in 1905, instructions are 
given (Chap. XVII, pars. 238-244) on the " hasty demoHtion, 
without explosives," of railways, stations, buildings, rolling 
stock, permanent way, water supply, etc. ; and in Chapter 
XXIII, " Railways and Telegraphs," the statement is made 
that— 

The duties likely to be required of troops in the field with 
regard to railways (apart from large railway schemes, for which 
special arrangements M'ould be necessary,) may be considered as 
either temporary repairs or the laying of short lengths of hne to 
join up breaks, the construction of additional works, such as 
platforms, etc., to adapt the line for military use, or the demolition 
of an existing line. 

Detailed information is given, for the benefit of R.E. 
officers, concerning railway construction, repair and recon- 
struction, and the main principles on which such work 
should be carried out for military purposes are explained. 
The best system to adopt for the effecting of rapid 
repairs is said to be that of establishing construction trains. 
" The reconstruction staff five in these trains, which rapidly 
advance along the line as it is being repaired, conveying, 
also, the necessary material." 

The peace training ^ of the Companies includes : recon- 

' " General Principles, Organisation and Equipment of Royal 
luigincers," Royal Engineers Journal, February, 19x0. 



ORGANISATION IN ENGLAND. 201 

naissance, survey and final location of a railway ; laying 
out station yards ; laying out deviations ; rapid laying of 
narrow-gauge " military " lines ; construction of all kinds 
of railway bridges ; signal installation ; water supply ; 
repairs to telegraphs and telephones necessary for working 
construction lines ; working of electric block instruments ; 
fitting up armoured trains ; construction of temporary 
platforms, and working and maintenance of construction 
trains. 

Instruction in reconnaissance and survey work is given to 
officers while at head-quarters, and a certain number of 
N.C.O.'s and men are also instructed in railway survey work. 
Parties, each commanded by an officer, are sent to carry out 
a reconnaissance and final location of a railway between two 
points about forty miles apart on the assumption that it is 
an unmapped country, and complete maps and sections are 
prepared. The Companies have also undertaken the con- 
struction and maintenance of the Woolmer Instructional 
Military Railwaj^ — a 4 ft. 8^ in. gauge military line, about 
six miles in length, connecting Bordon (London and South 
Western Railway) with Longmore Camp. All the plant 
necessary for railway work and workshops for the repair 
of rolling stock are provided at Longmore. 

In time of war the chief duties of a Railway Company, 
R.E., would be to survey, construct, repair and demolish 
railways and to work construction and armoured trains. 

In the South African campaign, when the military had 
to operate the railways of which they took possession in the 
enemy's country, some difficulty was experienced in obtain- 
ing from the ranks of the Army a sufficient number of men 
capable of working the lines. As the result of these condi- 
tions, it was arranged, in 1903, between the War Office and 
certain of the British railway companies that the latter 
should afford facilities in their locomotive departments and 
workshops for the training of a number of non-commissioned 
officers and men as drivers, firemen and mechanics, (capable 
of carrying out repairs,) in order to qualify them better for 
railway work in the field, in case of need. This arrange- 
ment was carried out down to the outbreak of war in 1914. 



202 THE RISE OF RAIL-POWER. 

The period of training lasted either six or nine months. In 
order to avoid the raising of any " labour " difficulties, no 
wages were given during this period to Army men who were 
already receiving Army pay as soldiers, but a bonus was 
granted to them by the railway companies, when they left, 
on their obtaining from the head of the department to which 
they had been attached a certificate of their efficiency. 

Strategical Railways 

The subject of strategical railwaj/s will be dealt with, 
both generally and in special reference to their construction 
in Germany, in Chapter XVIII. In regard to Great Britain 
it may be said that the position as explained by Sir George 
Findlay in his article in the United Service Magazine for 
April, 1892, is that whilst Continental countries have been 
spending large sums of money on the building of strategical 
lines for the defence of their frontiers, (or, he might have 
added, for the invasion, in some instances, of their neigh- 
bours' territory,) Great Britain, more fortunate, possesses 
already a system of railways which, though constructed 
entirely by private enterprise, could not, even if they had 
been laid out with a view to national defence, " have been 
better adapted for the purpose, since there are duplicated 
lines directed from the great centres of population and of 
military activity upon every point of the coast, w^hile there 
are lines skirting the coast in every direction, north, east, 
south and west." 

Some years ago there were certain critics who recom- 
mended the building of hnes, for strategical purposes, along 
sections of our coast which the ordinary railways did not 
directly serve ; but the real necessity for such lines was 
questioned, the more so because the transport of troops by 
rail on such short-distance journeys as those that would 
have been here in question might, with the marching to 
and from the railway and the time occupied in entraining 
and detraining, take longer than if the troops either marched 
all the way, or (in the event of there being only a small 
force) if they went by motor vehicles to the coast. 

One point that was, indeed, likely to arise in connection 



ORGANISATION IN ENGLAND. 203 

with the movement of troops was the provision of facilities 
for their ready transfer from one railway system to another, 
without change of carriage, when making cross-country 
journeys or travelling, for instance, from the North or the 
Midlands to ports in the South. 

We have seen that in France many such links were estab- 
lished, subsequent to the war of 1870-71, expressly for 
strategical reasons ; but in Great Britain a like result has 
been attained, apart from military considerations, from 
the fact that some years ago the different railway companies 
established ph37sical connections between their different 
systems with a view to the ready transfer of ordinary traffic. 
When, therefore, the necessity arose for a speedy mobilisa- 
tion, or for the transport of troops from any part of Great 
Britain to any particular port for an overseas destination, 
the necessary facilities for through journeys by rail, in the 
shortest possible time, already existed. 

In effect, the nearest approach to purely strategical 
lines in Great Britain is to be found, perhaps, in those 
which connect military camps with the ordinary railways ; 
yet, while these particular lines may have been built to 
serve a military purpose, they approximate less to strate- 
gical railways proper, as understood in Germany, than to 
branch lines and sidings constructed to meet the special 
needs of some large industrial concern. 

Generally speaking, the attitude of Parliament and of 
British authorities in general has not been sympathetic 
to suggestions of strategical railways, even when proposals 
put forward have had the support of the War Office itself. 

This tendency was well shown in connection with the 
Northern Junction Railway scheme which was inquired 
into by a Select Committee of the House of Commons 
in 1913. Under the scheme in question, a railway was 
to be constructed from Brentford, on the west of London, 
to Wood Green, on the north, passing through Acton, 
Ealing, Wembley Park, Hampstead and Finchley, and 
establishing connections with and between several of the 
existing main-line systems. In this respect it compared 
with those " outer circle " railway systems which, as a 



204 THE RISE OF RAIL-POWER. 

further result of the war of 1870-71, were expressly designed 
by the French Government for the better defence of Paris. 

The Northern Junction scheme was introduced to the 
Select Committee as one which, among other considera- 
tions, " would be important from a military point of view 
for moving troops from one point to another without 
taking them through London." Lieut. -General Sir J. S. 
Cowans, Quartermaster-General, a member of the Army 
Council responsible for the movement of troops, and 
deputed by the Secretary for War to give evidence, said : 

The proposed line would be a great advantage in time of emer- 
gency if it was constructed in its entirety. The Army Council felt 
that it would provide important routes between the South of 
England and East Anglia and the North. At present trains had 
to come from Aldershot to Clapham Junction by the South- 
western line, and be there broken up and sent over congested 
City Hnes on to the Great Northern. By the proposed line 
military trains could be handled without dividing them and be 
transferred to the Great Northern or Great Eastern without 
being sent over the congested City lines. 

Strong opposition was offered, however, on the ground 
that the construction of the line would do " irreparable 
damage " to the amenities of the Hampstead Garden 
Suburb ; and, after a sitting which extended over several 
days, the Committee threw out the Bill, the Chairman subse- 
quently admitting that " they had been influenced very 
largely by the objection of the Hampstead Garden Suburb." 

In 1 914 the scheme was introduced afresh into the 
House of Commons, with certain modilications, the pro- 
posed line of route no longer passing through the Hamp- 
stead Garden Suburb, though near to it. One member 
of the House said he had collaborated in promoting the 
Bill because " he most earnestly beheved this railway was 
of vital import to the mobilisation of our troops in time of 
emergency " ; but another declared that the alleged mili- 
tary necessity for the railway was " all fudge," while much 
was now said as to the pernicious effect the line would have 
on the highly-desirable residential district of Finchley. In 
the result strategical considerations were again set aside, and 
the House Rejected the Bill by a majority of seventy-seven. 



CHAPTER XV 

Military Railways 

By the expression " military railways " is meant lines 
of railways which, as distinct from commercial lines serving 
public purposes, have been designed expressly for military 
use. The fact that any line forming part of the ordinary 
railway system of the country is employed for the convey- 
ance of troops either direct to the theatre of war or to some 
port for embarkation therefrom does not constitute that 
line a " military " railway, in the strict sense of the term, 
whatever the extent of its use for military transport for 
the time being. Such line remains a commercial railway, 
all the same, and the application to it of the designation 
" military " is erroneous. 

Military railways proper fall mainly into two groups — 
(i) " field " or " siege " railways, constructed on the theatre 
of war for moving heavy guns, platform materials, etc., to 
their position ; conveying ammunition and supplies to siege 
batteries, magazines, advanced trenches or bombproofs ; 
bringing up reinforcements rapidly in case of a sortie ; 
conveying working-parties to and from their work ; remov- 
ing sick and wounded to the rear, and other kindred pur- 
poses, the loads being generally hauled by animals, by 
gasoline motor or by men ; and (2) " supply " railways, 
specially constructed to convey troops, stores, etc., from 
the base to the front, in time of war, or from an ordinary 
main-line railway to a military camp or depot in time of 
peace, where local lines of railway are not available for 
the purpose. 

These two main groups include various types of railways 
coming under one or the other designation, and ranging 

205 



2o6 THE RISE OF RAIL-POWER. 

from a very light portable tramway, put down at express 
speed to serve an emergency, and worked by small engines, 
mules or horses, to substantially built lines, of standard gauge, 
designed both to be worked by locomotives and to carry the 
largest possible number of troops or amount of freight. 

In any case, the details of construction, equipment and 
operation of a military railway vary from those of a com- 
mercial railway since the one would be intended to serve 
only a specific and possibly temporary purpose, in the attain- 
ment of which the question of speed would be a secondary 
consideration, whereas the other would require to assume a 
permanent form, be capable of higher speeds, and afford 
adequate guarantee of safety for the public, by whom it 
would be used. The building, also, of a military railway 
may be, and generally is, carried out by a corps of Railway 
Troops to which are specially delegated the duties of laying, 
working, maintaining, repairing, restoring or destroying 
railways ; and, provided the desired lines were built with 
sufficient dispatch, and answered the desired purpose, 
the military commanders v/ho would alone be concerned 
might well be satisfied. 

In many different ways the resort to military railways, 
whatever their particular type, has greatly extended the 
range of advantages to be gained from the application of 
rail-power to war. A full record of all that has been accom- 
plished in this direction could hardly be attempted here ; 
but a few typical examples of what has been done in this 
direction — though not always with conspicuous success — 
may be offered. 

The Crimean War 

The earliest instance of a purely military railway being 
constructed to serve the purpose of a campaign occurred 
in the Crimean War ; and, although the line then made 
would to-day be regarded as little more than an especially 
inefficient apology for a railway, it was looked upon at the 
time as a remarkable innovation in warfare. It further 
estabhshed a precedent destined to be widely followed in 
later years. 



MILITARY RAILWAYS. 207 

Between the camp of the alHes at Sebastopol and their 
base of supphes at Balaklava the distance was only seven 
or eight miles ; yet in the winter of 1854-55 the fatigue 
parties sent for rations, clothing, fuel, huts, ammunition 
and other necessaries were frequently no less than twelve 
hours in doing the return journey. The reason was that 
during the greater part of that time they were floundering 
in a sea of mud. The soil of the Crimea is clay impregnated 
with salt, and, under the combined influence of climatic 
conditions and heavy traffic, the route between camp and 
base had been converted into a perfect quagmire. Horses, 
mules and carts were, at first, alone available for transport 
purposes ; but, although plenty of animals were to be 
obtained in the surrounding country, only a limited number 
could be employed by reason of the lack of forage, a totally 
inadequate supply having been sent out from England. 
As for the animals that were used, their sufferings, as the 
result of those terrible journeys, their own shortage of food, 
and the effect of the intense cold on their half-starved 
bodies, were terrible. " In the rear of each Division," 
says General Sir Edward Hamley, in " The War in the 
Crimea," " a scanty group of miserable ponies and mules, 
whose backs never knew what it was to be quit of the saddle, 
shivered, and starved, and daily died." They died, also, 
on every journey to or from the base. The toil of going 
through the quagmire even for their own forage, or of 
bringing it back when they had got it, was too great for 
them, and the whole line of route was marked by their 
remains. 

As for the troops, they experienced great hardships owing 
to the inadequate supplies of provisions and fuel at the 
camp, although there might be plenty of both at the base. 
Apart from the physical conditions of the roads, or apologies 
for roads, between the two points, the campaign was begun 
without transport arrangements of any kind whatever. A 
transport corps formed for the British Army in 1799, under 
the title of the Royal Wagon Train, had been disbanded in 
1833, ^rid, whether from motives of economy or because 
the need for war preparations in time of peace was not 



2o8 THE RISE OF RATL-POWER. 

sufficiently appreciated, no other corps had been created 
to take its place. Hence the troops sent to the Crimea 
were required, at the outset, to look after the transport 
themselves, and in many instances they even had to do the 
work of mules and horses. It was not until January 24, 
1855, that a Land Transport Corps, composed of volunteers 
from various arms of the service, was raised by Royal 
Warrant and began to provide for a defect in the military 
organisation which had, in the meantime, involved the allies, 
and especially the British, in severe privations owing to the 
frequent shortage of supplies. The original intention to 
establish a depot at head-quarters before Sebastopol had 
had to be abandoned because of the hopelessness of any 
attempt to get a sufficient surplus of provisions to form a 
store. 

Such were the conditions that the pioneer military rail- 
way was designed to remedy. Built, at a very slow rate, 
by English contractors, who arrived at the Crimea with 
their men and material during the month of January, 1855, 
the line was a single-track one, with a 4 feet 84- inch gauge. 
For the first two miles from Balaklava it was worked by a 
locomotive. Then the trucks were drawn up an incline, 
eight at a time, by a stationary engine. Six horses next 
drew two trucks at a time up another incline. After this 
came a fairly level piece of road, followed by two gullies 
where each wagon was detached in succession and made to 
run down one side of the gully and up the other by its own 
momentum. Then horses were again attached to the 
trucks and so drew them, finally, to the end of the line 
on the Upland. 

Five locomotives, of from 12 to 18 tons weight, were 
provided, and there were about forty ordinary side-tip 
ballast wagons — all entirely unsuitable for use on a military 
railway. 

At first the men belonging to the contractors' staff — 
navvies and others — were entrusted with the working of 
the line. The question had been raised as to whether their 
services should not be made use of in other directions, as 
well. On their being sent out from England the idea was 



MILITARY RAILWAYS. 209 

entertained that they might construct trenches and batteries, 
in addition to building the railway, and there was a sugges- 
tion that they should, also, join the siege parties in the 
attack on Sebastopol. In order to test the question (as 
recorded by Major-General Whitworth Porter, in his 
" History of the Corps of Royal Engineers "), Sir John 
Burgoyne wrote to Mr. Beattie, principal engineer of the 
Railway Department, asking if he would approve of an 
invitation being given to the men to undergo such training 
as would qualify them to defend any position in which they 
might happen to be. In his answer Mr. Beattie MTote : — 

The subject of your letter was very fully and anxiously dis- 
cussed in London before I left, and it was determined not to 
arm the men. They were considered too valuable to be used 
as soldiers, and were distinctly told that they would not be 
called upon to fight. 

Their value, however, did not stand the test it underwent 
when they were called on to work the railway they had 
built. They were found to be lacking in any sense of dis- 
cipline ; they repeatedly struck work when their services 
were most urgently needed, and they had to be got rid 
of accordingly. They were replaced by men from the 
Army Works Corps and the Land Transport Corps, then 
in operation in the Crimea, and the members of the new 
staff — constituting a disciplined force — worked admirably. 
Major Powell, who became traffic manager of the line in 
March, 1855, and chief superintendent in the following 
July, has said concerning them ^ : — 

Many lost their lives in the execution of their duty. When I 
required them to work night and day to throw forward supplies 
for the great struggle — -the capture of Sebastopol — several of 
them remained seventy-two hours continuously at work. 

The quantities of ammunition and stores which could be 
carried were below the requirements of the troops engaged 
in the siege operations ; but during the last bombardment 
of Sebastopol — when the line was worked continuously, 

^ See lecture by Capt. C. E. Luard, R.E., on " Field Railways 
and their general application in war." Journal of the Royal United 
Service Institution, vol. xvii, 1873. 



210 THE RISE OF RAIL-POWER. 

night and day, by a staff increased to about i,ooo men, of 
whom 400 were Turks — the transport effected rose from 
200 tons a day, the Hmit attained under operation by the 
undisciphned navvies, to 700 tons. The hne also did 
excellent work on the re-embarkment of the troops at the 
end of the campaign. 

American Civil War 

In the American War of Succession, the existing lines of 
railway were supplemented in various instances by " surface 
railroads," which consisted of rails and sleepers laid on the 
ordinary ground without any preparation of a proper road 
bed, yet serving a useful purpose, notwithstanding the 
rough and ready way in which the^^ were put together. 

The Abyssinian Campaign 

How a railway specially constructed for the purpose 
may assist a military expedition in the prosecution of a 
" little war " in an uncivilised country, practically devoid 
of roads, and offering great physical difficulties, was shown 
on the occasion of the British Campaign in Abyssinia in 
1867-68 ; though the circumstances under which the line in 
question was built v/ere not in themselves creditable to the 
authorities concerned. 

Sent to effect the release of the British prisoners whom 
King Theodore was keeping in captivity at Magdala, the 
expedition under Sir Robert Napier (afterwards Lord 
Napier of Magdala) entered upon what was to be quite as 
much an engineering as a military exploit. Not only was 
Magdala 300 miles from Annesley Bay, the base of opera- 
tions on the Red Sea, but it stood, as a hill fortress, on a 
plateau more than 9,000 feet above the sea-level. To reach 
it meant the construction of roads in three sections. The 
first, which, in parts, had to be cut in the mountain side, 
rose to a height of 7,400 feet in 63 miles ; the second allowed 
of no more than a cart road, and the third and final stage 
was a mere mountain track where the only transport possible 
was that of mules or elephants. 



MILITARY RAILWAYS. 211 

When, in October, 1867, the advance Brigade landed at 
Zoulla, the port in Annesley Bay from which the advance 
inland was to be made, they took with them the materials 
for some tramway lines intended to connect two landing 
piers with the depots it was proposed to establish a mile 
inland. In November these plans were altered in favour 
of a line of railway, twelve miles in length, from the landing- 
place to Koomayleh, at the entrance of the Soroo Pass, the 
route to be taken by the expedition on its journey to the 
Abyssinian highlands. All the necessary plant was to be 
supplied by the Government of Bombay, who also under- 
took to provide the labour ; but it was the middle of Janu- 
ary, 1868, before a real start could be made with the work. 

Even then, as told by Lieut. Willans, R.E.,^ who took 
part in the expedition, the progress made was extremelj^ 
slow. The rails obtained from different railway companies 
in India were of five different patterns, of odd lengths, and 
varying in weight from 30 lb. to 65 lb. a yard. Some of 
them had been in use many years on the harbour works at 
Karachi, had been taken up and laid down several times, 
and had, also, been bent to fit sharp curves or cut to suit 
the original line. Some single-flanged rails had been fitted 
in the Government workshops at Bombay with fish-plates 
and bolts ; but the holes in the plates and rails were not at 
uniform distances, and the bolts fitted the holes so tightly 
as to allow of no play. Then, when the rails arrived, no 
spikes came with them, and without spikes they could 
not be laid. When the spikes followed, it was found that 
the augurs for boring holes in the sleepers had been left at 
Bombay, to come on by another ship ; though this par- 
ticular difficulty was met by the artisans of the 23rd 
Punjab Pioneer Regiment making augurs for themselves. 

If the rails gave much trouble — and even when they had 
been laid it was no unusual thing for them to break between 
two sleepers and throw the engine off the line — the loco- 
motives and rolling stock caused still more. 

"The Abyssinian Railway." By Lieut. Willans, R.E. Pa- 
pers on Subjects Connected with the Duties of the Corps of Royal 
Engineers. New Series. Vol. xviii. 1S70. 



212 THE RISE OF RAIL-POWER. 

Six locomotives were shipped from Bombay ; but, owing 
to the great difficulty in landing and the labour involved 
in putting them together, only four were used. Of these, 
one was a tank engine which, although just turned out from 
the railway workshops at Bombay, required new driving 
wheels after it had been running a fortnight. Another 
came with worn-out boiler tubes, and these had to be replaced 
at Zoulla. The two others, tank engines with only four 
wheels each, had previously seen many years' service at 
Karachi. All the engines were very light, weighing with 
coal and water from i6 to 20 tons each. The best of them 
could do no more than draw fifteen small loaded trucks 
up an incline of one in sixty. 

The sixty wagons sent were ordinary trolleys having no 
springs, no spring buffers and no grease boxes. Their 
axle-boxes were of cast iron, and wore out within a fort- 
night, owing to the driving sand. As the railway came 
into use, every truck was loaded to its fullest capacity, 
and the combination of this weight with the jarring and 
oscillation on a very rough line led either to the breaking of 
the coupling chains or to the coupling bars being pulled from 
the wagons at starting. When fresh coupling chains were 
asked for it was found that the boxes containing them had 
either been left behind at Bombay or were buried beneath 
several hundred tons of other supplies on board ship. At 
least forty per cent, of the trucks were either constantly 
under repair or had to be put aside as unfit for use. In 
May a number of open wagons with springs and spring 
buffers arrived from Bombay. Some of these were con- 
verted into passenger carriages. 

Difficulties arose in other directions, besides. 

The plant forwarded was adapted to the Indian standard 
gauge of 5 feet 6 inches, and was heavy and difficult to 
handle, especially under the troublesome conditions of 
landing. To-day, of course, a narrow-gauge railway, easily 
dealt with, would be employed in circumstances such as 
thos2 of the Abyssinian expedition. 

The Indian natives who had been sent in the first instance 
to construct the line were found unsuitable, and had to be 



MILITARY RAILWAYS. 213 

replaced by gangs of Chinese picked up in Bombay. The 
latter worked well and gave no trouble. 

The country through which the line was laid was timber- 
less, if not, also, practically waterless. Wells had to be 
sunk for the water wanted for the locomotives and the 
working-parties. 

The heat was excessive. The temperature at times was 
180 degrees Fahr. in the sun. EngHsh navvies could not 
have made the line at all. 

The two piers where the incoming vessels could alone be 
unloaded got so congested with traffic that it was only with 
the greatest trouble railway material could be landed. 

Use began to be made of the line as soon as any of it was 
ready, and the traffic at the shore end at once became so 
heavy that it was difficult to get materials and supplies 
through to the construction parties at the other end. 
Officers, also, who should have been superintending the con- 
struction had to devote a good deal of time, instead, to 
details of operation, or to looking after the repairs of rolling 
stock. h'i, 

In all these circumstances one cannot be surprised at the 
slow rate of progress made. One may, rather, wonder that 
the line got built at all. As it was, four months were spent 
on eleven miles of railway, or a total of twelve miles includ- 
ing sidings. There remained still another mile or so to be 
built when, at the end of April, news arrived that the object 
of the expedition had been attained, and that Magdala 
had fallen. It was then decided not to complete the line, 
but to devote all energies to preparing for the heavy traffic 
to be dealt with in the convej^ance of troops, baggage and 
stores on the return journey. 

From the middle of May to the middle of June the re- 
sources of the line were severely taxed ; but a great improve- 
ment had been made in the working arrangements, and 
a railway which had involved so much trouble in the mak- 
ing was eventually found to be of great practical service. 
Lieutenant Willans says of it : — 

The Abyssinian railway was a great success, if one may gauge 
it by the amount of assistance it gave to the expedition, by the 



214 THE RISE OF RAIL-POWER. 

celerity and dispatch with which, by its aid, stores were landed 
and brought up to the store sheds, and by the rapidity and ease 
with which the troops and their baggage were brought back 
and re-embarked at once. . . . 

As an auxiliary to the expedition, and as an additional means 
of transport, no one who had anything to do in connection with 
it can have doubted its extreme utility. 

Faulty, therefore, as had been the conditions under 
which the line was constructed, the results nevertheless 
established definitely the principle that, in such campaigns 
as the one in Abyssinia, military railways might serve 
an extremely useful purpose in facilitating the transport of 
troops and supplies. 

The Abyssinian experiences did, however, further show 
the desirability of any country likely to find itself in a 
position requiring the construction of military railways — 
as an aid to wars small or great — creating in advance an 
organisation designed to enable it, as far as possible, to 
meet promptly whatever emergency might arise, without 
the risk of having to deal with defective material, unsatis- 
factory labour, and administrative mismanagement. 

The same lesson was to be enforced by other expeditions 
in which England has taken part, and, down to the period 
when improvements in our system — or lack of system — 
began to be effected, there was much scope for criticism as 
to the way in which military railways, designed to facilitate 
operations undertaken in countries having a lack of communi- 
cations, had been either constructed or worked. Writing, 
in 1882, in the " Professional Papers " of the Royal Engineers 
(Chatham) on " Railways for Military Communication in the 
Field," Col. J. P. Maquay, R.E., observed in regard to 
what had been the experiences to that date : — 

In most of tlie wars that England has undertaken during the 
past thirty years, attempts have been made to construct rail- 
ways for the transport of stores and materials from the base 
of operations. This base must necessarily be on the sea coast 
for a country situated as England is. These railways have not 
been successful chiefly because, when war had broken out, such 
material was hastily got together as seemed most suitable to 
the occasion ; and, further, the construction of these lines was 
not carried out on any system. It is not surprising, therefore. 



MILITARY RAILM^AYS. 215 

that our military railways were never completed in time to be 
of much use to the troops they were intended to serve. 

Franco-German War 

In the Franco-German War of 1870-71 the Germans 
constructed two military railways — (i) a line, twenty-two 
miles in length, connecting Remilly, on the Saarbriick 
Railway, with Pont a Mousson, on the Metz-Frouard line ; 
and (2) a loop line, three miles long, passing round the 
tunnel at Nanteuil, blown up by the French. 

Special interest attached to these two lines inasmuch 
as they were the result of construction work done, not in 
anticipation of a war, or even immediately preceding 
hostilities, but during the course of an active campaign. 
In addition to this, they afforded an opportunity for show- 
ing what Prussia could do, under pressure, with the Con- 
struction Corps she had formed in order, among other 
things, to meet just such contingencies as those that now 
arose. 

At the beginning of the war the Prussian General Staff 
had (according to Riistow) assumed that Metz would offer 
a prolonged resistance, and that the defenders would be 
certain to make an attempt to interrupt the rail communi- 
cation between German}/ and her troops in the field. To 
meet the position which might thus be created, it was de- 
cided to build from Pont a Mousson to Remilly a field railway 
which, avoiding Metz, would link up at Remilly with the 
line proceeding thence to Saarbriick, and so ensure the 
maintenance of direct rail communication to and from 
Germany. On August 14, 1870, the day of the rearguard 
action at Borny, the survey and the leveUing of the ground 
w^ere begun, and three days later a start was made with 
the construction. Altogether some 4,200 men were em- 
ployed on the work, namely, 400 belonging to two Field 
Railw'ay Companies ; 800 forming four Fortress Pioneer 
Companies, and about 3,000 miners from the colHery dis- 
tricts of Saarbriick who had been thrown out of work 
owing to the war and accepted employment on the railway. 
The building corps had at their disposal a park of 330 



2i6 THE RISE OF RAIL-POWER. 

wagons and other vehicles, and patrol and requisition duties 
were performed for them by a squadron of Cavalry. 

Notwithstanding that so considerable a force was avail- 
able for the purpose, the work of building the twenty-two 
miles of railway took forty-eight days, the line not being 
ready for operation until October 4. This was in no way a 
great achievement, and it did not compare favourably with 
much that was done by the Federal Construction Corps 
employed in the American War of Secession. It is true 
that the irregularities of the ground were such as to render 
necessary numerous cuttings and embankments, and that 
two bridges and two viaducts had to be provided ; but the 
cuttings were only about 3 feet deep, and the embank- 
ments were only 5 feet high, except near one of the viaducts, 
where they were 10 feet high. The viaducts and bridges were 
of timber, with spans of about 16 feet. The building of the 
line was, therefore, in no way a formidable undertaking, 
from an engineering point of view. 

! Not only, however, did it take over 4,000 men nearly 
fifty days to make twenty-two miles of line, but the work 
had been done in such a way that when the autumn rains 
came on the track settled in many places ; traffic on the 
lines became very dangerous ; one of the bridges was 
washed aw^ay by the floods, and almost as many men had 
to be put on to do repairs as had previously been employed 
for the construction. Traffic of a very moderate descrip- 
tion — each locomotive drawing only four wagons at a 
time — was carried on for just twenty-six days, and then, 
happily for the engineers concerned, the developments in 
and around Metz rendered the line no longer necessary. 

How the restoration of the traffic interrupted through the 
explosion of French mines in the tunnel at Nanteuil occupied 
from September 17 to November 22 has already been told 
on page 128. 

Russo-TuRKisH War 

In the opinion of one English military critic, what short 
lines were made in the Franco-Germ^m War '' were neither 



MILITARY RAILWAYS. 217 

so speedily constructed nor so successful in result as to 
encourage the idea that lines of any length could be made 
during a campaign " ; but a different impression is to be 
derived from the story of what was accomplished in the same 
direction in the Russo-Turkish War of iSyy-y^. 

Russia planned her campaign against Turkey in the hope 
and expectation that it would be short, sharp and decisive. 
She started her mobilisation in good time, that is to say, 
in November, 1876, although she did not declare war until 
April 24, 1877. Making the mistake, however, of despising 
her foe, she anticipated no serious opposition from the 
Turks, but expected, rather, to paralyse them by a rapid 
advance, have a triumphal march to Constantinople, 
secure the desired safeguards for the Christians in Turkey, 
and see the war over before the end of the summer. 

One reason why Russia specially desired to bring the 
campaign to so early a conclusion lay in the deficient and 
precarious nature of the rail communication. Under a 
convention which had been agreed to with Rumania on 
April 16, 1877, Russia was to have a free passage for her 
troops through that country. She was, also, to have the use 
of the Rumanian railways and of all their transport facilities. 
But the only line then running through Rumania was one 
that went from Galatz, on the Russo-Rumanian frontier, to 
Bucharest, and thence (with a branch to Slatina) to Giur- 
gevo, on the Danube, where it connected with a Bulgarian 
line from Rustchuk, on the south of the river, to Varna, 
the Turkish base of supplies on the Black Sea. Not only 
was the Rumanian railway system thus limited in extent, 
but the lines had been indifferently constructed, they were 
badly maintained, and they had an inadequate personnel 
together with an insufficiency both of rolling stock and of 
terminal facilities. Still further, the fact that the Russian 
railways had a broader gauge than the railways of Rumania 
(among other European countries) caused great delay in 
the transfer, at the frontier, from the one system to the 
other, not alone of 200,000 men, but of the 850 field and 
400 siege guns, of the ammunition, and of much other 
material the troops required to take with them. Th j alter- 



2iS THE RISE OF RAIL POWER. 

native to dependance on the railway was a resort to roads 
impassable in wet weather. 

What really caused the Russian plans to miscarry, how- 
ever, was the obstinate defence of Plevna by Osman Pasha, 
who took up his position there on July ig, subjected the 
Russians to successive repulses, and did not capitulate 
until December lo, the siege costing the Russians 55,000 men 
and the Rumanians 10,000. 

When it was realised that the check at Plevna rendered 
certain a prolongation of the campaign, Russia set about 
the construction of a series of new lines of railway during 
the course of the war. The principal lines thus taken in 
hand were : — 

1. A line in Russia, from Bender, on the Dniester, to 
Galatz, establishing direct communication between the 
Odessa railways and the Rumanian frontier, and affording 
improved facilities for the sending of reinforcements to the 
seat of war. 

2. A line from Fratesti, on the Bucharest-Giurgevo Rail- 
way, to Simnitza, the point on the north bank of the Danube 
where, on the night of June 26-7, the Russians built the 
bridge which enabled them to cross the river. 

3. A line from Sistova, on the south side of the Danube, 
to Tirnova (Bulgaria), situate about thirty miles south-east 
of Plevna, and about twenty-five north of the Shipka Pass. 

Of these three lines the construction of the first, 189 
miles in length, was begun at the end of July, 1877. The 
original intention was to build a railway to serve the pur- 
poses of the war only ; but the conclusion that ulterior 
strategical and commercial purposes would alike be served 
by linking up Odessa with the Rumanian frontier led to 
the building of a railway likely to be of permanent useful- 
ness. The line was a single-track one, with a sufficient 
number of stations and passing places to allow of the running 
of seven trains in each direction in the twenty-four hours. 
The construction, carried out by contract, involved the 
building of a number of timber bridges and the provision 
of several embankments, one of which was over three miles 
in length. Great difficulties were experienced in regard 



MILITARY RAILWAYS. 219 

to labour, and especially by reason of the refusal of the men 
to work either on Sundays or on their numerous saints' 
days. Trains were, nevertheless, running on the line within 
100 days of the construction being started, and this not- 
withstanding the fact that the number of actual working 
days had been only fifty-eight. Whereas, therefore, the 
Germans had, in 1870, with the help of a Construction Corps 
over 4,000 strong, taken fortj^-eight days to build twenty-two 
miles of railway between Pont a Mousson and Remilly, the 
Russians in 1877 built, by contract, i8g miles of railway 
in just over double the same period. 

A railway from Fratesti to Simnitza had become indis- 
pensable inasmuch as the main line of communication for 
the Russian Army could not be continued for an indefinite 
period along the forty miles of defective roads — speedily 
worn out by the heavy traffic — which separated the Buchar- 
est-Giurgevo line from the bridge built across the Danube. 
The only important earthwork necessary was an embank- 
ment a mile and a half long and fourteen feet high. The 
bridges to be provided included one of 420 feet and two of 
210 feet each. In this instance the troubles experienced 
were due to the difficulty in getting the necessary materials 
for the work of construction owing partly to the existing 
Rumanian lines being blocked with military traffic, and 
partly to the state of the roads and to the use of all available 
draught horses for Army transport purposes. There could 
thus be no great celerity shown in construction, and the 
forty miles of railway, begun in the middle of September, 
were, in fact, not ready for working until the beginning of 
December. 

Like difficulties were experienced, though to a still more 
acute degree, in regard to the Sistova-Tirnova line, the 
length of which was to be seventy-five miles ; and here only 
the earth-works could be finished before the end of the 
campaign. 

What, however, had been accomplished during the time 
the war was in progress was (i) the completion of 229 miles 
of new railway, and the making of the road-bed for another 
seventy-five miles, together with the carrying out of a 



220 THE RISE OF RAIL-POWER. 

number of minor railway works ; (2) the acquisition, by 
purchase in different countries, of 120 locomotives and 2,150 
wagons and trucks, all new, and (3) the provision of a 
steam railway ferry across the Danube.^ 

So the development of the rail-power principle in warfare 
was carried still further by this construction, during the 
course of the Russo-Turkish conflict, of a greater length of 
railways, designed for military use, than had ever been 
built under Hke conditions before. The world gained a 
fresh lesson as to the importance of the role played by 
railways in war, and it was offered, also, a striking example 
of what could be done in the way of rapidly providing them 
in a time of emergency. 

On the other hand it had to be remembered that, of the 
three railways in question, the one which included 189 
miles out of the total 229 miles built was constructed on 
Russian territory where there was no danger of interruption 
by the enemy, while the delays which occurred with the two 
other lines, owing to the congestion of traffic, under war 
conditions, on existing railways depended upon for the 
supply of materials, seemed to point (i) to the risk that might, 
from this cause, be run if the building of lines necessary or 
desirable in the interests of some prospective campaign 
were left until the outbreak of hostilities, and (2) to the 
wisdom of constructing all such lines, as far as necessary 
and practicable, in time of peace. 

The Sudan 

If we turn now to the Sudan, we gain examples of military 
railways which, designed for the purposes of war, and 
constructed, in part, during the progress of active hostilities, 
first rendered great services in facilitating the conquest of a 
vast area, and then developed into a system of Government 

1 ' ' The Construction of Militarj^ Railways during the Russo- 
Turkish War of 1877-8." By Captain M. T. Sale, R.E. Journal 
of the Royal United Service Institution, vol. xxiv, 1881. "Dela 
Construction des Chemins de Fer en temps de guerre. Lignes con- 
struites par I'armee russe pendant la cam pagne 1S77-78." Par M. 
P. Lcssar, Ingenieur du Gouvernement russe. Traduit du russe par 
M. L. Avril. Paris, 1879. 



MILITARY RAILWAYS. 221 

railways operated, in turn, for the purposes of peace, and 
accomplishing" results as conspicuously successful in the 
latter direction as they had previously done in the former. 

During the time that Said Pasha was Viceroy of Egypt 
(1854-63) there was brought forward a scheme for the 
linking up of Egypt and the Sudan by means of a single 
line of railway from Cairo to Khartoum, with a branch to 
Massowa, on the Red Sea. It was an ambitious proiposal^ 
and, if it could have been carried into effect, the openng up 
of the Sudan to civilisation, by means of an iron road, 
might have altered the whole subsequent history of that 
much-suffering land. But the cost was regarded as pro- 
hibitive, and the scheme was abandoned for a time, to be 
revived, however, in a modified form in 1871, when Ismail 
Pasha was Khedive. It was then proposed that the line 
should start at Wady Haifa and be continued to Matemmeh 
(Shendy), situate about 100 miles north of Khartoum — 
a total distance of 558 miles. In 1875 a beginning was made 
with the building of this railway, which was to consist of a 
single Hne, with a gauge of 3 feet 6 inches, and was to be 
made with 50-lb. rails and 7-ft. sleepers ; but when, in 1877, 
after an expenditure of about ;£40o,ooo, the railway had been 
carried no farther than Sarras, thirty-three and a half 
miles from the starting-point, it was stopped for lack of 
funds. 

In the autumn of 1884 the British expedition to Khar- 
toum, where General Gordon was endeavouring to maintain 
his position against the Mahdi's followers, was resolved 
upon, and it was then decided to extend the Sudan Railway 
beyond the point already reached, at Sarras, in order to 
facilitate still further the journey of the troops along the 
valley of the Nile, which had been selected as the route 
of the expedition. 

Plate-laying for the extension was begun in September 
by a party of English and Egyptian infantry and native 
labourers, afterwards joined by the 4th BattaHon Egyptian 
Army and the 8th (Railway) Company of the Royal En- 
gineers. While, however, materials previously stored at 
Sarras were found to be still available, the trucks containing 



222 THE RISE OF RAIL-POWER. 

rails, etc., for the extension work had to be pushed by hand 
from Sarras to railhead owing to the absence of engines ; 
sleepers were carried on the backs of camels, of which 300 
were employed for the purpose, and the coolie work was 
entrusted to 700 native labourers, mainly old men and 
boys, most of whom had deserted by the end of October, 
when further plate-la3dng was discontinued. By that 
time the extension works had reached the thirty-ninth mile, 
and the line from Sarras to this point was opened on Decem- 
ber 4. 

Following on the fall of Khartoum and the death of 
Gordon in Januar3^ 1885, came the decision to extend the 
line to Firket (103 miles), in view of a then projected further 
campaign in the autumn of that year. The extension was 
sanctioned towards the end of February ; fifty-two miles 
of permanent way were ordered from England ; 300 plate- 
layers and railway mechanics were obtained from India, to 
supplement the construction forces already available ; and 
on August 7 the extension was completed as far as Akasha 
(87 miles). 

Meanwhile, however, there had been a change of policy 
which affected the whole situation. On the return of the 
expeditionary force to Korti (situate at the southern ex- 
tremity of the great Nile bend), the whole of the country to 
the south thereof passed under the control of the Der- 
vishes ; and the British Government, reluctant at that 
time to enter on the formidable task of reconquest, de- 
cided that no further military operations should be taken in 
hand, and that the Sudan must be definitely abandoned. 
Orders were accordingly given by Lord Wolseley in May, 
1885, for the withdrawal of the troops from all stations 
south of Dongola, which itself was abandoned on June 15, 
the retreat continuing as far as Akasha. Beyond this 
point, therefore, plate-laying for the proposed railway 
extension was not carried, although the formation levels 
had been completed to Firket. 

Subsequently the British retreat was continued to Wady 
Haifa, which then became the southern frontier of Egypt, 
the railway extension thence to Akasha, together with all 



MILITARY RAILWAYS. 223 

posts to the south of Wady Llalfa, being also abandoned. 

Excellent service had, nevertheless, been rendered by 
the railway, as far as it was carried. 

Operation of the line had been taken over by the 8th 
(Railway) Company, R.E., who, at the outset, had at 
their disposal only five more or less decrepit locomotives, 
fifty open trucks, five covered goods vans, and six brake 
vans. The troops were conveyed in the open trucks, and 
by the end of 18S4 all the stores for the opening of the 
campaign had been passed up. During the course of 1885 
additional locomotives and rolHng stock were obtained 
from the Cape. 

Summing up the work done on the Sudan Military Rail- 
way for the Nile Expedition of 1884-5, Lieut. M. 
Nathan, R.E.,i says that it included (i) the repair and 
maintenance of thirty-three and a half miles of existing 
railway ; (2) the construction of fifty-three and a half miles 
of new line through a nearly waterless desert, with no means 
of distributing material except the line itself ; (3) the 
transport, for the most part with limited and indifferent 
stock, of about 9,000 troops round the worst part of the 
second cataract when going up the river, and round nearly 
the whole of it when coming down ; and (4) the carriage 
of 40,000 tons for an average distance of thirty-six and a 
half miles. 

As against what had thus been achieved in the Nile 
Valley must be set a failure on the Red Sea. 

When, on the fall of Khartoum in January, 1885, the 
British Government first decided on an extension of the Nile 
Valley Railway, they further resolved on the building of a 
mihtary railway from Suakin to Berber, on the Nile, in 
order to have a second line of communication available for 
Lord Wolseley's Army ; and an Anglo-Indian force was 
sent to Suakin, under the command of General Sir Gerald 
Graham, in order, first, to defeat the Dervishes in the Eastern 
Sudan, and then to protect the construction of the proposed 

1 " The Sudan Military Railway." By Lieut. M. Nathan, 
R.E. " Professional Papers of the Corps of Royal Engineers, 
Occasional Papers," vol. xi, 1885. 



224 THE RISE OF RAIL-POWER. 

railway. Such a line would obviously have been of great 
strategical value to a Nile expeditionary force ; but the 
attempt to build it broke down owing, in part, to the defec- 
tive nature of the organisation resorted to, though still 
more to the active opposition of the enemy. 

Sir Andrew Clarke, Inspector-General of Fortifications, 
had from the first advocated that the hue should be sup- 
plied and laid by the military engineering strength then 
available ; but he was over-ruled, and the work was given 
to an English firm of contractors in the expectation, as 
Major-General Whitworth Porter tells, in volume two of the 
" History of the Corps of Royal Engineers," " that the 
necessary material would be supplied more readily, and in 
shorter time, through civilian agency." It was, however, 
decided to send the loth (Railway) Company of Royal 
Engineers both to carry out some local works in the neigh- 
bourhood of Suakin and to assist the contractors in the 
longer undertaking ; and this military element was strength- 
ened, not only by a force of Indian coolies, but, also, by 
the addition of thirty-nine members of Engineer Volunteer 
Corps in England who had enlisted for the campaign, all 
having had experience in trades qualifying them for rail- 
way work.^ There was thus practically a dual system, 
workable, in the opinion of Sir Andrew Clarke, " only by a 
species of compromise which was both unscientific and 
uneconomical." 

As for interruptions by the Dervishes, these took the 
form of constant attacks both on the fine under construc- 
tion and on the workers. Several actions were fought, 
and at Tofrik, near Suakin, the British sustained a serious 
loss of life. Posts were erected as the work slowly pro- 
gressed, and the bullet-proof train mentioned on page 76 
was used for patrolling the fine at night ; but in face of 

1 In his dispatch of May 30, 1885, Sir Gerald Graham said con- 
cerning these Vohuiteers : " Their services would have been of 
great value had the campaign lasted longer. As it was the Volun- 
teers worked well with their comrades of the Royal Engineers. . . . 
It may be considered the first experiment in associating the Volun- 
teer force with a combatant branch of the Regular Army on active 
service." 



MILITARY RAILWAYS. 225 

all the difficulties experienced the work was definitely 
abandoned when only twenty miles of the intended rail- 
way had been completed. The troops were recalled in 
June, 1885, the railway material not used was brought 
back to England, and a line linking up Suakin (and Port 
Sudan) with Berber, via Atbara Junction, was not finally 
opened until 1906. 

Reverting to the Nile Valley Railway, it is gratifying 
to be able to say that the success already spoken of as 
having been attained in this direction was but a prelude 
to still more important developments that were to follow. 

To prevent the carrying out of schemes which the Dervishes 
were known to be preparing for an invasion of Egypt, the 
British Government decided, early in 1896, to allow Egypt 
to resume occupation of the country along the Nile Valley 
abandoned at the time of the withdrawal in 1885, and on 
March 12, 1896, Sir Herbert (now Earl) Kitchener, who 
had succeeded to the command of the Egyptian army in 
1892, received instructions to advance to the south from 
Wady Haifa. Akasha, the point to which the Nile Valley 
Railway had been built, was occupied on March 20, the 
Dervishes retreating to Firket. 

As a means towards realising the objects of the expedi- 
tion. Sir Herbert Kitchener resolved to continue the rail- 
way along the Nile Valley to Kerma ; but this meant the 
construction of practically a new railway, since the Der- 
vishes had torn up over fifty of the eighty-seven miles 
of the original line between Wady Haifa and Akasha, 
burning the sleepers and twisting the rails, while the re- 
mainder of the line was in such a condition that it required 
relaying. The work of construction was entrusted to a 
staff of Royal Engineers operating under Lieut, (now 
Major-General Sir E. Percy C.) Girouard, and it was pushed 
forward with great energy, the line being urgently required 
for the forwarding of stores to the front, and especially 
so on account of the impediments to navigation along the 
Nile due to the cataracts. 

With the help of the railway, so far as it had then been 
restored, Sir Herbert Kitchener concentrated a force of 



226 THE RISE OF RAIL-POWER. 

9,000 men at Akasha, and early in June he made a success- 
ful advance on Firket. The Dervishes retired to Dongola ; 
but it was thought prudent, before following them up, to 
await a further extension of the railway. This was com- 
pleted as far as Kosha, ii6 miles from Wady Haifa, by 
August 4, i8g6. Three weeks later some heav}^ rains, 
lasting three days, were the cause of floods which, in a few 
hours, destroyed twelve miles of the newly-constructed 
line. The repairs were completed in about a week, but in 
the same month there w^as an outbreak of cholera which 
carried off a large number of the w'orking staff. 

Utilising the railwa}^ as far as Kosha, Sir Herbert Kit- 
chener concentrated the whole of his force at Fereig, on 
the north of the Kaibar cataract, and from thence a further 
advance was made to Dongola, which place the Dervishes 
made no attempt to defend. 

The immediate purpose of the expedition had thus been 
attained ; but, in the meantime, a further campaign had 
been resolved upon for the purpose of breaking down the 
power of the Khahfa and effecting the conquest of Khartoum. 
To this end the railway was continued another hundred 
miles, from Kosha to Kerma, which point was reached in 
May, 1897. Some 216 miles of railway had thus been com- 
pleted in about thirteen months, notwithstanding inter- 
ruptions which had led to ver}^ little progress being made 
during five months of this period, and notwithstanding, 
also, the fact that construction w'ork had to be carried on 
simultaneously with the transport of troops and stores 
so far as the line had been completed. 

Before, however, Kerma was reached. Sir Herbert Kit- 
chener instructed the staff of the Royal Engineers to make 
a survey of the Nubian Desert with a view to seeing whether 
or not it would be practicable to build an alternative line 
of railway across it from Wady Haifa direct to Abu Hamed 
(a distance of 232 miles), thus giving a direct route to Khar- 
toum. 

A survey carried out at the end of 1896 showed that the 
work was not hkely to present any unsurmountable en- 
gineering difficulties, and that the absence of water could 



MILITARY RAILWAYS. 227 

be overcome by the sinking of wells. The only doubtful 
point was whether construction could be carried through 
without interruption b}' a still active enemy. 

It was seen that the proposed desert line was likely to be 
of far greater importance, both strategically and politically, 
than a continuation of the Wady Halfa-Kerma line round 
the remainder of the Nile bend. The cutting off of this 
bend altogether would confer a great advantage on the 
Expeditionary Force. It was thus resolved to build the 
line, to run the risk of attacks by the enemy, and to push 
construction forward \vith the greatest energy. 

A start was made with the work on May 15, 1897, the 
staff which had been engaged on the Nile Valley line to 
Kerma returning to Wady Haifa in order to take the desert 
line in hand. By the end of July, 115 of the 232 miles of 
line had been completed, and Sir Herbert Kitchener, 
utilising the railway which had already been constructed 
to Kerma, then sent a force along the Nile Valley to effect 
the capture of Abu Hamed. This was accomplished on 
August 7, and the constructors of the desert line were 
thus enabled to resume their work with greater security 
and even accelerated speed. Abu Hamed was reached on 
October 31, 1897, the two extreme points of the great Nile 
bend being thus brought into communication by a direct 
line of railway. The construction of the 232 miles of track 
had been accomplished in five and a half months, not- 
withstanding the fact that the work was carried on during 
the hottest time of the year. An average length of a mile 
and a quarter of line was laid per day, while on one day in 
October a maximum of three and a quarter miles was 
attained. So well, too, had the work been done that trains 
carrying 200 tons of stores, drawn by engines weighing, 
without tender, fifty tons, were taken safely across the 
desert at a speed of twenty-five miles per hour. 

From Abu Hamed the line was at once pushed on in the 
direction of Berber, and its value from a military point of 
view was speedily to be proved. Receiving information, 
towards the end of 1897, that the Der\ishes were planning 
an attack on Berber, Sir Herbert Kitchener sent to Cairo 



228 THE RISE OF RAIL-POWER. 

for a Brigade of British troops to join with the Egyptian 
forces then at Berber in opposing this advance, and the 
Brigade arrived in January, 1898, having travelled by the 
desert railway not only to Abu Hamed, but to a point 
twenty miles farther south, which then constituted rail- 
head. Early in March the Anglo-Egyptian Army was 
concentrated between Berber and the Atbara river, and 
the battle of Atbara, fought in the following month, led 
to the complete annihilation of the forces sent by the 
Khalifa to drive the Egyptians out of Berber. 

There was known to be still an army of 50,000 men in 
Omdurman, at the command of the Khalifa ; but it was 
considered desirable, before any further advance was made 
by the Anglo-Egyptian forces, to await not only the com- 
pletion of the railway to the Atbara but the rise, also, 
of the Nile, so that the river would be available for the 
bringing up of steamers and gunboats to take part in the 
attack on Omdurman. 

Once more, therefore, Lieut. Girouard and his staff had 
to make the most strenuous efforts, and these were again 
so successful that the line was carried to the Atbara early 
in July. It was of the greatest service in facilitating the 
concentration of an Anglo-Egyptian Army, 22,000 strong, 
at Wad Hamed, and the victory of Omdurman, on Sep- 
tember 2, 1898 — when 20,000 of the enemy were killed or 
wounded— followed by the occupation of Khartoum, meant 
the overthrow of the Mahdi, the final reconquest of the 
Sudan, and the gaining of a further great triumph in the 
cause of civilisation. 

In the account of these events which he gives in volume 
three of the " History of the Corps of the Royal Engineers," 
Colonel Sir Charles M. Watson says concerning this ultimate 
outcome of a rebellion which had lasted, altogether, for a 
period of eighteen years : — 

Lord Kitchener, of course, by the skill and determination 
with which he conducted the operations to a successful termina- 
tion, deserves the principal credit for the happy conclusion 
of the campaign. But it must not be forgotten that a large 
part of the work was carried out by the officers of the Royal 



MILITARY RAILWAYS. 229 

Engineers, especially those who had charge of the construc- 
tion and maintenance of that railway without which, it is fair 
to say, the campaign could not have been conducted at all. 

The final triumph was the more gratifying because, 
although the desert railway had contributed so materially 
thereto, dependence upon it had not been without an ele- 
ment of serious risk which cannot be told better than in the 
words of Lord Cromer, in his book on " Modern Egypt " : — 

The interval which elapsed between the occupation of Abu 
Hamed and the final advance on Khartoum was a period of 
much anxiety. Sir Herbert Kitchener's force depended entirely 
on the desert railway for its supplies. I was rather haunted 
with the idea that some European adventurer, of the type 
familiar in India a century and more ago, might turn up at 
Khartoum and advise the Dervishes to make frequent raids 
across the Nile below Abu Hamed with a view to cutting the 
communication of the Anglo-Egyptian force with Wady Haifa. 
This was unquestionably the right military operation to have 
undertaken ; neither, I think, would it have been very diffi- 
cult of accomplishment. Fortunately the Dervishes . . . 
failed to take advantage of the opportunity presented to them. 
To myself it was a great relief when the period of suspense 
was over. I do not think that the somewhat perilous position 
in which Sir Herbert Kitchener's army was undoubtedly placed 
for some time was at all reaUsed by the public in general. 

Within about two months of the battle of Omdurman 
the plans were made for a further extension of the railway 
from Atbara to Khartoum, and Khartoum North was 
reached on the last day of 1899. The construction of a 
bridge over the Blue Nile subsequently allowed of trains 
running direct into, Khartoum. 

To-day this same railway has been carried a distance of 
430 miles south of Khartoum. It continues along the Blue 
Nile to Sennah, where it turns to the westward, crosses 
the White Nile at Kosti, and has its terminus at El Obeid, 
the capital of Kordofan Province. What this means is 
that an enormous expanse of territory has been opened 
up both to civilisation and to commercial development. 

Apart from the important gum trade of which El Obeid 
is the centre, the Sudan is pre-eminently a pastoral country. 
The number of its cattle, sheep and goats is estimated at 



230 THE RISE OF RAIL-POWER. 

" several millions " ; it has thousands of square miles 
available for cotton-growing, already carried on there for 
centuries, and it has wide possibilities in other directions, 
besides ; though stock-raising and cotton cultivation should 
alone suffice to ensure for the Sudan a future of great 
wealth and commercial importance. 

Beyond the districts immediately served by the extension 
there are others which are to be brought into touch with 
the railway, either direct or via the Nile, by means of a 
" roads system " linking up towns and villages with a 
number of highways extending to all the frontiers of the 
Sudan. On these roads and highways motor traction will, 
it is hoped, be gradually substituted for transport animals, 
the troubles caused by the tsetse fly and other pests 
being thus avoided. 

The scheme here in question is certainly an ambitious 
one, considering that the Sudan covers an area of 1,000,000 
square miles, and is equal in extent to the whole of British 
India ; but already the outlook is most promising. For 
twelve years before its rescue from heathenism by the 
British and Egyptian forces in 1898, Khartoum, which 
formerly had a population of 50,000, was represented by 
the mass of ruins to which it had been reduced by order of 
the Khalifa. To-day it is a large, beautiful, and well- 
built city, possessed of a Governor-General's palace, cathe- 
drals, a mosque, schools, hospitals, hotels, broad streets, 
public gardens, boulevards, imposing business premises, 
a good water supply, electric light, tramways, ferries, and 
other essentials of a capital city of the most progressive 
type. Khartoum itself has now about 30,000 inhabitants ; 
in Khartoum North, on the other side of the Blue Nile, 
there are 20,000, and in Omdurman 70,000, a total of 
120,000 for the three sister cities. Not only, also, have 
the natives, once living under the terror of their oppressors, 
settled down to peaceful pursuits, but many thousands of 
immigrants have come into the Sudan from West Africa 
(a striking testimony of the confidence felt by native 
tribes in the justice and security of British rule), while 
great expansion has taken place in the commercial interests 



MILITARY RAILWAYS. 231 

of the Sudan and more especially in the export of cattle 
and sheep. 

In the bringing about of these developments, affecting 
the peace and prosperity of so huge a country and of so 
many millions of people, the Sudan Military Railways 
have played a leading part. They rendered possible, in 
the first instance, the conquest of the Sudan, and then (save 
for the now abandoned Hue from Wady Haifa to Kerma) 
they became, with their extensions and improvements, the 
system of " Sudan Government Railways," having their 
branches to-day both from Atbara to Port Sudan and 
Suakin, on the Red Sea, and from Abu Hamed to Kareima, 
on the south side of the great Nile bend, whence there is 
free communication by water to the third cataract at 
Kerma. Concurrently, also, with the carrying out of the 
railway extension schemes, and in order to make greater 
provision for the prospective increase of traffic, 460 miles 
of the line north of Khartoum were relaid with 75-lb. rails, 
in place of the 50-lb. rails originally used, and the whole 
of the track from Khartoum to El Obeid was also laid with 
the heavier rails. 

So we are enabled to regard military railways from still 
another point of view — that, namely, in which they may 
develop into lines of permanent communication and pro- 
mote the blessings of peace and security no less than afford 
unquestionable advantages in the prosecution of war. 
Other examples of a similar kind might be offered from the 
history of British rule in Africa ; but the record of what 
has been accomplished in the Sudan may suffice to establish 
the further claim here presented as to the varied purposes 
that military railways may serve. 



CHAPTER XVI 

Railways in the Boer \¥ar 

The South African campaign of 1899-1902 afforded to 
Great Britain and to British Imperial interests their greatest, 
most instructive, and, also, their most anxious experiences, 
down to that time, not only of the services railways can 
render in the conduct of war, but of the difficulties and 
complications which may result from their employment, 
and especially from dependence on them for the purposes 
of military transport ; though, in the result, the services 
so rendered were a material factor in the success by which 
the military operations carried out by the British forces 
were crowned. 

When the Boers declared war in October, 1899, the vari- 
ous railway systems, working in direct communication 
with one another, in South Africa, had a total length of 
4,268 miles, namely, British South Africa, 3,267 ; the 
Transvaal, 918 ; the Orange Free State, 388 ; and in Portu- 
guese territory, 55. These railways consisted of single-track, 
narrow-gauge lines (3 feet 6 inches), never designed for 
such heavy traffic as the transport of an army and all its 
impedimenta would involve ; but it was obvious from the 
first that they must needs play a part of paramount impor- 
tance in the campaign. Independentl}/ of all that was 
involved in the conveyance of troops, munitions, supplies, 
etc., from England to the Cape, there was the consideration 
that from Cape Town, the principal base of our forces, 
to Pretoria, their eventual objective, the distance was 
1,040 miles. From Port Elizabeth it was 740 miles, and 
from Durban 511 miles. Journeys such as these could be 
made only by rail, and there was seen to be an imperative 

232 



RAILWAYS IN THE BOER WAR. 233 

need, not only for the railways themselves, but for an 
organisation which would, among other things, superintend 
military rail-transport in order to ensure efficiency in the 
movement of troops, stores, etc., and, also, provide for the 
speedy repair or rebuilding of damaged lines as well as for 
the operation of lines taken possession of in the captured 
territory. 

In view of the uncertainty of events in the Transvaal, 
and as a precautionary measure, the 8th (Railway) Com- 
pany, Royal Engineers, was sent out to the Cape in July, 
1899 ; and when, subsequently, the dispatch of an Army 
Corps was being arranged by the British Government, it was 
decided to create a Department of Military Railways, of 
which Major Girouard, R.E. (now Major-General Sir E. 
Percy C. Girouard, K.C.M.G.), who had rendered such 
valuable services in connection with military railways in 
the Sudan, and was then President of the Egyptian Rail- 
way Administration, was put in charge as " Director of 
Railways for the South African Field Force." A number 
of other Royal Engineer officers who had had experience 
of railway work in India and other parts of the British 
Empire were selected to serve as Assistant Directors or 
staff officers in various capacities, and the loth (Railway) 
Company, Royal Engineers, with the 6th, 20th, 31st and 
42nd Fortress Companies, were sent to join the 8th (Rail- 
way) Company in the carr3dng out of railway work. 

Organisation and Control 

The creation of this Department of Military Railways 
for South Africa carried still further the development of 
those questions of organisation and control which, as we 
have seen, had already raised important issues in the United 
States, in Germany, and in France. 

According to the official " History of the War in South 
Africa, 1899-1902," the Director and his staff were (i) to 
be the intermediaries between the Army and the technical 
working administration of the railway ; (2) to see that the 
ordinary working of the railway was carried on in such a 
manner as to ensure the greatest military efficiency ; and 



234 THE RISE OF RAIL-POWER. 

(3) to satisfy the demands of the Army on the railway 
without disorganising the working of the railway system 
as a whole. 

" In war," the official " History " further declares, 
" these services are essential, for the officers of a civil 
railway administration cannot discriminate between the 
demands of the various branches and departments of the 
Army, or class them in the order of urgency." This is 
perfectly true of the civil railway administration, and it 
is only what could be expected of railwaymen who, while 
competent to discharge their ordinary railway duties, 
might not be well versed in military matters, and ought 
not to be left with the responsibility of deciding between 
the possibly conflicting orders of different mihtary com- 
manders. 

All the same, there was another side to the question ; 
and this is dealt with by Sir Percy Girouard in his " History 
of the Railways during the War in South Africa," wherein 
he says, in regard to rail transport conditions in time of 
war : — 

Military commanders who have not previously studied the 
working of a railway attempt to seize and work the portion 
of line nearest to them, regardless of the remainder of the sj'stem. 
They often look upon trucks as another form of commissariat 
wagon which may be kept loaded for an indefinite period. They 
expect trains to stop and off-load, or load, on the main line. 
They like to have a number of trains ready, either loaded or 
unloaded, in case they should be required. They are apt to 
give orders for large entrainments and detrainments to be 
carried out at any part of the line, regardless of the railway 
facilities at that point, although perhaps a suitable place is 
within reasonable distance. Frequentty they have been known 
to countermand their orders for entrainments, heedless of the 
fact that, once arrangements have been made to concentrate 
rolling stock on a certain place, it takes time to alter these 
arrangements, and is sure to cause confusion. ]\Iany of them 
expect railway accommodation for troops to be on a liberal 
scale, and consider that there is no necessity, when close to a 
railway, to make any effort to cut down baggage and stores. . . . 

Commandants of posts on the line, which are very often 
l^laced at railway stations, are inclined to think that, because 
tliey are called " station commandants," it means that they 



RAILWAYS IN THE BOER WAR. 2j5 

are in charge of the railway station, and can give orders to 
railway officials as to traffic and other matters. . . . 

Civil railway officials have been heard to say that attacks 
by the enemy are not nearly so disturbing to traffic as the 
arrival of a friendly General with his force. 

It was under these circumstances that Sir Percy Girouard 
saw from the first the necessity for having in South Africa, 
for the duration of the war, a staff of officers whose business 
it would be, as he himself defines their duties, (a) to keep 
the military commanders fully informed of the capacity 
and possibilities of the railway, and to convey their orders 
and requests to the civil railway staff ; and (6) to protect 
the civil railway administration from interference by mili- 
tary commanders and commandants of posts ; in fact, to 
act as intermediaries between the army and the civil rail- 
way officials. 

In arriving at this conclusion Sir Percy was especially 
impressed by the rail transport experiences of France in her 
war with Prussia in 1870-1 ; and in his Report he gives a 
digest of Jacqmin's facts and recommendations by way of 
further justifying the step that he himself took. He thought 
it absolutely necessary that the staff of the Director 
of Railways should be paramount on the railway, and 
that no officer should be able to give any orders to railway 
staff officers or other railway officials unless fighting was 
actually proceeding at that spot. " This," he adds, " was 
the system adopted with great success by the Germans, 
the want of which caused such chaos on the French railwa3^s, 
and the correctness of which has been entirely established 
by the experience of this war. It is not too much to say 
that, unless it had been adopted in South Africa, the chaos 
would have been past belief." 

The Military Railway Controlling-Staff created, in accor- 
dance with these principles and policy, to co-operate with the 
technical working staff under the Director of Railways, 
was constituted as follows : — 

I. An Assistant-Director of Railways for Cape Colony, 
who was on the staff both of the Director of Railways and 
on that of the General Officer Commanding Lines of Com- 



236 THE RISE OF RAIL-POWER. 

munication, Cape Colony. His business it was to co-operate 
with the General Traffic Manager of the Cape Government 
Railway, in whose office he was given accommodation. In 
this dual capacity it was his duty to inform both the General 
Officer Commanding and the Director as to the traffic 
capacities of the railways ; to take the orders of the G.O.C. 
while advising him as to the best method of carrying them 
out ; to inform the railway officials what was required, and. 
Sir Percy adds, in giving these details, " to protect them 
from interference by unauthorised military officers." It 
was the duty, also, of the Assistant-Director to see that 
proper regulations were issued to the Army for {a) the 
efficient conduct of entrainments and detrainments ; {b) 
the forwarding of stores, and (c) the keeping of financial 
accounts in respect to the use made of the lines for military 
purposes. As between the General Officer Commanding 
and the Chief Traffic Manager, the Assistant-Director of 
Railways was the sole channel of communication. 

II. Four Deputy- Assistant-Directors, undertaking similar 
duties over particular sections of the railway system. 

III. Raihvay Staff Officers, located at leading stations to 
superintend all important movements, and constituting 
the only means of communication between the Army and 
the stationmasters. The latter were to take orders in 
respect to military requirements from no one else, and were, 
in turn, to be protected by the railway staff officers from 
interference with by other officers having no authority to 
give them direct orders. 

The defective step in the scheme, as originally planned, 
was in respect to the railway staff officers, who, of all those 
constituting the ]\Iilitary Railway Controlling Staff, were, 
under Army Regulations, on the staff of officers command- 
ing lines of communication and thus not controlled by the 
Director of Railways. The officers in question, though 
charged with the duty of looking after entrainments, de- 
trainments, etc., were in no way to interfere with the railway 
staff in the shunting or marshalling of trains or in regard to 
the traffic arrangements generally. For this reason the 
framers of the Army Regulations had assumed that there 



RAILWAYS IN THE BOER WAR. 237 

was no need for the railway staff officers to have any know- 
ledge of railway operation, or to be under the control of 
others who did possess such knowledge. 

After the annexation of the Orange Free State railways, 
the Chief of the Staff agreed that the railway staff officers 
in that State should be under the orders of the Director 
of Railways through his Deputy-Assistant-Directors ; and 
a like course was adopted shortly afterwards in respect 
to the railway staff officers in Cape Colony. In this way 
an undivided chain of responsibility was secured, affording 
a much greater guarantee of efficiency alike in control and 
in actual operation. 

Concerning the Deputy-Assistant-Directors, Sir Percy 
Girouard says they were found to be of great benefit to the 
railway officials, who appreciated their work and laboured 
in hearty co-operation with them ; though they experienced 
difficulty in establishing their position with the Generals 
and Staff officers, to whom the arrangement was an entire 
novelty, and one they did not at first understand. 

In the first instance the principle of military control 
applied specially to the lines in Cape Colony, those in Natal 
being still operated by the Natal Government Railway 
Department, with certain assistance in the matter of re- 
pairs ; though after eighteen months of war, the military 
transport system first established in Cape Colony became 
uniform throughout British South Africa. 

Transport Conditions 

The need for the elaborate organisation thus brought 
into existence was all the greater because of the difficulties 
by which those responsible for the conduct of military 
transport were faced. 

In November, 1899, considerable portions of the lines 
both in Cape Colony and in Natal were in the possession of 
the Boers, so that, beyond a certain distance, the British 
would have to fight for every mile of railway before they 
could make use of it. After, also, regaining possession of 
the lines on British territory controlled by the Boers, they 
would require first to capture and then to operate those on 



238 THE RISE OF RATE-POWER. 

the enemy's territory ; and in each case they would liavo 
to be prepared to repair the damage the enemy would be 
certain to do to the hnes in order to prevent their use by 
the advancing forces. Meanwhile the traffic must be kept 
open, as far as possible, for the conveyance of troops and 
stores to the theatre of war and for the carrying out of such 
strategic movements as the requirements of the military 
situation might render necessary, adequate protection of 
the lines being meanwhile assured. There were, in fact, 
occasions when the whole issue of the campaign seemed to 
turn upon the question as to whether or not the British 
could either secure possession of the railways or, alterna- 
tively, repair them as fast, more or less, as the enemy could 
demolish them. 

Although, again, so elaborate a system of organisation had 
been arranged, there was much that required to be done to 
adapt it to the conditions of African warfare. Initial mis- 
takes had to be remedied ; old evils reappeared in new 
forms ; regulations had to be made or modified according 
to experiences gained ; and, while there was at no time any 
general failure of transport, there certainly were partial 
failures. Not only was there an inadequate supply of 
trucks, partly because of the considerable number in the 
Boer States at the time of the declaration of war and partly 
because of the number locked up in Kimberley and Mafe- 
king, but trucks were kept loaded when they should have 
been promptly unloaded and released for service elsewhere ; 
lines were seriously blocked at critical moments by these 
loaded trucks, while chaos in certain large troop movements 
was only avoided owing to the control of Cape Town facili- 
ties by the Director's staff and to the fact that the Deputy- 
Assistant-Directors of Railwa5^s were enabled to have special 
officers at all important points. 

How THE System Worked 

As regards the operation of the railways during the war 
Sir Percy Girouard says : — 

Although not, perhaps, so much a matter of railway as of 
general staff administration, a word should be said as to the 



RAILWAYS IN THE BOER WAR. 239 

methods whereby the very limited resources of the single Hne 
of railway communication were allotted to ensure an equal 
attention to the requirements of the Army as a whole. 

The allocation of railway facilities was reserved strictly to 
the Chief of Staff, without whose order, in each case, nothing 
could pass by rail towards the front. The number of trains, 
or, more accurately, the number of trucks which could be hauled 
daily in the " up " direction, being communicated by the rail- 
way authorities to Lord Kitchener, he placed a number, liable 
to vary from day to day, at the disposal of the supply and 
remount departments, either generally for the maintenance 
of their dep6ts or for specific traffic. 

The number reserved for hospital, ordnance, engineer and 
special stores was even more closely calculated, and the demands 
of these departments had to be submitted for approval in the 
utmost detail. All authorisations were passed to the railway 
representatives at Headquarters, whose business it was to notify 
when the total of such orders outstanding for dispatch from 
the advanced base was exceeding the accommodation which 
could be provided within a reasonable time under the scheme 
of proportion in force for the time being. In such case the 
issue of permits fell temporarily into abeyance, or the outstand- 
ing list was revised to accord with the necessities of the moment. 
No truck could be loaded and no troops dispatched by rail 
without such authority, with the single exception of details 
and small parties, who were invariably made to travel upon the 
loaded supply trucks. Proposed troop movements by rail 
requiring separate accommodation had to be carefully con- 
sidered in view of the supply traffic they would displace, and, 
when time permitted, were generally made by road. It was 
this system alone which co-ordinated the railway requirements 
of the various departments and did so much to falsify previ- 
ously accepted figures as to the limits of the fighting force 
which could be maintained by a single Hne of railway. 

The Imperial Military Railways 
Following the questions which arose as to the working of 
railways on British territory within the sphere of the military 
operations came those concerning the railways taken from 
the enemy in the Boer States, and converted into a system 
of Imperial Military Railways for which the Department 
also became responsible. 

The occupation of Bloemfontein led to that place becom- 
ing the base of supplies for an army of 35,000 men, likely to 
increase to 100,000, while eventually the Imperial Military 



240 THE RISE OF RAIL-POWER. 

Railways included 1,130 miles of line. Efficient operation 
thus became a matter of grave importance, and the task 
to be accomplished was one of considerable magnitude, 
especially considering that a staff for the working of the 
system had to be created. In the traffic and locomotive 
departments alone no fewer than 3,000 white workers were 
needed. 

Many of the employes of the Netherlands Railway Company 
were kept on, even at the risk of their showing hostility 
to the British ; but the number who thus made themselves 
available was quite inadequate, even if they could all 
have been trusted. The Cape Government Railways were 
drawn on to the fullest possible extent for workers ; the 
Railway and the Fortress Companies of the Royal Engineers 
in South Africa were employed in opera.ting the lines ; rail- 
waymen in the Special Railway Reserve in England were 
sent for, and, of the remaining posts, from 800 to 1,000 were 
filled — the approval of the Commander-in-Chief being first 
obtained — by inviting soldiers and reservists serving in the 
Army who had had experience of railway work in civil 
life to join the staff of the Imperial Military Railways, pay 
at Royal Engineer rates being guaranteed to them. Posi- 
tions of the least importance were filled by men who had 
had no previous railway experience at all. Railway staff 
officers were also obtained mainly from among the troops ; 
though many even of these, being unfamiliar with the details 
of railway operation, had to be taught their special duties 
before they could attempt to discharge them. 

On September 30, 1900, the staff employed on the Im- 
perial Military Railways comprised close on 18,000 officers 
and men. From the time these railways were brought 
under the control of the British forces to August 31, 1900, 
they carried 177,000 passengers, 86,000 animals, and 520,000 
tons of goods. 

As the moral to be drawn from his experiences in 
having to create, under circumstances of exceptional diffi- 
culty, a staff for the operation of railways 1 aptured from the 
enemy, Sir Percy Girouard says : — 

The South African campaign has fully shown the necessity 



RAILWAYS IN THE BOER WAR. 241 

of having a number of traffic employes registered in peace 
time, who are paid a small retaining fee which will render them 
liable to be called out in case of war at home or abroad. The 
want of this system forced the Director of Railways in South 
Africa to employ a large number of men who had been employed 
by the enemy, and who could not be rehed on, and also to with- 
draw from the fighting-line a large number of soldiers with rail- 
way experience prior to enlistment ; and he was compelled to 
work the railways with this heterogeneous mass of individuals 
whose qualifications were unknown. The amount of corre- 
spondence entailed over conditions of service, pay, transfer, 
etc., of all these men, coming from different parts of South 
Africa and from different units, was tremendous. The registra- 
tion system would also arrange for the men on the railways 
being subject to Military Law, the necessity for which has been 
clearly proved. 



Repair of Railways 

Whilst all these arrangements in regard to operation and 
transport were thus being perfected, the need had arisen 
for an equally complete organisation in another direction, 
that, namely, of providing for the repair or restoration of 
railway lines damaged or destroyed by the enemy. 

Since the American Civil War the art of railway demoli- 
tion had made considerable advance by reason of the use 
for this purpose of dynamite — an agency which was now 
to be employed very freely by the Boers. With dynamite 
they easily blew up the bridges, or material portions thereof ; 
they destroyed the track for considerable distances by the 
simple process of exploding dynamite cartridges under 
alternate rail-joints ; they wrecked culverts, pumps and 
water tanks, and they effectively damaged locomotives 
which they had not time or opportunity to remove. Then, 
among other things, they derailed engines and trucks by 
means of mines ; they caused obstructions by throwing 
down into the railway cuttings boulders of up to two or 
three tons in weight ; they cut telegraph lines ; they re- 
moved or smashed up instruments and batteries at railway 
stations ; they wrecked the stations ; they burned many 
railway trucks, or otherwise rendered them useless ; they 
set fire to stacks of fuel, and, when dynamite cartridges 



242 THE RISE OF RATE-POWER. 

were not available, they deprived the locomotives of their 
vital parts and tore up considerable lengths of rails. 

By December, 1899, it had become evident that the 
Railway Companies and the Fortress Companies of the 
Royal Engineers, sent out to the Cape and brought up to 
their fullest strength, would be unequal to the requirements 
of the prospective situation. The Railway Corps thus 
formed was, accordingly, augmented by a Railway Pioneer 
Regiment, composed of miners, artisans and labourers who 
had been employed at Cape Town or Johannesburg, volun- 
teers from the ranks of the Army (preference being given 
to those already possessed of experience in railway work), 
and emplo3''es of the Orange Free State Railway. Some 
Field Railway Sections, created to form the nucleus of a 
staff to take over the working of railways in the enemy's 
country became construction parties, doing repairs only, 
and having no control of traffic except at railhead. In 
addition to all these, a large number of natives were engaged 
through Native Labour Depots opened at De Aar, Bloem- 
fontein and Johannesburg, the number so employed at any 
one time attaining a maximum of about 20,000. 

It was in the Orange Free State and the Transvaal that 
the Boers displayed their greatest activity in the way of 
railway destruction. At Norval's Pont and Bethulie they 
broke down the bridges crossing the Orange River, which 
divided Cape Colony from the Orange Free State. Before 
leaving Bloemfontein (occupied by the British March 13, 
1900), they destroyed all the bridges and all the culverts on 
the railway in their rear ; they blew up miles of the per- 
manent way, and they left the railway itself an almost 
complete wreck. North of Bloemfontein they pursued 
similar tactics along 180 miles of track, on which they 
wrecked more or less completely no fewer than fifty bridges, 
including the one over the Vaal River — a high structure with 
seven spans each of 130 feet. No sooner, too, had the line 
been reopened as far as Johannesburg than Commandant 
De Wet made a raid on it and undid all that the repairing 
parties had done over a length of thirty miles. Speedily 
following the re-establishing of rail communication with 



RAILWAYS IN THE BOER WAR. 243 

Pretoria, the Boers began a fresh series of guerilla attacks 
on the lines both in the Transvaal and in the Orange Free 
State ; and they continued these attacks for months — 
until, in fact, their power for doing further mischief had 
been finally checked. 

In carrjdng out repairs and reconstruction work of such 
vital importance to the advance and security of the British 
forces, the policy adopted by the Director of Railways was 
that of employing Royal Engineers to do rapid temporary 
repairs — with a view to having a line of some sort made 
available with the least possible delay — and leaving per- 
manent or even semi-permanent repairs to the Railway 
Pioneer Regiment. At convenient sidings on the railways 
throughout the theatre of war construction trams were 
stationed in charge of permanent-way inspectors and sec- 
tions of Royal Engineers who had at their disposal, at each 
of such sidings, a gang of men — whites and natives — varying 
in number from 300 to 1,000, according to circumstances. 
Infantry working-parties were also obtained wherever 
possible. 

Gangers began a patrol of the lines at dawn. Informa- 
tion as to any break or alarm was communicated to the 
nearest military post and telegraphed to the Deputy-Super- 
intendent of Works, M^ho thereupon ordered the dispatch 
of a construction train to the scene of any reported or pros- 
pective break without waiting for confirmation of the news 
received or of the suspicions aroused. 

This well-organised system operated to great advantage. 
At 2.30 a.m. on January i, 1901, for instance, information 
reached the Deputy-Superintendent of Works at Bloem- 
fontein that a break of the line had occurred at Wolvehoek, 
sixty-three miles distant. The construction train was 
instantly dispatched, and the repairs were completed by 
8 a.m. Rail comrrtunication with Johannesburg, notwith- 
standing the great amount of destruction done by the Boers, 
was restored within eleven days of the arrival of Lord 
Roberts at that place. It was restored to Pretoria within 
sixteen days of the occupation thereof by our troops. On 
the western side, where the enemy had been no less active 



244 THE RISE OF RAIL-POWER. 

than in the Orange Free State, rail communication was 
reopened within thirteen days of the rehef of Mafeking. 

In the official report on Field Transport in the South 
African War, it is said in regard to the Railways Depart- 
ment : — 

All temporary repairs in the Cape Colony, Transvaal, and 
Orange River Colony were carried out, with a few exceptions, 
by the militar}' railway staff. Up to 31 October, 1900, these 
temporary repairs included the restoration of seventy-five 
bridges, ninety-four culverts, and 37 miles of line. A detail of 
the general advance from Bloemfontein to Johannesburg, a 
distance of 265 miles, will give some idea of the expedition with 
which repairs were affected. The period during which the 
advance was being made was from 3 May to 11 June, 1900, in 
which space of time the following temporary repairs were exe- 
cuted : Twenty-seven bridges, forty-one culverts, 10 miles of 
line, including seven deviations, varying in length from 200 
yards to 2 miles. 

From 6 June to 15 November, 1900, the Imperial Military 
Railways were more or less seriously damaged by the enemy 
on 115 occasions, but all such damages were promptly repaired, 
and did not materially affect the working of the railways, except 
that the running of trains after dark had to be suspended. Dur- 
ing the same period fully 60 per cent, of damaged bridges and 
culverts were permanently or semi-permanently repaired. 

Of bridges, over 200, with spans ranging from nine feet 
to 130 feet, were destroyed wholly or in part during the 
progress of the war ; but even here the speedy restoration 
of traffic did not, as a rule, present any very grave difficulty. 
The course generally adopted, as one suited to South African 
conditions, was, not to start at once on the repair of the 
damaged bridge, but, in order to meet the exigencies of the 
moment, to construct a diversion or deviation line along- 
side, with small low-level bridges on piers, built of sleepers 
and rails. 1 These deviation lines offered great disadvan- 
tages by reason of their sharp curves, their steep approaches 
and their liability to be washed away in wet weather. The 
building even of temporary bridges across deep rivers having 

1 In Vol. II of the "Detailed History of the Railways in the 
South African War " (Chatham : Royal Itngineers Institute, 1904), 
there is a series of 45 full-page photographs of damaged bridges and 
of the low-level deviations constructed to take their place. 



RAILWAYS IN THE BOER WAR. 245 

a considerable volume of water also caused inevitable delays. 
But the lines in question served their purpose until the 
reconstruction of the damaged bridges — taken in hand as 
speedily as possible — could be effected. Anticipating the 
needs for this more permanent work, the Director of Rail- 
ways had arranged before leaving England for a supply of 
girders, similar to those in use in South Africa, to be sent 
out, together with sufficient timber, of useful dimensions, 
to rebuild the whole of the raihvay bridges in the Orange 
Free State, should it become necessary so to do — as, in 
point of fact, it did. Of new rails he had available, at one 
time, a total length of 300 miles. 

By October, 1900, the makeshift repairs completed on all 
the lines taken from the enemy were being gradually con- 
verted into permanent or semi-permanent reconstruction 
by the Works Department of the Imperial Military Rail- 
ways ; but the continuous guerilla raids of the enemy still 
made it impossible to run trains by night. These conditions 
led to a resort to the system of blockhouses which, first 
constructed for the defence of railway bridges in Natal 
during the advance for the relief of Ladysmith, and used 
extensively when Lord Roberts marched from Bloem- 
f ontein into the Transvaal, leaving a long track of railway 
lines behind him, were subsequently so far extended 
that the whole of the railway lines in the Transvaal and the 
Orange River Colony were provided with them.^ So well 
did they answer the purpose that by April, 1901, the worst 
of the trouble involved in maintaining railway communi- 
cations was over, although another year was to elapse before 
peace was restored. 

Military Traffic 

An especially remarkable achievement with which, under 
the various conditions here narrated, the Department of 
Military Railways is to be credited was in connection with 
the concentration of the force with which Lord Roberts 

^ For a description of these blockhouses, see vol. iii, pp. 125-6, 
of the " History of the Corps of the Royal Engireers," by Col. Sir 
Chas. M. Watson. Royal Engineers Institute, Chatham, 1915. 



246 THE RISE OF RAIL-POWER. 

marched from the Modder River to Bloemfontein, The 
movement began on January 21, 1900, by which time the 
repairs of the hnes had been completed, and within three 
weeks no fewer than 20,000 men, 13,590 horses and over 
24,000 tons of stores had been conveyed over a single line 
of railway. 

Taking the sum total of the military traffic carried on the 
Cape Government and the Natal Government Railways 
respectively during the war period, we get the following 
substantial figures : — 

Cape Government Railways, from October i, 1899, to 
March 31, 1901 : — Officers, men, and other passengers, 
1,247,000 ; supplies, etc., 1,058,000 tons ; horses and other 
live stock, 540,321, besides many wagons and guns. 

Natal Government Railways : — Officers, men, prisoners 
of war, sick and wounded, women and children (including 
Boer refugees), natives and Indians, 522,186 ; baggage and 
stores, supplies, hay, forage, etc., 861,000 tons ; ammuni- 
tion, 9,784 boxes ; guns, 454 ; vehicles, 6,430 ; pontoons, 
48 ; traction engines, 84 ; horses and other live stock, 
399,000. 

Miscellaneous Services 

The figures here given as to the military traffic carried 
do not represent the full extent of the work that was done 
by the South African railways during the course of the war. 
One must also take into account the wide variety of sub- 
sidiary services rendered, and these are the more deserving 
of attention because they show, more than had, perhaps, 
been the case in any previous war, that railways can afford 
valuable aid in the conduct of a campaign apart from the 
achievement of their fundamental purpose in the transport 
of men and materiel. 

If we look at the list of services rendered by the Natal 
Government Railways we find that the Railway Depart- 
ment — in addition to the transport work represented by the 
above figures — adapted six armoured trains ; prepared 
special carriages for the 6 in. and 47 guns ; adapted and 
equipped three hospital trains, withdrawing for this purpose 



RAILWAYS IN THE BOER WAR. 247 

fully a quarter of the most serviceable carriage stock from 
the ordinary traffic ; wired and lamped the hospitals at four 
different centres, supplying them, also, with electric cur- 
rent ; mounted the electric search-light apparatus with 
engine, dynamo, etc. ; supplied 30,000 troops at Colenso 
with water ; found the plant and fuel at Ladysmith for 
condensing water from the Klip River for 20,000 persons 
during the four months' siege ; allotted and arranged a 
portion of the goods-shed as the Base Medical Stores at 
Durban, and fitted up vans to follow the army with reserve 
medical supplies. 

The Department's Engineering Staff speedily restored, 
or temporarily provided — either on the Natal system or 
along 100 miles of the Transvaal railways, when these 
passed under control of the British forces — 72 bridges and 
culverts, varying in length from 10 to 600 feet ; 32 different 
portions of permanent way ; and many water tanks, etc. 
The Engineering Staff also effected in seven days a clear- 
ance through the Lang's Nek Tunnel, blown in by the 
Boers, and constructed several miles of new lines, sidings 
and deviations. 

The Natal Railway Pioneer Staff advanced with General 
Buller and worked the Netherlands Railway as far as 
Greylingstad, 100 miles beyond Charlestown (the point 
of traffic exchange with the Transvaal system), until the 
line was taken over by the Imperial authorities on August 
15, 1900. 

" For nearly six months, up to the relief of Ladysmith," 
says Mr. C. W. Francis Harrison, from whose official work 
on " Natal " ^ these details are mainly taken, " the Natal 
lines were robbed of about 40 per cent, of their total mileage 
and a quantity of their stock. On the clearance of the 
enemy from Natal and the south-eastern portion of the 
Transvaal, large supply depots were formed at Newcastle, 
Volksrust, Standerton and intermediate points ; and on 
the joining of the two main portions of the British army at 

"Natal: An Illustrated Official Railway Guide and Hand 
book." Compiled and edited by C. W. Francis Harrison. Pub- 
lished by Authority. London, 1903. 



248 THE RISE OF RAIL-POWER. 

Heidelberg, the greater portion of the stores for the forces 
was conveyed via Natal ; and this continued unceasingly 
until the termination of hostilities." 

Armoured Trains 

It was, again, in the South African war that armoured 
trains underwent their greatest development — down to 
that time — for the purposes alike of line protection and of 
attack on the enemy, although their real usefulness and the 
conditions necessary to their efficient operation were not 
established until after certain early experiences which had 
tended to throw doubts upon their efficiency, and had even 
led to their being regarded as of little or no account for the 
purposes of war. 

In view of prospective requirements, five armoured 
trains had been constructed in advance in the locomotive 
shops at Cape Town and another at Natal. Others were 
put together shortly afterwards ; but one of the Cape trains 
was wrecked by the Boers the first night of the war, and 
two of the Natal trains were locked up in Ladysmith. The 
remainder were employed on scouting expeditions during 
the earlier phases of the war. Their use not being then 
rightly understood, they were often sent considerable dis- 
tances without any support, with the result that one of 
the Natal trains was destroyed by the Boers at Chieveley, 
on November 15, 1899, and the Cape trains had several 
narrow escapes of sharing the same fate. 

On the occupation of Bloemfontein by the British, more 
armoured trains were constructed at the railway workshops 
there, and eventually the number available was increased 
to a fleet of twenty. Under an improved system of control 
and operation, and converted, by the addition of guns, into 
what were virtually batteries on wheels, the trains came 
to be regarded as offering possibilities of much practical 
usefulness. 

In a lecture on " Railways in War," delivered by him at 
the Royal Engineers' Institute, Chatham, and reported in 
the " Royal Engineers Journal " for July, 1905, Sir Percy 
Girouard, said : — 



RAILWAYS IN THE BOER WAR. 249 

The South African War at one time threatened to produce 
a siege, that of Pretoria, where fairly modern forts with modern 
armaments were known to exist. At the same time the enemy 
at Modder River were giving us some trouble with their heavy 
artillery. The Navy came to our rescue with heavy B.L. guns 
mounted on wheels. With a view to trying the use of the rail- 
way itself, it was pointed out that the railway department had 
both the shops and the goodwill to mount heavy guns, if re- 
quired. This offer was approved, and in a few weeks the two 
heaviest siege guns ever seen in the field were made ready. 
The carriages, designed by the combined wit of the machinery 
officers and the Chief Locomotive Superintendent of the Cape 
Government Railway, were most creditable achievements, old 
engine and tender frames being used as a foundation. The 
guns mounted were a 6-inch B.L., and no less a monster than 
a 9*2 inch B.L. The 6-inch went into action at Modder River. 
It was deemed unsafe to fix it at an angle of more than sixteen 
degrees to either side of the centre line of the railway ; but by 
placing it on a so-called firing curve a wider field of fire was 
secured. The gun behaved exceedingly well in every way ; 
and later on it was fired at right angles to the railway, without 
any damage either to itself or to the line. 

The 9-2-inch gun gave good results in its trials, but, 
although it was run up to Pretoria on its truck, there was 
no opportunity of firing it on the enemy. 

Sir Percy says in his " History " that — 

The experiments demonstrated the possibiHty of big guns 
being used in siege operations without any difficulty, the only 
limit to the size of the gun being the weight which the railway 
bridges wiU stand. 

Apart from the powers of usefulness offered by these 
batteries on wheels, there arose, in the early days of the war, 
the further question whether the usefulness of armoured 
trains proper might not be marred as the result of a defective 
system of control. 

At the outset the trains were placed entirely under the 
orders of officers commanding sections of the line ; but the 
arrangement was found unsatisfactory as the trains were 
constantly being rushed out regardless of Traffic Depart- 
ment regulations, and sometimes without even a " line 
clear " message. Having, also, the trains at their disposal, 
as they considered, officers commanding sections of the 



250 THE RISE OF RAIL-POWER. 

line often made use of them to inspect posts between stations, 
other traffic being stopped while the inspections were being 
made. On one occasion, when a large mob of cattle was 
being sent to Pretoria and there were no mounted troops 
available to convoy them, the expedient was resorted to 
of employing an armoured train for the purpose. The train 
had to adapt its speed to the rate of progress of the cattle 
alongside, and such was the interference with other traffic 
that the entire length of railway on the Delagoa main line 
was blocked until the cattle had reached their destination. 
In fact, instead of assisting traffic by preventing the enemy 
from interrupting it, the armoured trains caused. Sir Percy 
Girouard declares, " more interruptions than the enemy 
themselves." 

With a view both to meet these particular difficulties 
and to ensure a better use of the trains, there was appointed 
an Assistant-Director of Armoured Trains who was placed 
on the staff both of the Commander-in-Chief and of the 
Director of Railways and had under his control all the 
armoured trains in South Africa. Captain H. C. Nanton, 
R.E., the officer so appointed, had practical acquaintance 
alike with railway requirements and regulations and with 
armoured trains. In touch with Headquarters, and kept 
informed as to which portions of the line were most threat- 
ened by the enemy, it became his duty to order where the 
trains should be sent. Once despatched to a particular 
section of the line, an armoured train was to be under the 
control of the General or other officer commanding that 
section. The Assistant-Director had power to remove it, 
however, if he thought it was more urgently required else- 
where. It was his duty, also, to work in harmony with the 
officers in question ; but they, in turn, were not to use a) 
a private conveyance the train sent to them, and they were 
not to alter its garrison or equipment, or to give orders to 
the officer in charge which were contrary to the spirit of 
the general instructions. The Assistant-Director was him- 
self required to instruct officers in command of the trains 
as to the proper tactics to adopt, the best methods of patrol- 
ling, etc., and to see that they " worked in harmony with 



RAILWAYS IN THE BOER WAR. 251 

the railway officials, and were an assistance and not a 
hindrance to traffic." 

These improved conditions led to a recognised system 
for the employment of armoured trains, the purposes and 
duties of which were eventually defined as follows ^ : — 

1. In conjunction with columns in the field, to intercept 
the enemy whom the columns were driving on to the line. 

2. To act on the flank of a column or line of columns, the 
train being well advanced so as to prevent the enemy 
breaking to that flank. 

3. To reinforce stations and camps on the railway which 
were threatened by the enemy. 

4. To escort ordinary traffic trains. 

5. To reconnoitre. 

6. To patrol by day and night. 

7. To protect traffic routes generally. 

The garrison of an armoured train consisted of an In- 
fantry escort and Royal Artillery and Royal Engineer 
detachments. The R.E. detachment consisted of one N.C.O. 
and six sappers skilled in railway repairing work and in 
re-setting derailed engines and trucks ; two telegraph 
linesmen ; one telegraph clerk ; two engine-drivers and 
two firemen. When the train was engaged, all counted as 
effective rifles with the exception of the driver and fire- 
men on the footplate, and even they carried rifles in their 
engine cab for use against an enemy endeavouring to gain 
possession of the engine. 

Responsibility for the efficiency of the garrisons was 
placed upon the Assistant-Director of Armoured Trains. 
Whenever, also, a concentration of the trains had been 
decided upon, he was to attach himself to one of them, and 
take charge of the concerted action of the whole. 

In reference to the operation of the trains Captain M. 
H. Grant writes^ : — 

1 "History of the War in South Africa, 1899-1902. Compiled 
by Direction of His Majesty's Government." Vol. IV, Appendix 
10: "Notes on the Military Railway System in South Africa." 
London, igio. 
- Official "History," Vol. IV, Appendix 10. 



252 THE RISE OF RAIL-POWER. 

It was important that the officer commanding the train 
should be a man of judgment and strong nerve. He was often 
called upon to act on his own responsibility. His strong arma- 
ment and defences enabled him to attack superior forces. Yet 
his vulnerable points were many. He had ever to be alert 
that the enemy did not cut the Hne behind him. In addition 
to his visible foes and the constant risks of traffic in war time, 
he had to contend with skilfully-used automatic and observa- 
tion mines, and had to keep his head even amid the roar which 
followed the passage of his leading truck over a charge of dyna- 
mite, and then to deal with the attack which almost certainly 
ensued. Officers, therefore, had to be chosen from men of no 
common stamp. The danger from contact mines was to a cer- 
tain extent obviated by a standing order that each train should 
propel a heavily-loaded bogie truck. Such trucks had low 
sides and ends ; they in no way obstructed the view, or fire, 
from the trains ; and they performed the double purpose of 
exploding contact mines and carrying the railway and telegraph 
materials. The necessity for this propelled unoccupied bogie 
was exempHfied on several occasions. 

As regards their protection of the railway lines, the 
armoured trains rendered an invaluable service, and this 
was especially the case when the blockhouse system had 
been fully developed, and when, concurrently therewith, 
the enemy's artillery became scarce. In recording this 
opinion. Sir Percy Girouard further observes : — " There is 
no doubt, also, that the enemy disliked them intensely, 
and the presence of an armoured train had a great moral 
effect." 

In addition to the organisation and running of these 
armoured trains, there was included in every ordinary train, 
as far as possible, a special gun-truck on which was a pedes- 
tal-mounted Q. F. gun, under the charge of an escort. The 
trains also carried a machine gun at each end, arranged 
with a lateral sweep, to allow the fires to cross on either side 
of the train at a distance of from fifty to eighty yards. In 
addition to this, armour plates were hung on each side of 
the driver's cab, and the first train run each morning had 
two or three trucks in front of the engine as a precaution 
against any mine that might have been laid over-night. 



RAILWAYS IN THE BOER WAR. 253 

Ambulance and Hospital Trains 

Supplementing the references already made on pp. 95-6 
to the employment of ambulance and hospital trains in the 
South African War, it may here be stated that three out of 
the seven adapted from rolling stock already in use on the 
Cape or the Natal Government lines had been prepared in 
advance of the outbreak of hostilities, namely, two at the 
Cape and one in Natal, and these three were, consequently, 
available for immediate use. 

" In Cape Colony," as stated in " The Times History of 
the War in South Africa," " the two hospital trains that 
had been prepared in September were manned by a com- 
plete personnel from England, and were kept in constant 
touch with Lord Methuen's advance. In most cases they 
were run up almost into the firing line, and during the 
actions at Belmont, Graspan, Modder River and Magers- 
fontein, they relieved the force of its sick and wounded in 
an incredibly short time, conveying some to De Aar and 
Orange River, and others to the general hospitals at Cape 
Town." The services thus rendered by the hospital trains 
were greatly facilitated by the fact that during the first 
three months of the war the fighting was almost entirely 
on or alongside the railways. It was, therefore, possible 
to arrange for a speedy evacuation of wounded from the 
field hospitals. 

The same two trains, after working along the line of 
communication in Cape Colony, reached Bloemfontein 
early in April, 1900 ; and here they were of great use in 
helping to remove the sufferers from the enteric fever which 
was filling up, not only all the hospitals, but every other 
available building, as well, and finally attained, by the end 
of May, a maximum of 4,000 cases. Unable to meet all 
requirements arising under these exceptional conditions, 
the two hospital trains were supplemented by a number of 
locally-prepared or ordinary trains, made available for the 
transport either of sick or of convalescents. 

In regard to Natal, " The Times History " says that of all 
the medical arrangements made in connection with the 



254 THE RISE OF RAIL-POWER. 

war, " those during Sir Red vers Biiller's operations in Natal 
presented the most satisfactory features." 

The Hne of communication with the base was short, and 
it was ampty supphed with hospital trains. In addition to 
the one that had been formed before the outbreak of hos- 
tilities, a second and similar train was prepared in November, 
1889. The hospital train, " Princess Christian," con- 
structed in England at a cost of £14,000, mainly raised by 
Her Royal Highness — with a handsome contribution from 
the town of Windsor — reached Cape Town early in February, 
1900. It was sent on in sections to Durban, where it was put 
together in the Natal Government Railway workshops. 
Under the charge of Sir John Furley, who had also super- 
vised its reconstruction, the train was the first to cross the 
temporary trestle bridge provided to take the place of the 
one across the Tugela, at Colenso, which had been destroyed 
by the Boers, and it was, also, the first train to enter Lady- 
smith (March 18, 1900) after the siege. Between this 
time and September 5, 190 1, it made loS journeys, mainly 
on the Natal side and on the Pretoria-Koomati Poort line ; 
it ran a total of 42,000 miles, and it carried (in addition to 
the medical and nursing staff) 321 officers and 7,208 non- 
commissioned officers and men, a total of 7,529 sick and 
wounded, of whom only three died en route. In June, 1901, 
the train was formally presented by the Central Red Cross 
Committee to the Secretary of State for War as a complete 
hospital train unit for the use of the mihtary forces in 
South Africa ; but, on the assumption, apparently, that no 
further use for its services as a hospital train was likely 
to arise, it was subsequently dismantled. 

As showing the extent of the work done by the other 
hospital trains during the course of the war, it may be 
added that No. 2 ran 114,539 miles, in 226 trips, between 
November 22, 1898, and the end of August, 1902, conveying 
471 ofiicers and 10,325 non-commissioned officers and men, 
a total of 10,796, of whom only seven died en route. 

Transv.\al Railways and the War 
To the foregoing account of the British use of railways for 



RAIL^VAYS IN THE BOER WAR. 255 

military purposes during the course of the South African 
War it may be of interest to add a few notes giving the ex- 
periences of the Boers, as detailed in a statement on " The 
Netherlands South African Railway Company and the 
Transvaal War," drawn up at Pretoria, in April, 1900, 
by the Secretary of the Company, Mr. Th. Steinnetz, and 
published in De Ingcnicur of July 14 and 21, 1900.^ 

Under the terms of the concession granted to the Nether- 
lands South African Railway Company (otherwise the Neder- 
land Zuid Afrikaansche Spoorweg Maatschappij) by the 
Government of the Transvaal Republic, the latter were, in 
the event either of war or of danger of war, to have com- 
plete control alike over the railway and over everything 
— and everybody — necessary for its use, subject to certain 
undertakings as to the payment of compensation to con- 
cessionaires. By virtue of these powers the Executive 
Raad issued a decree on September 13, 1899, establishing 
Government control over the lines, and stating further : — 
" With the view of ensuring that proper use can be made 
of the railway, the whole of the personnel of the company 
are . . . commandeered to do duty on the railways in the 
functions they now occupy, and they are placed under the 
orders of the Commandant-General and the war officers 
indicated by him, or of other officials." The Government, 
in effect, took possession of all the lines, rolling stock, work- 
shops and other properties of the railway company for 
the purposes of military transport, and they assumed con- 
trol over the staff in order to ensure the working, not only 
of the company's own lines, but, also, of the lines in such 
portions of British territory as might be occupied by the 
forces of the Republic. 

Against the possibility of an immediate invasion of the 
Transvaal — " about which," says the statement, " there 
was much anxiety on account of the armoured trains, which 
the English advertised so loudly " — precautions were taken 
by preparing for demolition some of the bridges on the 
south-eastern section of the company's lines. Guards were, 

1 For English translation, see " Journal of the Royal United 
Service Institution," January, 1902. 



256 THE RISE OF RAIL-POWER. 

also, stationed at bridges and other important points 
throughout the Transvaal in order to protect them against 
attack or interference by " the great number of Anglophiles " 
assumed to be still in the Republic ; but the statement seems 
to suggest that, as shown by the small number of attempts 
made in this direction, the British rather neglected their 
opportunities. 

In regard to the transport of Transvaal troops, diffi- 
culties arose at the outset owing to the absence of data, 
even of the vaguest character, as to the numbers of 
burghers, horses and wagons it would be necessary to 
convey by train. Consequently, no military time-tables 
could be drawn up, and the traffic demands were met as 
best they could be when they were made. No more, how- 
ever, than eleven trains a day, in each direction, could be 
run on the south-eastern branch — a single-track line, with 
stations and crossing places about one hour's journey apart. 
Concerning the amount of traffic carried, Mr. Steinnetz 
says : — 

The total military traffic to the frontier was not so great as 
one would expect, in spite of only a portion of the burghers 
having taken up arms. From various districts the commandos 
marched mounted, with ox-wagons, to the place of assembly, 
as had been the custom in the past, although the use of the 
railwa}' would have saved time and trouble to both horses and 
men. Yet it was not the first time that the Transvaalers had 
had the opportunity of learning the use of railways in warfare. 
At the time of the Jameson Raid and the Magato Campaign 
full use had been made of them. 

Among the railway bridges which the Boers had prepared 
for destruction, in case of need, was an iron one of ii6 ft. 
span, the blowing up of which would have checked the 
anticipated British invasion of the Transvaal via Lang's 
Nek ; but the concentration of the British forces at Dundee 
and Ladysmith allowed the Boers to enter Natal without 
resistance ; and they took over, in sections, the working of 
the Natal railway in proportion as they advanced. At 
various stations in northern Natal long platforms had been 
specially constructed by the British, and other arrange- 



RAILWAYS IN THE BOER WAR. 257 

ments made, to permit of large movements of troops and 
especially the detraining of cavalry. These improvements, 
says Mr. Steinnetz, came in very handy for the Federal 
Army. The personnel of the lines had " retired in a great 
hurry," without attempting any demolitions or doing any 
damage to the lines beyond what could be easily repaired. 
The Lang's Nek tunnel was " wholly untouched." Mr. 
Steinnetz continues : — 

The Boers themselves, however, through fear of being sur- 
prised by armoured trains, and for other reasons, gave the 
breakdown gangs more work to do. The telegraph line was 
destroyed by them for long distances, the track was broken 
up and two bridges were damaged. In order to obstruct the 
retreat of General Yule from Dundee a bridge of two 30-foot 
spans on the Dundee branch line was blown up by the Irish 
Brigade with a dynamite charge in the central pier. The damage 
done was not very great and was easily repaired. The same 
ineffective measure was applied with greater success to a similar 
bridge over a small spruit near Waschbank. But even here 
the repair was not difficult. 

These admissions as to the ease with which the work of 
destruction could, as a rule, readily be put right again are 
in full accord with Sir Percy Girouard's report, in dealing 
with the same subject. It is only fair to accept, in turn, the 
assertion made by Mr. Steinnetz that the damage which the 
British did to certain of the railway bridges was " speedily 
repaired." 

Some of the later destruction work carried out by the 
Boers was of a more serious character. The blowing up of 
the Tugela bridge at Colenso — a structure consisting of 
five iron lattice girder spans of 100 ft. each on masonry 
piles — was entrusted by the Boer military authorities to 
an inspector of the railway company who had served in the 
Dutch engineers. It was accomplished by the simultaneous 
detonation of forty dynamite charges all connected by 
leads to a Siemens and Halske " exploder," the bridge being 
" thoroughly demohshed." In the destruction of the 
three-span bridge over the Orange River at Nerval's Pont 
the charge employed consisted of about three and a half 
chests of dynamite, or 198 lbs. Concerning the general 



258 THE RISE OF RAIL-POWEE. 

destruction of bridges by which the Boers sought to check 
pursuit after their abandonment of the siege of Ladysmith. 
Mr. Steinnitz says : — " There was no lack of explosives, 
and no need to spare them." 

The central workshops of the Netherlands Company 
were made use of by the Government for the repair of guns, 
rifles, wagons, etc., and for the manufacture of war material. 
Four complete ambulance trains were also fitted up there 
for the use of wounded burghers. 

All the traffic on the lines was done on Government 
orders, and all expenses were charged to them. No private 
traffic at all was carried. There were, consequently, no 
railway receipts, and the railway company had no responsi- 
bility. 

Development of Rail Power 

In one way or another the South African War of 1899- 
1902 was concerned in many of the most complicated of 
the problems that arise in connection with the use of 
railways for military purposes.^ 

In various ways, also, it advanced to a still further stage 
the whole question of the nature and possibilities of rail- 
power in war. 

It confirmed under especially remarkable conditions a 
fact which the American War of Secession had already 
established, namely, that even single lines of railway, 
passing through country occupied by or belonging to the 
enemy, may allow of campaigns being conducted at such 
distances from the base of supplies as, but for this means of 
communication, would render war impracticable. 

It offered further evidence as to the possibility, in favour- 

1 In the preface of his standard work on "Military Railways," 
Major W. D. Connor, of the Corps of Engineers, United States 
Army, says : ' ' On the military side I refer to the reports of Colonel 
Sir E. P. C. Girouard, K.C.M.G., R.E., of the British Army, whose 
work in Egypt and South Africa has set a high standard for any 
engineer who in future may be required to meet and solve rail- 
way problems in the theatre of war. These reports give the solution 
of many points as worked out in the field, and confirm the main 
lessons to be learned from the history of the military railways in 
our Civil War." (See " Bibliography.") 



RAILWAYS IN THE BOER WAR. 259 

able circumstances, of employing railways for the carrjdng 
out of important tactical movements. 

It re-established the essential need of organisation for 
the attainment of efficiency in military transport and 
especially in so far as such organisation deals with questions 
of control and co-ordination of the military and the technical 
elements. 

It placed on a recognised and clearly defined basis the 
uses of armoured trains and the best methods to be adopted 
for their construction and operation. 

It showed still more clearly, perhaps, than any previous 
war had done, the useful and beneficent purposes served 
by ambulance and hospital trains, whether constructed for 
the purpose or adapted from existing railway stock. 

It proved that, however apparently insecure a line of rail 
communication may be, and however active and destructive 
the attacks made on it by a pertinacious enemy, yet, with 
a strong and well-organised force of Railway Troops follow- 
ing close on the advancing army, and supplemented by an 
efficient system of line-protection, repairs and reconstruction 
can be carried out with such speed that comparatively little 
material delay will be caused, the final result of the campaign 
will not necessarily be affected, and the value of rail-power 
as an instrument of war will suffer no actual reduction. 



CHAPTER XVII 
The Russo-Japanese War 

The Russo-Japanese war of 1904-5 was a test not so 
much of the mihtary strength of the two combatants as of 
their respective means of communication and concentration. 

From Moscow to Port Arthur the distance is 5,300 miles, 
and, save for the sea journey via the Baltic, the North Sea, 
the Atlantic and the Indian Ocean, the Russians were de- 
pendent for the transport of their troops and stores to 
Manchuria on such very inadequate railways as they then 
controlled. Japan, on the other hand, was able to rely on 
her fleet and her considerably developed mercantile marine ; 
and, as soon as she had paralysed the Russian fleet and 
established her own command of the sea — as she did within 
two days of the outbreak of hostilities — she could land 
her forces whenever she chose at almost any convenient point 
on the sea-board of the theatre of war. 

The situation recalled, somewhat, the still worse position 
in which Russia had found herself at the time of the Crimean 
War when, in the absence of any rail facilities at all, her 
troops had to march, and their supplies and munitions had 
to be conveyed, hundreds of miles over dreary steppes — 
" huge columns that had quitted the far north and east of 
the interior dwindling to a few broken-down Battalions 
before they came in sight of Sebastopol " — whereas the 
allies could send their troops all the way to the Crimea by 
sea. 

While there are many other causes which, rightly or 
wrongly, have been regarded as contributing to the defeat 
of Russia by Japan — included therein being personal short- 
comings of the Russian officers ; mistakes made by them 
in strategy and tactics ; defects in the Russian military 

260 



THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR. 261 

system, and the half-hearted interest of the Russian nation 
in the struggle — the really decisive factors in the situation 
were the transport deficiencies of the Siberian and Man- 
churian railways. 

The construction of a Trans-Siberian Railway as a great 
strategic line stretching across Asia, facilitating the develop- 
ment of a vast territory, and, above all, calculated to foster 
the realisation of Russia's aims in the Far East, first came 
under discussion about the year i860. It was made the 
subject of an exhaustive study by a Committee of Ministers 
in 1875, but it was not until 1891 that the first sod was 
turned. 

Military and political considerations being paramount, 
such energy was shown in the work of construction that by 
1896 the western section had been carried through Irkutsk 
to Lake Baikal and from the eastern shores thereof to 
Strietensk, while the eastern section — known as the Usuri 
Railway — had been made through Russia's Maritime Pro- 
vince from Vladivostok to Khabarovsk. The original 
design was that the line should be constructed on Russian 
territory all the way to Vladivostok ; but this meant that 
from Strietensk it would have to follow the great bend made 
to the north by the Amur, the southern boundary of Russia, 
and the Russian Government thought it desirable to secure 
a more direct route. 

Towards the end of 1896, in return for the great services 
which she considered she had rendered to China in the war 
between that country and Japan, Russia obtained the con- 
cession for a railway which, starting from Chita, Trans- 
Baikalia, about 200 miles west of Strietensk, would pass 
through Manchuria to Vladivostok, avoiding the great bend 
of the Amur, though still offering the disadvantage that one 
important section of the through route would not be on 
Russian territory. Under a contract made between the 
Chinese Government and the Russo-Chinese Bank, a Chinese 
Eastern Railway Company \va.s formed to build and operate 
the line thus conceded ; but the arrangements made were 
carried out through the Russian Minister of Finance, and 
the line was directly dependent on the Russian State. 



262 THE RISE OF RAIL-POWER. 

Russia's occupation of Port Arthur in March, 1898, 
led, in the spring of the following year, to the further con- 
struction being begun of a southern branch of the Chinese 
Eastern Railway from Harbin, a station on the Chita- 
Vladivostok line, to the extremity of the Liao-tung penin- 
sula. 

It was these two railways, the Trans-Siberian and the 
Chinese Eastern, terminating at Vladivostok in the one 
direction and at Port Arthur in the other, which came into 
special consideration in the war of 1904-5. It was on the 
Trans-Siberian line, more especially, that Russia was mainly 
dependent (as the German official report on the war points 
out) not only for the concentration and maintenance of her 
army but even for the raising and organisation of most of 
its units. 

When the Trans-Siberian was first built, the desire to 
avoid undue expenditure on a line which must necessarily 
involve a huge expenditure, with little or no prospect of 
yielding a return sufficient for the payment of interest there- 
on, led to the adoption of an economy which was to hamper 
very materially the transport capacity of the railway. Only 
a single line of rails was allowed for ; a limit was placed on 
the breadth of the embankments ; the curves were greater 
than considerations of speed and safety should have per- 
mitted ; the gradients were either dangerously varied or 
so excessive that divisions of the trains were necessary ; the 
rails used were of no greater weight than from 42 lbs. to 
47 lbs. per yard, and they were badly laid, even then ; 
the bridges across the smaller streams were made of wood 
only ; the crossing-places and the railway stations were few 
and far between, while all the secondary constructions were 
provided on what was almost the cheapest possible scale. 

These conditions necessitated the limitation of the traffic, 
when the line was first opened, to the running of three trains 
a day in each direction. The length of the trains was re- 
stricted to sixty axles. It was thus impossible to meet the 
demands even of the ordinary traffic in peace time, apart 
altogether from any question as to military requirements 
in time of war. No sooner, therefore, were the main portions 



THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR. 263 

of the line ready, in 189S, than there was set aside, for a rail- 
wa}^ which was already to cost over £350,000,000, a further 
sum of £9,130,000 for relaying those portions of the line 
with a better quality of rails and sleepers, the reconstruction 
of sections dangerous to traffic, the provision of more 
stations and more rolling stock, and other improvements. 
It was expected that this additional work would be com- 
pleted by 1904, by which time the line was to be equal to 
the running of thirteen pairs of trains daily. 

Reporting on the condition of the Russian railways in 
1900 (at which date the Eastern Chinese line was still un- 
fmished). General Kuropatkin, then War Minister, after- 
wards Commander-in-Chief in Manchuria, did not hesitate 
to declare that it was still impossible for them to cope with 
heavy traffic. 

Relations between Russia and Japan became strained 
towards the end of 1903, though the Government of the 
former country were desirous that any outbreak of hostilities 
should be avoided until they were better able to undertake 
them. In his account of " The Russian Army and the 
Japanese War " General Kuropatkin says concerning the 
position at this period : — 

Our unreadiness was only too plain, and it seemed at that 
time that we should be able, with two or three years' steady 
work, so to strengthen our position in the Far East, and improve 
the railway, the fleet, the land forces, and the fortresses of Port 
Arthur and Vladivostok that Japan would have small chance 
of success against us. 

Regarding v/ar as inevitable, and disinclined to give 
Russia an opportunity of first strengthening her position 
in the directions here suggested, Japan broke off diplomatic 
relations with Russia on February 6, 1904, this being the 
immediate prelude to the hostilities that followed. 

In anticipation of a possible rupture, Russia had already 
despatched reinforcements and stores to the Far East by 
sea ; but the rupture, when it did come, found her quite 
unprepared to send further large reinforcements by land, 
while her forces in the Far East were scattered over the 
vast area extending from Lake Baikal to Vladivostok, and 



264 THE RISE OF RAIL-POWER. 

from Port Arthur to Nikolaievsk. No orders for mobilis- 
ation had been issued ; the army was in the midst of re- 
armament and re-organisation, and the unreadiness of the 
railways had prevented the drawing up of time-tables for the 
concentration of the troops. Ten days after the outbreak 
of war the Russian Government issued a statement in which 
they said : — 

The distance of the territory now attacked and the desire 
of the Tsar to maintain peace were the causes of the impossi- 
bility of preparations for war being made a long time in advance. 

Not only, too, was the seat of war 5,000 miles away, 
and not only was a single-track ill-equipped line of rail- 
way the only practicable means of sending troops and 
war material there by land, but an exceptionally great 
obstacle to traffic had to be met owing to the interruption 
of rail communication by Lake Baikal. 

Having a length of 380 miles, a breadth ranging from 
eighteen miles to fifty-six miles, a mean depth of 850 feet 
(with a maximum, in parts, of no less than 4,500 ft.), and a 
total area of over 13,000 square miles. Lake Baikal ranks, 
next to the great lakes of the United States and Central 
Africa, as the largest fresh-water lake in the world ; though 
it should, in reality, be regarded less as a lake than as a 
great inland sea. As it happened, also, this vast expanse 
of water stood in the direct line of route of the Trans- 
Siberian railway, and the crossing of it by the Russian 
reinforcements going to the Far East constituted a seriously 
defective link in the chain of communication. 

At an elevation of 1,360 feet above sea level, the lake is 
subject alike to severe gales, to heavy fogs, and to frosts so 
intense that in mid-winter the water may be frozen to a 
depth of ten feet. From the end of April to the end of 
December troops and travellers arriving by rail at one side 
of the lake crossed to the other by passenger steamers. Goods 
wagons were taken over by ferry-boats which, also, acted 
as ice-breakers early and late in the winter season, so long 
as the passage could be kept open. When, in the winter, the 
ice was strong enough to bear, traffic was conducted by 



THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR. 265 

transport sledges ; but when there was sufficient ice to stop 
the ferry-boats, though not sufficient to permit of the sledges 
being used — conditions which generally prevailed for about 
six weeks in the year — the traffic had to be discontinued 
altogether. 

The question will naturally be asked, — Why had not 
the constructors of the line avoided these disadvantages 
by carrying it round the lake ? The reply is that this had 
not been done, prior to the outbreak of war, owing to the 
formidable nature of the work involved from an engineer- 
ing point of view. 

Lake Baikal is bordered, on the south — the route a Circum- 
Baikal line would have to take — by mountains which rise 
sheer up from the water's edge to a height of, in places, 
no less than 4,600 ft. Across the mountains, along the 
rocky shores, and over the intervening valleys the railway 
would require to be carried for a distance of 160 miles in 
order to link up the two sections then divided by the lake. 
The difficulties of the work were likely to be as great as 
the cost would certainly be enormous, compared with that 
of the remainder of the Trans-Siberian railway. So it was 
that when the war broke out there were still 112 miles of 
the Circum-Baikal line to be constructed. 

So it was, also, that, pending the completion of this line 
round the lake, Russia's reinforcements from Europe for 
the Far East had to cross the lake itself ; and the outbreak 
of hostilities in the month of February placed Russia at an 
especially great disadvantage in regard to transport. 

The combined ferry-steamers and ice-breakers had 
made their final journey for the winter on January 27, 
and at first the only way in which the troops could cross 
the ice was by marching or by sledge. After a day's rest 
at Irkutsk, they were brought by train to Baikal station, 
at the lake side, arriving there at about four o'clock in the 
morning in order that they could complete the journey to 
Tanchoi station, on the other side of the lake — a distance 
of about twenty-five miles — in the day. The track was 
marked out by posts, supplemented by lanterns at night, 
and it was kept in order by gangs of labourers. Small 



266 THE RISE OF RAIL-POWER. 

bridges were placed over cracks in the ice. Shelters, in 
telephonic communication with one another, were pro- 
vided at four-mile distances ahke for the purpose of rest 
and for the distribution of food prepared by regimental 
field kitchens ; but the principal meal of the day was taken 
at a more substantial half-way house, where the cooking 
arrangements were on a more elaborate scale and better 
accommodation was provided. Around the half-way 
house at night petroleum flares were burned, so that it 
could be seen a long way off. In foggy weather, or during 
snow storms, bells were rung at all the shelters. Inasmuch 
as the temperature fell, at times, to 22 deg., Fahr., below- 
zero, the provision of these rest-houses must have been 
greatly appreciated. Baggage was taken across in sledges, 
the normal supply of which had been increased by an 
additional 3,000. Some of the troops also made the journey 
by this form of conveyance, four men being seated in each 
sledge. The batteries crossed with their own horses. 

As soon as the ice attained a thickness of about 44 ft., 
the expedient was adopted of laying a pair of rails along it 
in order, more especially, that the additional engines and 
railway w^agons urgently needed on the lines east of the 
lake could be taken across. The rails were laid on sleepers 
of exceptional length, the weight being thus distributed 
over a greater surface of ice ; but, even with this precaution, 
it was no easy matter to keep the line in working order 
owing to the extreme cold, to storms, to the occasional 
ice movements and cracks, or to the effect of earthquake 
shocks in destroying lengths of hne, sections of which 
sometimes required to be relaid almost as soon as they 
had been put down. The line was begun on February 10 
and completed by the 29th of the same month. Between 
March i and March 26 there were taken across the lake, 
by this means, sixty-five dismantled locomotives (re-built 
on arrival on the eastern side), twenty-five railway carriages, 
and 2,313 goods wagons. Transport was provided by 
horses, the number so used being about 1,000. 

Constructed to serve an exclusively military purpose, 
this twenty-five-mile line across Lake Baikal may cer- 



THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR. 267 

tainly be regarded as a " military railway," while as a 
military ice-railway it holds a unique position in the history 
of warfare. 

When, owing to the advancing season, the ice on the 
lake could no longer be trusted to bear either railway 
trucks or sledges, and when navigation was again open 
dependence had to be placed on the ferry services. There 
were, however, only two vessels available for the transfer 
of railway trucks across the lake, and each of these, accom- 
modating twenty-seven trucks at a time, could make no 
more than three return crossings in the twenty-four hours. 

Only in one way could an improvement be effected in 
these obviously inadequate facilities for getting an army to 
Manchuria, and that was in carrying the railway round the 
southern end of the lake, thus avoiding the delay caused by 
the hitherto unavoidable transshipment and crossing, and 
ensuring a continuous rail journey. The need for this 
Circum-Baikal link had, in fact, become urgent, and the 
work was pushed on with the greatest vigour. 

Mention has already been made of the engineering diffi- 
culties which the construction of the line involved. These 
will be better understood if it is added that the 160-mile 
link passes through thirty-four tunnels, having an aggre- 
gate length of over six miles ; that it is carried across 
valleys, or open spaces, on two hundred bridges, and that 
numerous cuttings and many large culverts had also to be 
provided. The total cost worked out at no less than 
£52,000 per mile — probably the largest sum per mile ever 
spent on a railway designed, in the first instance, to serve 
a distinctly military purpose, and exceeding by £35,000 
the average cost per mile, down to that date, of the entire 
system of Russian railways. Delays occurred, also, through 
strikes and other causes, and, in the result, it was not until 
September 25, 1904 — more than seven months after the 
outbreak of war — that the line was ready for use, and that 
an interruption of the rail journey by the crossing of Lake 
Baikal became no longer necessary. 

Meanwhile, an inadequate supply of engines and rolling 
stock had been a serious hindrance to traffic alike on the 



268 THE RISE OF RAIL-POWER. 

Trans-Baikal section of the Siberian line and on the Eastern 
Chinese lines. The locomotives and wagons taken across 
Lake Baikal either on the ice-railway or on the ferry boats 
had served a useful purpose, but six months elapsed before 
the Eastern Chinese lines could be worked to their full 
efficiency. 

There were other directions, as well, in which traffic 
hindrances arose. The freezing, down to the very bottom, 
of the rivers between the eastern side of Lake Baikal 
and Harbin (Manchuria) was a cause of serious difficulty in 
the early part of the year in getting water even for such 
locomotives as were available. In the western Siberian 
section the supply of water was impaired by the great per- 
centage of salt in the streams. In Manchuria the fuel reserve 
was inadequate ; soldiers were the only reliable portion of 
the subordinate railway staff ; the railway workshops were 
poorly equipped ; there were not nearly enough engine 
depots ; large supplies of rails, fish-plates, sleepers and ballast 
were needed, and much work had to be done in the con- 
struction of additional sidings, etc. All these shortcomings 
required to be made good whilst the war was in actual 
progress, though for the transport of most of the necessary 
materials and appliances there was only a single-track 
line of railway already overtaxed for the conveyance of 
troops, munitions and supplies. 

The number of trains that could be run was extremely 
limited. The capacity of the line of communication as a 
whole was fixed by that of the Eastern Chinese Railway 
between Chita and Harbin ; and after three months of war 
it was still possible to run from west to east in each twenty- 
four hours no more than three military trains (conveying 
troops, supplies, stores and remounts), one light mail train, 
and, when necessary, one ambulance train ; though these 
conditions were improved later on. 

The speed at which the trains ran — allowing for necessary 
stops in stations or at crossing places on the line — ranged 
from five to eleven miles an hour, with seven miles an hour 
as a good average. For the journey from Warsaw to Mukden 
the military trains took forty days, including one da3/'s 



THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR. 269 

rest for the troops at the end of every 600 or 700 miles. In 
April and May the journey from Wirballen, on the frontier 
of Russia and Germany, to Liao-yang, situate between 
Mukden and Port Arthur, took fifty da37S — an average 
speed of five and a quarter miles per hour. 

What with the transport and other difficulties that arose, 
it was not for three months after the outbreak of hostilities 
that the Russian troops in the Far East received reinforce- 
ments. It was not until after seven months of war that 
the three Army Corps sent from European Russia to join 
the field army were all concentrated in Manchuria. 

Under these conditions the Japanese, free to send their 
own armies by sea to the theatre of war, and able to con- 
centrate them with far greater speed, had all the initial 
advantage. The Russian reinforcements arrived in driblets, 
and they were either cut off as they came or, as regards, at 
least, the fighting from May 14 to October 14, provided 
only 21,000 men to replace 100,000 killed, wounded or sick ; 
whereas the Japanese were able to maintain a continuous 
flow of reinforcements to make good their own casualties. 

General Kuropatkin is of opinion that if the Russians 
had been able to command better transport from the 
outset the whole course of the campaign would have been 
changed. He thinks that even a single extra through troop 
train per day would have made a material difference, 
while the running, from the start, of six trains a day would, 
he believes, have secured for Russia alike the initiative and 
the victory. Referring to the Siberian and Eastern Chinese 
Railways he says : — 

If these lines had been more efficient, we could have brought 
up our troops more rapidly, and, as things turned out, 150,000 
men concentrated at first would have been of far more value 
to us than the 300,000 who were gradually assembled during 
nine months, only to be sacrificed in detail. ... If we had 
had a better railway and had been able to mass at Liao-yang 
the number specified, we should undoubtedly have won the 
day in spi^.e of our mistakes. 

Kuropatkin himself certainly did all he could to improve 
the transport conditions. In a statement he submitted to 



270 THE RISE OF RAIL-POWER. 

the Tsar on March 7, 1904, he declared that of all urgently 
pressing questions that of bettering the railway communi- 
cation between Russia and Siberia was the most important ; 
and he added : — " It must, therefore, be taken up at once, 
in spite of the enormous cost. The money expended will 
not be wasted ; it will, on the contrary, be in the highest 
sense productive inasmuch as it will shorten the duration 
of the war." 

On the Trans-Baikal section six new stations were added, 
and additional crossing places to facilitate the passing of 
trains were provided elsewhere, so that by May some 
additional trains per day could be run. In June orders 
were given by the Government for the execution of extensive 
works designed to increase the capacity of the Siberian and 
Eastern Chinese main lines to seven trains per day in each 
direction, and that of the southern branch to twelve per day. 
The cost of these improvements was estimated at £4,400,000. 

In November, 1904, Kuropatkin submitted to the Tsar a 
recommendation that the lines should be at once doubled 
throughout their whole length. The reinforcements, he 
declared, were even then still coming in driblets. " Supplies 
despatched in the spring are still on the Siberian side. 
Waterproofs sent for the summer will arrive when we want 
fur coats ; fur coats will come to hand v/hen waterproofs are 
wanted." 

There was need, also, to provide stores of provisions for 
the troops. So long as the army was a comparatively small 
one it could depend mainly on local resources. In pro- 
portion as it increased in size it became more and more 
dependent on supplies from European Russia ; but the 
collection of a sufficiency for a single month meant the run- 
ning of five extra trains a day for a like period. Even 
when ample supplies were available at one point, weakness 
and inefficiency in the transport arrangements might lead 
to the troops elsewhere suffering privations which should 
be avoided. 

Whether for financial or other reasons, the Russian Govern- 
ment did not adopt the idea of converting the single track 
of the railway system into double track ; but the improve- 



THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR. 271 

ments made in the traffic facilities (including the provision 
of sixty-nine additional places for the passing of trains) 
were such that by the time peace was concluded, on Sep- 
tember 5, 1905, the Russians had ten, or even twelve pairs 
of full-length trains running in the twenty-four hours, as 
compared with the two per day which could alone be run 
six months before the outbreak of war and the three per day 
which were running nine months later. The capacity of 
the lines had been increased practically fourfold ; though 
the general situation remained such as to evoke the follow- 
ing comment from the writer of the official German account 
of the war ^ : — 

In spite of the efforts made to improve the line, the connection 
of the Russian forces in East Asia with their home country 
was, and remained, an unreliable and uncertain factor in the 
calculations of Army Headquarters. No measures, were they 
ever so energetic, could be designed to remove this uncertainty, 
and it was only gradually, as the Manchurian Army itself in- 
creased and concentrated, and as the railway works advanced, 
that greater freedom of action was assured to the Commander- 
in-Chief ; but even then the army as a whole, with all its wants 
and supplies, remained dependent on the Siberian and Eastern 
Chinese Railways. 

What the railways did was to enable the Russians to collect 
at the theatre of war, by the time the war itself came to an 
end, an army of 1,000,000 men — of whom two-thirds had 
not yet been under fire — together with machine-guns, howit- 
zers, shells, small-arm ammunition, field railways, wireless 
telegraphy, supplies, and technical stores of all kinds. 
Kuropatkin says of this achievement : — 

The War Department had, with the co-operation of other 
departments, successfully accomplished a most colossal task. 
What single authority would have admitted a few years ago 
the possibility of concentrating an arm 3^ of a million men 5,400 
miles away from its base of supply and equipment by means of 
a poorly-constructed single-line railway ? Wonders were 
effected ; but it was too late. Affairs in the interior of Russia 

^ "The Russo-Japanese War. The Ya-Lu. Prepared in the 
Historical Section of the German General Staff." Authorized 
Translation by Karl von Donat. London, 1908. 



272 THE RISE OF RAIL-POWER. 

for which the War Department could not be held responsible 
were the cause of the war being brought to an end at a time 
when decisive mihtary operations should really have only just 
been beginning. 

Russia, in fact, agreed to make peace at a time when the 
prospect of her being able to secure a victory was greater 
than it had been at any time during the earlier phases of the 
war ; but the Japanese failed to attain all they had hoped 
for, the primary causes of such failure, in spite of their 
repeated victories, being, as told in the British " Official 
History " of the war, that " Port Arthur held out longer 
than had been expected, and the Trans-Siberian Railway 
enabled Russia to place more men in the field than had been 
thought possible."^ 

Thus, in respect to rail-power, at least, Russia still achieved 
a remarkable feat in her transport of an army so great a 
distance by a single-track line of railway. Such an achieve- 
ment was unexampled, while, although Fate was against 
the ultimate success of her efforts, Russia provided the 
world with a fresh object lesson as to what might have 
been done, in a campaign waged more than 5,000 miles 
from the base of supplies, if only the line of rail communi- 
cation had been equal from the first to the demands it was 
called upon to meet. 

Apart from this main consideration, there were some 
other phases of the Russo-Japanese War which are of 
interest from the point of view of the present study. 

The Field railways, mentioned on the previous page, con- 
stituted a network of, altogether, 250 miles of narrow-gauge 
railways built and operated by the Russian troops — either 
alone or with the help of Chinese labourers — and designed 
to act as subsidiary arteries of the broad-gauge Eastern 
Chinese Railway by (i) providing for the transport there- 
from of troops and supplies to the front ; (2) conveying 
guns and munitions to the siege batteries, and (3) bringing 
back the sick and wounded. Horses, ponies and mules 

1 " Official History of the Russo-Japanese War." Prepared by 
the Historical Section of the Committee of Imperial Defence. Lon- 
don, 1910. 



THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR. 273 

were employed for traction purposes. Each of the three 
Russian armies in the field had its own group of narrow- 
gauge lines, and the lines themselves served a most useful 
purpose in a country of primitive roads and inadequate local 
means of transport. 

In one instance a broad-gauge branch line was built 
inland, during the course of the war, from the Eastern 
Chinese Railway for a distance of twenty-five miles. A 
depot was set up at its terminus, and thence the supplies 
were conveyed to the troops bj^ a series of narrow-gauge 
lines extending to every part of that particular section of 
the theatre of war. 

Construction of the narrow-gauge line serving the Second 
Army, and extending nineteen miles from a point on the 
Eastern Chinese Railway near to Port Arthur, necessitated 
the provision of six bridges and three embankments. Three 
lines, the building of which was begun in January, 1905, 
were siege lines specially designed to serve the positions 
taken up at Liao-yang ; but all three were abandoned on 
the evacuation of Mukden, early in March. It was, how- 
ever, subsequent to the retreat from Mukden that the 
greatest degree of energy in constructing narrow-gauge 
lines was shown by the Russians. In addition to the 250 
miles brought into use, there was still another 100 miles 
completed ; but these could not be operated owing to the 
inadequate supply of wagons — a supply reduced still 
further through seizures made by the Japanese. 

During the course of the war the traffic carried on these 
military narrow-gauge lines included over 58,000 tons of 
provisions, stores, etc., 75,132 sick and wounded, and 
24,786 other troops.^ 

For the carrying out of all this construction work, and, 
also, for the operation of the Manchurian and Ussuri rail- 
ways, Russia had twenty-four companies of Railway Troops, 
the total force of which was estimated at 11,431. In the 
first part of the war she relied upon her six East Siberian 

1 " Construction et exploitation de chemins de fer a traction 
animale sur le theatre de la guerre de 1904-5 en Mandchourie." 
Revue du Genie Militaire, Avril, Mai, Juni, 1909. Paris. 



274 THE RISE OF RAIE-POWER. 

Railway Battalions. As the work increased other Battalions 
were brought from European Russia. 

The Japanese were not well provided with Railway 
Troops ; but they were none the less active in endeavouring 
to destroy the Russian lines of communication, on which 
so much depended. For instance, the railway to Port 
Arthur was cut b}/ them near Wa-fang-tien at ii p.m. on 
May 6. The Russians repaired the line, and by May lo a 
further train-load of ammunition was sent over it into Port 
Arthur. Three days later the Japanese cut the line at 
another point, and from that time Port Arthur was isolated. 

As regards the operation of the Siberian and Eastern 
Chinese Railways, Colonel W. H. H. Waters says : — ^ 

Taking the railway/ as a whole, from Chelyabinsk, which is 
the western terminus of the Siberian portion, to Mukden, a 
distance of close upon 4,000 miles, it has worked better than I 
expected ; but the one great fault connected with it has been, 
and is, the incapacity of Russian railwaymen, civil or military, 
to handle heav}^ station traffic properly. If Russia were to 
pay a British or American goods-yard foreman, say from Nine 
Elms station, a salary, no matter how high, and let him import 
his own staff of assistants, the improvement of the Asiatic lines 
in question would be remarkable. 

Then, again, Captain C. E. Vickers, R.E., writing on " The 
Siberian Railwa};^ in War," in the issue of " The Royal 
Engineers Journal " (Chatham) for August, 1905, points 
to the need which was developed for the control of the 
railway during war by a separate staff, as distinct from the 
staffs concerned in arranging operations, distributing 
supplies and munitions, and other military duties. 

Whether due to the personal incapacity spoken of by 
the one authority here quoted, or to the lack of a separate 
organisation alluded to by the other, the fact remains 
that the operation of the Siberian and Eastern Chinese 
lines did give rise to a degree of confusion that must have 

1 "The Russo-Japane.se War. Reports from British Officers 
attached to the Japanese and Russians Forces in the Field." Vol. 
III. General Report [dated March, 1905] by Col. W. H. H. Waters. 
London, 1908. 



THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR. 275 

greatly increased the difficulties of the position in which the 
Russians were placed. 

When, for example, in September, 1904, reservists were 
urgently wanted at Mukden after the retreat from Liao- 
yang, the traffic was so mismanaged that it took the troops 
seven days to do the 337 miles from Harbin — an average 
speed of two miles per hour. On Decernber 5, Harbin 
Junction was so blocked in all directions by trains which 
could neither move in nor go out that traffic had to be 
suspended for twelve hours until the entanglement was 
set right. Still further, after the fall of Port Arthur, on 
January 2, 1905, and the augmentation of the Japanese 
forces by Nogi's army, the arrival of reinforcements then 
so greatly needed by the Russians was delayed for over one 
month to allow of the forwarding of a quantity of stores 
which had accumulated on the line. 

Some, at least, of the difficulties and delays experienced 
in operation were undoubtedly due to developments of that 
interjercnce by vidividual officers with the working of the 
railways of which we have already had striking examples 
in the case of the American War of Secession and the Franco- 
German War of 1870-71. Colonel Waters writes on this 
subject : — 

It is interesting to note how the working of the hne was inter- 
fered with by those who should have been the first to see that 
no extraneous calls were made upon it when the organisation 
of the army and the strengthening of Port Arthur were of vital 
importance. 

The chief of the Viceroy's Staff was the intermediary between 
Admiral Alexeiev and General Kuropatkin, the former being 
at Mukden and the latter at Liao-yang, thirty-seven miles dis- 
tant. Frequent conferences took place between Kuropatkin 
and this officer, who always used to come in a special train to 
Liao-yang. This necessitated the line being kept clear for 
indefinite periods of time and dislocated all the other traffic 
arrangements, as the then chief of the railways himself declared. 

In the first days of May, 1904, the Viceroy and the Grand 
Duke Boris were at Port Arthur, and wished to leave it before 
they should be cut off. I heard that they actually took three 
special trains to quit Port Arthur, namely, one for each of them, 
and one for their baggage and stores. This entirely upset the 



276 THE RISE OF RAIL-POWER. 

troop train, supply and ammunition services, at a time, too, 
when the scarcity of heavy gun munition in the fortress was 
such that, within a week, Kuropatkin called for volunteers to 
run a train-load through, which was done a few hours only 
before the place was definitely invested. 

There were, throughout 1904, plenty of other instances of 
special trains being run for, and siding accommodation occupied 
by, various indi\'iduals, so that the organisation and mainten- 
ance of the army was considerably hampered thereby. 

These experiences simply confirm the wisdom of the 
action which other countries had already taken (i) to ensure 
the efficiejit operation of railways in time of war by staffs 
comprising the military and the technical elements in com- 
bination, and (2) to prevent the interference of the former 
in the details of the actual working by the latter. 

Russia was, in fact, distinctly behind Western nations in 
these respects in 1904-5, and the need for placing her 
military transport system on a sounder basis w^as among 
the many lessons she learnt — and acted upon — as the result 
of her experiences in the war with Japan. 



CHAPTER XVIII 

Strategical Railways : Germany 

Between " strategical " and " military " railways there 
are certain fundamental differences, just as there are, also, 
between both of them and ordinary commercial railways. 

While designed partly, mainly, or, it may be, exclusively, 
to serve military purposes, strategical railways, unlike 
military railways proper, form part of the ordinary railway 
system of the country in which they are built. They 
approximate to commercial lines in construction, equip- 
ment and operation, and they are worked in connection 
with them for the ordinary purposes of trade and 
travel ; though in their case any considerations as to 
whether the traffic they carry is remunerative does not 
arise, provided only that they are capable of fulfilling their 
real purpose — that, namely, of ensuring such military 
transports as may, sooner or later, be required of them. It 
is possible that in times of peace the amount of actual 
traffic passing over them will be comparatively small, if 
not even practically nil, and that many years may elapse 
before the special facilities they must necessarily offer, 
— such as extensive siding accommodation and long plat- 
forms for the loading and unloading of troop trains — are 
likely to be employed to the fullest extent ; but they never- 
theless form an integral part both of the railway system and 
of the military system of the country, and, having been con- 
structed, they are, at least, available for military purposes 
whenever wanted. 

One must, however, again bear in mind that a railway 
built to meet the ordinary requirements of trade and travel 
does not become a " strategical " any more than a " mili- 

277 



278 THE RISE OF RAIL-POWER. 

tary " railway simply because, in time of war, it is used, to 
whatever extent, for the conveyance of troops, supplies or 
war material. The essential factor in each instance is, not 
the use that is made of the line, but the particular, or, at 
least, the main object it has been built to serve. Just, 
also, as a commercial line remains a commercial line not- 
withstanding its use for military traffic, so, in turn, a 
strategical line remains a strategical line whatever the 
amount of civilian traffic it may carry in time of peace. 
Yet while the distinction thus drawn between general 
railways and strategical railways is abundantly warranted, 
the increase of the former may still have an important 
bearing on the operation of the latter because of the im- 
provement of transport facilities in the interior, and because 
of the greater amount of rolling stock which will be made 
available for war purposes. " From a military point of 
view," said von Moltke in the Prussian Herrenhaus on 
March 26, 1876, " every railway is welcome, and two are 
still more welcome than one " ; and he developed this idea 
in a further speech on December 17, 1879, when, in declaring 
that the ownership and operation of the leading Prussian 
railways was desirable from a military standpoint, he 
said : — ^ 

Railways have become, in our time, one of the most essential 
instruments for the conduct of war. The transport of large 
bodies of troops to a given point k an extremely complicated 
and comprehensive piece of work, to which continuous atten- 
tion must be paid. Every fresh railway junction makes a 
difference, while, although we may not want to make use of 
every railway line that has been constructed, we may still want 
to make use of the whole of the rolling stock that is available. 

Another important distinction between military and 
strategical railways is that whereas the building of the 
former will be governed primarily by military requirements, 
that of the latter may be fundamentally due to considera- 
tions of State policy. Strategical railways are wanted to 
serve the purposes of national defence or, alternatively, of 
national expansion. They are especially provided to ensure 

' " Gesammelte Schriften." Berlin, 1891, etc. 



STRATEGICAL RAILWAYS: GERMANY. 279 

the speedy concentration of troops on the frontier, whether 
to resist invasion by a neighbouring country or to faciUtate 
the invasion either of that country or, it may be, of territory 
on the other side thereof. The fact that they have been 
built may, in some cases, even further the interests of peace, 
should the increased means they offer for military transports 
render the country concerned a more formidable anta- 
gonist than it might otherwise be, and influence the policy 
of other States or lands accordingly. 

In tropical dependencies the building of railways as a 
practical proof of " effective occupation " is often regarded 
as preferable to military conquest, being likely, in most 
cases, to answer the same purpose while offering many other 
advantages, besides. In West Africa there are not only 
railways of this class but others that have, in addition, 
been designed as a precautionary measure against a not 
impossible invasion, at some future date, by Mohammedan 
tribes from North Central Africa. All such lines as these 
belong to the strategical type, though they may, also, 
serve an important part in furthering the economic develop- 
ment of the territories concerned. 

Strategical railways, whether designed for defensive or 
aggressive purposes, may, in turn, be divided into two main 
groups, (i) those that constitute a network of lines ; and 
(2) single or individual lines for short or long dis- 
tances. 

A network of strategical railways is generally found in 
direct association with frontiers. Single or individual 
strategical lines fall into various groups including (i) short 
lines or branches running out to some point on or near 
to a frontier ; (2) single lines carried for long distances, 
and, possibly, crossing entire continents ; (3) circular or 
short lines, connecting different railway systems with one 
another, in order to facilitate the movement of troops during 
mobilisation or concentration or for defensive purposes in 
the event of invasion ; (4) lines passing round cities or 
large towns in order to avoid delay of troop trains ; and 
(5) lines for coast defence. 

The ideal conditions for a network of strategical railways 



28o THE RISE OF RAIL-POWER. 

was already a subject of discussion in Germany in 1842, 
when Ponitz brought forward his proposal that that country 
should provide herself with such a system. There were, he 
said, theorists who designed, on paper, strategical railways 
which, starting from a common centre, radiated in straight 
lines to different points on the frontier and were connected 
with one another by parallel or intersecting lines of railway 
on the principle of a geometrical design, or, he might have 
added, of a spider's web. Ponitz admitted the excellence 
of the idea, suggesting that if there were, indeed, a group 
of lines to the frontier connected by cross lines allowing of 
a complete interchange of traffic, the enemy would never 
know at what point a sudden advance in force might not 
be made, while the linking up of the entire system would 
greatly facilitate working. 

In practice, however, as he proceeded to point out, this 
ideal system could not be fully adopted, partly because the 
planning of railways is influenced by the configuration of 
the country, which may not permit of geometrical designs for 
iron roads ; and partly because the trunk lines of national 
systems of rail communication had already been laid by 
private enterprise on the principle of catering for the social 
and economic needs of the community and of returning 
interest on capital expenditure, rather than of serving 
military or political purposes. 

In the proposals which Ponitz himself advanced for pro- 
viding Germany with a complete network of strategical 
lines he sought to combine, as far as possible, the commercial 
and the military principle ; though the subsequent pre- 
dominance, in most countries, of the economic element in 
regard to railways in general strengthened the force of his 
contention that an ideal system was not necessarily a 
practicable one. The suggested geometrical design was, 
nevertheless, not lost sight of, and it continued to be re- 
garded as the plan that should, at least, be followed in 
respect to strategical railways, as far as circumstances 
would permit. 

Dealing with this particular subject in his " Geschichte 
und System der Eisenbahnbenutzung im Kriege " (Leipzig, 



STRATEGICAL RAILWAYS: GERMANY. 281 

1896), Dr. Josef Joesten included the following among the 
conditions which, theoretically and practically, should 
enable a railway system to respond to the necessities ol 
war : — • 

1. To each of the strategical fronts of the national terri- 
tory there should be the largest possible number of railway 
lines, all independent the one of the other. 

2. The converging lines terminating at the bases of con- 
centration, and more especially those leading to the coast 
or to great navigable rivers, should be crossed by numerous 
transverse lines in order to allow of the rapid passing of 
troops from any one of the lines of concentration to any 
other. 

3. Positions or localities having a recognised strategical 
value should be selected as the places where the two types 
of lines should cross, and these intersection points, when 
they are near to the frontier, should themselves be protected 
by fortifications serving as points d'appui for movements 
of advance or retirement. 

It is possible that, if the building of railways in Germany 
had been left entirely to the State from the outset, these 
principles would have been generally followed there ; but 
in Prussia the private lines taken over as the result of 
the policy of nationalisation adopted by that country — the 
total length of those acquired since 1872 being now nearly 
10,000 miles — had been originally constructed to serve, not 
strategic, but economic purposes, and, more especially, the 
industrial interests of Westphalia and the Rhineland, the 
Government having been left by private enterprise to pro- 
vide, not alone the strategical lines, but, also, the lines that 
were wanted to serve the less promising economic require- 
ments, of Eastern Prussia. To say, therefore, as some writers 
have done, that the Prussian — if not the German — railways 
as a whole have been designed to serve military purposes is 
erroneous. It is none the less true that the adoption of the 
principle of State ownership conferred alike on Prussia and 
on other German States a great advantage in enabling them 
both to build strategical lines as, ostensibly, part of the 
ordinary railway system and to adapt existing lines to 



282 THE RISE OF RAIL-POWER. 

military purposes so far as conditions allowed and occasion 
might require. 

In these circumstances any close adherence to ideal 
systems has, indeed, not been practicable ; yet the activity 
shown in Germany in providing either new or adapted 
strategical lines of railway has been beyond all question. 

Such activity has been especially manifest since the 
Franco-German war of 1870-1. It is, indeed, the case 
that during the last twenty-five years there have been con- 
stant representations by Prussian trading interests that the 
railways in Westphalia and Rhineland, numerous as they 
might appear to be, were unequal to the industrial needs of 
those districts. The reasons for these conditions were that 
the Administration, eager to secure railway " profits," had 
neglected to provide adequately for improvements, widen- 
ings and extensions of line, and for additions to rolling 
stock. No one, however, is likely to suggest that Prussia 
has shown any lack of enterprise in the construction of 
strategical lines which would enable her to concentrate 
great masses of troops on her frontiers with the utmost 
dispatch. " The rivalry between neighbouring States," 
writes von der Goltz in " The Conduct of War," " has had 
the effect of causing perfectly new lines to be constructed 
solely for military reasons. Strategical railways constitute 
a special feature of our time " ; and in no country has this 
fact been recognised more clearly, and acted upon more 
thoroughly, than in Germany. 

It would, nevertheless, be a mistake to attempt to form 
a reliable estimate of the situation, from a strategical point 
of view, on the basis of the ordinary German railway maps, 
and certain reproductions thereof recently offered in the 
English Press have been wholly misleading. Not only 
may these maps be hopelessly out of date — one, for instance, 
that was published in a military journal in the autumn of 
1914 contained none of the strategical lines built by Prussia 
since 1900 for troop movements in the direction of Belgium 
— but they invariably draw no distinction between State- 
owned lines which do come into consideration in regard to 
military transports and agricultural or other lines — includ- 



STRATEGICAL RAILWAYS: GERMANY. 283 

ing many narrow-gauge ones — which serve local purposes 
only and are still owned by private companies, the State 
not having thought it necessary in the general interest to 
take them over. 

A more accurate idea of the real bearings of German 
railways on the military and strategical situation can be 
gathered from the large map (" Kartenbeilage I ") which 
accompanies the " Bericht " presented to the Kaiser, in 
1911, by the Prussian Minister of Public Works under 
the title of " Die Verwaltung der offentlichen Arbeit en in 
Preussen, 1900 bis 1910." On this map a clear distinction 
is drawn between State-owned and company-owned lines, 
while difference in colouring shows the additions made to 
the State system during the decade either by construction 
of new lines or by State acquisition of existing lines. 

One especially noticeable feature brought out by this map 
is the fact that, in addition to the innumerable railway 
lines built either to the frontiers or establishing intercom- 
munication and exchange of traffic between those lines 
themselves, there is an almost unbroken series running 
parallel to the coasts of Pomerania and East Prussia, and 
thence southward all along and close to the frontiers of 
Russia and Russian Poland. In this way troops can be 
moved, not only by different routes to many points along 
the Baltic coast or the Russian frontier, but, also, from one 
of these coastal or frontier points direct to another, as may 
be desired. 

The strategical significance of this arrangement is suffi- 
ciently obvious ; but any possible doubt as to the purpose 
aimed at is removed by some observations thereon made 
by Joesten, who further says in his " Geschichte und System 
der Eisenbahnbenutzung im Kriege " : — 

If it is true that, generally speaking, the best railways for 
general purposes constitute excellent lines of communication 
for armies, it is no less true that good, or very good, strategical 
lines cannot, and ought not to, in all cases constitute good com- 
mercial lines. In support of this assertion one can refer to 
the immense extent of railway lines on the coasts of Pomerania. 
These lines, which are of the first importance from a strategical 
point of view, have only a moderate value from a commercial 



284 THE RISE OF RAIL-POWER. 

standpoint, considering that they do not connect the interior 
of the country with any district providing goods or passenger 
traffic on a material scale, and only provide means of com- 
munication between localities having identical needs. 

What is thus admitted in regard to the coastal railways 
of Pomerania applies no less to many, if not to most, of the 
frontier lines in East Prussia, West Prussia and Silesia. 

Not only, again, is the number of German lines going to 
the frontiers, and no farther, out of all proportion to the 
number of those providing for international communication, 
but the map on which these observations are based shows 
that between 1900 and 1910 there were added to the Prus- 
sian State system many lines which (i) established additional 
transverse links between those already going to the Russian 
frontier, (2) provided alternative routes thereto, or (3) sup- 
plemented the lines which skirt the frontier, a few miles 
inland, by branches going therefrom to strategic points 
actually on the frontier itself. 

As against this construction of an elaborate network of 
strategical lines towards and along the Russian frontier, 
there must be put the fact that although, by this means, 
Germany acquired the power to effect a great and speedy 
concentration of troops on the frontier itself, her locomo- 
tives and rolling stock would not be able to cross into Russia 
and run on the railways there because of the di-fference in 
gauge. On the eastern frontier the question as to how an 
invasion in large force could be effected was, consequently, 
quite different from that which would present itself on 
the western frontiers, where the railway gauges of Belgium, 
Luxemburg and France were the same as those of Germany. 

It was certain that whenever, in the event of war, Ger- 
man troops were able to enter Russian territory, Russia 
would withdraw into the interior or else destroy such oi 
her locomotives and rolling stock as the enemy might other- 
wise utilise for his own purpose. If, therefore, the Germans 
wanted to use the existing Russian lines, they would either 
have to build, in advance, locomotives and rolling stock 
capable of running thereon, or they would have to convert 
the Russian gauge of 5 feet to the German gauge of 4 feet 8 



STRATEGICAL RAILWAYS: GERMANY. 285 

inches, so that German trains could run on the other side of the 
frontier. As already remarked on page 61, the reduction 
of the broader gauge into a narrower one would involve 
fewer engineering difficulties than an expansion of the Ger- 
man gauge into the Russian gauge ; yet even the former 
procedure, if carried out over any considerable length of 
line, would take up a good deal of time, and this would be 
still more the case if the Russians, when they retreated, 
destroyed the railway track and bridges behind them, as 
they might confidently be expected to do. 

Dependence, again, on the existing lines across the frontier 
would, apart from questions of conversion and reconstruc- 
tion, still give Germany only a very small number of railway 
routes into Russia, and these, also, at points where the 
opposition offered might be especially active. 

What, in these circumstances, Germany evidently planned 
to do as soon as her troops crossed the frontier, in the event 
of a war with Russia, was to supplement the strategical 
lines on her own side of that frontier by military light rail- 
ways which, laid on the ordinary roads, or on clearances to 
be effected, on Russian territory, would render her indepen- 
dent of the ordinary railways there, while offering the fur- 
ther advantage (i) that the laying of these narrow-gauge 
military lines — in rough and ready fashion, yet in a way 
that would answer the purposes of the moment — could be 
effected in shorter time than the gauge-conversion and the 
reconstruction of the Russian trunk lines would take ; and 
(2) that these military railways could be built from any 
points along the frontier which were capable of being 
reached direct from the German strategical lines, and offered 
either an existing road or the opportunity of making one 
for the purpose. 

In the light of this assumption, one can understand more 
clearly the reason for those short lines which, branching out 
from the German strategical railways that run parallel to 
the Russian frontier though some miles from it, are carried 
to the frontier and there suddenly stop. It was, presum- 
ably, from such terminal points as these that the laying of 
the military railways on Russian territory would begin. 



286 THE RISE OF RATT.-POWER. 

As regards the type of railways to be employed and the 
preparations made in advance for supplying and constructing 
them, we have the testimony of Mr. Roy Norton, an Ameri- 
can writer, who says in " The Man of Peace " — one of the 
" Oxford Pamphlets, 1914-15," pubHshed by the Oxford 
University Press : — 

On February 14 of this year (1914) I was in Cologne, and 
blundered, where I had no business, into what I learned was a 
military-stores 3^ard. Among other curious things were tiny 
locomotives loaded on flats which could be run off those cars 
by an ingenious contrivance of metals, or, as we call them in 
America, rails. Also there were other flats loaded with sec- 
tions of tracks fastened on cup ties (sleepers that can be laid 
on the surface of the earth) and sections of miniature bridges 
on other flats. I saw how it was possible to lay a line of tem- 
porary railway, including bridges, almost anywhere in an in- 
credibly short space of time, if one had the men. . . . Before 
I could conclude my examination I discovered that I was on 
verboten ground ; but the official who directed me out told 
me that what I had seen were construction outfits- 
Mr. Norton further quotes the following from a letter he 
had just received from a Hollander who was a refugee in 
Germany at the outbreak of the war, and reached home on 
August 30, 1914 :— 

Never, I believe, did a country so thoroughly get ready for 
war. I saw the oddest spectacle, the building of a railway 
behind a battle-field. They had diminutive little engines and 
rails in sections, so that they could be bolted together, and 
even bridges that could be put across ravines in a twinkling. 
Flat cars that could be carried by hand and dropped on the 
rails, great strings of them. Up to the nearest point of battle 
came, on the regular railway, this small one. ... It seemed 
to me that hundreds of men had been trained for this task, for 
in but a few minutes that small portable train was buzzing 
backward and forward on its own small portable rails, distribut- 
ing food and supplies. . . . I've an idea that in time of battle 
it would be possible for tliose sturdy little trains to shift troops 
to critical or endangered points at the rate of perhaps twenty 
miles an hour. ... A portable railway for a battle-field struck 
me as coming about as close to making war by machinery as any- 
thing I have ever heard of. 

One may thus reasonably conclude, in regard to the Russo- 



STRATEGICAL RAILWAYS: GERMANY. 287 

German frontier, (i) that the broader gauge of the Russian 
railways would itself offer no real obstacle to the German 
troops whenever the time came for their invading Russian 
territory ; (2) that in this eventuality the Germans would 
be able, by reason of the preparations made by them in 
advance, to lay down along the ordinary Russian roads 
lines of military light railways already put together in com- 
plete sections of combined rails and sleepers, which sections 
would only require to be fastened the one to the other to be 
at once ready for use ; and (3) that these portable military 
railways, to be built on Russian territory, were designed 
both to supplement and to render still more efficient Ger- 
many's network of strategical railwaj^s along her eastern 
frontier. 

In southern Silesia many improvements in the rail com- 
munication with Austria were made in 1900-10. New 
connections were established with the frontier railways, 
offering alternative routes from interior points, while various 
lines which stopped short of the frontier were extended to 
it and linked up with Austrian lines on the other side. 

In her relations with France, Germany's efforts to im- 
prove still further her rail communications to the eastern 
and north-eastern frontiers of that country have been con- 
tinuous since the war of 187c -i, on which campaign she 
started with a great advantage over the French since she 
was able to concentrate her troops on those frontiers by nine 
different routes, namely, six in North Germany, and three 
in South Germany, whereas France herself had then only 
three available. The course adopted by Germany has been 
(i) to secure a larger number of routes to the French frontier. 
South Germany's three lines, for instance, being increased 
to six ; (2) to provide double track, or to substitute double 
for single track, for lines leading to the frontier and having 
a strategical importance ; (3) to construct lines which cross 
transversely those proceeding direct to the French frontiers, 
thus allowing of intercommunication and transfer of traffic 
from one to another ; and (4) improvement of the interior 
network of lines, with a view to facilitating military transport 
services in time of war. " Altogether," says Joesten, " we 



288 THE RISE OF RAIT.-POWER. 

have nineteen points at which our railways cross the Rhine, 
and sixteen double-track lines for the transport of our 
troops from east to west, as against the nine which were 
alone available for concentration in 1870." 

While showing all this activity on the immediate frontiers 
of France, Germany was no less zealous in providing alter- 
native routes for a fresh invasion of French territory, the 
adoption of this further policy being obviously inspired 
by the energy that France was herself showing in the 
strengthening of her north-east frontier against invasion. 

One such alternative route was represented by Luxem- 
burg. Not only did Germany have lines of her own on the 
north, south, and east of Luxemburg, but the hnes within 
the Grand Duchy itself had passed under German control ; 
and if Germany thought fit to disregard her treaty obliga- 
tions, and use the Hnes for strategical purposes, Luxemburg 
was powerless to prevent her from so doing. 

Another alternative route was by way of Belgium ; and 
the various developments of Germany's railway policy on 
the Belgian frontier since 1908 point in an unmistakable 
manner to deliberate preparation on her part for an invasion 
of that country, whether for the purpose of passing through 
it, as a means of reaching a more vulnerable part of French 
territory than the strongly fortified north-east corner, or 
in pursuance of designs against Belgium itself. 

The full story of Germany's activity in this direction will 
be found in a series of articles from the Fortnightly Review 
reproduced by the author, Mr. Demetrius C. Boulger, in 
" England's Arch-Enemy : A Collection of Essays forming 
an Indictment of German Pohcy during the last sixteen 
years" (London, 1914)-^ 

The story opens with the establishment by Germany, 
about the year 1896, of a camp at Elsenborn, ten miles 
north-east of Malmedy, a town situate close to the Belgian 
frontier and four miles from the Belgian town of Stavelot. 

^ The articles which here specially come into question are — 
"The Menace of Elsenborn " (published in the Fortnightly, July, 
igo8) ; "An Object Lesson in German Plans" (February, 1910) ; 
and "A Further Object Lesson in German Plans " (February, 1914). 



STRATEGICAL RAILWAYS: CxERMANY. 289 

The camp was begun on a small scale, and at the outset the 
establishment of it on the site in question was declared by 
the Prussian authorities to have no strategical significance. 
It steadily developed, however, in size and importance, 
and its position, character and surroundings all suggested 
that it was designed for aggressive rather than defensive 
purposes. 

At first the camp was reached from Hellenthal, a station, 
fourteen miles away, on a light railway connected with the 
lines in the Eifel district, between Cologne and Treves 
(Trier), on the Moselle ; but in 1896 a light railway was con- 
structed from Aix-la-Chapelle parallel with the Belgian 
frontier as far as St. Vith, a distance of fifty miles, the main 
purpose of this line being stated to be the securing of a 
better connection, from Sourbrodt, for the camp at Elsen- 
born. The line was, nevertheless, extended to Trois Vier- 
ges (Ger. Uflingen), where it connected both with the rail- 
way system of the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg and with 
the main lines of the Belgian System from Pepinster, via 
Spa, Stavelot, Trois Ponts and Gouvy, to Trois Vierges, 
From Trois Ponts there is a direct route to Liege, while 
Gouvy, situate only a few miles from Trois Vierges, is the 
junction both for Libramont, on the main line from Brussels 
to Metz and Alsace, and for the further junction of Beatrix, 
the central point of a Belgian line running parallel with the 
French frontier from Dinant to Luxemburg. 

The single-track line from Aix-la-Chapelle along the Bel- 
gian frontier, supplemented by a light-railway branch from 
Weismes to Malmedy, met all the traffic requirements of a 
scantily-populated and primitive district, devoid alike of 
industries and of local resources, and offering very little 
traffic ; but in 1908 the Prussian Government suddenly 
decided to double the line, first as far as Weismes, and then 
to St. Vith, notwithstanding that there was no apparent 
justification for such a procedure. The widening involved, 
also, the reconstruction of a high embankment originally 
designed for one set of metals, a fact which showed that 
only a few years previously — since when the local traffic 
had not materially increased — there was no idea that a 

u 



290 THE RISE OF .RAIL-POWER. 

double-track line would ever be wanted. Still more signifi- 
cant was the fact that, in addition to the second set of metals, 
sidings were provided on such a scale at the stations en 
rotite, in localities possessing only a dozen or so of cottages, 
that, in the aggregate, trains containing a complete Army 
Corps could have been accommodated on them. At one 
station three sidings, each about 500 yards long, were sup- 
plied, and at another a perfect network of sidings was con- 
structed, including two which were at least half a mile long 
and were, also, equipped with turntables.' 

The provision, more especially, of sidings such as these 
at local stations where the trains were few and far between 
and the ordinary merchandise was represented by some 
occasional coal trucks, could have but one purpose. They 
were obviously designed— in conjunction with the substitu- 
tion of double for single track — to permit of a large body 
of troops, whether from Aix-la-Chapelle (an important 
point of concentration for the Prussian Army, on moblisa- 
tion), or elsewhere, being assembled in the immediate 
neighbourhood of Weismes, the junction of the branch line 
to Malmedy, for an invasion of Belgium. The doubling of 
the rails as far as Weismes was completed by May, 1909. 
It was afterwards continued to St. Vith, and so on to Trois 
Vierges. 

We have thus far, however, got onl}^ the first chapter of 
the story. The second opens with the further attempt of 
the Prussian Government to secure an extension of the 
Weismes-Malmedy line as a " light railway " across the 
frontier to Stavelot, three miles east of Trois Ponts, thus 
giving a shorter route from Aix-la-Chapelle and the camp 
at Elsenborn to Liege, Namur, Louvain and Brussels, and 
a second route to Gouvy for Libramont, Bertrix and the 
north of France. 

As the result of the influence they were able to bring to 
bear on them, the Germans succeeded in pursuading the 
Belgian Government, not only to agree to the Weismes- 
Malmedy branch being continued to Stavelot, but them- 

^ They were "hydraulic tiirntables," according to Major Stuart- 
Stephens. See The English Review for June, 1915. 



STRATEGICAL RAILWAYS: GERMANY. 291 

selves to build the greater part of this connecting link, and 
even to cut, on the north of Stavelot, a tunnel without which 
that town would have remained inaccessible by rail. 

Once more there could be no suggestion that this connect- 
ing hnk, opened in October, 1913, was wanted in the inter- 
ests of the ordinary traffic, the needs of which were ade- 
quately met by the diligence running twice a day between 
Malmedy and Stavelot. What was really aimed at was a 
rail connection with the Belgian system by means of which 
the troops concentrated in those extensive sidings on the 
Aix-la-Chapelle-St. Vith line could be poured into Belgium 
in a continuous stream for the achievement of designs on 
Belgium or — operating from either the Belgian or the 
Luxemburg frontier — on France. 

In helping to provide this connection, Belgium, as subse- 
quent events were to show, was in a position akin to that 
of a man forced to dig the grave in which he is to be buried 
after being shot ; but Belgium, we are told, " yielded in 
this and other matters because she could not resist without 
support, and no support was forthcoming." There cer- 
tainl5^ was an attempt to lull possible suspicions by the 
designation of the Malmedy-Stavelot link as a " light rail- 
way." It was, also, evident that the physical conditions 
of the Weismes-Malm6dy branch, with which it was to con- 
nect, would not permit of any heavy traffic along it. But 
the so-called " hght railway " was built with the same gauge 
as the main-line systems on each side of the frontier ; 
the powers obtained in respect to it allowed of trains being 
run at a speed of forty miles an hour, as against the recog- 
nised speed of sixteen miles an hour on light railways 
proper ; while no sooner had the link been estabhshed than 
Germany discarded the defective Weismes-Malmedy branch 
for the purposes of military transport, and built a new hne 
from Malmedy to Weywertz, a station to the north or north- 
east of Weismes. This Malmedy- Weywertz branch would, 
it was understood, be used exclusively for military traffic, 
and the station at Weywertz was, in due course, provided 
with its own extensive platforms and network of sidings 
for the accommodation of troop trains. 



292 THE RISE OF RAIL-POWER. 

We now come to the third chapter of the story ; and here 
we learn that what was happening in the immediate prox- 
imity of the German-Belgian frontier was but part of a much 
wider scheme, though one still designed to serve the same 
purpose — that, namely, of ensuring the invasion of Belgium 
by German troops with the greatest facility and in the least 
possible time. 

From Weywertz, the new junction for Stavelot and the 
Belgian railways in general, the Germans built a line to 
Jiinkerath, a station north of Gerolstein, on the line from 
Cologne to Treves. Then from Blankenheim, immediately 
north of Jiinkerath, and from Lissendorf, on the south of 
the same station, there were opened for traffic, in July, 1912, 
new double-track lines which, meeting at Diimpelfeld, on 
the existing Remagen-Adenau line, gave a through route 
for troops from the Rhine, across the Eifel district to Wey- 
wertz, and so on to Stavelot for destinations (in war-time) 
throughout Belgium, Luxemburg, or along the northern 
frontier of France. 

This direct route to Belgium offered the further advantage 
that it avoided any necessity for troops from the Rhine to 
pass through Cologne, where much congestion might other- 
wise occur. It also left the Aix-la-Chapelle-Weywertz 
route free for troops from Cologne and Westphalia, while 
a further improvement of the facilities for crossing the 
Rhine made Remagen still more accessible for troops from 
all parts of Central Germany destined for Belgium — and 
beyond. 

Reference to the Prussian State Railways official map 
shows, also, (i) a new line from Coblenz which joins, at 
Mayen, the existing railway from Andernach, on the Rhine, 
to Gerolstein, in the Eifel, whence the Belgian border can be 
reached either via Jiinkerath and We3^wertz or via Lam- 
mersweiler and the Luxemburg station of Trois-Vierges ; 
(2) the extension to Daun, also on the Andernach-Gerolstein 
route, of a short branch on the Coblenz-Treves Railway which 
previously terminated at Wittlich ; and (3) several other 
small lines in the Eifel district, offering additional facilities 
for the concentration of troops on the Belgian frontier. 



STRATEGICAL RAILWAYS: GERMANY. 293 

So the Malmedy-Stavelot " light . railway " — especially 
in view of this series of new German lines all leading thereto — 
had become a railway of the greatest strategical impor- 
tance ; and the fourth chapter of the story (though one 
upon which it is not proposed to enter here) would show 
how this network of strategical lines, developed with so 
much energy and thoroughness, was brought into operation 
in 1914 immediately on the outbreak of war, and, from that 
time, constituted one of the main arteries for the passage 
of German troops to and from Belgium and Northern 
France. 

In regard to Holland, one finds a new line of railway from 
Jiilich — a station reached from Diiren, on the main line 
between Cologne and Aix-la-Chapelle — to Dalheim, the 
German frontier station on the direct line from Cologne via 
Rheydt to Roermond, a Dutch station on the right bank 
of the Meuse (which is here crossed by two bridges), and 
thence through the Belgian stations of Moll and Heren- 
thals and across the flat expanse of the Campine to Antwerp. 

This line obviously offers an alternative route for the 
transport of troops from Cologne and Aix-la-Chapelle to 
Dalheim ; but of still greater significance is the information 
given by the writer of the Fortnightly Review articles as to 
the changes carried out at Dalheim itself, transforming 
that place from " an unimportant halting-place " into " a 
point of concentration of great strategical importance " 
on the frontiers of Holland. 

Inasmuch as the line from Dalheim to Roermond and 
on to Antwerp was already a double one, the alterations 
made at Dalheim were confined to a liberal provision of 
railway sidings in order that, as we have seen was done on 
the Belgian frontier, a large body of troops could be con- 
centrated for a possible invasion, in this instance, either of 
Holland itself, or of Belgium by the alternative route across 
the south-eastern corner of Dutch territory. 

One of the Dalheim sidings, about a quarter of a mile in 
length, is situate on a high embankment ; and, in order 
that it could be reached without interfering with other 
traffic, a bridge over which the main line runs east of Dal- 



294 THE RISE OF RAIL-POWER. 

heim station was widened to allow of the laying across it of 
a third pair of rails. Other sidings adjoining Dalheim 
station have no fewer than ten pairs of parallel rails, and 
there are still others on the west of the same station, to- 
wards the Dutch frontier. At Wegberg and Rheydt, east 
of Dalheim, further sidings were provided which, like those 
at Dalheim, would not possibly be required for other than 
military reasons. 

Summing up the situation in regard alike to the Belgian 
and the Dutch frontiers, Mr. Boulger remarks, in his article 
of February, 1914 : — 

Thus on an arc extending from Treves to Nijmegen (exclud- 
ing from our purview what is called the main concentration on 
the Saar, behind Metz), the German War Department has 
arranged for a simultaneous advance by fourteen separate 
routes across Holland, Belgium and the Grand Duchy. 

In view of all these facts, there is no possible room for 
doubt as to the prolonged and extensive nature of the pre- 
parations made by Germany for the war she instigated 
in 1914 ; but the particular consideration with which we 
are here concerned is that of seeing to what extent those 
preparations related either to the construction of strate- 
gical lines of railway or to the adaptation of existing lines 
to strategical purposes. 

Leaving Belgium and Holland, and looking at the Prus- 
sian State lines in Schleswig-Holstcin, one finds on the 
official map the indication of a new hne (partly built and 
partly under construction in 1910) which, starting from 
Holtenau, at the mouth of the Kaiser Wilhelm Canal in 
the Baltic, continues the short distance to Kiel, then turns 
to the west, connects with the Neumiinster-Vandrup main 
line to Denmark, crosses the canal, and so on to Husum, 
a junction on the Altona-Esbjerg west-coast route. This 
new line would evidently be of strategical advantage in 
moving troops from Kiel either for the defence of the Kaiser 
Wilhelm Canal or to resist invasion by sea on the north of 
the waterway. Then the existing line from Kiel through 
Eckcrnforde to Flensburg, on the Neumiinster-Vandrup 
route to Denmark, and giving through connection from 



STRATEGICAL RAILWAYS: GERMANY. 295 

Kiel to Tondern and Hoyer on the west coast — has been 
" nationahsed, " and so added to the Prussian State system ; 
while from two stations just to the north of Flensburg there 
are short new lines which, meeting at Torsbiill, continue to 
the Alsener Sund, on the west of the Little Belt, and may — 
or may not — be of value in improving Prussia's strategical 
position in this corner of the Baltic, and in immediate 
proximity to the Danish island of Fiinen. 

Finally a large number of additions have been made in 
recent years to the State Railway systems in the interior 
of Germany ; and, although a good proportion of these 
may have been provided to meet the increased economic 
and social needs of the German people, many of them must 
be regarded as strategical lines designed to facilitate (i) the 
mobilisation of troops on the outbreak of war ; (2) their 
concentration, by routes covering all parts of the Empire, 
as arranged long in advance ; and (3) their speedy transfer 
across country from one frontier to another, should several 
campaigns be fought at the same time. 

The resort by German}^ to strategical railways in Africa 
and elsewhere, as a means of furthering her Weltpolitik, will 
be dealt with in the two chapters that follow. 



CHAPTER XIX 
A German-African Empire 

Strategical railways in South-West /Africa were built 
by Germany as a means towards the achievement of her 
designs on British South Africa ; but these, in turn, were 
only part of a still greater plan having for its purpose the 
transformation of Africa as a whole into a German-African 
Empire which should compare in value, if not in glory, 
with that of the Indian Empire itself. 

Colonisation societies began to be formed in Germany 
as early as 1849 > though in the first instance the aims of 
their promotors were directed mainly to such parts of the 
world as Brazil, Texas, the Mosquito Shore, Chih and 
Morocco. All such places as these, however, offered the 
disadvantage that Germans going there could only become 
foreign settlers under the more or less civilised Powers 
already in possession.^ In the 60 's and 70 's of the nine- 
teenth century attention in Germany began to be diverted, 
rather, to Africa as a land where vast expanses, possessing 
great prospects and possibilities, and not yet controlled 
by any civilised Power, were still available not only for 
colonisation but for acquisition. So it was that successive 
German travellers explored many different parts of Africa 
and published accounts of their journeys designed, not 
merely as contributions to geographical science, but, also, 
to impress a then somewhat apathetic German public with 
the importance of their acquiring a " footing " on the 
African continent. In 1873 a German Society for the 
Exploration of Equatorial Africa was founded. This was 
followed in 1876 by the German African Society, and subse- 

1 See Vol. III. of "The Story of Africa," by Robert Browm. 
London, 1894. 

296 



A GERMAN-AFRICAN EMPIRE. 297 

quently these two bodies were combined under the name 
of the BerHn African Society. 

Not long after this, evidence was forthcoming that some- 
thing far more than the settHng of German colonists in 
Africa and the securing of a " footing " on African soil by 
Germany was really being kept in view. 

In 1880 Sir Bartle Frere, at that time Governor of the 
Cape and High Commissioner for South Africa, forwarded 
to Lord Kimberley a translation of an article which had 
just been contributed to the Geographische Nachrichtcn by 
Ernst von Weber ; and, in doing so he informed the Colonial 
Secretary that the article contained " a clear and well- 
argued statement in favour of the plan for a German colony 
in South Africa which was much discussed in German 
commercial and political circles even before the Franco- 
German War, and is said to have been one of the immediate 
motives of the German mission of scientific inquiry which 
visited southern and eastern Africa in 1870-71." 

Von Weber's proposals ^ pointed, however, to the creation, 
not simply of " a German colony " in South Africa, but of 
a German Empire in Africa. " A new Empire," he wrote, 
" possibly more valuable and more brilliant than even the 
Indian Empire, awaits in the newly-discovered Central 
Africa that Power which shall possess sufficient courage, 
strength and intelligence to acquire it " ; and he proceeded 
to show (i) why Germany should be this Power, and (2) 
the means by which she might eventually secure control 
of the whole country. 

The establishment of trading settlements was to ensure 
for the Germans a footing in the districts north of the 
Transvaal, and this was to be followed by the flooding of 
South Africa generally with German immigrants. The 
Boers spread throughout South Africa were already allied 
to the Germans by speech and habits, and they would, he 
thought, be sure to emigrate to the north and place them- 
selves under the protection of the German colonies there, 
rather than remain subject to the hated British. In any 

^ "The Germans and Africa," by Evans Lewin, Librarian of 
the Royal Colonial Institute. London, 1915- 



298 THE RISE OF RAIL-POWER. 

case, " a constant mass-immigration of Germans would 
gradually bring about a decided numerical preponderance 
of Germans over the Dutch population, and of itself would 
effect the Germanisation of the country in a peaceful 
manner. It was," he continued, " this free, unlimited 
room for annexation in the north, this open access to the 
heart of Africa, which principally inspired me with the 
idea, now more than four years ago, that Germany should 
try, by the acquisition of Delagoa Bay and the subsequent 
continued influx of German immigrants into the Transvaal, 
to secure future dominion over the country, and so pave 
the way for the foundation of a German-African Empire 
of the future." 

The procedure to be followed was (i) the acquiring of 
territory in Africa b}^ Germany wherever she could get it, 
whether in the central or in the coastal districts ; {2) co- 
operation with the Boers as a step towards bringing them 
and their Republics under German suzerainty ; and (3) 
the overthrow of British influence, with the substitution 
for it of German supremacy. 

These ideas gained wide acceptance in Germany ; they 
became a leading factor in the colonial policy of the Im- 
perial Government, and they reconciled the German people, 
more or less, to the heavy burdens which the developments 
of that policy were to involve. 

German South-West Africa 

The first steps towards the attainment of the aspirations 
entertained were taken by Herr Adolf Liideritz, a Bremen 
merchant who, acting under the auspices of the German 
Colonial Society, and having received from the Imperial 
Foreign Office assurances of its protection, established a 
trading settlement, in April, 1883, in the bay of Angra 
Pequefia, situate between Namaqualand and Damaraland 
on the west coast of Africa, and about 150 miles north of 
Orange River, the northern boundary of Cape Colony. 
Acquiring from a Hottentot chief a stretch of territor}* 215 
miles in extent in the Hinterland of Angra Pequeiia, Liide- 
ritz raised the German flag in the settlement, which thus 



A GERMAN-AFRICAN EMPIRE. 299 

became (leimany's first colony. Further concessions of 
territory were obtained, and in September, 1884, Germany 
announced tiiat the west coast of Africa, from 26 degrees S. 
latitude to Cape Frio, excepting \Valfisch Bay (declared 
British in 1878), had been placed under the protection of 
the German Emperor. A treaty made between England 
and Germany in 1890 defined the limits of the German 
South- West African Protectorate as bounded on the south 
by the Orange River and Cape Colony, on the north by 
Portuguese Angola, on the west by the Atlantic, and on 
the east by British Bechuanaland, with the so-called " Cap- 
ri vi Strip," giving Germany access from the north-east 
corner of her Protectorate to a point on the Zambezi River 
north of Victoria Falls. ^ The total area comprised within 
these boundaries was about 322,200 square miles. 

At the outset, the new Protectorate aroused little enthu- 
siasm in Germany as a colony where her surplus population 
could hope to settle and prosper under the German flag 
instead of going to foreign countries, as so many thousands 
of Germans were then doing. On a coast-line of 900 miles 
there was no good natural harbour except the one at Wal- 
fisch Bay, owned by the British. Swakopmund and Liide- 
ritzbucht, on which the German colonists would have to 
rely, were then little better than open roadsteads. Con- 
siderable expanses of the territory itself consist of drought- 
stricken desert. The rainfall in Damaraland and Nama- 
qualand averages only about three inches a year. In 
certain districts a period of five or six years has been known 
to pass without any rain at all. A record of rainfall on 
some parts of the coast has shown a total of one-fifth of 
an inch in the course of twelve months. At Walfisch Bay 
the British settlement imports its fresh water from Cape- 
town. On the higher of the series of plateaux rising gradu- 
ally to the Kalahari desert the cHmatic conditions are more 
favourable, and the better rainfall in the north-east allows 

^ Under the terms of the treaty of July 1, 1900, Germany was 
to have "free access" from her South-West Africa Protectorate 
to the Zambezi River "by a strip which shall at no point be less 
than twenty English miles in width." 



300 THE RISE OF RAIL-POWER. 

of good crops being grown, while various sections are 
favourable for stock-raising. In later years, also, various 
deposits of copper were found in the district of Otavi, some 
400 miles from Swakopmund, and diamond fields, which 
yielded nearly ;^i,ooo,ooo worth of stones in the first year, 
were discovered east of Liideritzbucht in 1908. But in 
Germany the Protectorate was regarded as a desirable 
acquisition mainly, if not exclusively, because of the advan- 
tages it was expected to afford as a base for the eventual 
creation of a German-African Empire. 

The Herero Rising 

The attainment of this higher purpose seemed likely 
to be furthered as the result of the steps taken to suppress 
the risings of the Hereros and the Hottentots between the 
years 1903 and 1907. Not only did the reinforcements 
sent out from Germany assume such proportions that at 
one time the Germans are said to have had no fewer than 
19,000 men under arms in the Protectorate, but the troops 
took with them a plentiful supply of pom-poms, mountain 
guns, field guns and Maxims of various kinds, the Revue 
Militaire des Armees Etrangeres being led to remark thereon 
that " the German columns had an unusually large propor- 
tion of artillery, roughly two batteries to three companies 
of mounted infantry ; and it is difficult to believe that so 
many guns were necessary, especially as the Hereros had 
no artillery at all.^ Probably," the Revue continued, "the 

1 The Hereros (Damaras) are not a warlike people, and although, 
at the time of the rising, many of them were armed with Mausers 
and Lee-Enfields, it has been said of them that they were not of 
much account with the rifle, their "natural weapon" being the 
assegai. A German White Book on the rebellion stated that the 
cause of the outbreak was the spirit of independence which char- 
acterised the Hereros, ' ' to whom the increasing domination of 
the Germans had become insupportable, and who believed them- 
selves stronger than the whites." According to Mr. H. A. Bryden 
(" The Conquest of German South-West Africa," Fortnightly Review, 
July, 1915) the real causes were the abuses of the white trader, 
the brutal methods of certain of&cials, and the seizure and occupa- 
tion nf tribal lands. The war developed into one of practical exter- 
miiiation for the natives concerned. Of the Hereros between 



A GERMAN-AFRICAN EMPIRE. 301 

artillery could have been dispensed with altogether ; and 
had this been done, the columns would have been rendered 
more mobile." 

The military measures taken appeared to be in excess 
of requirements even when allowance was made for the 
fact that the campaign was fought in difficult country 
and that the Germans themselves lost about 5,000 men ; 
but the real significance of the policy adopted lay in the 
keeping of a considerable proportion of the German expedi- 
tionary force in the colony after the rising had, with German 
thoroughness, been effectively crushed. 

This procedure attracted attention and adverse com- 
ment even in Germany, where doubts were already being 
entertained as to whether good value was being received 
for the £30,000,000 which the suppression of the troubles 
had cost. It was, however, made clear that the still con- 
siderable body of German troops left in the colony was 
being kept on hand there in case of the opportunity arising 
for its employment in another direction — that, namely, 
of achieving Germany's aspirations in regard to the con- 
quest of British South Africa, and the final elimination of 
British influence from Africa in general. 

Evidence both as to the nature of these continued aspira- 
tions and as to the further purpose it was hoped the troops 
on the spot might effect was forthcoming in various direc- 
tions. 

In a book of 416 pages, published in 1905, under the title 
of " Das neue Siidafrika," Dr. Paul Samassa emphasised 
the part which the German people had taken in the settle- 
ment of South Africa ; pointed to the close relationship 
and affinity of feeling between Germans and Boers ; encour- 
aged the idea of their mutually looking forward to the 
opening up of South Africa as " a land of settlement for 
the German race," and said, further : — 

German South-West Africa is, to-day, a strong trump card 
in our hands, from the point of view of Weltpolitik. In Eng- 

20,000 and 30,000 were either killed outright or driven into the 
Kalahari desert to die of starvation. The Hottentots also lost 
heavily. 



302 THE RISE OE RAIL-POWER. 

iand much has been said of late as to what a good thing it would 
be for that country if our fleet were annihilated before it became 
dangerous. . . . On our side we might cool these hot-heads, 
and strengthen the peace party in England, if we reminded 
them that, whatever the loss to ourselves of a war with that 
country, England would run a greater risk— that of losing 
South Africa. We have in German South-West Africa to-day 
about 12,000 troops, of whom one-half will remain there for 
a considerable time. In the event of a war between Germany 
and England the South African coast would naturally be block- 
aded by England ; and there would then be nothing left for 
our troops to do but to go on to Cape Colony — for their food 
supplies. 

In so doing they could, he argued, count upon the sup- 
port of the Boers, of whom there were 14,000 opposed to 
the English at the end of the South African war. As 
against this possible concentration of German troops and 
Boers there was the fact that the English garrison in South 
Africa did not exceed 20,000. So, he added, the people 
in England could consider " what an incalculable adventure 
a war with Germany might be, notwithstanding the superi- 
ority of the English fleet." 

Speaking in the Reichstag in February, 1906, Herr 
Ledebour called attention to the fact that Major von Fran- 
cois, who at one time was in command of German South- 
West Africa, had declared, in his book, " Nama und 
Damara," issued three months previously, that fewer than 
one thousand troops would suffice to maintain order in 
the colony ; and Herr Ledebour added : — " For two years 
imaginative Pan-German politicians have been disseminat- 
ing the idea that a large force must be maintained in South- 
West Africa for the purpose of exercising in the sphere of 
Weltpolitik pressure upon England, with the eventual 
object of invading Cape Colony." 

There is the testimon^^ also, of " An Anglo-German," 
who, in the course of an article on " German Clerks in 
British Offices," published in The London Magazine for 
November, 1910, tells the following story : — 

During a recent stay in Gemian}^ I was introduced bj^ a man 
I know to be one of the chief functionaries of the Commerce 



A GER^IAN-AFRTCAN EMPIRE. 303 

Defence League ^ to a friend of his who had just returned from 
(German South-West Africa. On a subsequent meeting I entered 
into conversation with this gentleman, and made inquiries 
about German progress in that part of the world. He answered 
my questions wathout reserve. Little headway was being 
made, and little was looked for. Men and money were being 
freely expended, without present return. The only good har- 
bour (Walfisch Bay) is a British possession, as hkewise are all 
the islands of any value which are dotted along the coast. 

" Why then," was my inevitable query, " do the Germans 
persist in their occupation of the country ? " 

He smiled craftily. 

" We Germans look far ahead, my friend," he rephed. " We 
foresee a British debacle in South Africa, and we are on the 
spot. Thanks to the pioneers of our excellent League, our 
plans are all matured. The League finances the scheme and 
the Imperial Government supplies the miHtary forces. By 
cession — or otherwise — W^alfisch Bay will before long be Ger- 
man territory ; but in the meantime British Free Trade opposes 
no obstacle to us, and we can pursue our purpose unmolested." 

" But what is that purpose ? " I asked, with the object of 
leading him on. 

" Surely you are not so bhnd as to need enhghtment ! " was 
his reply. " Germany has long regarded South Africa as a 
future possession of her own. When the inevitable happens, 
and Great Britain finds her hands full elsewhere, we are ready 
to strike the moment the signal is given, and Cape Colony, 
Bechuanaland, Rhodesia — all frontier States — will fall like 
ripe apples into our grasp." 

In order, however, that Germany might be prepared 
thus to take action at a moment's notice, two things were 
essential, in addition to having troops on the spot, namely, 
(i) that the colon}- should possess railways within striking 
distance alike of the Cape, of Bechuanaland and of Rho- 
desia ; and (2) that the military preparations as a whole 
should be so complete as to be read}^ for any emergency. 

^ The Commerce Defence League, as explained by the writer 
of the article, is an organisation of German traders which gives 
subsidies to German clerks so that they can take up appointments 
at nominal salaries in foreign countries, on the understanding thpt 
they are to report to the League as to the business methods, etc., 
of those countries and on openings for German trade or industry 
therein, the League acting on such information and dividing among 
its subscribers the profits derived from the agencies opened or the 
competitive businesses started. 



304 THE RISE OF RAIL-POWER. 

Railways in G.S.W. Africa 

Railways were indispensable on account, not only of the 
considerable distances to be covered, but, also, of the 
sand-belts and stretches of desert across which the transport 
of troops and stores would be a matter of great difficulty 
without the help of railways. They were, in fact, a vital 
part of the whole scheme. 

Following on Germany's annexation of Damaraland 
and Great Namaqualand, and her conversion of them into 
the Protectorate of German South-West Africa, a party 
of German engineers and surveyors landed at Swakopmund 
with the design of planning a line of railway to be con- 
structed from that point to Windhoek, and thence across 
the Kalahari desert to the Transvaal. About the same 
time, also, Germans and Boers were alike working to secure 
as much of Bechuanaland as they could, without attracting 
too much attention to their proceedings. A realisation 
of these further aims might have been of great value to 
Germany in facilitating the attainment of her full pro- 
gramme in respect to Africa ; but the scheme was frus- 
trated by Great Britain's annexation of Bechuanaland 
in September, 1885, the result of the step thus taken being 
to drive a wedge of British territory between German 
South-West Africa and the Boer Republics. 

So the railway in question got no further east than Wind- 
hoek, the capital of the colony, a distance inland of 237 
miles. 

Having failed in one direction, Germany tried another. 
Under a concession granted to them in 1887 by the Govern- 
ment of the Transvaal Republic, a group of Dutch, German 
and other capitalists, constituting the Netherlands South 
African Railway Company, built a railway from Delagoa 
Bay to Pretoria ; and the new aim of Germany was, appar- 
ently, to make use of this line, and so get access to the 
Transvaal — and beyond — from the east coast instead of 
from the west. 

Confirmation of this fact is to be found in " A Brief 
History of the Transvaal Secret Service System, from its 
Inception to the Present Time," written by Mr. A. E. 



A GERMAN-AFRICAN EMPIRE. 305 

Heyer, and published at Cape Town in 1899. The writer 
had held a position in the Transvaal which enabled him 
to learn many interesting facts concerning the working 
of the system in question. Among other things he tells 
how, at Lisbon, every effort was made to obtain a port in 
Delagoa Bay, and how, " aided by Germany, Dr. Leyds 
approached Lisbon over and over again with a view to 
get Delagoa Bay ceded to the Transvaal " ; though the 
Doctor got no more from the Portuguese authorities than a 
reminder that, under the London Convention of 1884, the 
South African Republic could conclude no treaty or engage- 
ment with any foreign State or nation (except the Orange 
Free State) until such treaty or engagement had been 
submitted to the Queen of England for her approval. 

That Germany, in giving her " aid " in these matters 
to the Transvaal Republic, was inspired by a regard for 
the furthering of her own particular schemes is beyond 
all reasonable doubt ; but Mr. Heyer shows, also, that 
when the negotiations with Portugal were unsuccessful, 
there was elaborated a scheme under which Germany and 
the Transvaal were to get what they wanted by means of 
a coup de main. Mr. Heyer says on this subject : — 

I have before me a copy of a document, dated Pretoria, 
August 24, 1892 (the original of which is still in a certain Govern- 
ment office in Pretoria), wherein a Pretoria-Berlin scheme is 
detailed, namety, " How a few regiments of Prussian Infantry 
could be landed at Delagoa Ba}^ and force their way into Trans- 
vaal territory, and, ' once in,' defy British suzerainty, and for 
all time ' hang the annoying question of her paramountcy on 
the nail.' " The name of Herr von Herff, then German Consul 
at Pretoria, appears on the document. Any one reading this 
cleverly-planned " Descent on Delagoa " would be readily 
convinced as to how very easily a German raid on Delagoa 
territory could be successfully accomplished. 

This project, also, proved abortive, and, in default 
of Delagoa Bay, Germany had still to regard her South- 
West African Protectorate, with its railways and its armed 
forces, as the base from which British interests were to 
be wiped out — sooner or later — from the Cape to Cairo. 

At the time of the outbreak of war in 1914, the principal 



3o6 



THE RISE OF RAIL-POWER. 



railways in German South- West Africa — apart irom some 
minor Hnes which do not come into consideration — were as 
follows : — 



Railway. 



2 ft. Gauge. 
Miles. 



3 ft. 6 in. Gauge. 
Miles. 









Northern 

Otavi 

Southern 

North-to-South 


121 

425 


119I 

34oi 
317 


1 
Total .... 546 


777 



Granting that the Northern Railway was needed to 
afford a means of communication beween Swakopmund 
and the capital of the colony, and that the original purpose 
of the Otavi line was to provide an outlet for the copper 
obtained from the mines in that district, it is, nevertheless, 
the fact that the Southern and the North-to-South lines 
were designed to serve what were mainly or exclusively 
strategical purposes. 

When the building of the first section of the Southern 
line — from Liideritzbucht to Aus — was under considera- 
tion in the Reichstag, one of the members of that body, 
Herr Lattmann, recommended that the vote should be 
passed without being referred to a committee ; and in 
support of his recommendation he said : — 

This way of passing the vote would be of particular import- 
ance for the whole nation, since the railway would not then have 
to be regarded from the point of view of provisioning our troops, 
or with regard to the financially remunerative character of the 
colony, but because a much more serious question lies behind 
it, namely, what significance has the railway in the event of 
complications between Germany and other nations ? Yes, 
this railway can be employed for other purposes than for trans- 
port from the coast to the interior ; our troops can be easily 
conveyed by it from the interior to the coast and thence to 
other places. If, foi example, a war had broken out with 
England we could send them into Cape Colony. 



A GERMAN-AFRICAN EMPIRE. 307 

From Aus the line was extended in 1908 to Keetmans- 
hoop, a distance inland of 230 miles from Liideritzbucht. 
Situate in the Bezirk (district) of South-West Africa nearest 
to Cape Province, Keetmanshoop, with the railway as a 
source of supply from the chief harbour of the colony, 
developed into the leading military station of German 
South-West Africa. 

At Keetmanshoop all the chief military authorities were 
stationed. It became the headquarters of the Medical 
Corps, the Ordnance Department, the Engineer and Rail- 
way Corps, and the Intelligence Corps of the Southern 
Command. It was the point of mobilisation for all the 
troops in that Command. It had a considerable garrison, 
and it had, also, an arsenal which a correspondent of the 
Transvaal Chronicle, who visited the town about two years 
before the outbreak of war in 1914 and gathered much 
information concerning the military preparations which 
had then already been made,^ described as four times as large, 
and, in regard to its contents, four times as important, as 
the arsenal at Windhoek. Those contents included — 47 
gun carriages ; fourteen i6-pounders ; eighteen ambu- 
lances ; 82 covered convoy vehicles ; 3,287 wheels, mostly 
for trek ox-wagons ; three large transportable marquees 
used as magazines and containing 28,000 military rifles ; 
huge quantities of bandoHers, kits, etc. ; three further 
magazines for ammunition, and large stores of fodder ; 
while further military supplies were constantly arriving 
by train from Liideritzbucht, whither they were brought 
from Germany by German ships. In the arsenal workshops 
was a staff of men actively engaged on the making of, 
among other military requirements, 1,000 saddles and 
water bags for the Camel Corps kept available for crossing 
the desert between the furthest limit of the railway and the 
Cape Province border. 

It was, also, in this south-eastern district, and in imme- 
diate proximity, therefore, to Cape Province and Bechuana- 
land, that the military forces kept in the colony had all 
their principal manceuvres. 

1 See South Africa, November 14, 1914- 



3o8 THE RISE OF R.\IL-POWER. 

Of still greater importance, from a strategical stand- 
point, was the branch of this Southern Railway which, 
starting from Seeheim, fort}'- miles west of Keetmanshoop, 
continued in a south-east erh^ direction to Kalkfontein, 
eight}^ miles north of Raman's Drift, on the Orange River, 
and less than ninety miles from Ukamas, where the Germans 
had established a military post within five miles of Nakob, 
situate on the Bechuanaland border, only forty miles 
from Upington, in Cape Province. From Kalkfontein 
the branch was to be continued another thirty miles to 
Warmbad, and so on to Raman's Drift — a convenient point 
for the passage of the Orange River into Cape Province 
territory' b}" an attacking force. At Seeheim, the junction 
of this branch hne, a Service Corps was stationed ; Kalk- 
fontein was the headquarters of the Camel Corps of 500 
men and animals ; and at Warmbad there was a military 
post and a mihtary hospital. 

The North-to-South hne allowed of an eas}^ movement 
of troops between the mihtary headquarters at Keetmans- 
hoop and Windlioek, or vice versa. According to the 
original estimates this line was not to be completed before 
1913. Special reasons for urgency — as to the nature of 
which it would be eas}'' to speculate — led, however, to the 
line being opened for traffic on I\Iarch S, 1912. From 
\Mndhoek, also, troops were supphed to Gobabis, situate 
100 miles east of the capital and about forty miles west of 
the Bechuanaland frontier. Gobabis became a German 
military station in 1S95. Provided with a well-equipped 
fort, it became the chief strategical position on the eastern 
border of German South-^^'est Africa. A railway con- 
necting Gobabis ^^'ith Windhoek was to have been com- 
menced in 1915. 

From Windhoek, as already told, there is rail communi- 
cation with Swakopmund. 

Grootfontein, the terminus, on the east, of the Swakop- 
mund-Ota^^. line, had been a military station since 1S99. 
Its special significance lay in the fact that it was the nearest 
point of approach by rail to the " Capri\"i Strip." along 
wliich the German troops, conveyed as far as Grootfontein 



A GERMAN-AFRICAN EMPIRE. 309 

by rail, were to make their invasion of the adjoining British 
territory of Rhodesia. Troop movements in this direction 
would have been further faciHtated by a Knk at Karibib 
connecting the Swakopmund-Otavi-Grootfontein line with 
the one to Windhoek and thence to the military head- 
quarters at Keetmanshoop. Karibib was itself a military 
base, in addition to having large railway ofhces and work- 
shops. 

With, therefore, the minor exceptions, the system of 
railways in German South- West Africa had been designed 
or developed in accordance with plans which had for their 
basis an eventual attack on British territory in three sepa- 
rate directions — (i) Cape Province, (2) Bechuanaland and 
(3) Rhodesia. The Southern and the North-to-South lines 
had, also, been built exclusively with the standard Cape 
gauge of 3 ft. 6 in., so that, when " der Tag " arrived, and 
German succeeded British supremacy in South Africa, 
these particular lines could be continued in order to link 
up with those which the Germans would then expect to take 
over from Cape Province. Keetmanshoop was eventually 
to be converted from a terminus to a stopping-place on a 
through line of German railway from Liideritzbucht to 
Kimberley, the effect of which, it was pointed out, would 
be to shorten the distance from Europe to Bulawayo by 
1,300 miles as compared with the journey via the Cape. 
Surveys had been made for extensions (i) from Keetmans- 
hoop, via Hasuur, to the Union frontier near Rietfontein, 
and (2) from Kalkfontein, on the southern branch, to 
Ukamas, also on the frontier and in the direction of Uping- 
ton, in Union territory. Each of these additions would 
have carried the original scheme a stage further, though 
it was not, apparently, thought wise to make them before 
" der Tag " actually arrived. 

On these various railways the Government of German 
South-West Africa had expended, so far as the available 
figures show, a total of, approximately, £8,400,000, defrayed 
in part from Imperial funds and in part from the revenue 
of the Protectorate. This total includes the amount paid 
by the Government to the South-West Africa Company 



310 THE RISE OF RAIL-POWER. 

for their line from Swakopmund to the Company's mines 
at Otavi and Tsumeb, but it does not include the cost of 
the original narrow-gauge Government line from Swakop- 
mund to Windhoek, of which the section between Swakop- 
mund and Karibib was abandoned when the Swakopmund- 
Otavi line, via Karibib, was taken over, the remaining section 
from Karibib to Windhoek being then converted into the 
Cape 3 ft. 6 in. gauge. On most of the open Hnes no more 
than two or three trains a week were run, and on some of 
the branches there was only one train in the week.^ . 

Military Preparations 

Further details as to the elaborate nature of the prepara- 
tions made for the realisation of Germany's dreams of con- 
quest in Africa are supplied by Mr. J. K. O'Connor in a 
pamphlet published at Capetown, towards the end of 1914, 
under the title of " The Hun in our Hinterland ; or the 
Menace of G.S.W.A." Mr. O'Connor made a tour through 
German South- West Africa a few months before the out- 
break of the war, assuming the role of a journalist in search 
of data concerning the agricultural resources of the terri- 
tory. He obtained much information which had other 
than an agricultural interest. 

He ascertained, for instance, that the German troops 
then in the territory consisted of Mounted Infantry, Field 
Artillery, Machine Gun Divisions, Intelhgence Divisions, 
an Engineer and Railway Corps, Field Railway Divisions, 
an Etappen-Formation, a Camel Corps, a Police Force 
and a Reserve, representing altogether — apart from natives 
— a trained European force of approximately 10,000 men, 
whose duties and location in the event of war had all been 
assigned to them in advance. 

He found that the railways had been supplemented by 
a strong transport service of natives, who had an abundant 
supply of oxen and mules for their wagons. 

1 " Memorandum on the Country known as German South- 
West Africa. Compiled from such information as is at present 
available to the Government of the Union of South Africa." Pre- 
toria, 1915 



A GERMAN-AFRICAN EMPIRE. 311 

He tells how (in addition to the military stations already 
mentioned) the Germans had established throughout the 
territory a network of block-houses, strengthened by forts 
at intervals and supplemented by magazines and store- 
houses at central points ; while 1,600 miles of telegraph 
and telephone wires, together with the " Funken-telegraph," 
placed all these stations and outposts in touch with one 
another as well as with the military headquarters and the 
various towns. ^ 

He says concerning Keetmanshoop that its conversion 
into the chief military station in the territory was " the 
first move in the German game." 

He points to the fact that " Das Koloniale Jahrbuch," 
published by authority, laid it down that the Boers in 
British South Africa must be constantly reminded of their 
Low-German origin ; that German ideas must be spread 
among them by means of German schools and German 
churches, and he declares : — " For thirty years Teuton 
ideas have been foisted upon the Boer population of British 
South Africa. For thirty years, under the guise of friend- 
ship, Germany has plotted and planned for the elimination 
of the Anglo-Saxon element from South Africa." 

Mr. O'Connor further writes : — 

From what I was able to gather it was evident that the military 
plans of the Germans were completed for an invasion of the 
Union territory, and that they were only awaiting the day when 
Peace would spread her wings and soar from the embassies of 
Europe. It was not anticipated, however, that that would 
be in August, 1914. 

They were confident of success, and from the conversations 
that took place between officers and myself it was evident that 
the possession of the African continent was the greatest desire 
of the Teutons. 

The smashing up of France and Great Britain were only inci- 
dents that would lead to the whole continent of Africa becoming 
a German possession ; and it was considered that as Germany 
would accomplish this, despite her late entrance upon the stage 
as a Colonial Power, she would have more to show for her thirty 
years as such a Power than could either England or France, 
who had started colonising centuries before her. 

^ The colony was also in wireless-telegraphic communication 
via Togoland, with Berlin. 



312 THE RISE OF RAIL-POWER. 

The great aim became to break France and England, for the 
purpose of acquiring their African possessions ; and, having 
broken these Powers, Germany would have turned her atten- 
tion to the African possessions of smaller Powers who, having 
neither England nor France to rely upon, would have been 
compelled to relinquish their possessions, and, by so doing, 
would have made Germany the supreme Power in Africa. 

Summing up the conclusions at which he arrived, as the 
result of all that he saw for himself and all that he had 
heard from responsible German officers during the course 
of his tour, Mr. O'Connor says : — 

From the day the Germans set their feet upon South-West 
African soil they have prepared themselves for a raid into 
British territory. For years the Reichstag has voted two 
million pounds per annum for the purpose. Had these mil- 
lions been spent on the development of South-West Africa 
it would, to-day, be a colony of which any country might 
be proud. But what can they show for this expenditure ? 
Nothing but a miUtary camp. 

It is evident, then, that this territory has not been regarded 
by the Berliners as a colony, but as a jumping-off ground for 
an invasion of British South Africa. 

Here we have simply an amplification of ideas which, 
as we have seen, had long been entertained in Germany ; 
though they were ideas it was now being sought to reduce 
to practice by a resort, in advance, to every step that could 
possibly be taken for ensuring their realisation. Any 
suggestion that the system of strategical railways which 
had been built, and the elaborate military preparations 
which had been effected, were merely precautions against 
a further possible rising of the natives would have been 
absurd. 

Rail Connection with Angola 

What Mr. O'Connor says in regard to Germany's attitude 
towards the African possessions of the smaller Powers gives 
additional significance to a report published in the Leip- 
ziger Neiieste Nachrichten of May 31, 1914, concerning a 
project for building a line of railway along the coast of 
German South-West Africa to connect with Portuguese 



A GERMAN-AFRICAN EMPIRE. 313 

Angola. This was to be the first of a series of fines which 
" after lengthy discussions with the Imperial Government," 
were to be carried out in German South- West Africa by a 
syndicate of prominent shipping and banking houses in 
Germany, controlling an initial capital of 50,000,000 marks 
(/'2, 500,000). It was further reported that in the early 
part of 1914 the Governor of German South-West Africa 
made a tour through the northern part of the Protectorate, 
going as far as Tiger Bay, in Angola, " in connection with 
possible railway construction in the near future." 

Angola was certainly an item on the German list of desir- 
able acquisitions in Africa. It has been in the occupation 
of Portugal since the middle of the fifteenth century ; but 
the point of view from which it was regarded by advocates 
of German expansion may be judged from some remarks 
made in the Kolnische Zeitung by a traveller who returned 
to Germany from Angola in June, 1914 : — 

The game is worth the candle. An enormous market for 
industrial products, rich and virgin mineral treasures, a fruitful 
and healthy country equally suitable for agriculture, cattle- 
breeding and immigration, and the finest harbours on the west 
coast — that is the prize that awaits us. 

A territory offering these advantages, having an area 
estimated at 484,000 square miles, and extending inland 
for a distance of 1,500 miles, might be coveted for its own 
sake ; but its possession would have been of still greater 
value to Germany (i) as a continuation, northwards, of 
German South-West Africa, and (2) as the starting point 
for a chain of communications, under German control, 
extending right across the African continent, from west 
to east. 

The coast-railway spoken of by the Leipziger Neuesic 
Nachrichten was to link up German South-West Africa with 
Angola, in which country, also, the Germans hoped to 
obtain extensive mining and agricultural concessions, thus 
forwarding their established policy of peaceful penetration 
by means of commerce and railways, and establishing 
economic interests which might be expected to lead to 



314 THE RISE OF RAIL-POWER. 

political developments in due course, and so prepare the 
way for an eventual seizure of " the prize that awaits us." 

The Germans had also sought to finance the completion 
eastwards of the Lobito Bay or Benguela Railway, to which 
reference will be made later on in connection with the 
development of the Katanga district of the Belgian Congo ; 
but the condition they advanced, namely that the control 
of the line should be left in their hands, coupled with their 
adoption of suspicious lines of policy in other directions,^ 
led to their railway proposals being declined by the Portu- 
guese, with thanks. 

German East Africa 

Then, in order to understand the full scope of the aspira- 
tions Germany was cherishing towards the x\frican Continent, 
one must take into account her railways on the east coast 
no less than those on the west coast, since these, also, 
formed an essential part of the general scheme. 

The line which stretches right across German East Africa, 
from Dar-es-Salaam, the capital of the Protectorate, to 
Kigoma, on Lake Tanganyika, and north of Ujiji, has a 
total length of 1,439 miles ; and if the economic develop- 
ment of a territory estimated as having a total area of 
384,000 square miles had been the sole aim in view, the 
Tanganyikabahn would have well deserved to rank as a not- 
able enterprise in German colonial expansion, and one call- 
ing for commendation rather than criticism. The question 
arises, however, whether, in addition to the development of 
German East Africa itself, the railway in question was not 
intended, also, to facilitate the realisation of Germany's 
designs against Central Africa as part of her aforesaid 
scheme for the eventual conquest of the African continent. 

The feverish haste with which the second and third 
sections of the railway were built sufficed, in itself, to give 
rise to suspicions of ulterior designs. The first section, 

^ For details of so-called ' ' invasions ' ' of Portuguese territory 
by German political agents, posing as engineers and prospectors, 
see an article on " The Invasion of Angola," by Mr. George Bailey, 
in the issue of " United Empire : The Royal Colonial Institute 
Journal," for October, 191 5. 



A GERMAN-AFRICAN EMPIRE. 315 

from Dar-es-Salaam to Morogo (136!^ miles), was constructed 
by a syndicate of German bankers acting under a State 
guarantee of interest, and the work, begun in February, 1905, 
was completed in September, 1907. The second section, 
from Morogo to Tabora (526 i miles), was to have been 
completed by July i, 1914 ; but in 1910, the Reichstag 
voted a special credit both for the earlier completion of this 
second section — which was thus finished by February 26, 
1912 — and for surveys for the third section, from Tabora 
to Kigoma (776 miles). Such, again, was the celerity with 
which the work on this third section was pushed forward 
that, although the date fixed for the completion of the line 
was April i, 1915, through rail communication from the 
Indian Ocean to Lake Tanganyika was established by 
February i, 19 14 — that is to say, one year and two months 
in advance of time. 

We here come to the two-fold question (i) Why was the 
railway extended at all for the 776 miles from Tabora to 
Lake Tanganyika, considering that this portion of the 
German Protectorate offered, in itself, the prospect of no 
traffic at all for the line ^ ; and (2) why was it necessary 
that such haste should be shown in the completion of the 
undertaking ? 

"The Other Side of Tanganyika" 

To the first of these questions the reply is (i) that the 
traffic on which the western section of the Tanganyikabahn 
was mainly to rely for its receipts was traffic originating in 
or destined for the Belgian Congo ; (2) that the control it 
was hoped to secure over Belgian trade was, in combination 
with the strategical advantages offered by the railway, to 
be the preliminary to an eventual annexation by Germany 
of the Belgian Congo itself ; and (3) that like conditions 
were to lead, if possible, to the final realisation of von 
Weber's dream of 1880. 

" That we are directing our gaze to the other side of Tan- 

1 " Le Cheinin de Fer du Tanganyika et les progres de i'Afrique 
orientale allemande." Par Camille Martin. Renseignments coloni- 
aux, No. 3. Supplement de I'Afrique fraiiQaise, Mars, 1914. Paris. 



3i6 THE RISE OF RAIL-POWER. 

ganyika," said the Kolonial Zeitung of April 4, 1914, in 
referring to the completion of the railway to Kigoma — an 
event which occasioned a great outburst of enthusiasm in 
Germany — " goes, of course, without saying." 

There certainly is much on " the other side of Tangan- 
yika " to which Germany might look with feelings of envy. 
In regard to mineral wealth, alone, the resources of the 
South-eastern section of the Belgian Congo could not fail 
to make a strong appeal to her. 

The great copper belt in the Katanga district,^ com- 
mences about 100 miles north-west of the British South 
African post, Ndola (situate twelve miles south of the 
Congo border), and extends thence, in a north-westerly 
direction, for a distance of 180 miles, with an average 
breadth of twenty-five miles. " In the not far distant 
future, when the many problems of development are solved, 
the Katanga copper belt," says Mr. J. B. Thornhill,^ " will 
be one of the controlling factors in the copper supply of the 
world." In the report of the British South Africa Com- 
pany for the year ending March 31, 1914, it was stated 
that the copper-mining industry in Katanga had attained 
to considerable dimensions ; that furnaces \vith a capacity 
of 1,000 tons of copper per month were at work, and that 
further large additions to the plant were being made. 

Katanga has, also, a tin belt, and coal, gold, iron and 
other minerals are found there, besides. 

In the German territory on the eastern side of Lake 
Tanganyika there are, indeed, minerals ; but they are 
found in no such abundance as in the Belgian territory on 
the western side of the lake. German East Africa can, 
however, produce in great abundance the wheat, the rice 
and the other food supplies necessary for the workers in 
Katanga mines, and the German view has been that the 
eastern and the western sides of the lake should be regarded 

i A region on the Belgian Congo about 115,000 square miles in 
extent and one of the best watered districts in Africa, lying nearly 
in the centre of the African continent, and equidistant, therefore, 
from the Atlantic and Indian Oceans. 

* " Adventures in Africa under the British, Belgian and Portu- 
guese Flags." Londcn, 1915. 



A GERMAN-AFRICAN EMPIRE. 317 

as complementary the one to the other, and that the Tan- 
ganyikabahn should convey these food supplies to the lake, 
for transfer to the other side by steamer, and bring back 
the products of the mines for distribution, via the German 
east coast route and the Indian Ocean, among the markets 
of the world. In the same way it was hoped that all goods 
and necessaries likely to be imported into the Katanga 
and Mweru districts from Europe would reach their destina- 
tion via this German East Africa Central Railway ; and 
German business houses were strongly advised to establish 
branches in those districts,^ so that, apparently, Germany 
would eventually control the trade as well as the transport 
of " the other side of Tanganyika." 

The development of the south-western section of Ger- 
many's east-coast Protectorate had, in itself, become a 
matter of vital importance (" eine Lebensfrage " ^) ; but 
the Belgian Congo was the only quarter to which that sec- 
tion could look for markets for its produce. The possibility 
of securing sufficient traffic for the Central Railway to ensure 
its financial success may have been a secondary considera- 
tion ; but the railway itself was to serve a most important 
purpose, economically, by helping Germany to capture 
the Tanganyika and trans-Tanganyika trade, and by mak- 
ing her East Africa colony more prosperous ; politically, 
by strengthening her hold on the Belgian Congo through 
the increase of her commercial interests there ; and 
strategically, by affording her the means of effecting a 
speedy concentration of troops in Central Africa, should 
the occasion for so doing arise. 

This last-mentioned purpose was to be further attained 
by the projected construction of what would have been a 
purely strategical line from Tabora, on the Tanganyika- 
bahn, to Mwanza, on the southern shores of the Victoria 
Nyanza, whence German troops would — in case of need — 
be in a position to make a rear attack on British East Africa. 

^ " Welches Interesse hat Deutschland an der ErschUessung des 
Congo ? " Von Emil Zimmerraann. KolonioJe Rundschau, Mai, 
191 1. Berlin. 

- "Die Eroberung des Tanganyika-Verkehrs." Vcn Emil Zim- 
mermann. Koloniah Rundschau, Jan., igii. Berlin. 



3i8 THE RISE OF RAIL-POWER. 

Central Africa 

German^^'s hopes of thus strengthening her position in 
Central Africa by means of the Tanganyikabahn received, 
however, a serious set-back through the activity and enter- 
prise of Belgian and British interests in providing, open- 
ing up or projecting alternative transport routes which 
threatened (i) to divert a large proportion of the traffic she 
had expected to secure for the East Africa Central line ; (2) to 
diminish greatly the prospect of her achieving the commer- 
cial and political aims she cherished in regard to the Belgian 
Congo ; (3) to make it still more difficult for German East 
Africa to emerge from a position of comparative isolation, 
and (4) to impede greatly the realisation of Germany's 
aspirations in regard alike to Central Africa and the African 
Continent. 

It is the more necessary that the bearing of all these 
facts on the general situat on should be understood because 
they tend to indicate the critical nature of the position into 
which the said aspirations had drifted, and the imperative 
necessity by which Germany may, by 1914, have considered 
she was faced for adopting some bold course of action if she 
were still to look forward to the possibilit}- of those aspira- 
tions being realised. 

The principle originally adopted by King Leopold in his 
efforts to develop the Congo State was that of supplement- 
ing navigation on the Congo by railways wherever these 
were necessary either to overcome the difficulties presented 
by rapids or to supply missing links in the chain of com- 
munication to or from the west coast. The same policy 
was followed by the Belgian Government when they assumed 
control, and the last of these links — the line, 165 miles long, 
from Kabalo to Albert ville, connecting the Congo \vith the 
Tanganyika — was opened in March, 1915. One reason, in 
fact, given in Germany for the express speed at which the 
Tanganyikabahn was completed to Kigoma was an alleged 
fear that the Belgians might capture the trade and transport 
of the territory in question by getting to the lake first. 

This combined river and rail transport still left it neces- 
sary for traftic from the Congo basin to the west coast to 



A GERMAN-AFRICAN EMPIRE. 319 

follow the winding course of that river, with a number of 
transhipments ; and if the route in question had been the 
only competitor of the Tanganyikabahn, Germany would 
have had less cause for uneasiness. Meanwhile, however, 
the Compagnie du Chemin de Fer du Bas-Congo had built 
a line — forming a continuation of the Rhodesian Railways 
— from the boundary of Northern Rhodesia, at Elizabeth- 
ville, to Kambove (Katanga) ; and a continuation of this 
line to Bukama, on the Lualaba, a navigable tributary of 
the Congo, was (i) to give shorter and better access to the 
Congo for products from Katanga, and (2) to establish 
combined rail and water transport between the entire rail- 
way system of South Africa and the mouth of the Congo. 
Already the minerals from Katanga were finding their outlet 
to the sea on the east coast via the Rhodesian Railways 
and the Portuguese port of Beira, instead of via the Tan- 
ganyikabahn and the German port of Dar-es-Salaam. The 
former had, indeed, become the recognised route for this im- 
portant traffic in preference to the latter. The line between 
Kambove and Bukama had not been completed when war 
broke out in 1914 ; but the provision of this through route, 
and the various facilities it would offer, rendered still more 
uncertain the prospect of Germany getting control of the 
trans-Tanganyika traffic for her own lines. 

There were other important railway schemes, besides. 

From Bukama rail communication is to be continued 
right across Central Africa to Matadi, to which point the 
Congo is navigable for large vessels from its mouth, less 
than a hundred miles distant. This line, in addition to 
avoiding the great bend of the Congo, will open up and 
develop the vast and promising territory in the northern 
districts of the Belgian Congo, south of that river. 

Another scheme which is to be carried out is a line from 
Kambove, in the Southern Katanga, to the south-western 
boundary of the Belgian Congo, and thence across Portu- 
guese territory to the present eastern terminus of the Lobito 
Bay Railway. This will give to the mining interests of 
Katanga direct rail communication, by the shortest possible 
route, with a port on the west coast, while the connection 



320 THE RISE OF RAIL-POWER. 

at Kambove with the l^iodesian and South African sys- 
tems will make the line a still more important addition to 
the railways of Africa for the purposes alike of development 
in the central districts and as a shorter route to and from 
Europe. German financiers were at one time desirous of 
undertaking the extension eastward of the Lobito Bay 
Railway — mainly, as it seemed, with a view to furthering 
German interests in Portuguese territory (see page 314) ; 
but the Kambove-Lobito Bay line is now to be constructed 
with British capital. 

Finally there is the Cape-to-Cairo Railway which, passing 
through the Katanga mining districts, is likely to divert 
still more of the traffic Germany had counted upon alike 
for her Tanganyikabahn and as a means towards the attain- 
ment of her political aspirations in Central Africa. 

Whilst these various developments were proceeding, 
there were still others, in the Cameroons, to which attention 
may now be directed. 

The Cameroons, Lake Chad and the Sudan 

Anticipations of the great results for Germany which 
would follow from the building of railways in the Cameroons 
began to be entertained about the year 1897. The main 
objective of the schemes brought forward seems to have 
been, however, not simply the internal economic develop- 
ment of an already vast area, but the carrying of lines of 
communication to the furthest limits of that area in order, 
apparently, to extend German interests and influence to 
territories beyond. 

One of these schemes was for the building of a line of 
railway from Duala, the chief port of the Cameroons, to 
Lake Chad (otherwise Tsad), a sheet of water some 7,000 
square miles in extent which, situate on the western borders 
of the Sudan, constitutes the extreme northern limits of 
German territory in this direction, while the shores of the 
lake are occupied jointly by Germany, England and France. 

The proposed line was to have an estimated total length 
of about 1,000 kilometres (621 miles). In September, 1902, 



A GERMAN-AFRICAN EMPIRE. 321 

the German Imperial Government granted to a Kamerun- 
Eisenbahn-S3mdikat a concession for building the line ; 
an expedition sent out by the syndicate made a survey of 
the route in 1902-3 ; and a Kamerun-Eisenbahn-Gesell- 
schaft, with a capital of 17,000,000 marks (£850,000), was 
formed by a group of bankers and others in Germany to 
build the first section. 

In December, 1903, the German Emperor, at his recep- 
tion of the President of the Reichstag, gave his blessing to 
all such enterprises by declaring that an essential condition 
(" eine Lebensbedingung ") for the welfare of Germany's 
colonies in Africa was that the building of railways should 
be taken earnestly in hand. In 1905 the prospects of the 
proposed line seemed so hopeful that the early commence- 
ment of construction was announced as probable ; but 
various difficulties arose, including much trouble in regard 
to labour, and the line did not get beyond the end of its 
first stage, a distance of only 160 km. (100 miles) from the 
coast. 

Although the scheme was thus not fully carried out, 
there was no doubt as to the nature of the purposes it had 
been designed to serve. In his official and detailed account 
of the proposed undertaking ^ — a book of exceptional 
merit from the point of view of the clearness and of the 
exhaustive data with which " the case for the line " is 
presented — the director of the syndicate says : — 

My opinion is that only a great railway — one that unites the 
Sudan with the Atlantic, and that extends from Lake Chad 
to the west coast of Africa — will be in a position both to develop 
fully the economic interests of the Cameroons and to assure 
to Germany a means of access to the richest territor}^ that Cen- 
tral Africa possesses. 

Had the hue been completed as far as Lake Chad, it 
would have been a powerful competitor of British railways 
via the Nile or the Red Sea for the traffic of the Sudan, 

' " Kamerun und die Deutsche Tsadsee-Eisenbahn." Von Carl 
Rene, Director des Kamerun-Eisenbahn-Syndikats. 251 pp. Mit 
37 Textbildern und 22 Tafehi nach Original-Aufnahmen der Kame- 
run-Eisenbahn-Expediton, 1902-3. Berlin, 1905. 



322 THE RISE OF RAIE-POWER. 

with its vast commercial possibilities ; and, had it been foimd 
the better route, it might have established German com- 
mercial supremacy in this part of Central Africa, with the 
inevitable political developments to follow. " The Ger- 
man Tsadsee-Eisenbahn," the director of the syndicate 
further wrote, " will, especially when it has been completed, 
be for the whole of Central Africa a Kulturwerk of the first 
importance." 

The Germanisation of Lake Chad, combined with an 
eventual acquiring by Germany of French interests in the 
Sahara and North Africa, would further have permitted 
the continuation of the Tsadsee-Eisenbahn from that lake 
to Algeria along the route already projected in France for 
a Trans-African line linking up the Mediterranean alike 
with the Congo and with the Rhodesian and other British 
railways in South Africa, via Lake Chad — a line which, it 
is said, would offer no great technical difficulty in construc- 
tion.^ 

The Cameroons and the Congo 

Another ambitious scheme was for the building of a 
Mittellandbahn which, crossing the Njong, would event- 
ually link up the chief port of the Cameroons with a navig- 
able tributary of the Congo. Here, again, the line as 
actually constructed has not been carried a greater distance 
than about 300 km. (186 miles). At one time, in fact, the 
original project seemed to have been abandoned ; but quite 
recently it has been brought forward again under conditions 
which have a distinct bearing on what has already been said 
concerning Germany and Central Africa. 

From the views expressed by Emil Zimmermann in his 
" Neu-Kamerun," ^ one gathers that in 1913 Germany was 
regarding with some degree of concern alike the outlook 
for her Tanganyikabahn, on v/hich over ;^7,ooo,ooo had been 

1 " Bulletin de la Societe de Geographie et d 'Etudes coloniales 
de Marseilles." Tome XXXVI, No. i. le Trimestre, 191 2. 

2 " Neu-Kamerun ; Reiseerlebnisse und wirtschaftspolitische 
Untersuchimgen." Von Emil Zimmermann. 135 pp. Map. Ber- 
lin, 1913. 



A GER^IAN-AFRICAN EMPIRE. 323 

spent, and the prospective set-back to her aspirations in 
regard to the Belgian Congo ; and Herr Zimmermann, in 
giving an account of the additions made to her Cameroons 
possessions at the expense of France, under the agreement 
of November 4, 1911, following on the Agadir crisis, makes 
certain overtures to Belgium, and follows them up with a 
distinct threat, should she refrain from responding to them. 

Belgium and Germany, he says, in effect, are the two 
dominant Powers in Central Africa ; and he is of opinion 
that it will be to their mutual interest to co-operate in the 
development of that great territory. Belgium, however, he 
finds to be faced by the need for a great outlay of money 
(i) on account of necessary improvements of her Congo rail 
and river communication, to meet expanding traffic require- 
ments, and (2) in order to develop her Katanga territory. 
She cannot herself command the necessary capital, but 
Germany could assist her to raise it, and would do so — 
provided Belgium undertook that traffic from her Tangan- 
yika and Mweru districts, and, also, from points east of the 
Middle Congo, should reach the sea by " its natural outlet," 
that is to say, by the German East African Central Railway. 

Should Belgium refuse to agree to these proposals, and 
should she, by her high tariffs, continue to impede the flow 
of traffic to German territory, then it would be open to 
Germany to construct lines of railway from the west coast 
either to navigable tributaries of the Congo or to the Congo 
itself, and so divert the traffic from the Belgian Congo at 
certain important points, to the serious prejudice of Belgian 
interests. 

Apart from what might be done in the way of extending 
the Duala-Njong line to the said navigable tributaries of 
the Congo, as originally projected, Herr Zimmermann says 
that, under the treaty of November 4, 1911, Germany has 
the right to continue her Cameroons railways across French 
territory (France having reciprocal rights as regards Ger- 
man territory) ; and he points out how she could exercise 
this power, to the detriment of Belgium, should that country 
not accept her proposals in regard to the Congo basin and 
Central Africa. He specially mentions the fact that when 



324 THE RISE OF RAIL-POWER. 

the boundaries of the 100,000 square miles of territory 
added, at the expense of France, to the German Cameroons 
(then already 191,000 square miles in extent), were fixed 
by virtue of the treaty of 1911, the wedge-like strip on 
the south of Spanish Muni was so defined as to leave at the 
eastern point thereof a gap between the Spanish territory 
and the French Cameroons wide enough for either a road 
or a railway ; and he emphasises the fact that, by taking 
advantage of the facilities thus open to her, Germany could, 
under the treaty of 1911, construct a railway 1,000 km. 
(621 miles) long from Muni Bay through the said gap and 
cross French territory to the junction of the Sangha with 
the Congo. Alternatively, and by arrangement with France, 
the line could start from Libreville. " What such a rail- 
way, tapping the Congo-Sangha-Ubangi traffic at its most 
favourable point, would mean, can," Herr Zimmermann 
remarks, " be left to the Belgians themselves to say." 

He does not suggest that such schemes as these would 
in themselves be of great value to Germany ; but he thinks 
they might have a powerful influence, both politically and 
economically, on the solution of the Tanganyika problem 
in Germany's favour. In fact, he considers that since the 
1911 treaty Germany has practically controlled the situation 
in Central Africa ; and from all he says it is a reasonable 
assumption that the Agadir crisis, the concession of territory 
exacted from France, and the undertaking as to the carrjdng 
of German Cameroon railways across French territory, had 
far more to do with German designs on the Belgian Congo 
and Central Africa than is generally supposed. 

In another work, published a year later,^ the same writer, 
adopting now a distinctly different tone, endeavoured to 
appease an " Anti-Central Africa agitation " which, he 
tells us, had developed in Germany and was protesting alike 
against the " danger " of acquiring any more " Congo- 
swamps " and against the " boundless German plans " in 
Africa. He further sought to soothe the suspicions which, 
he found, had been excited in Belgium and elsewhere as 

1 "Was ist uns Zentralafrika ? " Von Emil Zimmermann. ^j 
pp. Berlin, 19 14. 



A GERMAN-AFRICAN EMPIRE. 325 

to the nature of Germany's plans in Africa. Germany, 
he declared, had no annexation projects in view. Her as- 
pirations were purely economic. Kamerun, thanks to the 
German-French treaty of igii (which, he reiterated, had 
changed the whole situation), could now take a considerable 
share in the development of Central Africa, and was the 
more entitled so to do since she had, in Duala, " one of the 
best harbours on the west coast of Africa." 

Official Admissions 

As against, however, affirmations such as these, there 
is the undisputable evidence of no less an authority than 
the German Foreign Minister himself as to the real nature 
of Germany's designs on the Belgian Congo. 

In the second Belgian Grey Book, published in August, 
1915, under the title of " Correspondance Diplomatique 
relative a la Guerre de 1914-15," there is given (pp. 2-3) a 
letter from the Belgian Minister in Berlin, Baron Beyens, 
to his Government, recording, under date April 2, 1914, a 
conversation which the French Ambassador in Berlin in- 
formed him he had had quite recently (and, therefore, only 
about four months before the outbreak of war) with the 
German Foreign Minister. Herr von Jagow suggested to 
him that Germany, France and England should arrive at 
an agreement on the construction and linking up of rail- 
ways in Africa. M. Gambon replied that in this case Bel- 
gium ought to be invited to confer with them, as she was 
constructing some new railways on the Congo. He also 
expressed the view that any conference held on the subject 
should meet at Brussels. To this Herr von Jagow re- 
sponded, " Oh no ; for it is at the expense of Belgium that 
our agreement should be made. Do you not think," he 
added, " that King Leopold placed too heavy a burden on 
the shoulders of Belgium ? Belgium is not rich enough to 
develop that vast possession. It is an enterprise beyond 
her financial resources and her means of expansion." The 
French Ambassador dissented, but Herr von Jagow went 
on to affirm that the great Powers were alone in a position 
to colonise, and that the small Powers were destined to 



326 THE RISE OF RAIL-POWER. 

disappear or to gravitate towards the orbit of the large 
ones. In the words of the Belgian Minister — 

II developpa ropinion que seules les grandes Puissances sont 
en situation de coloniser. II devoila meme le fond de sa pensee 
en soutenant que les petits Etats ne pourraient plus mener, 
dans la transformation qui s'operait en Europe au profit des 
nationalites les plus fortes, par suite du developpement des forces 
economiques et des moyens de communication, I'existence 
independante dont ils avaient joui jusqu'a present. lis etaient 
destines a disparaitre ou a graviter dans I'orbite des grandes 
Puissances. 

" Der Tag " and its Programme 

The story here presented of Germany's aims in Africa 
has taken us over almost the entire African Continent. It 
now only remains to be seen how those aims were to be 
realised, not merely as the outcome of Pan-German dreams 
and advocacy, but as the result of many years of scheming, 
plotting and actual preparation, all directed to the wiping 
out of the influence in Africa of other Powers, great as well 
as small, and the final realisation of Germany's long- 
cherished purpose. 

According to conversations Mr. O'Connor had with 
military officers in German South- West Africa just before 
the outbreak of war in 1914, the programme under which 
Germany hoped to become " the supreme power in Africa " 
when " der Tag " so long looked forward to should arrive 
M'-as, in effect, as follows : — 

Belgium was to be disposed of "at one gulp." This 
would make it an easy matter for Germany to take over 
the Belgian Congo. 

France would be paralysed ; and, being paralysed, she 
would not be able to prevent Germany from succeeding to 
the whole of her possessions in Africa. 

The Dervishes would stir up a rebellion in Egypt, ^ and 
other rebellions were anticipated in Ireland and India. 

1 How Egypt was to be invaded and captured by the Germans 
and Turks, in combination, with the help of the raihvays in Asia 
Minor, will be told in the following Chapter. 



A GERI\IAN-AFRICAN EMPIRE. 327 

While England was fully occupied in these directions the 
Afrikanders were to rise en masse and declare British South 
Africa an Afrikander Republic. 

The forces in German East Africa would make a sudden 
raid into British East Africa. Having annexed that terri- 
tory and got possession of the railway, they would next 
invade Rhodesia from the east, in co-operation with troops 
from German South- West Africa advancing to the Zambezi , 
via the Caprivi Strip, from the railway terminus at Groot- 
fontein. 

Meanwhile German columns would have moved (i) from 
the military station at Gobabis into Bechuanaland, crossing 
the desert of Kalahari, to effect the capture of Vryburg ; 
and (2) from Keetmanshoop, and other points served by 
the Seeheim branch, into northern Cape Province, via 
Raman's Drift, Schuit Drift and the south-east corner of 
the territory. 

Rhodesia having been seized, more troops would be 
available to proceed to the assistance of the Afrikander 
forces operating in the Cape Province, the Transvaal and 
the Orange Free State — a " rising " on the part of the 
Afrikanders as soon as they saw a good opportunity for 
one being taken for granted. In return for the services 
thus rendered by her to the Afrikanders in establishing their 
Republic, Germany would take a portion of the Transvaal, 
as well as part of the Zululand coast. 

With Belgium and France effectively crushed, and the 
power of Great Britain in South Africa broken down, those 
countries would no longer be in a position to prevent Ger- 
many from annexing Portuguese Angola ; and this she 
was to do next. She Vv^ould " allow " the Afrikander Re- 
public to take Delagoa Bay ; but the Republic itself was 
to come under the " guardianship " of Germany. The 
word " suzerainty," Mr. O'Connor says, was not mentioned, 
" guardianship " being preferred ; but, with the exception 
of Italian Somaliland — about which nothing was said — 
practically the whole of Africa was either to belong to 
Germany or to be brought directly or indirectly under 
her control. 



328 THE RISE OF RAIL-POWER. 

The Objective of the World-War 

Since the outbreak of the World- War in 1914 there has 
been much speculation as to the real objective and purpose 
of Germany in bringing it about. 

Do the facts stated in the present chapter afford any 
help towards a solution of this problem ? 

We have seen the nature of the aims cherished by Ger- 
many towards Africa, the practical and persistent efforts 
she made during a long series of years for their attainment, 
and the substantial expenditure she incurred in the hope 
of at last securing the prize she considered was awaiting her. 

We have seen how the purpose of Germany in Africa 
was less to develop colonies for their own sake than to 
regard them as points from which to absorb or to control 
neighbouring territories. 

We have seen how the development of rival railways 
in Central Africa had recently threatened the supremacy 
Germany hoped to gain and may, indeed, have suggested 
to her the need for early vigorous effort, if she wished still 
to secure the realisation of her aims. 

We have seen what, in the view of the German Foreign 
Minister, should be the fate of small Powers which stand 
in the way of the aggrandisement of great ones. 

We have seen, also, how, in the opinion of officers serving 
in German South- West Africa, the real purpose of the war 
to which they were looking forward, and for which they 
were preparing, was the German annexation of Africa, and 
how the " smashing up " of France and Great Britain, the 
overthrow of Belgium, the seizure of Portuguese possessions, 
and the virtual absorption of the proposed new Boer Re- 
publics were to be the preliminaries to a final transforma- 
tion of the whole African Continent into a German possess- 
sion — the " new Empire " which, in the words of von Weber, 
was to be " possibly more valuable and more brilliant than 
even the Indian Empire." 

May one not conclude, in face of these and of all the other 
facts which have here been narrated, that one, at least, of 
the main objectives of Germany (apart from minor ones) in 



A GERMAN-AFRICAN EMPIRE. 329 

provoking the Great War was no less a prize than the African 
Continent ; ^ and that when she invaded Belgium and France 
she did so less with the object of annexing the former coun- 
try, and of creating another Alsace-Lorraine in the latter 
than of having " something in her hand " with which to 
" bargain " — in the interests of her projects in Africa — 
when the time came for discussing the terms of peace, assum- 
ing that she had not already attained her purpose at the 
outset by the sheer force of what she thought would be her 
irresistible strength ? 

If this conclusion should seem to be warranted, on the 
basis of what has already been told, it may certainly be 
regarded as confirmed by the fact that, down to the moment 
when these lines are being written, any suggestions coming 
from German sources as to possible terms of peace have 
invariably included proposals for the concession to Ger- 
many of territory in Africa as " compensation " for the 
surrender of territory she has herself occupied in Belgium 
and France. 

Thus, in a despatch published in The Times of September 
4, 1915, a statement was reproduced from the Chicago 
Tribune giving, on the authority of " a writer in close touch 
with the German Embassy," the terms on which Germany 



1 Should there still be any doubt on this point, it will be removed 
by the frank admission of Die Nene Zeit, even whilst the Great War 
is still in progress, that Germany undertook the war with " the 
main object of extending her colonial possessions." As quoted in 
the Daily Express of October 8, 1915, Die Neiie Zeit further said : — 
" Herr Paul Rohrbach favours the acquisition of the whole of Central 
Africa, but opines that this territory, vast as it is, will not be adequate 
to furnish Germany with all the elbow room she may require within 
the next half-century. Professor Delbriick, while agreeing with 
Herr Rohrbach, as to the importance of Central Africa, as well as of 
Angola and the whole of British East Africa, further emphasises the 
necessity for the acquisition of the Sudan and the southern part of 
the Sahara, now in the possession of France. We are quite in 
agreement with these eminent leaders that we must found an 
" India " of our own, and that the greater part of the African 
continent must furnish the requisite territory. Once well established 
in this new empire, we shall link ourselves with Asiatic Turkey, and 
also with China, reconstructing the political and economic founda- 
tions of both on a scientific German basis." 



330 THE RISE OF RAIL-POWER. 

would be prepared to agree to peace. These terms included 
the following : — 

The cession of the Belgian Congo to Germany, as compensa- 
tion for the evacuation of Belgium. 

The cession of African colonial territory to Germany by 
France, as compensation for the evacuation of Northern France. 

Then, also, on October 24, 1915, the New York American 
published a long interview with Professor Hans Delbriick 
on the terms of peace which Germany hoped to secure if 
" President Wilson and the Pope " would consent to act 
as mediators. The interview (which had been approved 
by the German censor) included the following passage : — 

It is quite possible that peace could be secured by ceding to 
Germany such colonies as Uganda by England and the French 
and Belgian Congos as a ransom for the evacuation by German}^ 
of Northern France and Belgium. 

Such concessions, if one can conceive the possibility of 
their being made — would still leave Germany far from the 
attainment of her full African programme ; but the fact of 
these proposals being put forward at all as " terms of peace " 
is quite in keeping with the whole course of Germany's 
policy in Africa, and points clearly to what may, in fact, 
have been her chief objective in the war itself. 

Any moral reflections either on the said policy or on the 
" programme " by means of which it was to have been 
carried out would be beyond the scope of the present work. 

What we are here concerned in is the fact that Germany's 
dreams of an African Empire, given expression to by von 
Weber in 1880, and the subject of such continuous effort 
ever since, were, in the possibilities of their realisation, 
based primarily on the extension and utilisation of such 
facilities for rail-transport as she might be able either to 
create or to acquire. 



CHAPTER XX 
Designs on Asiatic Turkey 

Just as avowedly strategical lines in Africa were to lead 
the way to the creation of a German African Empire, so, 
in turn, was that system of economic-political-strategical 
lines comprised within the scheme of what is known as the 
" Baghdad Railway " designed to ensure the establishment 
of a German Middle- Asian Empire, bringing under German 
control the entire region from the Mediterranean to the 
Persian Gulf, and providing convenient stepping-off places 
from which an advance might be made on Egypt in the one 
direction and India in the other. 

The conception of this further programme was spread 
over (i) the period during which Germany's aspirations were 
limited to the inheritance of Turkey's possessions in Asia ; 
and (2) the period when such inheritance began to be re- 
garded as a means to the realisation of still greater aims in 
the domain of Weltpolitik. 

For more than half a century Asiatic Turkey has been 
looked upon as Germany's Land of Promise. Anatolia was 
thought a most desirable territory for her surplus population. 
The development, under German influence, of that territory 
as a whole — especially with a revival of the Babylonian 
system of irrigation — was considered to offer vast possi- 
bilities of commercial prosperity. Wheat, cotton and 
tobacco, especially, might be raised in prodigious quantities, 
and there was the prospect, also, of a petroleum industry 
rivalling that of Baku itself. Turkey was a decadent 
nation, and as soon as " the Sick Man " succumbed to his 
apparently inevitable fate — or even before, should circum- 
stances permit— Germany was ready to step into his shoes. 

331 



332 THE RISE OF RAIE-POWER. 

That these aspirations had, indeed, long been cherished 
is a fact capable of ready proof. 

In 1848 Wilhelm Roscher, the leading expounder of the 
historical school of political economy in Germany, selected 
Asia Minor as Germany's share in the Turkish spoils, when- 
ever the division thereof should take place ; and Johann 
Karl Robertus (1805-1875), the founder of the so-called 
scientific socialism in Germany, expressed the hope that he 
would live long enough to see Turkey fall into the hands 
of Germany, and, also, to see German soldiers on the shores 
of the Bosporus. 

Coming to a more recent period, we find that Dr. Aloys 
Sprenger, the German orientalist, published, in 1886, a 
pamphlet on " Babylonia, the richest land in the past, and 
the most promising field for colonisation in the present," ^ 
in which, after dealing with the history, physical conditions 
and resources of Babylonia, he predicted that, before the 
end of the century, not only Babylonia but Assyria, which 
was inseparable from it, would, if not formally annexed, at 
least come under the control of some European Power. 
Assyria and Syria, he declared, were even better adapted 
for colonisation than Babylonia. He continued : — 

The Orient is the only territory on earth which has not yet 
been taken possession of b}' some aspiring nation. It offers the 
finest opportunities for colonisation, and if Germany, taking 
care not to let the opportunity slip, should act before the Cos- 
sacks come along, she would, in the division of the world, get 
the best share. . . . The German Kaiser, as soon as a few 
hundred thousand armed German colonists bring these promis- 
ing fields into cultivation, will have in his hand the fate of Asia 
Minor, and he can — and will — then become the Protector of 
Peace for the whole of Asia. 

Dr. Karl Kaerger, traveller and economist, lamented, in 
his " Kleinasien ; ein deutsches Kolonisationsfeld " (Ber- 
lin, 1892), the enormous loss sustained by Germany in the 
migration of so many of her people and of so much capital 
to Anglo-Saxon lands ; but there were, he affirmed, only 

' " Babylonieii, das reichste Land in der Vorzeit und das lohn- 
endste Kolonisationsfeld fiir die Gegenwart." 128 pp. Heidelberg, 
1886. 



DESIGNS ON ASIATIC TURKEY. 333 

two countries to which German settlers could go with any 
hope of retaining alike their nationality and their commer- 
cial relations with the Mutterland. Those countries were — 
Africa and Asia Minor. He had been especially impressed, 
during the course of his travels, by the prospects and possi- 
bilities of Anatolia, and he recommended the establishment 
there of large German companies which would organise 
schemes of colonisation and land cultivation on a large scale. 
The colonies so established should be self-governing, free 
from all taxation for ten years, have the right of duty-free 
importation of necessaries, and enjoy various other privi- 
leges, while Turkey, in return for the concessions she thus 
made to the settlers, would be assured " the protection of 
Germany against attack." Not only hundreds of thousands, 
but millions, of colonists could find a second home on those 
wide expanses. Germany herself would gain a dual advan- 
tage — an economical one, and a political one. Concerning 
the latter. Dr. Kaerger observed : — 

If the German Empire, while maintaining her friendship 
with Austria and Italy — which, under all circumstances, the 
political situation in Europe undoubtedly requires — can direct 
the stream of her emigration to the fertile territories of Turkey, 
and if she can conclude with that country a closer customs con- 
vention, then the entire economic, and with it, also, the political 
future of Germany wiU rest on a broader and a firmer basis than 
if the present streams of hundreds of thousands of her people, 
and millions of capital, continue to pass in increasing propor- 
tions, year by year, to countries which are economically hostile 
to us. 

Dr. Kaerger was especially concerned lest Germany might 
be anticipated by Russia or England in the realisation of 
her own designs on Asia Minor. Should, he declared, either 
of those countries acquire any further territory from Turkey, 
or increase in any way Turkey's dependence upon them, 
the result would be the most serious disturbance of the 
prevailing situation in Europe that had occurred since 1870, 

The development of all these ideas went so far that in 
1895 the Alldeuischer Blatter recommended that Germany 
should establish a Protectorate over the Turkish possessions 
in Asia Minor; and in the following year the Alldeuischer 



334 THE RISE OF RAIL-POWER. 

Verband published a manifesto on " German claims to the 
Inheritance of Turkey" (" Deutschlands Anspruch an das 
tiirkische Erbe "), making a formal statement of Germany's 
alleged rights to the Turkish succession. 

Germany had by this time already secured a footing on 
the soil of Asiatic Turkey by virtue of the Anatolian Rail- 
way. The first section— a length of about seventy miles, 
extending from Haidar Pacha (situate on the north-eastern 
coast of the Sea of Marmara, and opposite Constantinople) 
to Ismidt— was built in 1875 by German engineers to the 
order of the Turkish Government. It was transferred in 
1888 to a German syndicate, nominees of the Deutsche 
Bank. Under the powers then conferred upon them, the 
syndicate opened an extension, on the east, to Angora, in 
1892, and another, on the south, to Konia, in 1896, the total 
length of line being thus increased to 633 miles. 

As the result of the visit of the German Emperor to Con- 
stantinople in 1898, followed by negotiations between the 
Porte and the director of the Deutsche Bank, authority was 
given to a new German Company — the Imperial Ottoman 
Baghdad Railway Company — under conventions of 1889, 
1902 and 1903, to continue the existing Anatolian Railway 
from Konia to the Persian Gulf, via Adana, Nisibin, Mosul 
and Baghdad. This extension was to constitute the main 
line of the Baghdad Railway proper ; but the Company also 
acquired control over most of the branch railwaj^s already 
in operation. One of these was the French Smyrna — Afium 
Karahissar line, which constitutes the direct trade route 
between Smyrna and places served by the Anatolian railway, 
and has, also, a branch to Panderma, on the southern shores 
of the Sea of Marmara. Another was the short line from 
Adana to Mersina, giving access to the Mediterranean. 
This meant the substitution of German for French interests, 
while the course taken by the Anatolia-Baghdad Railway 
from the Bosporus to Adana shut off the possibility of an 
extension of the British line from Smyrna via Aidin to 
Egerdir (west of Konia) into the interior. 

Then in 191 1 the Company acquired the right to build a 
new port at Alexandretta, with quays, docks, bonded ware- 



DESIGNS ON ASIATIC TURKEY. 335 

houses, etc., and to construct thence a short Ime of railway 
connecting with the Baghdad main hne at Osmanieh, east 
of Adana. By these means the Germans acquired the 
control over, if not an actual monopoly of, the traffic be- 
tween one of the most important ports on the eastern sea- 
board of the Mediterranean — a port where a trade valued 
at three and a half million sterling is already being done — 
and the vast extent of territory in Asia Minor designed to 
be served by the Baghdad Railway. 

From Muslimiyeh, a little town on the north of Aleppo, 
there is a short branch connecting the Baghdad Railway 
with the Hcdjaz line from Damascus to Medina, which is 
eventually to be carried on to Mecca ; while from Rayak, 
north of Damascus, a branch built in a south-westerly 
direction was to be carried to within a short distance of the 
Egyptian frontier. 

From the junction for the Aleppo branch, the main hne 
was to continue across the Mesopotamian plain to Baghdad 
(whence a branch to Khanikin, on the Persian frontier was 
projected) and so on to Basra, for the Persian Gulf. 

Thus the scheme for what passes under the title of the 
Baghdad Railway embraces three separate and distinct 
regions of Asiatic Turkey — (i) Anatolia, (2) Syria and (3) 
Mesopotamia. In other words, whereas in their first phase, 
German aspirations for Turkish territory were based on 
the economic advantages of settlement in Anatolia — a 
region in itself large enough to accommodate all the Ger- 
mans who were likely to want to settle there — in the 
second phase those aspirations were based on an extension 
of the Baghdad Railway towards Egypt in the one direction 
and the Persian Gulf in the other. This dual extension 
became the more noticeable, also, inasmuch as for the pas- 
sage of the Taurus range of mountains a total of nearly 100 
miles of blasting and tunnelling would have to be carried 
out, the cost of construction on certain sections of the line 
rising to between £35,000 and ;£40,ooo a mile. The exten- 
sion, therefore, was likely to be a costly business, the total 
length of the Baghdad Railway proper, apart from the 
Anatolian system, being, as projected, about 1,350 miles, of 



336 THE RISE OF RAIL-POWER. 

which, however, only about 600 miles were, in June, 1915, 
available for traffic. ^ Admitting the desirability of opening 
up Mesopotamia to commercial and agricultural development, 
it may, nevertheless, be asked, were there other motives — 
and motives to which still greater weight might have been 
attached — for this expansion of the earlier designs ? 

Abdul Hamid's reason for granting the concession is said 
to have been that the extension of the line to the Persian 
Gulf would greatly strengthen the mihtary position of 
Turkey, since it would enable her to effect a speedy transfer 
of troops between the Bosporus and the Gulf, or inter- 
mediate places, as against the many months that might be 
occupied by marching on foot across plains and mountains. 
Germany's reasons for seeking to construct the Baghdad 
Railway, its branches and connections, to the full extent 
of the programme laid down, were, not simply the develop- 
ment of new trade routes, as certain inspired representations 
have sought to make the world believe, and not simply the 
gain of various other economic advantages, but (i) a desire 
to increase German influence over Turkey ; to strengthen 
her military and other resources with a view to employing 
them eventually in the advancement of Germany's own 
mterests ; and to ensure the reaHsation of that eventual 
Protectorate over Turkey which would convert the country 
into practically a German province ; and (2) the furthering 
of Germany's aims against Great Britain in the belief that 
she, too, was a decadent country whose possessions, when 
we could no longer defend them effectively, Germany would 
be the more likely to secure for herself if, with a concentra- 
tion of Turkish forces to assist her, she were established 
within striking distance of some of the most vulnerable 
points of the British Empire, ready to take instant advan- 
tage of any favourable opportunity that might present 
itself, whether in a prospective break-up of that Empire 
or otherwise. 

Of evidence concerning Germany's efforts to obtain 
increasing influence over Turkey there is no lack. 

We have, in the first place, the fact that in 1882 a German 
' Important extensions have been carried out since. 



DESIGNS ON ASTATIC TURKEY. 337 

military mission, of which General the Baron Colmar von 
der Goltz was the principal member, undertook the training 
of the Turkish Army according to the principles of German 
military science, with the result that the Turkish Army 
became a more efficient instrument for the attainment, not 
only of her own aims or purposes, but those, also, of Germany 
herself. 

The Kaiser, although the supreme head of the Lutheran 
Church, and although having no jMohammedan subjects 
of his own, sought to pose as the champion of Mohammedans 
in general and the Defender of their Faith. During his 
visit to Damascus in November, 1898, he declared — " May 
the Sultan, may the three hundred million Mohammedans 
living who, scattered throughout the earth, honour in 
his person their Caliph, rest assured that at all times the 
German Kaiser will be their friend." ^ 

Whenever political trouble threatened to fall upon Tur- 
key, as the result of such occurrences as the Armenian and 
Macedonian atrocities or the insurrection in Crete, it was 
Germany who became her champion as against the other 
Powers of Europe. 

Everything possible was done to push German trade in 
Turkey and to establish closer commercial relations with 
her. There came a time when every city of importance in 
the Turkish Empire was declared to be " overrun with 
German bankers, German clerks and German bagmen." 

Not only, too, were German engineers active in seeking 
to get concessions for new railways, and not only were 
German financiers equally active in endeavouring to control 
existing ones, but, as Dr. Charles Sarolea points out, in his 
book on " The Anglo-German Problem," there are, in the 
agreements between the Baghdad Railway Company and 
the Porte, financial clauses which must ultimately place 
Turkey entirely at the mercy of her professed champion. 
" In Turkey Germany alone would rule supreme " ; and 
the aspirations for a German Protectorate over Turkey, 
with the Sultan as a vassal of Germany, would then be 
realised. 

1 Dr. Dillon, in The Contemporary Review, April, 1906. 

Z 



338 THE RISE OF RAIL-POWER. 

Writing on the position as he found it in 1903, M. x\ndre 
Cheradame said in " La Question d'Orient " : — 

More and more the Germans seem to regard the land of the 
Turks as their personal property. All the recent German litera- 
ture relating to Turkey affords proof of the tendency. An 
ordinaiy book of travels is entitled, " In Asia Minor, by Ger- 
man Railwaj's." In his " Pan-Germanic Atlas " Paul Lang- 
hams gives a map of " German Railways in Asia Minor." So 
it is, indeed, a matter of the organised conquest of Turkey. 
Everywhere and in everything, Turkey is being encircled by 
the tentacles of the German octopus. 

Coming, next, to the nature of Germany's aims against 
England and the part which the Baghdad Railway was to 
play in their attainment, we have the frank confessions of 
Dr. Paul Rohrbach, an authority on the subject of Germany's 
Weltpolitik, and a traveller who has paid four visits to Asia 
Minor. In " Die Baghdadbahn " (2nd. edition, 1911) he 
tells us that Ludwig Ross, a professor at Halle who was 
well acquainted with Anatolia, was the first to point to Asia 
Minor as a desirable place for German settlement. At the 
outset economic considerations were alone concerned, and 
in Bismarck's day Germany's relations to England played 
only a minor role in her foreign politics ; but in proportion 
as Germany's interests were developed and her soil no longer 
provided sufficient food Jor her peopl ■ or sufficient raw 
products for her manufactures, she had to look abroad for 
the supply of her surplus needs. In so doing, however, 
her interests abroad might be endangered by the British 
Fleet. Hence the necessity for a German Fleet ; and, 
although the German sea-power might not be strong enough, 
by itself, to attack and conquer England, it could bring 
certain considerations home to English policy. Dr. Rohr- 
bach continues : — 

If it came to a matter of war with England, it would be for 
Germany simply a question of life and death. The possibility 
of a successful issue for Germany depends exclusively on one 
consideration, namely, on whether or not we can succeed in 
bringing England herself into a dangerous position. That end 
can in no way be obtained by means of a direct attack across 



DESIGNS ON ASIATIC TURKEY. 339 

the North Sea ; any idea of a German invasion of England 
being possible is a mere phantasy. One must seek, therefore, 
another combination in order to assail England at some vulner- 
able spot ; and here we come to the point where the relations 
of Germany to Turkey, and the conditions prevailing in Turkey, 
are found to be of decisive importance for German foreign 
policy. There is, in fact, only one means possible by which 
Germany can resist a war of aggression by England, and that 
is the strengthening of Turkey. 

England can, from Europe, be attacked by land and mortally 
wounded only in one place — Egypt. If England were to lose 
Egypt she would lose, not only her control over the Suez Canal 
and her connexions with India and the Far East, but, presum- 
ably, also, her possessions in Central and East Africa. The 
conquest of Egypt by a Mohammedan Power, such as Turkey, 
might, in addition, have a dangerous effect on her 60,000,000 
Mohammedan subjects in India, besides being to her prejudice 
in Afghanistan and Persia. 

Turkey, however, can never dream of recovering Egypt until 
she controls a fully-developed railway system in Asia Minor 
and Syria ; until, by the extension of the Anatohan Railway 
to Baghdad, she can resist an attack by England on Mesopo- 
tamia ; until her army has been increased and improved ; 
and until progress has been made in her general economic 
and financial conditions. . . . The stronger Turkey becomes, 
the greater will be the danger for England if, in a German- 
English conflict, Turkey should be on the side of Germany ; 
and, with Egypt for a prize, it certainly would be worth 
the while of Turkey to run the risk of fighting with Germany 
against England. On the other hand the mere fact that Turkey 
had increased in military strength, had improved her economic 
position, and had an adequate railway system, would make 
England hesitate to attack Germany ; and this is the point at 
which Germany must aim. The policy of supporting Turkey 
which is now being followed by Germany has no other purpose 
than that of effecting a strong measure against the danger of 
war with England. 

From other directions, besides, similar testimony was 
forthcoming. 

The Socialist Liepziger Volkszeitung declared in March, 
1911, that " the new situation shortly to be created in Asia 
Minor would hasten the break-up of the British Empire, 
which was already beginning to totter (schwanken) . " 

In Die Neiw Zcit for June 2, 1911, Herr Karl Radek said : — 



340 THE RISE OF RAIL-POWER. 

The strengthening of German Imperialism, the first success 
of which, attained with so much effort, is the Baghdad Railway ; 
the victory of the revolutionary party in Turkey ; the prospect 
of a modern revolutionary movement in India, which, of course, 
must be regarded as a very different thing from the earlier 
scattered risings of individual tribes ; the movement towards 
nationahsation in Egypt ; the beginning of reform in Egypt 
— all this has raised to an extraordinary degree the poHtical 
significance of the Baghdad Railway question. 

The Baghdad Railway being a blow at the interests of English 
Imperialism, Turkey could only entrust its construction to 
the German Company because she knew that Germany's army 
and navy stood behind her, which fact makes it appear to 
England and Russia inadvisable to exert too sensitive a pres- 
sure upon Turkey. 

In the Akadcmische Blatter of June i, 1911, Professor R. 
Mangelsdorf, another recognised authority on German 
policy and politics, wrote : — 

The political and military power an organised railway system 
wiU confer upon Turkey is altogether in the interest of Germany, 
which can only obtain a share in actual economic developments 
if Turkey is independent ; and, besides, any attempt to increase 
the power and ambition of England, in any case oppressively 
great, is thereby effectively thwarted. To some extent, indeed, 
Turkey's construction of a railway system is a threat to Eng- 
land, for it means that an attack on the most vulnerable part 
of the body of England's world-empire, namely Egypt, comes 
well within the bounds of possibility. 

These declarations and admissions render perfectly clear 
the reasons for Germany's professions of friendship for 
Turkey and for her desire that that country should become 
stronger and more powerful. They also leave no doubt as 
to the real purpose the south-western branch of the Baghdad 
Railway was designed to effect. The conquest of Egypt by 
a combined German and Turkish force was the first object 
to be accomplished with the help of the railway extension 
to the Egyptian frontier in one direction and to Mecca in 
another ; but Dr. Rohrbach's suggestion that the loss of 
Egypt by England would entail the loss, also, of her pos- 
sessions in Central and East Africa has a further bearing 
on what has been told in the previous chapter concerning 
Germany's designs on Africa as a whole. The strategical 



DESIGNS ON ASIATIC TURKEY. 341 

raih\'ays in German South- West Africa ; the projected ex- 
tensions thereof — when circumstances permitted ; the 
German East African Hnes, and the south-western branch 
of the Baghdad Railway in the direction of Egypt were 
all to play their part in the eventual creation of a Cape- 
to-Cairo German-African Empire. 

If we now direct our attention to the south-eastern 
branch of the Baghdad Railway, we are met by the repeated 
protests made by Germany that in desiring the construction 
of a railway to the Persian Gulf she was influenced solely 
by commercial considerations. Against these protests, 
however, there are to be put various material facts which 
leave no room for doubt that Germany's aims in this direc- 
tion were otherwise than exclusively economic, while even 
the economic purposes which the Baghdad Railway would, 
undoubtedly, have served must have eventually led to a 
strengthening of Germany's political position, this, in turn, 
helping her military and strategical purposes. 

As originally planned, the port of Basra (the commercial 
centre of trade in Mesopotamia, situate, sixty miles from 
the sea, on the Shat-el-Arab — the great river formed by 
the junction of the Tigris and the Euphrates — and open to 
the shipping of the world) was to have been the terminus 
of the Baghdad Railway ; and if commercial considerations 
had, indeed, been exclusively aimed at, this terminus would 
have answered all requirements. 

No objection was, or could be, raised by the British 
Government to the construction of the Baghdad Railway, 
on Turkish territory, as far as Basra. In the later develop- 
ments of the scheme, however, Germany and her Turkish 
partner sought to ensure the continuation of the line from 
its natural commercial terminus, at Basra, to a political 
and strategical terminus, at Koweit, on the shores of the 
Persian Gulf. The Ahendpost (Berlin) voiced the German 
view when it spoke of Koweit as " the only possible outlet 
to the Baghdad Railway." 

But the extension of an avowedly German line of railway 
to Koweit would have been a direct challenge to the para- 
mountc}' which Great Britain claimed over the Persian 



342 THE RISE OF RAIL-POWER. 

Gulf. It would have come into collision with British policy, 
interests and prestige in the East. It would have given 
the German and Turkish allies an excuse for creating at 
Koweit a harbour, with wharves, docks, warehouses, etc., 
which might be converted into a naval and military base 
capable of serving far different purposes than those of 
trade and commerce — those, namely, of a new line of 
advance on India. It would, in combination with the 
control already exercised by the Deutsche Bank over the 
railways in European Turkey, have assured to Germany 
the means of sending her Naval forces or her troops, together 
with supplies and ammunition, direct to the Persian Gulf, 
either to strengthen her fleet or to carry out any further 
designs she might cherish in the domain of Weltpolitik as 
affecting the Far East. It would have meant that, as far 
as the head of the Persian Gulf, at least, rail-power would 
have rendered her less dependent on the exercise of sea- 
power, on her own account, and would have enabled her 
to neutralise, also, as far as the said Gulf, the sea-power of 
England. 

What so fundamental a change in the strategical position 
might imply was well expressed by so eminent and impartial 
an authority as A. T. Mahan, when he said, in his " Retro- 
spect and Prospect " (1902) : — 

The control of the Persian Gulf by a foreign State of con- 
siderable naval potentiality, a " fleet in being " there, based 
upon a strong military port, would reproduce the relations of 
Cadiz, Gibraltar and Malta to the Mediterranean. It would 
flank all the routes to the Farther East, to India and to Aus- 
tralia, the last two actuaUy internal to the Empire, regarded 
as a political system ; and, although at present Great Britain 
unquestionably could check such a fleet, it might well require 
a detachment large enough to affect seriously the general strength 
of her naval position, . . . Concession in the Persian Gulf, 
whether by positive formal arrangement, or by simple neglect 
of the local commercial interests which now underlie political 
and military control, will imperil Great Britain's naval situa- 
tion in the Farther East, her political position in India, her 
commercial interests in both, and the Imperial tie between 
herself and Australia. 

One is thus led to the conclusion that Koweit as the 



DESIGNS ON ASIATIC TURKEY. 343 

terminus of the south-eastern branch of the Baghdad Rail- 
way, and within four days of Bombay, would have been as 
vital a point for British interests as the terminus of the south- 
western branch within about twelve hours of Egypt ; while 
the possession of this further advantage by Germany would 
have been in full accord with the proposition laid down by 
Rohrbach and others as to the line of policy Germany should 
adopt for " bringing England herself into a dangerous 
position." 

With a view to safeguarding British interests from any 
possible drifting into this position, as regards the Persian 
Gulf, the claim was raised, some years ago, that England 
should have entire control of the railway from Baghdad to 
Koweit. Germany did not see her way to assent to this 
proposal ; but in 1911 she announced that she would forgo 
her right to construct the section from Baghdad to Basra 
on the understanding that this final section would be 
completed by Turkey. By way of compensation for the 
concession thus made by her to British view's, she secured 
certain financial advantages and the right both to build 
the Alexandretta extension and to convert Alexandretta 
itself into practically a German port on the shores of the 
Mediterranean. 

The precise value of the " concession " thus made by 
Germany was, however, open to considerable doubt. If 
she could succeed in her long-cherished aim of establishing 
a virtual protectorate over Turkey, then the fact that the 
final section of the Baghdad Railway had been built by 
Turkey, and not by Germany, would have become a matter 
of detail not likely to affect the reality of Germany's control. 
The Hue to Basra might have been nominally Turkish but 
the directing policy would have been German ; and like 
conditions would have arisen had Great Britain agreed to 
allow Turkey — though not Germany — to continue the rail- 
way from Basra to Koweit. 

In the wide scope of their aggressive purpose, the Bagh- 
dad Railway and its associated Hues can best be compared 
with those roads which the Romans, in the days of their 
pride — the pride that came before their fail — built for the 



344 THE RISE OF RATL-POWER. 

better achievement of their own aims as world-conquerors. 
Apart from the fact that the roads now in question are iron 
roads, and that the locomotive has superseded the chariot, 
the main difference between Roman and German is to be 
found in the fact that the world which the former sought to 
conquer was far smaller than the one coveted by the latter. 

The programme of M^eltpolitik comprised in the German 
schemes embraced not only countries but continents. In 
addition to the aspirations cherished as regards Europe, 
that programme aimed at the eventual annexation to the 
German Empire of three other Empires — the Turkish, the 
Indian, and a new one to be known as the German-African. 
It was further to secure the means of sending troops direct 
from Germany via Constantinople and the Baghdad Railway 
to the frontiers of Persia for possible operations against that 
country in combination with the Turkish military forces, 
these having first been brought under German control. 
The Baghdad Railway itself was, in the same way, and with 
like support, to afford to Germany the means of threatening 
Russian interests both in Persia and in Trans-Caucasia. 
It was to nullify England's sea power in the Mediterranean, 
if not, to a certain extent — through the establishment of 
a new Power at the gate of India — in the Far East, as well. 
It would, as Mahan showed, have flanked our communica- 
tions with Australia, giving Germany an advantage in this 
direction, also, had Asia and Africa failed to satisfy her 
aspirations. 

Regarded from the point of view of its designed effect 
on the destinies of nations, on the balance of political power, 
and on the reconstruction of the world's forces — all for the 
aggrandisement of a single people — the full programme 
must be looked upon as the most ambitious and the most 
unscrupulous project of world-conquest that has yet been 
placed on record in the history of mankind. 

For its attainment, however, it clearly depended no less 
upon rail-transport than upon force of arms ; and in this 
respect it represented Germany's greatest attempt to apply, 
in practice, that principle of rail-power to which she had 
devoted eight decades of inquiry, trial and organisation. 



CHAPTER XXI 

Summary and Conclusions 

As will have been gathered from the preceding chapters, a 
prolonged period of consideration, preparation and appli- 
cation in many different countries throughout the world, 
prior to the outbreak of the Great War in 1914, had estab- 
lished certain definite facts and fundamental principles in 
regard to the relations of railways to warfare in general. 
These may now be brought together and summarised in 
four groups or divisions, namely, (A) Advantages ; (B) 
Conditions Essential to Efficiency ; (C) Limitations in 
Usefulness ; and (D) Drawbacks and Disadvantages. 

A. — Advantages 

Assuming (i) the provision, in advance, of a system or sys- 
tems of railways capable of meeting all the requirements 
of the military situation on the outbreak of war, or (2) 
the possibility of constructing military railways during the 
progress of hostilities, such railways should permit of — 

A mobilisation of troops and their concentration at the 
frontier, or at the seat of war, with a speed that was 
impossible under earlier conditions. 

Simultaneous use of different routes across the national 
territory for concentration either on the frontier or at a 
point some distance therefrom where the concentration 
can be completed without fear of interruption by the enemy. 

Sudden invasion of neighbouring territory b}^ troops 
sent in a succession of rapidly-following trains direct from 
various points in the interior of the country where they 
might have been concentrated without the knowledge of 
the enemy, this procedure being adopted in preference to 

345 



346 THE RISE OF RAIL-POWER. 

collecting at the frontier in advance a force on such a scale 
as would disclose prematurely the intentions entertained. 

The possibility of using promptly, for these purposes, 
the full strength of the country's available resources — the 
railway lines in the interior having already been adapted 
thereto, as well as those on or directly connecting with the 
frontier — with a proportionate increase of the offensive 
and defensive power of the State. 

The supplementing of increased mobility and celerity by 
decreased strain on the physical powers of the troops and 
the avoidance of such inevitable reduction in their numbers 
as would result from the trials and fatigues of prolonged 
marches by road (in combination with the carrying of kits, 
etc.), should railway lines not be available. 

A further consequent increase in the fighting strength of 
the arm}^ 

The possible attainment of the power of initiative through 
an early concentration of large forces at points of strategic 
importance either on national or on enemy's territory.^ 

The carrying out of strategical combinations on a scale 
or of a character which would formerly have been imprac- 
ticable. 

Employment of railways for tactical purposes during the 
progress of a war, including therein [a] movement of troops 
from one part of the theatre of war to another, whether with 
a view to effecting big changes of front or otherwise ; {b) 
employment of the same Army Corps on different fronts in 
succession, their transfer being effected in the briefest pos- 
sible interval of time ; (c) the rapid bringing up of reinforce- 
ments at a critical moment to some position exposed to 
overpowering attack which might otherwise be lost ; {d) 
surprise attacks on the enemy ; {e) the throwing of great 

1 Von Moltke is reported to have said on one occasion in the 
Reichstag : ' ' Our Great General Staff is so much persuaded of 
the advantages to be derived from obtaining the initiative at the 
outset of a war that it prefers to construct railways rather than 
forts. An additional railway, crossing the whole country, makes 
a difference of two days in the assembling of the army, and advances 
the operations proportionately." ' ' In the concentration of armies," 
says von der Gnltz in " The Conduct of War," " we reckon almost 
by hours." 



SUMMARY x\ND CONCLUSIONS. 347 

masses of troops on distant points ; (/) strengthening weak 
places in the fighting Hne ; (g) strengthening threatened 
forts by means of troops, guns, munitions or suppUes ; {h) 
reHef of invested fortresses, and {i) retirement by rail — 
when circumstances permit — of troops after defeat. 

Control of a line of rail communication between the base 
and the strategic centre of operations, facilitating the 
enormous amount of transport in both directions which 
must be kept up in the rear of the army, and for which the 
elements of speed, safety and regularity may be of vital 
importance. 

The possibility, thanks to railways, of regarding the whole 
interior of the national territory as a base for the supply of 
requirements at the front, dependence having no longer to 
be placed on a base established in one particular district 
with its restricted range of possible supplies and its collec- 
tion of magazines, stores, workshops, transport parks, etc., 
protected by fortresses, entrenched camps, or other means 
of defence. 

The establishment of supplementary, sectional or ad- 
vanced bases along the line of communication, with railway 
services so arranged that supplies can be dispatched daily 
in such regulated quantities, and to such points, as will serve 
the immediate needs of the army in the field, without risk 
either of shortage or of excess. 

Avoidance, under these conditions, of congestion of the 
railway lines in the immediate rear of the army by trains or 
loaded wagons containing a redundancy of supplies which 
(a) cannot be unloaded, (b) restrict the use of the lines for 
other purposes, and (c) might have to be abandoned to the 
enemy in the event of a sudden retreat. 

Material benefits from the substitution of rail for road 
transport of food, etc., by reason of (a) greater speed and 
regularity ; (6) less risk of deterioration from exposure to 
weather, and other causes ; (c) decreased cost of transport 
as compared with earlier conditions involving the employ- 
ment of a greater number of drivers, escort, guards, horses 
and road vehicles ; and {d) the arrival at destination of the 
full quantities dispatched, the need for the consumption 



348 THE RISE OF RAIL-POWER. 

of an appreciable proportion eu route by men and animals 
in a convoying wagon train, carrying supplies for long 
distances by road, being non-existent. 

Reduction in the need for field ovens and other para- 
phernalia of the arm}^ cook, since much of the food required 
— bread, for example — can be prepared in cities or elsewhere 
at a distant base and forwarded regularly by rail. 

Freedom, more or less complete, from the once prevalent 
obligation on the part of an advancing army that it should 
" live upon the country "• — a condition which the enormous 
increase in the size of armies to-day would render impossible 
of fulfilment, even assuming that the people of the country 
invaded had not withdrawn live stock, vehicles and food 
supplies on their retirement before the invader. 

In addition to this provision for the wants of an army in 
its advance into hostile country, the safeguarding of the 
troops against the risk of their becoming a band of demoral- 
ized marauders, wandering over a wide area to seek and 
appropriate food whenever they can find it — as was the 
case, for instance, in the Napoleonic wars— the maintenance 
of discipline and the continued usefulness of the troops as a 
concentrated body for the military purposes in view being 
further assured when both men and leaders are relieved 
of anxiety as to the continuance of their supplies. 

The conduct of war at a great distance from the base by 
reason of the facilities offered for the forwarding alike of 
troops, reinforcements, supplies and military materials, 
the value of even a single line of railway in the achievement 
of this purpose having been incontestably established. 

Defence of frontiers by strategical railways which may, 
also, become available for general use. 

Investment of cities or fortresses in occupied territory 
when, owing to the lack or the deficiency of food suppHes 
in the surrounding country, the troops engaged are mainly 
if not entirely dependent on those brought to them by rail 
from their own base.^ 

^ " Without railroads, it is said, the siege of Paris would have 
been impossible " (Bigelow's " Principles of Strategy "). " During 
the siege of Paris one railway for some time fed the [German] army 



SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS. 340 

Victualling of cities before, and their revictualling after, 
investment.^ 

Extension of lines of communication by means of quickly- 
constructed narrow-gauge siege railways to be operated 
by motor traction, animal power, or otherwise, including 
therein trench tramways for {a) removal of wounded men 
from the trenches ; {b) transport of siege guns to trenches ; 
and (c) supplying ammunition to battery. 

Transport of heavy siege guns, mortars, ammunition and 
other materials of a size or weight that would render im- 
practicable their conveyance, whethet singly or in the 
aggregate, along ordinary roads, the railway offering, in this 
respect, facilities for ponderous transport comparable to 
those of the steamship, with the further advantage of being 
able, in most instances, to take the guns, etc., to the spot 
or to the locality where they are wanted. 

Material aid given to expeditions to countries otherwise 
devoid of means of communication, by the construction of 
military railways. 

Employment of armoured trains which, apart from their 
usefulness in defending railways against attack, may, as 
movable fortresses, render important service in the opera- 
tions against the enemy. 

Removal of sick and wounded from the theatre of war, 
and the ensuring of their distribution among hospitals in 
the rear or throughout the interior, thus [a) avoiding alike 
the embarrassment to the army and the many dangers and 
evils that would result from their remaining in overcrowded 
hospitals on or near the battle-field ; {b) giving the men a 

of, in round numbers, 200,000 men, brought up the siege materials 
and reinforcements averaging 2,000 to 3,000 men a day, and even, 
at one time, fed Prince Frederick Charles' army, as well, with very 
slight assistance from the exhausted theatre of war " (Hamley's 
"Operations of War"). 

1 During the thirty-five days preceding the investment, Paris 
received by the Western Railway, alone, 72,442 tons of provisions 
and 67,716 head of cattle. But for these supplies she could not 
have endured so long a siege. In the revictualling of Paris, after 
the siege, the railways, though much restricted by the Germans, 
brought into the city, in the course of twenty days, 153,955 tons 
of provisions and 42,580 head of cattle. 



350 THE RISE OF RAIL-POWER. 

better chance of effecting a speedy recovery and returning 
soon to the ranks ; and (c) adding to the fighting strength 
of the army by the combination of these two advantages. 

FaciUties for giving a short leave to officers and men who, 
though neither sick nor wounded, have been so far affected 
by their strenuous exertions that they stand in need of 
a rest, or change, for which tliey will fight all the better 
subsequently. 

Dispatch of prisoners of war into the interior by trains 
which have brought reinforcements or supplies, the army 
thus being speedily relieved of what might otherwise be a 
hindrance to its operations. 

Return of material no longer wanted at the front and 
constituting impedimenta of which it is desirable to get 
rid as soon as possible. 

Conveyance into the interior of " trophies of war " — 
including plunder— taken from captured towns or cities. 

Retirement of troops from occupied territory on the 
declaration of peace. 

B. — Conditions Essential to Efficiency 

In the matter of railway construction there should be — 

i. Uniformity of gauge, together with physical connec- 
tions between the different systems or sections, in order 
{a) that the locomotives and rolling stock on an}^ one 
line can be used for military transport on any other ; {b) 
that mobilisation, concentration and the forwarding of sup- 
plies and military material can be facilitated by the run- 
ning of through trains from any probable or possible point 
of dispatch ; and (c) that troops can readily be transferred 
from one front, or from one part of the coast, to another 
for the purpose either of attack or of defence. 

ii. Lines linking up the interior of the country with the 
frontier, with the coast, or with principal ports by different 
routes, tranverse lines connecting them, in turn, one with 
another. 

iii. Double track for all lines leading direct to the frontier. 

iv. In the case of single-track lines crossing continents or 
otherwise, a liberal provision of passing places each capable 



SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS. 351 

of accommodating the longest troop train likely to be run. 

V. On all lines, and at all important stations, a sufficiency 
of sidings, with provision of, or the possibility of providing 
speedily, all such facilities as may be needed for the prompt 
and efficient handling of military transports whenever the 
occasion should arise. ..-——" 

Preparations in advance should include — 

i. The carrying out of a scheme of organisation based 
on recognition of the following principles : — {a) That, while 
the railway is an instrument capable of rendering great and 
even incalculable services in the conduct of war, the working 
of it is a highly-skilled business only to be entrusted to those 
possessed of the necessary experience ; (0) that interference 
with such working on the part of military oihcers not pos- 
sessing the requisite technical knowledge of the details and 
limitations of railway operation may result in chaos and 
disaster ; (c) that railwaymen, in turn, are not likely to 
be fully acquainted with the technicalities of military con- 
ditions and requirements, and should not, in any case, be ^ 
left with the responsibility of having to decide between the 
possibly conflicting demands of various military authorities ; 
(d) that, for these reasons, there should be co-ordination 
of the military and the technical railway elements, operating 
throughout the whole scheme of organisation in its manifold 
details, avoiding conflict of authority, ensuring harmony 
of working, and offering the fullest guarantee that all 
military requirements will be met so far as the capacity of 
the railway, together with a due regard for safe and efficient 
operation, will allow ; and {c) that effect can best be given 
to these various conditions by the appointment of inter- 
mediary bodies which, representing the dual elements, shall 
alone have power to give directions, or to make demands, 
in respect to military rail-transport during the continuance ^ 
of war. — ■^ — 

ii. Collection of data concerning the physical character, 
resources and transport capabilities of the railwaj^s both in 
the national territory and in any other country to which the 
war operations may extend. 

iii. Study of all movements of troops, etc., likely to be 



352 THE RISE OF RAIL-POWER. 

necessary on the outbreak of war ; the preparation of special 
time-tables for the running of troop trains, etc., and the 
working out of all essential details respecting military 
transport in general. 

iv. Creation and training of bodies of Railway Troops 
qualified to undertake the construction, destruction, repair 
and operation of railways in time of war. 

C. — Limitations in Usefulness 

The usefulness of railways in war is limited by the follow- 
ing considerations, among others : — 

Railways are " inferior to ships in power of simultan- 
eously transporting heavy loads" (Von der Goltz). For 
this reason an overland route to India could never compete, 
in respect to military transport, with the sea route via the 
Suez Canal. Such overland route, also, passing through 
foreign countries, would be especially liable to attack and 
interruption. Where, however, the overland route goes 
entirely through national territory (as in the case of the 
Trans-Siberian Railway), and when the questions of time 
and safety, in regard to an alternative sea route, suggest 
possible disadvantages, railways will be preferred to ships 
in spite of the said inferiority. 

Railways are inferior to roads in so far as, like rivers and 
canals, they are on fixed spots. Troops depending on them 
are thus able to move only in the direction in which lines 
have been or can quickly be laid, whereas if they went by 
road they might have a greater choice of alternative routes. 

For these reasons the choice of the zone of concentration 
or of the " decisive points " may depend less to-day on 
political, mihtary or geographical reasons (as in the Napo- 
leonic wars) than on the direction, extent and capacity of 
the available railways. 

Great masses of troops can be entrained only at stations 
where facilities for their so doing have been prepared in 
advance. The provision of these facilities is even more 
necessary in the case of Cavalry or Artillery than in that of 
Infantry. Hence the movement of considerable bodies of 
troops may be restricted to certain lines, and their entrain- 



SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS. 353 

ment or detrainment even to certain large stations. In 
the case of road marching these restrictions would not apply. 

Vehicles specially constructed for the purpose can alone 
be used on railways. Any deficiency in their supply must 
needs cause delay. 

During the time the troops are travelling by railway their 
power of resisting attack is much more restricted than it 
would be if they were marching by road, they can do little 
or nothing to protect the railway lines, while if the enemy 
can only get to the railway he may be in a position to pre- 
vent the train from continuing its journey, and take the 
troops in it at a disadvantage. 

For these reasons, among others, troop movements by 
rail at the theatre of war, and especially in the enemy's 
country, are attended by a degree of risk which may render 
it desirable to abandon the use of the railway for the time 
being. 

Railways are especially liable to destruction by the enemy, 
and, although the arrangements made in advance may 
permit of speedy repairs or reconstruction, the interruption 
of traffic for even a day or half a day may be a matter of 
grave importance during the concentration of the army or 
at some critical moment. 

Destructions of line carried out by a retreating force, in 
order to delay pursuit by the enemy, will be to the dis- 
advantage of that force when, after having driven back the 
enemy, it would itself make use of the line it had rendered 
unserviceable. — — \ 

Dependence on the railway for the transport of consider- ^ 
able bodies of troops on short journe3''s — say for twenty, 
twenty-five or thirty miles — is rendered inexpedient by the 
fact that, when allowance is made for the time likely to be 
taken, not only on the journey, but in the assembling at the 
station, in the entraining and detraining (perhaps at some 
place devoid of adequate platform or siding accommodation), 
and in the march from the arrival station to destination, it 
may well be found that the troops could cover the distance 
in less time by road, apart from the consideration, suggested 
above, as to their being in a better position, when marching, 

A A 



354 THE RISE OF RAIL-POWER. 

to resist attack. Experts in all countries have studied this 

question with a view to deciding, on the basis of their 

^ national conditions, within what limit it would be better 

j for troops to march by road in preference to going by rail. 

For reasons akin to those here stated, supplemented by 
the recent great expansion of motor transport, less has been 
heard of late concerning the proposed construction in this 
country of strategical railwa37s along a coast -line remarkable 
for its sinuosities, and presenting, therefore, an exceptional 
position from the point of view of coast railways for purely 
defensive purposes. 

As regards long-distance journeys, whilst armies march- 
ing by road have often been materially reduced in propor- 
tions by the number of men falling out owing to lameness, 
exhaustion, or other causes, those who reached the theatre of 
war, representing " the survival of the fittest," were better 
able to endure the trials and fatigues of the subsequent 
campaign than if they could have made the journey by rail 
under conditions involving no strain, but affording them 
no such exercise and strengthening of their physical powers.^ 

Experience has further shown that exceptionally long 
railway journeys may have a prejudicial effect upon troops 

^ "The railways spare the troops fatigue," remarks Lieut. -Col. 
Tovey, R.E., in " The Elements of Strategy " ; " but it may be that 
when they have to use their legs aftei^wards there will be more 
falling out and lagging behind, in consequence." Balck, in his 
" Taktik," says : " It is only in respect to the important considera- 
tion as to speed that the rail-transport of troops is to be preferred 
to road-marching. The real advantages of marching on foot — 
which was formerly the rule, and had the effect of ' separating the 
chaff from the wheat ' and of preparing the inen for the toils of 
fighting — are not counterbalanced by the fact that the troops 
arrive at the theatre of war in their full numbers. When time 
permits, marching on foot is preferable because it accustoms the 
men both to their new equipment and to marching in large bodies. 
After a long railway journey — on which the feet will have swollen 
and the new boots will have been especiallv troublesome — marching 
becomes particularly irksome, and the falling out of footsore men 
is very considerable. It is, nevertheless, the almost invariable 
rule that the troops shall begin their marching immediately they get 
to the end of the rail journey, since it may be a matter of great 
importance that the station at which they detrain should be cleared 
again as soon as possible." 



SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS. 355 

from the point of view, also, of maintenance of discipline.^ 
The services rendered by railways in war relate much 
more to strategy than to tactics. Great masses of troops 
and munitions, brought from all parts of the interior, may 
be conveyed readily and safely by rail to particular points 
in the theatre of war ; but the possibility of effecting their 
transport by rail from one point to another on the battle- 
field when the opposing forces are in actual contact is sub- 
ject to many restrictions and constitutes a much more diffi- 
cult undertaking. 

The imperative need for guarding a long line of railway 
communications, more especially in occupied territory, 
may lead to the withdrawal of a considerable number of 
men from the main army, weakening the strength of the 
available fighting force proportionately. 

D. — Drawbacks and Disadvantages 

While, notwithstanding the conditions to be observed 
and the limitations to be experienced, the balance of advan- 
tage conferred by railways on the conduct of war may 
appear so pronounced, from a military and a political point 
of view, there is a darker side to the story, as regards the 
world at large, which must also be taken into account. 

If railways have increased the power of defending a 
country against invasion they have, also, increased enor- 
mously the power of aggression at the command of an invader. 

They offer vastly greater facilities to military Powers for 
the making of sudden attacks on neighbouring countries — 

^ In alluding to the conditions under which Russian reinforce- 
ments were sent to Manchuria during the Russo-Japanese War, 
General Kuropatkin writes ("The Russian Army and the Japanese 
War ") : "In former days troops had to make long marches in 
full service order before they reached the battle-field. If properb,^ 
conducted these marches hardened the men, and enabled units 
to settle down ; all superfluous luggage was discarded ; the weaker 
men were left behind ; the officers and men got to know one another. 
But, nowadays, with railway transport, the results are very different. 
Going to the Far East, our men were crowded in railway carriages 
for as long as forty days at a time, out of the control of their officers, 
who were in different compartments. In the old and well-dicipHned 
units in particular harm was done ; but in the case of newly-formed 
units ... it was most harmful," 



356 THE RISE OF RAIL-POWER. 

themselves, it may be, in a state of more or less unprepared- 
ness. 

They afford the opportunity for overwhelming weaker 
Powers by means of armies mobilised and concentrated in 
the interior and poured on to or across the frontier in an 
endless succession of trains following one another with such 
rapidity that the initial movement may, in some instances, 
be carried out within the short space of twenty-four hours. 

They permit of the prosecution of war at distances which, 
but for the means offered for military transport by rail, 
would render war impracticable. 

They allow of war being carried on between a number of 
nations at one and the same time, thus spreading the area 
over which the conflicts of to-day may extend. 

They encourage the cherishing of designs of world-power 
and dreams of universal conquest. 

They have added to the horrors of war by facilitating the 
transport and the employment of the most terrible engines 
of war. 

They have rendered possible the carrying off of plunder 
from an occupied territory to an extent which would be 
impossible if the invaders had to depend on ordinary road 
vehicles for their means of transport. 

They have brought fresh risks and dangers upon civil 
populations, the maintenance of lines of rail communication 
being a matter of such paramount importance to an invader 
that the severest measures may be adopted by him towards 
the community in general as a means of terrorising them 
and ensuring the security of the railway lines. 

What, in effect, count as " advantages " in one direction 
may be the gravest of disadvantages in another. 



Such, for attack or for defence, for good or for evil, is the 
nature, and such are the possibilities, of that rail-power in 
warfare which, after eighty years of continuous evolution, 
was, in the War of the Nations imposed on mankind in 
1914, to undergo a development and an application on a 
wider, more impressive, and more terrible scale than the 
world had ever seen before. 



Appendix 
INDIAN FRONTIER RAILWAYS 

On the north-west frontier of India the plains of the Punjab 
are separated from the great central valley of Afghanistan, 
from the deserts of Baluchistan, and from the Russian Empire 
on the north thereof, by ranges of mountains, otherwise " a 
gridiron of stupendous ridges and furrows," intersected by 
passes which have always been regarded as the most vulnerable 
points of the Indian Empire. Through these passes from the 
earliest days of recorded history there has come a long snccessi';n 
of invasions instigated by that incalculable wealtii of India 
which may well have inspired the envy of dwellers in less favoured 
lands. 1 

These considerations would alone suffice to establish the 
need for an effective control of the more important of the said 
passes by the Power which exercises supremacy in India ; but 
the obligation thus devolving upon the British people as the 
present holders of that supremacy has been increased in recent 
times by two further factors — (i) troubles with frontier tribes; 
and (2) the development of that Central Asian Question which, 
though now no longer acute, was, not so many years ago, a 
source of great anxiety in England and India. Frontier troubles 
gave rise to a number of expeditions to Afghanistan from time 
to time, while the gravity of the general situation was increased 
by the once steady advance of Russia towards India — ^whether 
for the purposes of actual conquest thereof or, alternatively, for 
the attainment of the aim cherished by Russia during three 
centuries for an outlet to a southern sea, such outlet being 
sought via the Persian Gulf on her disappointment in regard to 
the Dardanelles ; though British interests were concerned in 
either case. 

This combination of circumstances, with the possibility, at 
one time, that Afghanistan might become the theatre of war 

^ Altogether there have been twenty-six invasions of India, dating back 
to about 2,000 years B.C., and of this number no fewer than twent3^-one 
have ended in conqviest. 

357 



358 APPENDIX. 

in a conflict between two great European Powers, invested with 
special interest and importance the provision on the north-west 
frontier of India of railway lines which, whether constructed 
to the more important passes or going actually through them, 
would form a ready means of concentrating Anglo-Indian troops 
at such places on the frontier, or beyond, as occasion might 
require. 

From this point of view the Bolan and Khyber passes — the 
former leading to Ouetta and Kandahar and the latter to Kabul — 
have more especially had importance attached to them as " the 
two gates of India." 

Proposals for constructing railways through them were ad- 
vanced as early as 1857, when Mr. (afterwards Sir) W. P. Andrew, 
chairman of the Sind, Punjab and Delhi Railway, acted as 
spokesman of a deputation which waited on Lord Palmerston 
in order to urge the construction of (i) a railway down the valley 
of the Euphrates, improving our communications with India by 
connecting the Mediterranean and the Persian Gulf ; and (2) 
railways through the Bolan and Khyber passes, not only, as he 
urged, facilitating the movement of troops to the frontier, but 
offering alternative routes by means of which the flank or the 
rear of an enemy operating beyond or between the limits of the 
two lines might be threatened. Mr. Andrew followed up with 
great earnestness and perseverance for many years his advocacy 
of these views, publishing a succession of books and pamphlets 
and writing many letters to the Press on the subject. 

Such advocacy had, however, no practical issue, and, though 
the arguments originally advanced in favour of the Euphrates 
railway lost most of their force on the opening of the Suez Canal, 
the consequences of the neglect to provide better means of 
communication with the north-west frontier were well manifested 
in the troubles of 1878-79-80. 

The refusal of the Ameer of Afghanistan — -who had already 
accorded an ostentatious welcome to a Russian Embassy at 
Kabul — to receive a British mission led, in 1878, to an order 
being given for the advance of three columns of British forces 
upon Afghan territory, the routes selected for this purpose being 
(i) the Khyber Pass, (2) the Kuram Pass, and (3) the Bolan Pass. 
At this time, however, the system of frontier railways which had 
been advocated so long scarcely existed except on paper. The 
nearest point of railway communication with Afghanistan was 
then at Sukkur, on the Indus. An extension across the Sind 
desert to the entrance to the Bolan Pass had been surveyed, and 
a very short section had been laid ; but in their advance on 
Kandahar Sir Donald Stewart and his force had to march all the 
way from the Indus, experiencing great trials in crossing the 
intervening desert, where many of the men lost their lives. The 



APPENDIX. 359 

work of constructing this desert railway — -which presented no 
engineering difficulty — was now taken actively in hand, and the 
line was available for the troops on their return. 

Success attended the expedition of 1878 so far as it led to the 
flight of Shere Ali, the occupation of Kandahar by Sir Donald 
Stewart, the control by the British of the three main highways 
between India and Afghanistan, and the signing of the treaty 
of Gandamak ; but the murder of Sir Louis Cavagnari and his 
staff at Kabul, in September, 1879, rendered necessary the send- 
ing of a further expedition, General Sir Frederick (afterwards 
Lord) Roberts being directed to proceed with a British force by 
the Kuram route to Kabul. 

Thereupon the whole question of transport facilities was re- 
vived afresh, and, although the expedition itself was a con- 
spicuous success, delays and commissariat difficulties arose which 
might have been avoided had better railway facilities been avail- 
able. The terminus, at that time, of the Punjab State Railway 
was at Jhelum, seventy miles from Rawal Pindi, 180 from 
Peshawar, and 260 from Thai, the frontier post of the Kuram 
pass ; and in spite of the vigorous efforts made, between 1878 
and 18S0, to extend the line, Jhelum remained the actual railway 
base throughout, no material assistance being gained from the 
twenty miles of extension which, owing to the great engineering 
difficulties presented by innumerable ravines, could alone be 
carried out during that period. Commenting on the " painfully 
slow " progress being made by the Khyber column. The Times of 
October 13, 1879, remarked : — 

It is now upwards of a quarter of a century since the chairman 
of the Sind railway commenced to broach the idea of connecting 
the Khyber and Bolan passes with the i-aihvay system of India, 
For more than a quarter of a century he has imsparingly advocated 
these views. . . . Had the views so persistently advocated bj^ Mr. 
Andrew, and so ' repeatedly brought forward by us, been adopted 
at the commencement of the struggle last October, as we then 
ventured to insist upon, vast sums would have been spared in the 
hire of transport, and we should have been spared the ignominy of 
feeling that a British army, nominally on active service, has occupied 
five weeks in covering less than seventy miles. 

Rawal Pindi — one of the most important strategical points 
in India— was not reached by the railway until October, 1880, 

1 It has been stated that the number of camels employed during the 
expeditions of 1878-80 for transport purposes, in default of better rail 
communication, was so great as almost to exhaust the supply of the 
frontier provinces of Sind and Punjab, while from 30,000 to 40,000 of them 
died owing to the excessive toils and trials of the work they were required 
to perform, the financial loss resulting therefrom to the Treasiiry being 
estimated at /2C)0,ooo- 



36o APPENDIX. 

by which time the Afghan War of 187S-80 had been brought to 
a close ; and the further extension of the Indian railway system 
to Peshawar, — another position of the utmost strategic import- 
ance, situate ten miles from the entrance to the Khyber Pass, 
and igo from Kabul — was effected by May, 1883. 

From a military point of view, however, still greater import- 
ance was attached, at that time, to the securing of rail communi- 
cation through the Bolan Pass to Quetta and Pishin in the direc- 
tion of Kandahar, this being the route by which, it was thought, 
the Russians would be certain to attempt their invasion of India, 
— if they should undertake one at all. 

Surveys for an extension of the Sukkur-Sibi desert line to 
Pishin were made whilst that line was under construction, and 
early in 1880 the Government gave directions that the extension 
was to be proceeded with ; though they decided that the route 
to be taken from Sibi should be through the Hurnai Pass in 
preference to the Bolan route, the former being regarded as 
preferable for the broad-gauge line (5 ft. 6 in.) with which the 

Kandahar State Railway," as it was to be called, would be 
provided. 

Arrangements were at once made for collecting the necessary 
materials and for carrying through the work with the least possi- 
ble delay ; but further progress was checked, in July, 1880, by 
the disaster at Maiwand. In the following October the Glad- 
stone Government, who had succeeded the Beaconsfield Adminis- 
tration and had, apparently, resolved upon a complete reversal 
of the Indian policy of their predecessors, followed up an earlier 
announcement of their intention to withdraw from Kandahar by 
giving orders for the cessation of the work on the Sind- Pishin 
railway. Maiwand having been avenged, and some refractory 
tribes subdued, Afghanistan was completely evacuated by the 
British at the end of April, 1881, and the construction of frontier 
railways in India was dropped, for the time being. 

In the middle of 1883 came a reconsideration of the position. 
Russia was then showing increased activity in the direction of 
Merv, and the British Government concluded, apparently, that 
they had been too hasty in ordering the abandonment of the 
Kandahar State Railway scheme nearly three years before. So 
they gave orders that the work should be resumed ; though, in 
order to render this volte face on their part less conspicuous, 
they directed that the undertaking should now be known only 
as the " Hurnai Road Improvement Scheme " ; that it should 
be proceeded with quietty, in order that it might not attract too 
much attention, and that the suggestion of a " road improve- 
ment scheme," instead of a railway, should be kept up by the 
engineers not being allowed to have even a temporary line of 
rails for conveying stores, materials for bridges, etc., from the 



APPENDIX. 361 

base to the passes. This last-mentioned stipulation meant that 
the stores and materials had to be either transported on the 
backs of camels or dragged on wheels up stream ; and it was 
estimated that, in addition to the great loss of time, a sum of not 
less than £1,000,000 was wasted in this way before the order 
prohibiting the use of temporary rails was rescinded. 

A start^was made with the work in October, 1883, and the 
fact that .the Russians were then actually approaching Merv, 
and that a sudden advance by them in force was regarded as 
probable, led to the laying of great emphasis on the need for 
construction being pushed on with the utmost vigour. When, 
in P'ebruary, 1884, the Russians did occupy Merv, the pressure 
brought to bear on the Engineer-in- chief became still more acute. 
Then, in May, the British Government formally announced that, 
owing to the encroachments of Russia, the line would be built. 
The fiction of a " Hurnai Road Improvement Scheme " was now 
abandoned. Henceforth the line under construction was to be 
known as " The Sind-Pishin State Railway." 

From the very outset, however, the difficulties which crowded 
upon Colonel (afterwards Sir James) Browne, R.E., an officer 
well experienced in railway and engineering work who was 
entrusted with the carrying out of the scheme, were unfavourable 
to the prospects of speed in construction. The surveys which 
had already been made were found not only worthless but mis- 
leading. The first members of his staff were unacquainted with 
railway work and had to be succeeded by men brought from 
England. The plant and materials previously collected, but 
disposed of at scrap-iron prices when the line was abandoned in 
t88o, had now to be replaced at an almost fabulous cost, owing 
to the urgency of the need for them. 

All these were, nevertheless, minor troubles as compared with 
the physical conditions to be overcome. 

Starting from an elevation, at Sibi, of 300 ft., the line was to 
rise 6,200 ft. in the 120 miles between Sibi and the summit level 
at Kach. 

Then, for the greater part of the 224 miles to which the line 
was to extend, the country was a wilderness of rocks and stones 
— a land of barrenness and desolation, where there was no 
timber, no fuel, scarcely a blade of grass, and, in places, for 
stretches of several miles, no water. It was a land, too, almost 
devoid of inhabitants, while those who did dwell there were 
described as "a savage and blood-thirsty race of robbers," 
continually engaged in plunder and inter- tribal warfare, and not 
growing sufficient food even for their own consumption. Almost 
everything that was wanted — including supplies for from 15,000 
to 30,000 workers and materials for the line — had to be imported 
from a distance. 



362 APPENDIX. 

Still less inviting was this inhospitable region by reason of 
its range of climatic conditions. The lowlands have the reputa- 
tion of being one of the hottest corners of the earth's surface. 
A temperatm-e of 124 deg. Fahr. has been registered in the Nari 
valley. The highlands, in turn, offer the alternative of Arctic 
cold, the temperature there falling in winter to 18 deg. below 
zero. Between the lowlands and the highlands there is a tem- 
perate zone ; but here the constant pestilence was dreaded no 
less than the extremes of heat and cold elsewhere. 

As the result of these conditions, the work of construction 
could be carried on in certain districts for part of the year only, 
and the workers had to be transferred from one section of the 
Hue to another according to the season. Such a movement of 
front involved the transport of everything, — stores, tools, offices 
and some thousands of men. " The management of this vast 
exodus," says Captain Scott-Moncrieff, R.E., in his paper on 
" The Frontier Railways of India," ^ " was a work of considerable 
anxiety and difficulty. A sudden influx of people, such as this, 
into a desolate and barren land naturally caused a famine. 
Everything was eaten up, and for some days the question of 
supplies was the burning question of the hour. . . . Nine 
hundred camel loads of food were consumed daily on the works." 
The customary load for a camel was 400 lbs., but some of the 
camels carried loads of 8co lbs. up the pass. 

The engineering difficulties fell into four principal groups, — 
(i) the Nari Gorge ; (2) the Gundakin Defile ; (3) the Chuppur 
Rift, and (4) the Mud Gorge.^ 

The Nari Gorge, about fourteen miles in length, beginning 
just beyond Sibi, has been described as " one of the most weird 
tracks through which a railway has ever been carried. The hills, 
absolutely bare, rise above the valley for many thousands of 
feet in fantastic pinnacles and cliffs. It is a scene of the wildest 
desolation." The Nari river, running through the gorge, is 
formed by a combination of three streams having but little water 
on ordinary occasions, but becoming, in time of flood, a raging 
torrent which fills up the whole gorge for miles, attains a depth 
of ten feet, and has a velocity of five feet per second. Over this 
river the railway had to be carried in five different places. Not 
alone bridges, but heavy embankments, cuttings and tunnels 
were needed. At one point there was an especially dangerous 
tunnel in which so many accidents occurred, owing to roof or 
sides falling in, that at last no workmen would enter it except at 
a wage five-fold that of the high rate already being paid. The 

1 " Professional Papers of the Corps of Royal Engineers," Vol xi, 1885. 

2 " J.ife and Times of General Sir James Browne, R.E., K.C.B., K.C.S.I." 
by General J. J. McLeod Innes, London, 1905. 



APPENDIX. 363 

whole work was liable to be stopped for months together, owing 
to the washing away of half- completed embankments or bridges ; 
though until this portion of the Hne had been completed no 
materials could be sent to the sections beyond. 

In the Gundakin Defile, eight miles long, two tunnels had to 
be made through some most treacherous material, and four 
bridges had to be provided. 

The Chuppur Rift is a chasm three miles long in the spurs of 
a rocky mountain forming an apparently insuperable barrier. 
In time of floods the river attains a height of from 30 to 40 ft. 
The running of the railway on a ledge along the side of the 
mountain being impracticable, owing to the nature of the rock, 
the engineers cut a line of continuous tunnels partly on one side 
of the rift and partly on the other, connecting the two series by 
an iron girder bridge ; but, instead of constructing the tunnels 
in the usual way, from each end — a procedure which would have 
taken much time — ^they adopted the expedient of driving open- 
ings (adits) into the side of the cliff at various points, and then 
cutting the tunnel right and left of each of these openings until 
the various sections met. The only way in which the openings 
could be made was by lowering men down by ropes several 
hundred feet from the top of the cUff until they reached the 
point where the work for an opening was to be started. They 
then drove crowbars into the perpendicular sides of the cliff in 
order to gain the necessary support for a platform from which 
the blasting operations could be carried on. Six of these openings 
were made on one side of the cliff and six on the other. As a 
separate gang of men could operate at each it was possible to com- 
plete the whole work in the course of a few months. Altogether 
there is a collective length of 6,400 ft. of tunnels in the rift, in 
addition to a viaduct 75 ft. high, with seven spans of 40 ft. each, 
and a bridge having an elevation over the river of 250 ft., and 
consisting of a central span of 150 ft. and eight spans of 40 ft. 

On the summit level, twenty-five miles in length, came the 
five-mile long Mud Gorge, — a narrow valley, between precipitous 
mountains, filled with a soil little better than dried mud, and of 
such a character that several bad slips of road-bed, carrying 
away the whole of the line, occurred. 

One would think that with all these difficulties — -physical, 
climatic and engineering — to face, the constructors of the railway 
might have been excused any more ; but there were others 
besides. 

In August and September, 1884, the troops and native labourers 
employed on the work on the lower part of the line were visited 
by an outbreak of fever and scurvy of a virulence almost unpre- 
cedented in Indian experience. Large numbers of the men died. 
In one gang of 200 the average number of deaths was ten a day. 



364 APPENDIX. 

Of those who surviv^ed the majority were so prostrated as to be 
scarcety capable of doing anything. Sixty per cent, of the Sappers 
were in hospital. 

Fresh troops, to the extent of three Battalions of Pioneers, 
were brought on to the work ; but they had scarcely arrived 
before — -in November — there was a severe outbreak of cholera. 
The Afghans thereupon " bolted to a man " ; and they were 
followed by many skilled artisans who had been collected from 
various parts of India. Additional labour had to be obtained 
from the Eastern Punjab, but much time was lost. 

Whilst the engineers were struggling to overcome these mani- 
fold difficulties, the political situation was steadily becoming 
still more acute. The climax seemed to be reached by the 
Penj-deh incident of March 30, 1885, when a Russian force under 
General Komarolf seized this important strategical position, 
situate near the junction of the Khushk and Murghab rivers. 
On April 27, 1885, Mr. Gladstone proposed in the House of 
Commons a vote of ;^i 1,000, 000 for the purposes of what then 
seemed to be an inevitable war with Russia. The money was 
voted the same night. 

So the urgency for completing the line which would now, 
probably, have been available for use had it not been stopped 
in 1880, was greater than ever. Orders were sent to India that 
the work must be continued along all parts of the line regardless 
of seasons. Within a week or two, however, of the war vote at 
Westminster, cholera broke out afresh among the construction 
party in India. By the end of May it was spreading among them 
" like a raging fire " ; while to the cholera itself there was added 
a heat so intense that even the most willing of workers found it 
almost unendurable. 

Under this combination of cholera and excessive heat, work 
on the lower sections of the line was stopped altogether for a 
time — Government orders and Russians notwithstanding. All 
possible measures were taken to mitigate the severity of the 
epidemic ; but the death-rate increased with frightful rapidity. 
Some of the best workers, European and Asiatic — men who could 
least be spared, on account of the responsible positions they held 
— were carried off. During the month of June no fewer than 
2,000 died out of io,oco. Of the remainder large numbers sought 
safety in flight. Many of the minor Government officials, such as 
telegraph and Post Office clerks, went off in a body. 

Whilst sickness and disease had thus been afflicting the camps, 
fresh troubles had arisen in another direction. Early in 1885 
the district was visited by a succession of floods exceeding in 
severity anything known there for sixty years. In the course 
of three months the rainfall amounted to 19.27 inches, — a total 
six times in excess of the average. Several bridges and man}- 



APPENDIX. 365 

miles of temporary roads were washed away ; numerous accidents 
were caused ; camping grounds were destroyed ; communications 
were interrupted ; food supplies became scarcely obtainable, 
and great delay resulted in the prosecution of a work for which 
urgency was being so persistently demanded. The floods did 
not finally subside until the end of May. 

Nature having done so much to impede the progress of the 
undertaking, it only remained for politicians and officials to do 
what they could to follow her example. 

Mention has already been made of the initial prohibition of 
temporary lines of rails for the conveyance of stores and materials, 
and the loss of time and waste of money involved in the use of 
camels instead ; but to this one fact may be added another, 
namely, that after the Engineer-in-Chief had made his arrange- 
ments to obtain sleepers from the juniper forests on the north 
of the line — this being the only timber available in the whole 
district — ^the Government vetoed the arrangement on the ground 
that it might, possibly, lead to quarrels among the Afghan 
tribes. The timber had to be procured from India, instead. 
Hence more delay. 

Then the original arrangement with the Engineer-in-Chief, 
that the work was to be carried out under the Military Depart- 
ment of the Indian Government, and that, in the interests of 
urgency, he should have a free hand, was changed into one which 
required that the work should be controlled by a new member 
of the Public Works Department, who, it is alleged, interfered 
with many of the working details which should have been left to 
an Engineer-in-Chief, and, by his " unskilled and unqualified 
control," caused still further delay, together with much expense 
and confusion. A good deal of time was lost, for instance, before 
Col. Browne could get even some indispensable instruments and 
survey appliances. Especially persistent, also, was Col. Browne's 
immediate superior in demanding from him " detailed esti- 
mates " which, on account of the uncertainties of the engineer- 
ing work and of the other factors in the situation, it was 
impossible to prepare whilst the construction of the line was in 
progress. 

Such, however, was the energy which had been shown, in spite 
of all these difficulties and drawbacks, that the work was com- 
pleted within the two years and a half fixed by the Engineer-in- 
Chief at the start as the period in which — -" with money freely 
granted " — it could be done. On March 27, 1887, an engine 
ran over the line all the way from Sibi to Quetta, and the Hurnai 
Railway was formally declared open for traffic. 

In the meantime the apparent certainty of war with Russia, 
following, especially, on her seizure of Penj-deh, had led, in April, 
1885, to an order being given for the construction of a light rail- 



366 APPENDIX. 

way from Sibi tJirough the Bolan Pass to Ouetta, as an alterna- 
tive, more direct and more quickly constructed route, of which 
use could be made for a movement of troops to the frontier on 
the anticipated partial mobilisation of the Indian Army. 

The laying of this light railway constituted another notable 
engineering achievement. 

Running through the heart of what has been described as 
" some of the boldest mountain scenery in India," the Bolan Pass 
has a length of about sixty miles and a breadth ranging from one 
mile to a space, in places, of only about twenty yards between the 
rugged mountain walls which here convert the pass into a mere 
defile. The pass is, in fact, practically the bed of the Bolan 
River, and is dry for the greater part of the year, but liable to 
floods. The temporary narrow-gauge line was to be laid along 
the river bed without interfering with the military road con- 
structed in 1882-84 as far as Quetta. 

For the first forty miles there was a fairly good gradient ; but 
beyond that came a very heavy rise to the top of the pass ; and 
here, at least, anything more than a metre-gauge line would 
have been impracticable. The possibility of constructing a 
line of railway through the pass at aU had long been the despair 
of engineers, and this was the reason why the Hurnai route had 
been decided on in preference to the Bolan for the broad-gauge 
line to Ouetta. Unfortunately, too, the climatic were even 
greater than the engineering difficulties. The heat in the lower 
parts of the pass was " beyond all description," and cholera or 
other diseases carried off thousands of the workers. 

With these two lines at their disposal, the Government were, 
in the spring of 1887, quite prepared for a concentration of British 
and Indian forces in Afghanistan, had the political condition 
rendered such a course necessary ; but the situation had by then 
greatly improved, thanks to the negotiations which had been 
proceeding with Russia for the demarcation of frontiers. In 
April, 1877, the British and Russian commissioners met at St. 
Petersburg, and, as the result of still further negotiations, the 
questions at issue were settled without the appeal to arms which 
had at one time appeared inevitable. 

In 1892 some fifty miles of the Bolan light railway were aban- 
doned in favour of another route which, avoiding the first part 
of the pass, allowed of a broad-gauge line being laid from Sibi 
through Quetta to Bostan Junction, where it connects with what 
is now known as the Hurnai- Pishin Loop. A branch ninety 
miles in length, from Quetta to Mushki, on the Seistan trade 
route, was opened in 1905. 

To-day the Sind- Pishin railway, with its two sections, via the 
Bolan and the Hurnai respectively, has its terminus at New 
Chaman, on the actual frontier of Afghanistan, and within seventy 



APPENDIX. 367 

miles of Kandahar. A broad-gauge line throughout, it forms 
part of the railway system of India, linking up at Ruk junction 
with the hne running thence along the north bank of the Indus 
to Karachi, and, by means of a bridge across the Indus, with a 
line on the south of the river which, in one direction provides an 
alternative route to Karachi, and in the other connects with 
Calcutta and other leading cities. The Sind-Pishin hne affords, 
in fact, a most valuable means for concentrating on the Afghan 
frontier, within a short distance of Kandahar, and in the shortest 
possible time a considerable body of troops collected from all 
parts of India, together with reinforcements from Europe, landed 
at Karachi. As a strategical hne, therefore, the railway is of 
exceptional importance to India and to British interests in 
general ; though there can be no suggestion that it would be used 
otherwise than for purely defensive purposes. 

Then, in what, since 190 1, has constituted the North- West 
Frontier Province of India, there has been a considerable ex- 
tension of frontier railways in recent years, — -all serving important 
strategical purposes. From Peshawar — 1,520 miles from Cal- 
cutta — there is a broad-gauge extension, twelve miles in length, 
to Fort Jamrud, at the mouth of the Khyber Pass ; from Naus- 
hahra, a cantonment twenty-seven miles due east of Peshawar, 
there is a narrow-gauge line to Dargai, at the foot of the Malakand 
Pass ; while among other lines is one to Thai, a military outpost 
on the extreme limit of British territory which serves also as a 
depot for the trade with Northern Afghanistan passing through 
the Kurram valley ; and one to Banu, a garrison town, seventy- 
nine miles south of Kohat, built on a site chosen for political 
reasons by Sir Herbert Edwards in 1848. 

A number of other railways on the north-west frontiers of 
India have been proposed. Whatever may or may not be 
ultimately done in regard to these further schemes, it is obvious 
that those already constructed have made an enormous difference 
in our strategical position in regard to Afghanistan and the lands 
beyond as compared with the miHtary transport conditions of 
1878. 



368 APPENDIX. 



THE DEFENCE OF AUSTRALIA 

With a total area of 2,948,000 square miles, a population of 
less than four and a half million, and a coast line of 11,300 miles, 
the continent of Australia is peculiarly open to attack, and the 
possibilities of invasion, or of attempts at invasion, have not 
only been much discussed there of late years, but they have given 
rise to schemes of land defence in which the building of strategical 
railways and the adapting of existing lines to strategical purposes 
form important factors. 

Under present conditions Western Australia and the Northern 
Territory are isolated from the remaining States of the Common- 
wealth so far as regards rail communication, and are at the mercy 
of any invader who might be able to land a force there unchal- 
lenged by the British Fleet. 

Since the autumn of 1912, however, there has been under 
construction a railway which, starting from Kalgoorlie, the 
eastern terminus of the Western Australian system, will proceed 
in a direct line for 1,063 miles to Port Augusta, on the South 
AustraHan system, thus estabUshing through rail connection 
between Perth (Western Australia) and the farthest Hmit of the 
Queensland railway system, a total distance, that is, of about 
4,000 miles. When this, the first of Australia's proposed trans- 
continental lines, is completed, it will be possible to send troops 
from the Central or the Eastern States to Western Australia, not 
only by rail, but by a railway laid so far inland that they will 
be safe from attack from the sea. There would thus be a reason- 
able certainty of the troops arriving at their destination ; whereas 
if they had to go by water there might be the risk of the vessels 
in which they were making the journey being captured by the 
enemy. While, therefore, the KalgoorUe-Port Augusta line is 
expected to serve other than purely strategical purposes, it is, 
in effect, the latter which claim first consideration. 

Referring to the Northern Territory, in an article contributed 
by him to The Empire Review for May, 1910, Mr. F. A. W. 
Gisborne, an authority on AustraHan questions, wrote : — 

This vast region embraces 523,620 square miles of land, and lies 
close to Asia, the most populous of the continents. At present it 
contains, exclusive of the aborigines, barely one thousand white 
people and about twice as many Chinese. It lacks railway communi- 
cation with the settled parts of Australia, and is completely isolated 
from them. Its magnificent harbour, accessible to the largest vessels 
afloat, and constituting the natural gateway to tropical Australia, 
lies, save for the British Fleet, absolutely defenceless. Behind it 
extend millions of acres of fertile plains never yet tilled, and never 
likely to be cultivated by white hands. Practically no industry 



APPENDIX. 369 

flourishes in a region which could support myriads of agriculturists 
and operatives. 

That some of the peoples of crowded Asia may, sooner or later, 
seek a settlement for their surplus millions on what, for them, 
would be so desirable a land as the Northern Territory, with it s 
magnificent opportunities for those capable of working in a 
tropical climate, is a contingency that has been fully reahsed in 
Australia, and the questions have arisen (i) as to whether the 
presence of a thousand whites in a region half a million square 
miles in extent constitutes such " effective occupation " thereof 
as gives them a right to its exclusive possession ; and (2) whether 
it would be possible either to prevent Asiatics from invading 
the Northern Territory, if they sought so to do, or to eject them 
therefrom if they did. 

The latter question raises in an especially interesting form the 
problem as to the respective merits and possibilities of sea-power 
and rail-power. 

Sea- power would, assuredly, have to be rehed upon for safe- 
guarding the Northern Territory against invasion, since it would 
be impossible for the Commonwealth Government to station 
troops at every prospective landing point along i,2C0 miles of a 
tropical coast-line in sufficient force to keep off any invader who 
might appear there at some unexpected moment. For the 
checking, therefore, of such invasion, dependence would have 
to be placed on the power of the British Fleet (i) to stop the 
invader, {2) to cut off his connections if he should effect a landing, 
or (3) to carry war into the invader's own country. 

Nor, if any large Asiatic settlement — as distinct from an 
" invasion " in the ordinary acceptation of that term — did take 
place in the Northern Territory under conditions that might not 
call for the intervention of the British Fleet, is it certain that 
the ejection of the settlers could be ensured with the help even 
of a trans-continental line of railway. Here the question is not 
that of the carrying power of a single line of railway. The 
examples offered by the War of Secession, the South African War 
and the Russo-Japanese War have well estabhshed the great 
advantages that even single lines, extending for great distances, 
can confer in the effecting of military transport. The considera- 
tions that would arise in Austraha are, rather, (i) the fact that 
troops arriving at Pine Creek or Port Darwin from the south might 
have to make some very long and very trying marches across 
the 523,000 square miles comprising the Northern Territory 
before they reached the settlement of the Asiatics whom they 
were to eject, while they would be dependent for their supplies 
on a far-distant railway base ; and (2) the doubt as to whether 
Australia could spare a sufficiently large body of troops to under- 
take such an expedition, having regard to the defence require- 

B B 



370 APPENDIX. 

ments of her south-eastern States, the integrity of which would 
count as of more vital importance than an Asiatic settlement 
in her Far North. So there are those who think that if such a 
settlement were eventually effected in the Northern Territory, 
under conditions not constituting a casus belli, Australia would 
simply have to accept the situation, and reconcile herself to it as 
best she could. 

All these things may seem to reflect on the precise value, from 
the rail-power point of view, of that direct communication which, 
more especiallj^ for strategical reasons, Austraha has hoped 
eventually to obtain between north and south as well as between 
west and east. It is, nevertheless, desirable to see what has 
already been done in this direction. 

The construction of a north-to-soutli trans-continental line, 
passing through the very centre of the Australian mainland, and 
linking up the Northern Territory with the southern and eastern 
States, has been under discussion for a period of about forty 
years. Progress seemed to be assured by the Acceptance Act 
of 1910, under which the Government of the Commonwealth, 
in taking over the Northern Territorj' from South Australia, 
agreed to build a trans-continental line connecting Oodnadatta, 
the northern terminus of the South Australian railway system, 
and 688 miles from Adelaide, with Pine Creek, the southern 
terminus of the Northern Territory sj'stem, and 145 miles distant 
from Port Darwin. This connecting link would have a length 
of 1,063 miles, — ^the same, by a singular coincidence, as that of 
the Kalgoorlie-Port Augusta line. 

Since this " bargain " between the South Austraha and the 
Commonwealth Governments was made, there have been many 
advocates of an alternative, or, othervv^ise, a supplementary route 
which, instead of going direct from South Australia to the 
Northern Territory, (passing through the central Australian 
desert,) would link up — on their west — with the railway systems 
of Victoria, New South Wales and Queensland, connections with 
the new line being made by these States where necessary. This 
" eastern deviation route " would, it is argued, offer a greater 
strategical advantage, as compared with the other route, because 
if troops had to be despatched to the north, they could more 
readily be supplied from Melbourne and Sydney' — which, between 
them, contain over one-fourth of the entire population of Aus- 
traha — than from Adelaide ; while to send troops from Queens- 
land, New South Wales and Victoria to South Australia in order 
that they might start on their journey to the Northern Territory' 
from Oodnadatta, would involve a material delay under, possibly, 
urgent conditions. Thus it is estimated that if the eastern 
route were adopted, troops and travellers from Brisbane to Port 
Darwin would only travel about 2,234 niiles as against 3,691 



APPENDIX. 371 

miles via Sydne3^ Melbourne, Adelaide and the central Australian 
route from Oodnadatta. 

How these rival claims and contentions will be eventually 
settled remains to be seen ; but there has now been added to them 
a project for the building of other avowedly strategical hues, 
establishing a more direct connection between the Kalgoorlie-Port 
Augusta trans-continental line, when it is finished, and the 
capitals of Victoria, New South Wales and Queensland respec- 
tively, facihtating the mutual defence of the eastern, southern 
and western States in a time of crisis. This further scheme is, 
however, designed only to supplement the trans-continental 
hues already mentioned. 

As regards the eastern States and the " central " State of South 
Australia, the question of an Asiatic invasion may be assumed 
not to arise. It has, however, long been regarded as possible 
that if Great Britain were at war with some non-Asiatic Power 
able to challenge her supremacy on the seas, the enemy might 
make an attack, not on the admittedly vulnerable Northern 
Territor}/ — which he would not want either as a colony for 
Europeans or as a " jumping-off " place from which to conquer 
the remainder of Australia— but on some point along the coast- 
line of nearly 2,000 miles which, stretching from Rockhampton, 
in Queensland, to Adelaide, in South Australia, comprises (with 
a Hinterland of some 200 miles) the most populous, the most 
wealthy and (for non-Asiatics) the most desirable section of the 
whole Australian continent. 

It is true that Germany — the Power which claims first attention 
from this point of view — has shown far greater desire to convert 
Africa into a German Empire than she has to effect the annexation 
of Austraha. Yet that she has recognized the weakness of the 
Australian situation is suggested by the fact that, in dealing with 
the defensive power of the Commonwealth, Dr. Rohrbach, one 
of the exponents of German "World-Policy, and author of " Deut- 
schland unter den Weltvolkern," among other works, has declared 
that Austraha could not resist if her four chief towns, ail of them 
near the coast, were occupied by an invader.^ 

Which of these four towns, or which particular point along 
the said 2,000 miles of coast-line, an invader would select for 
his main attack — apart from feints elsewhere — must needs 
be uncertain ; but this very fact only adds to the imperative 
importance of those responsible for the defence of Australia being 
able to move troops freety, and within the shortest possible 
period, either from one State to another or from any place to 
another within one and the same State, as the defence conditions 
might require. 

1 See " The Origins of the War " ; by J. Holland Rose, Litt.D. Cam- 
bridge, 1914. 



372 APPENDIX. 

When we thus pass on to consider the question as to the use 
of existing lines of railway in Australia for strategical purposes, 
we find that the most noteworthy expression of opinion on this 
branch of the subject is contained in the following extract from 
the " Memorandum " which Lord Kitchener wrote in 1910, as 
the result of an investigation made by him, at the request of the 
Commonwealth Government, into the " Defence of Australia " : — 

Railway construction has, while developing the country, resulted 
in lines that would appear to be more favourable to an enemy in- 
vading Australia than to the defence of the country. Difierent 
gauges in most of the States isolate each system, and the want of 
systematic interior connection makes the present lines running inland 
of little use for defence, although possibly of considerable value to an 
enemy who would have temporary command of the sea. 

The " different gauges " undoubtedly constitute one of the 
most serious shortcomings of the existing railways in Austraha in 
regard to those military movements with which we are here alone 
concerned. 

Strategical considerations as applied to rail transport require, 
not only that troops shall be readily conveyed, when necessary, 
from one part of a country or one part of a continent to another, 
but that a mobilisation of the forces shall be followed by a 
mobilisation of railway rolling stock. Locomotives, carriages 
and trucks on lines which are not themselves likely to be wanted 
for military transport should be available for use on the lines 
that will be so wanted, in order that all the rolling stock of all 
the railways in all parts of the country or of the States concerned 
can, at a time of possibly the gravest emergency, be concentrated 
or employed on whatever lines, or in whatever direction, addi- 
tional transport facihties may be needed. 

The importance of this principle was first recognised by von 
Moltke ; but when the railways of Austraha were originally 
planned, each State took a more or less parochial view of its own 
requirements, its own geographical conditions, or its own re- 
sources, and adopted the gauge which accorded best therewith, 
regardless of any future need for a co-ordinated system of rail- 
transport serving the requirements of the Austrahan continent as 
a whole. 

So we find that the 3 ft. 6 in. gauge has been adopted in 
Queensland, South Australia (with a further 600 miles of 5 ft. 
3 in. gauge), Western Australia, and the Northern Territory; 
the 4 ft. 8i in. gauge (the standard gauge in Great Britain and, 
also, of over 65 per cent, of the world's railway mileage,) in New 
South Wales ; and the 5 ft. 3 in. gauge in Victoria. This means, 
in most cases, that when the frontier of a State is reached, passen- 



APPENDIX. 373 

gers, mails, baggage and merchandise must change or be trans- 
ferred from the trains on the one system to those of the other. 

Assuming that the west-to-east trans-continental railway 
(which is being built with the 4 ft. 8^ in. gauge) were now available 
for use, a traveller by it from Perth, Western Australia, through 
South Australia, Victoria, New South Wales, and Queensland 
would require, on account of the differences in gauge, to change 
trains at least five times. This may be regarded as an extreme 
case ; but the evils of the existing conditions are presented to 
us in a concrete form by an estimate which the Defence Depart- 
ment of the Commonwealth recently made as to the time it would 
take to move a force of 30,000 mounted troops from Melbourne 
to Brisbane. It was shown that, with the present break of gauge, 
this operation would occupy no less a time than sixty-three days ; 
whereas if there were no break of gauge twenty-three days would 
suffice. Thus the differences of gauge would mean a loss of forty 
days in effecting transfers at the frontier. In this time much 
might happen if the enemy had obtained temporary control of the 
sea. Under these conditions, in fact, he would be able to move 
his own forces by sea for the still longer distance from Adelaide 
to Brisbane in five days. Brisbane might thus be captured 
by the enemy while the reinforcements it wanted were still 
changing trains at the State boundaries. 

It may be of interest here to recall the fact that at one time 
there were still greater differences of gauge on the railways in 
the United States ; that in 1885 the American railway com- 
panies resolved upon establishing uniformity as a means of over- 
coming the great inconveniences due to these conditions ; and 
that in 1886, after adequate preparation, the conversion of prac- 
tically the entire system of railways in the United States to the 
4 ft. 8| in. gauge was effected in two days. Strategically, there- 
fore, the United States Federal Government could now, not only 
send troops by rail from any one part of their vast territory to 
another, but utilise almost the Vv'hole of the available rolling 
stock for military purposes. 1 

Unification of gauge forms, however, a serious proposition for 
Australia on account of the prodigious outlay which, owing 
to the short-sighted policy of the past, it would now involve." 

The estimated cost of converting all the 4 ft. 8| in. gauge in 
New South Wales and all the 3 ft. 6| in. gauge in Queensland, 
South Australia, Western Australia and the Northern Territory 

1 In the New York Sun of June 18, 1911, there was published an article 
which had for its heading, " If Troops had to be Rushed, the Railroads 
in this Country could move 250,000 Men a Day." 

' The mileage of lines open, under construction, or authorised, in the 
three gauges, is as follows : — 5 ft. 3 in. gauge, 4,979 miles ; 4 ft. 8^ in. 
gauge, 6,160 miles; 3 ft. 6 in. gauge, 11,727 miles. 



374 APPENDIX. 

to the 5 ft. 3| in. gauge of Victoria is no less than £51,659,000. To 
convert all the 3 ft. 6 in. and 5 ft. 3 in. railways to the 4 ft. 8^ 
in. gauge of the New South Wales lines would cost £37,164,000. 
To convert to the 4 ft. 8| in. gauge all the trunk lines connecting 
the capitals — and this without shortening the present circuitous 
routes or modifying the heavy grades — would alone cost about 

£12, 000,000. 

In addition to this still undecided " battle of the gauges" 
there are in Australia other disadvantages, from a strategical 
standpoint, in the existing railway system, included therein 
being (i) an undue preponderance of single over double track, so 
that any exceptional amount of traffic causes a congestion which 
is likely only to be aggravated bj^ new lines constructed, or 
extensions made, before the carrying capacity of the trunk lines 
has been increased ; and (2) the building of lines which either 
lead nowhere or have been expressly stopped short of the boun- 
daries of a State in order to retain, for the railways of that State, 
traffic from outlying districts which would pass, by a much 
shorter journey, to the port of a neighbouring State if, by means 
of through railway connexion, the residents in the districts 
concerned were free to avail themselves of their geographical 
advantage in respect to their nearness to such port. 

In addition to the efforts she has already made, or is proposing 
to make, to effect such improvement both in her railway system 
and in her military transport facilities as may be practicable, 
Australia has sought to provide for that effective organisation 
without which, as experience elsewhere has fully shown, great 
and even disastrous confusion may arise at a critical moment 
owing to conflicts of authority and other troubles or difficulties 
in the working of such railways as may be utilised for military 
movements. 

The action taken in this direction is based on a further re- 
commendation made bv Lord Kitchener, who, in the course of 
his Memorandum to the Commonwealth Government in 1910 
said (paragraph 85) : — 

Preparation for mobilisation is primarily the work of the General 
Staff, who recommend the lines to be followed and advise where, 
and in what quantities, the munitions of war of the various units 
should be stored. Concentration can only be satisfactorily effected 
when the railway and military authorities are in the closest touch, 
and -work in absolute harmony. To secure this co-operation, I 
advise that a War Railway Council be formed, as is the case in the 
United Kingdom, composed of the Chief Railway Commissioner 
from each State, under the presidency of the Quartermaster-General 
of the Citizen Forces, and with an officer of the Headquarters Staff 
as secretary. 

A War Railway Ccuncil for the Commonwealth was duly 



APPENDIX. 375 

constituted in 191 1. The Council, which forms an adjunct of 
the Commonwealth Defence Department, consists of the Quarter- 
master-General, (president,) the senior oificer of the Engineer and 
Railway Staff Corps also created for the railway system alike of 
the Commonwealth and of each State (such senior officer being 
the Chief or the Deputy Commissioner of Railways) ; the Con- 
sulting Military Engineer of the Commonwealth, and two re- 
presentatives of the naval and military forces, with a military 
officer as secretary. The duties of the Council in time of peace 
are, generally, to furnish advice to the Minister of Defence on 
railway matters, and, particularly {a) to determine the method of 
supplying information to, and obtaining it from, the different 
railway departments ; (b) to suggest regulations and instructions 
for carrying out movement of troops ; (c) to suggest the method 
of organising railway staff officers in time of war to act as inter- 
mediaries between the various railway authorities and the 
troops ; {d) to consider the question of extra sidings, loading 
platforms, etc. ; and proposals for unification of gauges ; and 
(e) to suggest the organisation and system of training of railway 
troops. In time of war the Council further advises the Minister 
of defence on questions of mobilisation. The organisation for 
military rail- transport in the several States follows on the lines 
of the system already adopted in the United Kingdom, as laid 
down in the Field Service Regulations. 



BIBLIOGRAPHY 

The following list of books, pamphlets and articles bearing 
on the evolution and the development of rail-power down to 
the outbreak of the Great War in 1914 — this alone being the 
purpose and the scope of the present work — was originally 
based on selections from a " List of References on the Use of 
Railroads in War " prepared by the Bureau of Railway Econo- 
mics, Washington, D.C, U.S.A., and including items from all 
the leading libraries of the United States (Library of Congress ; 
the libraries of the principal Universities, Colleges and learned 
or technical societies ; State libraries, public libraries, private 
railway-hbraries, and the library of the Bureau itself), together 
with various foreign libraries, such as those of the Minister of 
Public Works in Berlin, the International Railway Congress at 
Berne, and others besides. 

Much valuable help has been derived from the American list ; 
but a large number of its references, and especially those relating 
to the World- War itself, have not here been reproduced, while so 
many additions have been gathered in from other sources 
among which might be mentioned the published catalogue of 
the War Office Library ; the libraries of the British Museum, 
the Royal Colonial Institute, and the Patent Office ; the 
Journal of the Royal United Service Institution, the publi- 
cations of the Royal Engineers' Institute, and official or other 
publications in Great Britain, France, etc.), that the Biblio- 
graphy here presented may, perhaps, be regarded as practically 
a new compilation, supplementing the excellent purpose which 
the list of the American Bureau of Railway Economics will 
undoubtedly serve. 

EARLIEST REFERENCES (1833-50). 

Harkort, Friedrich Wilhelm. Die Eisenbahn von Minden 
nach Koln. Hagen, 1833. 

[The earliest published work in which the importance 
and the possibilities of railways from a military stand- 
point were advocated.] 
Ueber die militarische Benutzung der Eisenbahnen. Berlin, 
i836. 

376 



BIBLIOGRAPHY. 377 

Darlegung der technischen und Verkehrs-Verhaltnisse der 
Eisenbahnen, nebst darauf gegriindeter Eroterung iiber 
die militarische Benutzung derselben. Berlin, 1841. 

" Pz." (Carl Eduard Poenitz). Die Eisenbahn als militar- 
ische Operationslinien betrachtet und durch Beispiele 
erlautet. Nebst Entwurf zu einem miUtarischen Eisen- 
bahnsystem fiir Deutschland. Adorf [Saxony], 1842. 

II Aufl. Adorf, 1853. 

Essai sur les Chemins de Fer, consideres comme lignes d'opera- 
tions militaires. Traduit de Tallemand par L. A. Unger. 
Paris, 1844. 

[A French translation of the above-mentioned work by 
Poenitz, with an introduction by the translator and a 
map of Germany and Austria showing railways existing in 
1842 and the " system " projected by the German writer.] 

Uebersicht des Verkehrs und der Betriebsmittel auf den inland- 
ischen und den benachbarten auslandischen Eisenbahnen 
fiir militarischen Zwecke ; nach den beim grossen General- 
stabe vorhandenen Materialen zusammengesteUt. Berlin, 
1848-50. 

Hoffmann, C. Amtlich erlassene Vorschriften iiber Anlage 
und Betrieb der Eisenbahnen in Preussen. Berlin, 1849. 

WARS AND EXPEDITIONS 

Crimean War (1854-55) 

Hamley, Gen. Sir Edward. The War in the Crimea. London, 

1891. 
LuARD, R.E., Capt. C. E. Field Railways and their general 

appUcation in war. Journal of the Royal United Service 

Institution, Vol. XVII, 1873. 

[Refers to military railway built for use in the Crimea.] 

Italian War (1859) 

Bartholony, F. Notice sur les Transports par les Chemins 
de Fer fran9ais vers le theatre de la guerre d'ltalie. 
71 pp. Paris, 1859. 

— — Millar, R.A., Major, Topographical Staff. The Italian 
Campaign of 1859. Journal of the Royal United Service 
Institution, Vol. V, pp. 269-308. London, 1861. 
[Introductory reference to use of railways.] 

American Civil War (1861-65) 

Abhandlung iiber die Thatigkeit der amerikanischen Feldeisen- 
bahn-Abtheilungen der Nordstaaten ; bei den Directionen 
der Staatseisenbahnen. Durch das Konigl. Ministerium 
in Circulation gesetzt. Berlin. 



378 BIBLIOGRAPHY. 

Bacon, E. L. How railroads helped save the Union. Rail- 
roadman's Magazine, July, 1909. 

Haupt, Herman. Reminiscences of General Herman Haupt, 
Chief of the Bureau of United States Military Railroads 
in the Civil War. 321 pp. Illustrations. Milwaukee, 
Wis., 1901. 

Henderson, Lieut.-Col. G. F. R. Stonewall Jackson and 
the American Civil War. Second edition. Two vols. 
London, 1899. 

Porter, W. E. Keeping the Baltimore and Ohio in Repair 
in War Time was a Task for Hercules. Book of the Royal 
Blue, June, 1907. 

United States Military Railroads. Report of Brev.-Brig.-Gen, 
D. C. McCallum, Director and General Manager, from 
1861 to 1866. Executive Documents, 39th Congress, ist 
Session. House. Serial number, 1251. Washington, 1866. 

ViGO-RouissiLLON, F. P. Puissauce Mihtaire des Etats-Unis 
d'Amerique, d'apres la Guerre de la Secession, 1861-65. 
IIP Partie ; chap, viii, Transports generaux. Paris, 
1866. 

Austro-Prussian Campaign (1866) 

Cooke, R.E., Lieut.-Col. A. C. C. Short Sketch of the Cam- 
paign in Austria of 1866. 70 pp. Map. London, 1867. 

Webber, R.E., Capt. Notes on the Campaign in Bohemia 

in 1886. Papers of the Corps of the Royal Engineers, 
N.S., Vol. XVI. Woolwich, 1868. 

Abyssinian Expedition (1867-68) 

Willans, R.E., Lieut. The Abyssinian Railway. Papers 
on Subjects Connected with the Duties of the Corps of 
Royal Engineers. N.S. Vol. XVIII. Woolwich, 1870. 

Franco-Prussian War (1870-71) 

BuDDE, Lieut. H. Die Franzosischen Eisenbahnen im Kriege 
1870-71 und ihre seitherige Entwicklung in militarische 
Hinsicht. Mit zwei Karten und zehn Skizzen im Texte. 
99 pp. Berhn, 1877. 

[Gives maps of the French railway system in 1870 and 
1877 respectively.] 

Die franzosischen Eisenbahnen im deutschen Kriegsbe- 

triebe, 1870-71. 487 pp. BerUn, 1904. 

Ernouf, Le Baron. Histoire des Chemins de Fer fran^ais 
pendant la Guerre Franco-PrussiennCw Paris, 1874. 

Jacqmin, F., Ingenieur en Chef des Ponts et Chaussees. Les 
Chemins de Fer pendant la Guerre de 1870-71. 351 pp. 
Paris, 1872. 

2« edition. 363 pp. 1S74. 



BIBLIOGRAPHY, 379 

Muller-Breslau, F. Die Tatigkeit unserer Feldeisenbahn- 
Abteilung im Kriege 1870-71. Berlin, 1896. 

Railway Organisation in the late War. Edinburgh Review, 
January, 1872. 

Russo-TuRKisH War (1877-78) 

Lessar, p. De la construction des Chemins de Fer en temps 
de guerre. Lignes construites par I'armee russe pendant 
la campagne 1877-78. Traduit du russe par L. Avril. 
142 pp. 10 Planches. Paris, 1879. 

Sale, R.E., Capt. M. T. The Construction of Mihtary Rail- 
ways during the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-78. Journal 
of the Royal United Service Institution, Vol. XXIV. 1880. 

Egypt and the Sudan (1882-99) 

History of the Corps of the Royal Engineers. Vol. II. By 
Maj.-Gen. Whitworth Porter, R.E. The War in Egypt, 
1882-85, PP- 64-87. London, 1889. 

Vol. HI. By Col. Sir Chas. M. Watson. The Sudan 

Campaigns, 1885-99, PP- 53-76- Royal Engineers' 
Institute, Chatham, 1915. 

Military History of the Campaign of 1882 in Egypt. Prepared 
in the Intelligence Branch of the War Office. Revised 
edition. London, 1908. 

Nathan, R.E., Lieut. M. The Sudan Military Railway. Pro- 
fessional Papers of the Corps of Royal Engineers. Occa- 
sional Papers, Vol. XL 1885. 

Wallace, R.E., Maj. W. A. J. Railway Operations in Egypt 
during August and September, 1882. Professional Papers 
of the Corps of Royal Engineers, Chatham. Occasional 
Papers, Vol. IX. 

Philippine War (1898) 

CoLSON, L. W. Railroading in the Philippine War. Balti- 
more and Ohio Employes' Magazine, Feb., 1913. 

Soldiers Running a Railroad. Railroad Telegrapher, f)ept., 1899. 
[Tells how the 20th Kansas Regiment ran four miles 
of the Manila and Dagupan Railroad during the Philippine 
insurrection.] 

South African War (1899-1902) 

Detailed History of the Railways in the South African War, 
1899-1902. Two vols. Royal Engineers' Institute, Chat- 
ham, 1905. 

Vol. I. — Organisation, Military Control, Working and 
Repair of Cape and Natal Government Railways ; Man- 
agement, Engineering and other Departments of Imperial 



38o BIBLIOGRAPHY. 

Military' Railways ; Railway Pioneer Regiment ; Organisa- 
tion, Equipment and Use of Armoured Trains ; Army 
Labour Depots. 

Vol. II. — 6i Photographs and 93 Drawings. 

GiROUARD, R.E., LiEUT.-CoL. E. P. C, Director of Railways, 
South African Field Force. History of the Railways 
during the War in South Africa, 1899-1902. 149 pp. 
Maps. London, 1903. 

Harrison, C. W. Francis. Natal : an Illustrated Official 
Railway Guide and Handbook. Published by Authority. 
London, 1903. 

[Gives a statement, on pp. 287-290, as to services ren- 
dered by Natal Government Railways during South African 
War.] 

History of the War in South Africa, 1899-1902. Compiled 
by the Direction of His Majesty's Government. Vol. IV, 
Appendix 10, Notes on the Military Railway System in 
South Africa. London, 19 10. 

Netherlands South African Railway Company and the Trans- 
vaal War. Account by the Secretary, Th. Steinnetz, dated 
Pretoria, April, 1900. De Ingenieur, July 14 and 21, 1900. 
English translation in Journal of the Royal United Service 
Institution, Jan., 1902. 

The Times History of the War in South Africa, 1899-1902. 
Vol. VI, Part II, chap, iii, The Railway Work in the War, 
pp. 297-331. London, 1909. 

Watson, Col. Sir Chas. M. History of the Corps of the Royal 
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Walter, Maj. James, 4th Lancashire Artillery Volunteers. 
England's Naval and Military Weakness. The Volunteer 
Force. London, 1882. 

[References to services rendered by the Engineer and 
Railway Volunteer Staff Corps in the Volunteer Reviews 
of 1881. See p. 305.] 

Official Piihlications 

Army Service Corps Training. Part HI, Transport. Section 
VI, Conveyance of War Department Stores, i — Rail. 
Appendix HI, Acts of Parliament relating to Transport 
Services. 1911. 



392 BIBLIOGRAPHY. 

Field Service Pocket Book. Section 30, Transport by Rail. 
General Staff, War Office. 1914. 

Field Service Regulations. Part I, Operations. 1909. (Re- 
printed, with amendments, 1914.) Chap, iii, Movements 
by Rail, pp. 62-6. Part II, Organisation and Admin- 
istration. 1909. (Reprinted, with amendments, 1913.) 
Chap, viii, Railway Transport, pp. 91-96. General Staff, 
War Office. 

Instruction in Military Engineering. Part VI, Militarj' Rail- 
ways. War Office, 1898. 

[Embodies a portion of the course of instruction in rail- 
ways at the School of Military Engineering, Chatham. 
Was first issued with Army Orders, dated March i, 1889, 
as a Manual of Military Railways, 95 pp.] 

Manual of Military Engineering. Chap, xvii : Hasty Demoli- 
tion of Railways . . . without Explosives. Chap, xxiii : 
Railways. (Technical details concerning construction, re- 
pairs and reconstruction.) 144 pp. General Staff, War 
Office, 1905. 

Manual of Military Law. War Office, 1914. 

[Includes a brief account of the relations of the State to 
the railways in regard to the conveyance of troops (see pp. 
184-5), and gives text of various Parliamentary enactments 
relating thereto.] 

Notes on Reconnaissance and Survey of Military Railways for 
Officers of R.E. Railway Companies. Compiled in the 
Quartermaster-General's Department of the War Office. 
1910. 

Railway Manual (War). 64 pp. 191 1. Reprinted, witli 
Amendments, 1914. 

Regulations for the Transport of Troops by Railway Quarter- 
master-General's Office, Horse Guards, Feb. 28, 1867. 

Holland 

WijNPERSSE, Kapt. W. J. M. v. D. De voorbereiding van 
het militair gebruik der spoorwegen in oorlogstijd. 76 pp. 
Plans and plates. s'Gravenhage, 1905. 

India 

Andrew, W. P. Our Scientific Frontier. London, 1880. 
Innes, R.E., Gen. J. J. McLeod. Life and Times of Gen. Sir 

James Browne, R.E., K.C.B., K.C.S.I. 371 pp. London, 

1905. 

[Gives an account of the construction of the Sind-Pishin 

Railway, of which Sir J. Browne was Chief Engineer.] 
Lyons, Capt. Gervais. Afghanistan, the Buffer State. Great 



BIBLIOGRAPHY. 393 

Britain and Russia in Central Asia. 232 pp. Maps. 
Madras and London, 1910. 

[Gives, in summarised form, much information con- 
cerning British Indian frontier and Russian Central Asian 
Railways.] 

Military Railways in India. Precis of Report of the Railway 
Transport Committee, India, 1876. Professional Papers 
of the Corps of Royal Engineers. Occasional Papers, 
Vol. II. Chatham, 1878. 

Ross, CLE., David. Military Transport by Indian Rail- 
ways. 109 pp. Maps and plates. Lahore, 1883. 

Transport by Rail of Troops, Horses, Guns, and War 

Material in India. A lecture. 24 pp. London, 1879. 

ScoTT-MoNCRiEFF, R.E., Capt. G. K. The Frontier Railways 
of India. Professional Papers of the Corps of Royal En- 
gineers. Occasional Papers, Vol. XI, 1885. Chatham. 

Italy 

Allix, G. La Mobihsation des Chemins de Fer Italiens. Jour- 
nal des Transports, 3 Juillet, 1915. Paris. 

Aymonino, C. Considerations Mihtaires et Strategiques sur 
les chemins de fer italiens. Traduit de ITtalien par G. 
Malifaud. 3e. ed. 68 pp. Paris, 1889. 

Le Ferrovie dello Stato e le grandi manovre del 191 1. Revisia 
Technica delta Ferrovie Italiane, Nov., 1912. 

Z-'VNOTTi, Mag. B. Impiego dei ferrovieri in guerra. 67 pp. 
1902. 

Russia 

Fendrikh, Col. A. von. The Organisation of a Staff for Mili- 
tary Railway Work and of a Central Management for the 
Control of Rolling Stock in War Time. Translated from 
The Russian Military Magazine, by Capt. J. Wolfe Murray, 
R.A., D.A.A.G. Journal of the Royal United Service Institu- 
tion. Vol. XXXII, 1889. 

Igel, Gen. von. Russlands Eisenbahnbau an der Westgrenze. 
Deutsche Revue, Dec, 1902. Stuttgart. 

K., H. Das russische Eisenbahn-Netz zur deutschen Grenze 
in seiner Bedeutung fiir einen Krieg Russlands mit Deutsch- 
land. 29 pp. Map. Hannover, 1885. 

NiENSTADT, Oberstlt. Das russische Eisenbahnnetz zur 
deutschen-osterreichischen Grenze in seiner Bedeutung 
fiir einen Krieg. 43 pp. Map. Leipzig, 1895. 

Strategical Railways. Translated from the Voiennyi Sbornik. 
Journal of the Royal United Service Institution, Oct., 1899. 



394 BIBLIOGRAPHY. 

Spain 

Taylor, Ten. T. L. Los ferrocarriles en la guerra. 288 pp. 
Plates. Barcelona, 1885. 

Switzerland 

Blaser, Haupt. E. Die Zerstorungs- nnd Wiederherstellungs- 
Arbeiten von Eisenbahnen. 22 pp. Plates. Basel, 1871. 

Hoffmann-Merian, T. Die Eisenbahnen zum Truppen Trans- 
port und fiir den Krieg im Hinblick auf die Schweiz. 2e. 
Ausg. Basel, 1871. 

NowACKi, Karl. Die Eisenbahnen im Kriege. 160 pp. 
Zurich, 1906. 

United States 

Are Railroads NeutraUsing Sea Power ? American Revieiv 

of Reviews, June, 1913. 
BiGELOW, John, Captain loth Cavalry, U.S. Army. The 

Principles of Strategy, illustrated mainly from American 

Campaigns. 2nd edition. Philadelphia, 1894. 
Commerce of the Ohio and Western Rivers. Importance of 

Railroads in a MiHtary point of view. DeBoic's Commercial 

Review, June, 1857. 
Connor, Maj. W. D. Military Railways, 192 pp. Illus- 
trations. Professional Papers, No. 32, Corps of Engineers, 

U.S. Army. Washington, 1910. 
Operation and Maintenance of the Railroad in a Theatre 

of War. Journal of the Military Service Institute. New 

York, 1905. 
Derr, W. L. The working of railways in MiUtary Operations. 

Engineering Magazine, Oct., 1898. 
Great Railroad Feats during War and Flood. WasJiington, D.C., 

Post, April 25, 1 913 
Grimshaw, Robert. War Capacit}^ of United States Railways. 

Scientific American, May 1,1915. 
Haines, Charles O. Our Railroads and National Defence. 

The North American Review, Sept., 1915. 
Haupt, Herman. Mihtary Bridges . . . including designs for 

trestle and truss bridges for military railroads, adapted 

specially to the wants of the service in the United States. 

310 pp. 69 plates. New York, 1864. 
Use of Railroads in War. Jour^ial of the Military Service Insti 

tution. Vol. XXI. New York, 1897. 
Palmer, Capt. John McAuley. Railroad Building as a Mode 

of Warfare. North American Revieiv, Dec, 1902. 
Railroads, and not Bullets, will feature the next War. Wash- 
ington, D.C., Star, Feb. 11, 1912. 



BIBLIOGRAPHY. 395 

Wilson, W. B. History of the Pennsylvania Railroad Company. 
Two vols. The Railroad in War Times, Vol. I, pp. 411-18. 
Philadelphia, 1899. 



AMBULANCE AND HOSPITAL TRAINS 

FuRSE, Lieut. -Col. G. A. Military Transport. Chap, vii 
Railway Ambulance Trains, pp. 185-99. Diagrams and 
illustrations. London, 1882. 

GuRLT, Dr. E. Ueber den Transport Schwerverwundeter und 
Kranker im Kriege, nebst Vorschlagen iiber die Benutzung 
der Eisenbahnen dabei. 33 pp. Berlin, i860. 

[Contains, so far as can be traced, the earliest recom- 
mendations as to the special fitting up of railway rolling 
stock for the transport of the sick and wounded in war.] 

LoEFFLER, Dr. F. Das Preussische Militar-Sanitatswesen 
und seine Reform nach der Kriegserfalirung von 1866. 
Two parts. Berhn, 1869. 

[In the appendix of Part II of this work will be found an 
" Anleitung zur Ausfiihrung der Beforderung verwundeter 
und Kranker MiUtairs auf Eisenbahnen," issued July i, 
1861.] 

LoNGMORE, Surg.-Gen. Sir T. A Manual of Ambulance Trans- 
port. 2nd edition. Edited by Surg.-Capt. W. A. 
Morris. Chap, vi. Class V, Railway Ambulance Trans- 
port, pp. 347-89. Illustrations. London, 1893. 

[The 1st edition was published in 1869 under the title of 
A Treatise on the Transport of Sick and Wounded Troops.] 

Medical and Surgical History of the War of the Rebellion. 
Part III, Vol. II, Surgical History. Railway Transporta- 
tion, pp. 957-71. Diagrams and illustrations of hospital 
cars, fittings, etc. U.S.A. Dept. of War. Surgeon-Gen- 
eral's Office.' Washington, 1883. 

[Gives a detailed account of the evolution, in the Civil 
War, of the hospital train in vogue to-day. A copy of 
the work will be found in the British Museum Library 
Pressmark : 7686 i. 4.] 

Melville, A.M.S., Surg.-Capt. Continental Regulations for 
the Transport of Sick and Wounded by Rail. Journal 
of the Royal United Service Institution. Vol. XLII, pp. 
560-92. London, 1898. 

Military Hospital Trains : Their Origin and Progress. The 
Railway Gazette, Dec. 4, 1914. London. 

Nieden, J. Der Eisenbahn-transport verwundeter und er- 
krankter Krieger. 2 Aufl. 271 pp. Berlin, 1883. 

Otis, George A. A Report on a Plan for Transporting Wounded 



396 BIBLIOGRAPHY. 

Soldiers by Railway in Time of War. Surgeon-General's 
Office, War Department, Washington, 1875. 

[The material parts of this work are reproduced in the 
" Medical and Surgical History of the War of the Rebel- 
lion."] 

Report by the Central British Red Cross Committee on Volun- 
tary Organisations in aid of the Sick and Wounded during 
the South African War. Part VII, Hospital Trains, 
pp. 32-5. London, 1902. 

Report on the Medical Arrangements in the South African War. 
By Surg.-Gen. Sir W. D. Wilson, K.C.M.G., late Principal 
Medical Officer, South African Field Force. Part IX, 
Hospital Trains, pp. 213-9. London, 1904. 

RiDDELL, J. Scott. A Manual of Ambulance. Section on 
Railway Ambulance Wagons and Ambulance Trains, pp. 
168-76. 6th edition. London, 1913. 

ARMOURED TRAINS 

Adams, W. Bridges. English Railway Artillery : A Cheap 
Defence against Invasion. Once a Week, Aug. 13, 1859. 
London. 

Armoured Truck (" Union Railroad Battery," Petersburg) 
used in the American Civil War, 1861-65. See illustration. 
Century Magazine, Sept., 1887, p. 774. 

BoxALL, Charles Gervaise, Col. Commanding ist Sussex 
Artillery Volunteers. Armoured Train for Coast Defence 
in Great Britain, The. Paper read at a meeting of Officers 
and N.C.O.'s of the Brigade at Newhaven Fort, Sussex, 
May 14, 1894. II pp. 

Railway Batteries and Armoured Trains. Fortnightly 

Review, Aug., 1895. 

Connor, Maj. W. D. Military Railways. Section on Armoured 
Trains, pp. 141-50. Professional Papers, No. 32, Corps 
of Engineers, U.S. Army. Washington, 1910. 

Detailed History of the Railways in the South African War> 
1899-1902. Vol. I, Section on Organisation, Equipment 
and Use of Armoured Trains. Chatham, 1905. 

Field Service Regulations. Part I, Operations. 1909. (Re- 
printed, with amendments, 1914.) Section 40, Defence 
of Railways. General Staff, War Office, London. 

FitzGerald, W. C. The Armoured Train. The Four-track 
Neivs, March, 1906. New York. 

Forbin, V. Les trains blindes. Nature, Dec. 12, 1914. Paris. 

Eraser, R.E., Lieut. T. Armour-plated Railway Wagons 
used during the late Sieges of Paris in 1870-71. Papers 
of the Corps of Royal Engineers, N.S., Vol. XX. Wool- 
wich, 1872. 



BIBLIOGRAPHY. 397 

GiROUARD, R.E., Lieut. -Col. E. P. C. History of the Rail- 
ways during the War in South x\frica, 1899-1902. Section 
V, The Organisation and Use of Armoured Trains. London, 
1903. 

HoBART, Frederick. The first Armoured Train. Railway 
Age Gazette, Jan. 22, 1915. Chicago, U.S.A. 

LoDiAN, L. The Origin of Armoured Railroad Cars unques- 
tionably the Product of the American Civil War. Rail- 
road and Locomotive Engineering, May, 1915. New York. 

[Reproduces from Leslie's Weekly for May 18, 1864, an 
illustration of a " Railroad Battery on the Philadelphia and 
Baltimore Railway," showing a "box" car completely 
covered with armour plating, with loop-holes at end and 
side for guns, and placed on the line in front of the locomo- 
tive, itself otherwise unprotected.] 

Military History of the Campaign of 1882 in Egypt. Prepared 
in the Intelligence Branch of the War Office. Revised 
edition. London, 1908. 

[References to use of armoured train.] 

Nance, Capt. H. O. Armoured Trains. Lecture delivered 
at the Royal Engineers' Institute. 52 pp. Photographs 
and drawings. Professional Papers, fourth series. Vol. I, 
Paper 4. Chatham, 1906. 

[The subject is dealt with in three sections : (i) Uses 
of Armoured Trains ; (2) Construction, equipment and 
garrison ; (3) Organisation and administration.] 

Railway Manual (War). Chapter VI, Section 15, Armoured 
Trains. London, 1911. 

Walker, Lieut. Arthur. Coast Railways and Railway Artil 
lery. Journal of the Royal United Service Institution, Vol. 
IX, pp. 221-23. Plates. London, 1866. 



INDEX 



Abyssinian Campaign : Construc- 
tion and working of military 
railway, 210-14. 

Adams, William Bridges : 67-9. 

Advantages from Use of Rail- 
ways : 345-50. 

Africa, German Designs cn : 
Proposals of von Weber, 297 ; 
German South-West Africa, 
298-300 ; the Herero rising, 
300-1 ; railways, 304-10 ; 
military preparations, 307, 310 
-12 ; rail connection with 
Angola, 312-14 ; German East 
Africa Central Railway, 314- 
7 ; Katanga district, 316 ; 
Central Africa, 318 ; rival 
railway schemes, 319-20 ; rail- 
way schemes in the Cameroons, 
320-5 ; official admissions, 
325-6 ; " der Tag " and its 
programme, 326-30. 

Agadir Crisis, The : 324. 

Aggression, Use of Railways 
for : 355-6. 

Alexander the Great : 63. 

Alexandretta, Germany and : 

334. 343- 

Alexeiev, Admiral : 275. 

Ambulance Trains : see Railway 
Ambulance Transport. 

American Civil War : What it 
established, 13 ; railway lines, 
15 ; Federal Government and 
railways, 16 ; mileage taken 
over, 18 ; gauge of lines, 18 ; 
condition of lines, 19 ; Trans- 
portation Department, 20-1 ; 
locomotives, 21-2 ; rolling 
mills, 23 ; movement of 
troops, 23-5 ; destruction of 
railways ; 27-8 ; Construc- 
tion Corps, 29-37 ; control of 
railways, 43-50 ; protection 
of, 54-5 ; armoured cars ; 
72-4 ; removal of sick and 
wounded, 86-91 ; American 



precedents followed in Europe, 
104, 122, 153, 177 ; " surface 
railroads," 210 ; the Civil War 
and the South African cam- 
paign, 258 (w.). 

Anatolia : 331, 335. 

Anatolian Railway, The : 334. 

Angola : 299, 312-4, 320. 

Armoured Trains : Protection of 
railway lines, 59 ; first sug- 
gested, 67-9 ; proposals of 
Lieut. A. Walker, 69-70 ; of 
Col. Wethered, 70-71 ; of 
Lieut. E. P. C. Girouard, 71-2; 
Civil War, 72-4 ; Franco- 
Prussian War, 75 ; Egyptian 
Campaign, 75-6, 224 ; Delhi, 
76 ; experiments in France, tj; 
at Newhaven, Sussex, 77-9 ; 
South African War, 79, 248-52. 

Asia Minor : Germany's " share " 
in the Turkish spoils, 332 ; 
Germany's colonisation field, 
332-3 ; proposed German pro- 
tectorate, 333. 

AsPiNALL, Mr. J. a. F. : 197. 

Atlantic and North Carolina 
Railroad : 36, 73. 

Australia and the Baghdad 
Railway : 342, 344. 

Austria-Hungary : Early troop 
movements by rail, 8-9 ; 
scheme for strategical railways, 
9 ; Italian campaign of 1859, 
11-12 ; Railway Troops, 123 ; 
German rail communications, 
287. 

Austro-Prussian Campaign : Pro- 
tection of railways, 55, 59 ; 
removal of sick and wounded, 
91-2 ; Prussian mobilisation, 
104 ; defective transport ar- 
rangements, 104-5 ; destruc- 
tion and restoration of railway 
lines, 124-6. 



Babylonia, Germany and : 332. 



398 



INDEX. 



399 



Baghdad Railway, The : Conces- 
sion, 334; branches, 334-5; 
Germany's aims, 336 ; the 
conquest of Egypt, 338-40 ; 
the Persian Gulf, 341 ; India, 
342 ; Capt. Mahan's views, 
342 ; the desired extension to 
Koweit, 343 ; what the rail- 
way was to accomplish, 344. 

Balck : no. 

Baltimore and Ohio Railroad : 
29. 

Basson, Wilhelm : 127. 

Becker, Lieut. : 169-70. 

Belgium : Early Railways in, 
4-5 ; German strategical lines 
on IBelgian frontier, 288-294 ; 
German designs, 323-4, 325-6, 

327. 329. 

Berigny, M. de : 7. 

Beyens, Baron : 325. 

Bigelow, Capt. J. : 56, 348 [n.) 

Billington, Mr. R. J. : 78. 

Bismarck, Prince: 136, 338. 

Blockhouses for Protection of 
Railways : 54, 58, 245. 

Boulger, Mr. D. C. : 288, 294. 

BoxALL, Col. C. G. : 78. 

British Central Red Cross Com- 
mittee : 95, 254. 

British East Africa : 317, 327. 

British South Africa : German 
designs on, 301, 302, 303, 308, 
312, 327. 

Bryden, Mr. H. a. : 300 (n.). 

Budde, H. : 51. 

BuLLER, Sir Redvers : 254. 

Burgoyne, Sir John : 178, 209. 

Butterworth, Sir A. K. : 197. 

Caledonian Rly. : 197. 

Calthrop, Mr. Guy : 197. 

Cameroons, The : 320-5. 

Campenau, Gen. : 137. 

Canals and Troops : i. 

Cape Government Railways : 
237, 240, 246, 253. 

Cape-to-Cairo Railway : 320. 

Central Africa : 318-20. 

Ch^radame, M. Andre : 338. 

Christian, Princess : 254. 

Clarke, Sir Andrew : 224. 

Coast Defence : 67, 179. 

Commerce Defence League, The 
German : 303 (w.). 

Congo, The Belgian : 315-320, 
322-6. 

Conditions Essential to Effici- 
ency : 350-2. 



Connor, Maj. W. D. : 58, 80, 

258 (n.). 
Construction Corps : U.S.A., 
20, 21, 23, 29-37 ; Prussia, 
122-3, 124-8, 132-6, 215-6, 
219 ; Austria, 123-4 > Ba- 
varia, 127-133 ; France, 128, 
152-4 ; England, 198-202 ; 
South African War, 242-5 ; 
Russo-Jaoanese War, 273-4. 
Construction of Railways : 
Military requirements, 350-1 . 
Control of Railways in War : 
Conditions of operation, 40-3 ; 
American Civil War, 43-50 ; 
views of Baron M. M. von. 
Weber, 50-2 ; need for inter- 
mediaries, 52 ; organisation 
in peace, 99 ; Austro-Prussian 
War, 104-5 ; German system 
in 1870-71, 106-115 ; new 
regulations, 115-7 ; present 
system, 11 8-1 21 ; inefficient 
military control in France in 
1870-71, 139-147 ; creation of 
new organisation, 149-170 ; 
State control in England, 176- 
7 ; draft scheme for State 
operation, 185-7 : Railway 
Transport Officers, 1 89-191 ; 
South African War, 233-7, 
238-9, 249-52 ; Russo-Japan- 
ese War, 274-5 ; general, 351. 
Cowans, Lieut. -Gen. Sir J. S.: 204. 
Crimean War : Deaths from sick- 
ness and disease, 81 ; re- 
moval of sick and wounded by 
railway, 83 ; transport con- 
ditions, 207-8 ; construction of 
military railway, 208 ; opera- 
tion, 208-10 ; recalled by 
Russo-Japanese War, 260. 
Cromer, Lord : 229. 



Danish War (1864) : gi, 104. 

Delagoa Bay : 304-5, 327. 

Delbruck, Prof. Hans : 330. 

Dent, Mr. C. H. : 197. 

Dent, Mr. F. H. : 197. 

Destruction of Railways : Vul- 
nerability, 26-7 ; early in- 
stances, 27 ; American Civil 
War, 27-37 ; Mexican War, 
37-9 ; Austro-Prussian War, 
124, 125-6 ; Franco-German 
War, 128-30 ; South African 
War, 241-5, 256-8 ; Russo- 
Japanese War, 274. 



400 



INDEX. 



Disadvantages of Railways : 

355-6. 
Dufaure, M. : 7. 
DuMANT, Jean Henri : 84. 

East Prussia, Strategical Rail- 
ways in : 283. 

Egypt : German anticipations of 
rebellion, 326 ; aims against 
Egypt, 338-9 ; conquest to be 
facilitated by railways, 340. 

Egyptian Campaigns : Armoured 
cars, 75-6 ; Railway Com- 
panies, Royal Engineers, 199. 

EiFEL District : German strate- 
gical railways, 289-292. 

Elsenborn, German Camp at : 
288-9. 

Engineer and Railway Staff 
Corps : Formation, 179-182 ; 
constitution, 18 1-2 ; functions 
and work done, 182-7, 192 ; 
supplemented by War Railway 
Council, 187. 

England, Organisation in : Early 
regulation for troop move- 
ments, 2 ; legislative enact- 
ments, 175-7 ; invasion pros- 
pects and formation of Volun- 
teer Corps, 178 ; Engineer and 
Railway Staff Corps, 179-187 ; 
attitude of War Office, 180 ; 
War Office and defence scheme, 
185-7 ; War Railway Council, 
187-9 ; Railway Transport 
Officers, 1 89-191 ; Railways 
Executive Committee, 195-7 '• 
Railway Companies, Royal 
Engineers, 200-2. 

Ernouf, Baron : 141. 

Evans, Dr. T. W. : 91. 

Fay, Sir Sam : 197. 

FiELDHOusE, ]VIr. W. J. : 95. 

FiNDLAY, Sir George : 184-7, 
195. 196, 202. 

Forbes, Sir William : 182, 197. 

Formanoir, Captain A. de : 124 
(n.). 

Fortresses for Protection or 
Railways : 59. 

France : Early references in 
French Chamber, 6-7 ; com- 
plaints in 1842 of German 
aggressive lines, 7 ; early rail- 
ways, 7 ; railways and the 
Italian campaign of 1859, 9-1 1 ; 
early regulations, 138 ; Mar- 
shal Niel's Commission, 138-9 ; 



experiences in Franco-Ger- 
man War, 139-148 ; German 
railway lines on French fron- 
tiers, 287-8 ; Germany's alter- 
native routes, via Luxemburg, 
288 ; via Belgium, 288-93 ; 
French possessions in Africa 
to be seized by Germany, 326 ; 
to be demanded as " ransom," 
329- 

France, Organisation in : Early 
regulations, 138 ; action taken 
after the Franco-German War, 
149-50 ; Superior Military 
Commission, 150, 15 1-2 ; Field 
Railway Sections, 153-4 > I^ail- 
way Troops, 154-6 ; existing 
organisation, 157-168 ; tests, 
169 ; views of German author- 
ity, 169 ; defensive railways, 
170-4. 

Franco-German War : France : 
Armoured wagons, 75 ; rail- 
transport regulations, 138 ; 
the Niel Commission, 138-9 ; 
despatches by rail, 1 39-40 ; ab- 
sence of military organisation, 
140 ; confusion and chaos, 
140-2 ; conflicting orders, 142; 
local authorities, 143 ; un- 
loading 143-4 ; congestion at 
stations, 145—7 » seizure of 
rolling stock by enemy, 147. 

Franco-German War : Germany : 
Safeguarding of railway lines, 
56-8 ; removal of sick and 
wounded, 94-5 ; rail trans- 
port conditions, 106-115 ; 
Railway Troops, 127-8 ; des- 
truction of lines, etc., 128-30 ; 
operation of French lines by 
Germans, 130-1 ; construc- 
tion of military lines, 215-6. 

Franc-tireurs and Railways : 
57, 129-30. 

Eraser, R.E., Lieut. : 129. 

Fredericksburg Railroad : 29. 

French Trans-African Railway 
Scheme: 322. 

Frere, Sir Bartle : 297. 

Friron, Gen. : 64. 

Furley, Sir John : 95, 96, 254. 



Gambon, M. : 325. 

Gauge, Railway : Various coun- 
tries, 60 ; Russian policy in 
respect to, 61 ; experiences in 
Russo-Tu kish War, 61, 217 ; 



INDEX. 



.[01 



Germany and Russian lines, 
284-6. 

German East Africa : 314-5, 
316-7. 

German Emperor, The : African 
railways, 321 ; visit to Con- 
stantinople, 334 ; to Damascus, 
337. 

German South- West Africa : 
298-312. 

Germany and Egypt : 338-40. 

Germany : Early proposals for 
strategical railwaj's, 2-3 ; early 
railways constructed, 5 ; pos- 
sible attacks on two fronts, 5 ; 
" aggressive " lines, 7 ; early 
troop transports, 8 ; control of 
railways in war, 50-52 ; rail- 
way ambulance transport, 84- 
6, 91-3, 94 ; see also Germany, 
Organisation in. 

Germany, Organisation in : In- 
fluence of American Civil War, 
104, 122 ; Railway Section of 
General Staff formed, 104 ; 
Danish War (1864), 104 ; 
Austro-Prussian War, 104-6 ; 
Route Service Regulation, 106- 
9 ; Franco-Prussian War, 1 10- 
15 ; further Regulations, 115- 
6 ; Field Service Regulations, 
117 ; present basis of organ- 
isation, 1 88-1 21 ; Railway 
Troops, 122-37. 

Girouard, Sir E. Percy C. : 71, 
225, 228, 233-7, 238-9, 240-1, 
248-9, 252, 257, 258 (w.). 

Goltz, von der : 135, 139, 282, 
346 («.). 352. 

Gordon, Gen. : 221, 222. 

Graham, Gen. Sir G. : 223, 224 
{n.). 

Granet, Sir Guy : 197. 

Grant, Capt. M. H. : 251. 

Grant, Gen. : 22. 

Great Central Railway, 197. 

Great Eastern Rly. : 194, 204. 

Great Northern Rly. : 194, 
197, 204. 

Great Western Railway : 192, 

195 («■), 197- 

Grey, Earl de : 180. 

Grund System of Railway Fit- 
tings : 94. 

Gurlt, Dr. E. : 81, 84, 85. 

Gyulia, Count : 12. 

Hai.leck, Gen. : 23-4. 

IIamley, Gen. SirE. ; 207, 349 [n.). 



Harkort, F. W. : 2-3. 

Harrison, Mr. C. W. F. : 247. 

Haupt, Herman : Pioneer of Con- 
struction Corps, U.S.A., 29- 
30 ; rebuilding of bridges, 
31-2 ; control questions, 43-9 ; 
armoured car, 72. 

Hedjaz Railway : 335. 

Herbert, Mr. Sidney : 180. 

Herff, Herr von : 305. 

Heyer, Mr. A. E. : 305. 

HiNE, Maj. Charles. : 37. 

HoBART, Mr. F. : 73. 

Holland: German strategical lines 
on Dutch frontier, 293-4. 

Home, R.E., Lieut. -Col. R. : 63. 

Hood, Gen. : 35. 

Hospital Trains ; see Railway 
Ambulance Transport. 

India : German anticipations of 
rebellion, 326 ; the Baghdad 
railway and India, 342, 344. 

Invasion of England : Fears of, 
67, 177-8, 182. 

Italian Campaign (1859) : Con- 
veyance of troops by rail, 
9-13 ; destruction of railway 
lines, 27 ; removal of sick 
and wounded by rail, 84. 

Jacqmin, M. ; 143, 148, 235. 
Jagow, Herr von : 325-6. 
Joesten, Dr. Josef: 281, 283. 

Kaerger, Dr. Karl : 332-3- 
Katanga District (Central Africa): 

316-20. 
Kelton. J. C. : 50. 
Kitchener, Lord : 58, 225, 226, 

227, 228, 229, 239. 
Kuropatkin, Gen. : 263, 269-70, 

271, 275, 355 [n) 



Lamarque, Gen. : 6. 
Lancashire and Yorkshire Rly. : 

197. 
Land Transport Corps (Crimea) : 

181 (m.), 208, 209. 
Langhams, Paul : 338. 
Lanoir, M. Paul : 136-7. 
Lattmann, Herr : 306. 
Ledebour, Herr : 302. 
Leopold, King: 318, 325. 
Limitations in Usefulness of 

Railways : 352-5. 
Liverpool and Manchester Rly.: 

I, 8. 

D D 



402 



INDEX. 



LoBiTo Bay Rly. : 314, 319-20 . 

LoDiAN, Mr. L. : 73. 

London and North Western 

Rly. : 194, 197. 
London and South Western 

Rly. : 192, 193, 197, 199, 201. 
London, Brighton and South 

Coast Rly. : 77-8, 197. 
London, Chatham and Dover 

Rly. : 199. 
London, Defence of : 71. 
LoRME, M. DupuY DE : 75. 
Luard, R.E., Capt. C. E. : 209. 
LiJDERiTz, Adolf : 298. 
Luxemburg Railways : 288, 289, 

292. 

McCallum, D.G. : Appointed Mili- 
tary Director, etc., U. S. rail- 
roads, 17-18 ; views on situ- 
ation, 19 ; creation of Trans- 
portation Department and Con- 
struction Corps, 20, 32-37 ; 
movement of troops, 23-4 ; 
question of control, 50 ; Ger- 
man translation of report, 127. 

McDowell, Gen. : 30, 54. 

McMurdo, Gen. Sir W. M. : 180, 
181, 182-3. 

Mahan, Capt. A. T. : 342, 344. 

Manassas Gap Railway : 55. 

Manby, F.R.S., Mr. C. : 180. 

Mangelsdorf, Prof. R. : 340. 

Maquay, R.E., Col. J. P. : 214. 

Marschall, M., 7. 

Massena, Marshal : 64. 

Matheson, Mr. D. A. : 197. 

Meade, Maj.-Gen. G. G. : 54. 

Meigs, Gen. : 48. 

Mexico, Railway Destruction 
IN : 37-9. 

Midland Railway : 197. 

Military Operation of Railways: 
Civil War, 20-1 ; Franco- 
German War, 1 30-1 ; British 
organisation 175 ; South Afri- 
can War, 239-41 ; Russo- 
Japanese War, 374. 

Military Railways : Descrip- 
tion of, 205-6 ; pioneer mili- 
tary line in Crimean War, 206- 
10 ; American Civil War, 210 
Abyssinian Campaign, 210-14 
Franco-German War, 2 1 5-6 
Russo-Turkish War, 216-20 
the Sudan, 220-231 ; Russo- 
Japanese War, 272-3 ; general, 

349- 
Millar, R.A., Maj. : 9. 



MoLTKE, VON : 8, 106, 109, 278, 

346 («.). 
Morache, Dr. : 81. 
Muni (Spanish) : 324. 

Nance, Capt. H. O. : 80. 
Nanton, R.E., Capt. H. C. : 250. 
Napier of Magdala, Lord : 210. 
Napier, Sir Charles : 178. 
Napoleon : 62, 63, 64. 
Nashville and Chattanooga 

Rly. : 33, 34. 
Natal Government Railways : 

237, 246-8, 253. 
Natal Railway Pioneer Staff : 

247. 
Nathan, R.E., Lieut. M. : 223. 
National Defence Act, 1888 : 

177. 195- 
Netherlands South African 

Rly. : 240, 254-8. 
Niel, Marshal: 138, 139. 
Norton, Mr. Roy : 286. 
North Eastern Rly. : 197. 
North Missouri Railroad : 29. 

O'Connor, Mr. J. K. : 310-12, 
326-7. 

Orange and Alexandria Rail- 
road : 46, 55, 88. 

Osman Pasha : 218. 

Panz, Oberst. von : 123. 

Peel, Gen. : 176. 

Pernot Capt. A. : 172, 174. 

Philadelphia-Baltimore Rail- 
road : yi,. 

Philadelphia Railroad : 87. 

Pomerania, Strategical Rail- 
ways in : 283. 

Ponitz, C. E. : 4-6, 280. 

Pope, Gen. : 43. 

Porter, Maj.-Gen. Whitworth : 
209, 224. 

Potter. Mr. F. : 197. 

Powell, Maj. : 209. 

Preparations in Peace : Need 
for, 98-102 ; 106, 123, 138, 
149, 178-180, 184, 351-2. 

Protection of Railways in War : 
American Civil War, 54-5 ; 
blockhouses, 54, 58 ; placing of 
civilians on engines or trains, 
55. 57-^ '< Austro-Prussian 
War, 55-6 ; Franco-Prussian 
War, 56-8 ; South-African 
War, 58 ; permanent fortresses, 
59 ; use of armoured trains, 
59 ; removal of rolling stock. 



INDEX. 



403 



59 ; destruction of, 60 ; ditier- 
ent gauge, 60-1 ; terrorising 
of civil population, 356. 
Prussian Railway Troops : For- 
mation of Field Railway 
Section, 122 ; operations in 
Austro-Prussian campaign, 
123 124-6; permanent cadre, 
127 ; Franco-Prussian War, 
127-8, 1 30-1 ; Railway 

Battalion, 132-4 ; Railway 
Regiment, 134 ; Communication 
Troops, 134 ; need for Railway' 
Troops, 135-6 ; raUwaymen 
as spies, 136-7 ; construction 
of military lines, 215-6. 

Radek, Herr Karl : 339-40. 
Railway Ambulance Transport : 
Deaths from disease and sick- 
ness, 81 ; importance of prompt 
removal of sick and wounded, 
82-3 ; Crimean War, 83 ; 
Italian War, 84 ; recommenda- 
tions by Dr. Gurlt, 84-5 ; 
first Prussian Commission, 85 ; 
American Civil War, 86-91 ; 
Danish War, 91 ; Austro- 
Prussian War, 91-2 ; second 
Prussian Commission, 92-3 ; 
Paris International Exhibition 
(1867), 93 ; third Prussian 
Commission, 94 ; Franco-Prus- 
sian War, 94-5 ; South African 
War, 95-6 ; 253-4 '< naethods 
now in vogue, 96-7. 

Railway Companies, Royal En- 
gineers : Formation, 199 ; 
services in Egypt, 199 ; duties, 
200 ; training 200-2 ; ser- 
vices in the Sudan, 221-9 I 
South African War, 233, 240, 
242, 243, 251. 

Railway Pioneer Regiment : 
242, 243. 

Railways Executive Committee : 
195-6. 

Railway Transport Officers : 
189-191, 193-4- 

Railway Wagons, Unloading of : 
American Civil war, 46, 47-8 ; 
Austro-Prussian War, 105 ; 
Franco-German War, 11 1-2, 
144, 145 ; South African War, 
234, 238, 239. 

Regulation of the Forces Act, 
1871 ; 176, 177, 195, 196, 197. 

Rene, Carl : 321-2. 

Reprisals, Prussia and : 55-6 



Rhodesia : 320, 322, 327. 

Roberts, Lord : 58, 245. 

Robertus, J. K. : 332. 

Rohrbach, Dr. Paul : 338-9, 340. 

Roon, von : 85. 

Roscher, Wilhelm : 332. 

Ross, Prof. Ludwig : 338. 

Rothwell, R.A., Col. j. S. : 184. 

Rumigny, Gen : 3 

Russia : Early troop movements 
by rail, 8 ; polic}' in respect to 
railway gauge, 61, 135-6, 217; 
military lines built in campaign 
against Turkey, 216-220 ; Ger- 
man strategical lines on Rus- 
sian frontier, 284—7. See also 
Russo-Japanese War. 

Russo-Japanese War : Distances 
from theatre of war, 260 ; the 
Trans-Siberian Railway, 261 , 
262-3 ; Chinese Eastern Rail- 
way, 261, 262 ; unreadiness of 
Russia, 263 ; Lake Baikal, 
263, 264-7 ; ice railway across 
the lake, 266-7 '< circum-Baikal 
line, 267 ; traffic hindrances, 
268 ; number of trains, 268 ; 
speed, 268 ; Russian reinforce - 
ments in driblets, 269 ; rail 
improvements, 270-1 ; depen- 
dence on railway, 271 ; re- 
sults accomplished, 271-2 ; 
field railways, 272-3 ; Rail- 
way Troops, 273-4 ; operation, 
274 ; control, 274-6, 355 {n.). 

Russo-TuRKiSH War : Railway 
gauge, 61 ; construction of 
military railways, 216-20. 

Said Pasha : 221. 
Samassa, Dr. Paul: 301-2. 
Sarolea, Dr. Charles : 337. 
ScHAFFER, E. : 113 («.). 
Schleswig-Holstein : German 

strategical lines, 294. 
ScHOFiELD, Gen. : 24. 
Scott, Maj.-Gen. D. A. : 181. 
Sherman, Gen. W. T. : 19, 34-6, 

54. 65. 

Sick and Wounded in War : 
Evacuation hospitals, 167 ; 
infirmary stations, 167 ; dis- 
tribution stations, 167 ; gener- 
al, 349-50. See also. Rail- 
way Ambulance Transport. 

South African War : Removal of 
locomotives and rolling stock, 
59-60 ; hospital trains, 95-6, 
253-4 ; transport of troops for 



404 



INDEX. 



embarkation, 193 ; South 
African railways, 232-3 ; cre- 
ation of Department of Mili- 
tary Railways, 233 ; control 
questions, 233-5 ; basis of 
organisation, 235-7 '< trans- 
port conditions, 237-8 ; how 
the system worked, 238-9 ; 
Imperial Military Railways, 
239-40 ; need for operating 
staff organised in time of 
peace, 240-1 ; destruction and 
repair of lines, etc., 241-5 ; 
Railway Pioneer Regiment, 
242 ; blockhouses, 245 ; mili- 
tary traffic, 245—6 ; miscellane- 
ous services, 246-8 ; armoured 
trains, 248-52 ; operation of 
Netherlands South African 
Railway by Boers, 254-9 ; the 
war and rail-power, 258-9. 

South Carolina Railroad : 36. 

South Eastern and Chatham 
Rly. : 197. 

South Eastern Rly. : 199. 

Sprenger, Dr. A. : 332. 

Stanton, Mr. : 23, 29. 

Stavelot-Malmedy Line : 288- 
292. 

Steinnetz, Mr. T. : 255-8. 

Strategical Movements ry Rail .' 
12, 25, 245-6, 346. 

Strategical Railways : Early 
proposals in Germany, 2, 5-6, 
7 ; France, 7 ; Austria, 9 ; 
defensive lines in France, 170— 
4 ; position in Great Britain, 
202 ; connecting links, 203 ; 
attitude of Parliament, 203 ; 
Northern Junction line, 203-4 I 
nature of strategical railways, 
277-80 ; ideal conditions, 279- 
81 ; position in Germany, 
281-4 ; Pomerania and East 
Prussia, 283-4 '< Russian fron- 
tier, 284-7 ; southern Silesia 
287 ; French frontier, 287-8 
Belgian frontier, 288-93 
Dutch frontier, 293-4 '< Schles- 
wig-Holstein, 294 ; German 
South- West Africa, 304-9 ; An- 
gola, 312-4 ; German East 
Africa, 314-5 ; Cameroons, 
320-4 ; Baghdad Railway, 

334-344- 
Stuart-Stephens, Maj. : 290 (•«.). 
Sturgis, Gen. : 44. 
Suakin-Berber Line : 199, 223-5. 
Supplies for Troops : War of 



Secession, 15-16, 46; "living 
on the country," 63, 64, 65 ; 
conditions in pre-railway davs, 
63-4 ; discipline, 64 ; road 
transport, 65 ; advantages of 
rail transport, 65-6 ; defective 
organisation, Austro-Prussian 
War, 105 ; new system for 
Germany, 107 ; Franco-Ger- 
man War, 110-113, 143-6; 
present French system, 164-6 ; 
general, 347-8. 

Surface Railroads in the Ameri- 
can Civil War : 210. 

Sudan, The: Early railway schemes, 
221 ; Wady Halfa-Sarras line, 
221 ; extension for expedition 
of 18S4, 221-2 ; abandon- 
ment, 222 ; results attained, 
223 ; Suakin-Berber line, 223- 
5 ; Nile Valley line, recon- 
structed and extended, 225—6 ; 
Nubian Desert line, 226-7 ; 
extension to Atbara, 228 ; 
Khartoum, 229 ; El Obeid, 
229 ; military results, 228 ; 
services to civilisation, 230-1 ; 
Germany and the Sudan, 321-2. 

Suv6roff : 62. 

Szlumper, Mr. G. S. : 197. 

Tactical Movements by Kail : 

Thiers, M. : 64. 
Thornhill, Mr. J. B. : 316. 
Thomas, Gen. G. H. : 89. 
TovEY, R.E., LiEUT.-CoL. : 354 («.). 
Town, Dr. F. L. : 90. 
Trans-Siberian Rly. Sec Russo- 
Japanese War. 
Transvaal, Germany and the : 

304. 305. 311. 327- 

Troop Movements by Rail : 
Early, 8 ; Italian campaign 
of 1859, 9-12 ; Civil War, 
23—5 ; quicker transport, 62 ; 
more complete numbers, 62-3 ; 
Danish War of 1S64, 104 ; 
Austro-Prussian War, 104 ; 
Franco-Prussian War, iif), 
139-140; Volunteer reviews 
and army manceu\Tes, 192, 
194 ; South African War, 193, 
245-6 ; Russo-Japanese War, 
269, 271 ; general, 345-6, 352-4. 

Turkey, Asiatic : Germany's 
Land of Promise, 331. 

Turkey : Germany's designs 
against, 331, 336-40. 



INDEX. 



405 



Unger, L. a. : 6. Weber, Ernst von : 297, 330. 

Weeks, G. E. : 37-8. 

Vickers, R.E., Capt. C. E. : 274. Wellington, Duke of : 65, 177. 

ViGO-RouissiLLON, M. : 36. Weltpolitik : 331, 342, 344, 356. 

Volunteer Corps in Great Wernekke, Regierungsrat : 8 . 

Britain ; 67, 178-9, 182, 191-2. Western and Atlantic Rly. : 34 . 

Westphalen, H. L. : 124. 

Walker, Lieut. Arthur : 69. Wethered, Col. E. R. : 70. 

Walker, Sir Herbert A. : 197. Wheeler, Gen. : 34. 

Walter, Maj. J. : 191-2. Willans, R.E., Lieut. : 211, 213. 

War Railway Council, The : Wilson, President : 330. 

187-9, 193, 196. WoLSELEY, Lord : 199, 222, 223. 

Waters, Col. W. H.H. : 274, 275. Wright, C.E., Mr. T. : 70. 
Watson, Col. Sir Charles, 228. 
Watson, Mr. P. H. : 72. 

Webber, R.E., Capt. C. E. : 35, Zavodovski System of Railway 

125, 126. Fittings : 94. 

Weber, Baron, M. M. von : 50-2. Zimmermann, Emil : 322-5. 



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A HISTORY OF INLAND TRANSPORT AND 
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I 

11 

III 

IV 

V 

VI 

VII 

VIII 

IX 

X 

XI 

XII 
XIII 
XIV 

XV 

XVI 



CHAP. 

Introductory XVII 

Britain's Earliest Roads XVIII 

Roads and the Church XIX 

Earuy Trading Conditions XX 

Early Road Legislation XXI 

Early Carriages XXII 

Loads, Wheels and Roads XXIII 

The Coaching Era XXIV 

The Age of Bad Roads XXV 

The Turnpike System XXVI 

Trade and Transport in the XXVII 

Turnpike Era XXVIII 

Scientific Road-making XXIX 
Rivers and River Transport 

River Improvement and Indus- XX.\ 

trial Expansion 

Disadvantages of River Naviga- X.XXI 

TION 

The Canal Era 

xii. + 532 pp. 6s. net. Postage 



The Industrial Revolution 
Evolution of the Railway 
The Railway Era 
Railway E.xpansio.v 
Railways and the State 
Decline of Canals 
Decline of Turnpikes 
End of the Coachi.ng Era 
Railway Rates and Charges 
The Railway System To-day 
What the Railways have Done 
Railways a National Industry 
Tramways, Motor-buses and 

Rail-less Electric Traction 
Cycles, Motor-vehicles and 

Tubes 
The Outlook 
.Authorities 
Index 
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